

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-83-45

Facility: BSEP Unit 2

Event Date: April 8, 1983

During Unit 2 power operation on April 8, 1983, a routine channel check of reactor level instrumentation revealed that reactor level instrument 2-B21-N017D-1 showed a level indication of 194 inches. At the time, redundant instrumentation showed a level indication of 187 inches. 2-B21-N017D-1 supplies a reactor low level input to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) to initiate a reactor scram and a PCIS Group 2, 6, 7, and 8 signal at a reactor level of greater than or equal to 162.5 inches.

Initial investigation of this event revealed small leaks on the valve packing nut of the N017D-1 reference leg flow bypass valve. The leaks were suspected of allowing the instrument reference leg level to decrease and cause N017D-1 to sense a higher than actual reactor level. The leaks were eliminated, the reference leg was refilled to compensate for level decrease, and N017D-1, Rosemount Inc., Model No. 1152, was returned to service. In addition, during subsequent shutdown of Unit 2 on April 8, 1983, the N017D-1 reference and variable sensing leg tubing was flushed to ensure the tubing was clear of any possible crud accumulation which may have caused or contributed to the event.

Following the return of N017D-1 to service, further investigation of this event was conducted by plant Engineering with assistance from the plant I&C Maintenance group and from the General Electric Company. During this investigation, the equalizing valve between the reference and variable sensing legs of N017D-1 was checked for valve seat leakage which could have caused a level decrease in the instrument reference leg. The check of this equalizing valve revealed no valve seat leakage.

The reference leg tubing to N017D-1 was installed in July 1980, as part of a modification to install analog-type reactor level instrumentation on Unit 2. No other similar problems have occurred involving N017D-1 on Unit 2 since the April 8, 1983, back flush of the instrument's sensing leg tubing. It is concluded the event resulted from crud in the tubing which was in the tubing prior to installation of the involved modification. The investigation determined the crud problem was confined to instruments operating off the subject sensing leg tubing installed by the July 1980 modifications; therefore, no further action is required regarding this event.

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

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Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429
September 6, 1984

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP/84-1926


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30323

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-324
LICENSE NO. DPR-62
SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-83-45

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.9b of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 2, the enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted. The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and both are in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977.

Very truly yours,



C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/sdl/LETC4

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung
NRC Document Control Desk

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