

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Roger S. Boyd, Assistant Director
for Reactor Projects, DRL
THRU: R. L. Tedesco, Chief, RPB #2, DRL

FROM : V. Stello & A. J. Rizzo ✓ *Stello* *Rizzo*
Division of Reactor Licensing

SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY - OYSTER CREEK - DOCKET NO. 50-219

DATE: May 15, 1967

A meeting was held on May 4 and 5, 1967 at Bethesda with representatives of General Electric and Jersey Central. In attendance were:

Jersey Central

J. V. Neely
G. F. Trowbridge
D. R. Rees
G. H. Ritter
D. E. Hetrick
T. J. McCluskey

Pickard & Lowe

W. W. Lowe
Burns & Roe
J. C. Archer
G. A. Lari

AEC

R. Tedesco, DRL
H. Specter, DRL
A. J. Rizzo, DRL
J. R. Sears, CO
B. Blumenthal, DRL
J. Buzy, DRL
V. Stello, DRL
N. Davison, DRL
I. Spickler, DRL

GE-APED

T. O. Brown
R. A. Huggins
W. Schultheis
E. M. Kratz
T. E. Bloom
R. V. Poe
W. L. Stiede
D. R. Miller
R. McWhorter

The meeting in general could not be characterized as a typical meeting with GE. Answers to our questions did not reflect the usual degree of confidence and assurance in the design areas with which we usually direct our review. We had previously submitted an agenda to Jersey Central covering the particular areas that would be discussed at the meeting. The following are specific areas wherein the response was deficient:

1. Design criterion for Class I equipment including containment penetrations: The response to this matter suggested that these portions of the plant were not analyzed (or designed). At this stage of the plant construction we find it difficult to accept. Further, it appeared as though the A&E firm responsible for the containment penetration design did not have clear understanding of the criteria to be followed.



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2. Response to detailed questions: The GE representatives were neither prepared to discuss design bases and capability (e.g., containment and pipe whiplash) nor familiar with the contents of the FD&SAR.
3. Plant operation and safety procedures: Many of the operating and safety procedures are still in the very early stages of preparation and are therefore not available for our review. Typical areas explored included surveillance and operator action following certain transients.
4. Review of analytical methods for accident and dose calculations related to site: Information contained in the FD&SAR is of marginal value since the degree of conservatism is questionable in our opinion. On this basis, our review will really start after we have received answers to many questions. Areas to be questioned include containment design, surveillance and testing, leak detection, rod worth minimizer, and radiological consequences of accidents.

Detailed areas discussed included the following:

1. Closure time and leak tightness of the main steam isolation valves are to be tested at the Tarapur plant. It is anticipated that this test program will be scheduled prior to issuance of an operating license for Oyster Creek. Alternative testing would be proposed should Tarapur operation be delayed.
2. Damage from missiles created due to a catastrophic failure of the turbine were discussed. Data from the study presented for Quad-Cities has been modified for the Oyster Creek Plant. We may have to bring in a consultant to review this analysis.
3. The rod worth minimizer (RWM) was discussed. GE claims that no credit was taken for the RWM in any of the accident analyses. We do not have a position in this regard, but clearly will have to arrive at one in the near future.
4. We will require considerable data on the model, calculational methods and assumptions used to predict the pressure transient within the containment following a design basis accident.

5. Our review of the emergency plans and safety procedures will have to be conducted on a working basis with the applicant.
6. We have not agreed on acceptable primary and secondary leakage testing programs or on the limits which these tests are to demonstrate. J.C. is proposing a 5% per day limit for the primary containment.
7. Methods used for the dose calculations are not conservative and warrant further review since we are now dealing with an operating plant.

At the conclusion of the meeting we discussed some of the problem areas with G. Ritter as outlined in the beginning of this memorandum. He also expressed concern over the manner in which questions were answered. He indicated that he would contact GE to register his concern.

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