DUKE POWER COMPANY P.O. BOX 33189

CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR 2RODUCTION

September 18, 1984

TELEPHONE (704) 373-4551

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. Denton:

License Condition 8 of Facility Operating License NPF-24 for Catawba Unit 1 requires that "... all provisions of the approved fire protection program as delineated in NUREG-0954 through SSER #3" shall be maintanined in effect. Our review of the Catawba SER and supplements identified a number of incorrect descriptions of the Catawba fire protection program. These items are identified on the attached pages.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucher 1 Mg

Hal B. Tucker

ROS:s1b

Attachment

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station

Mr. Robert Guild, Esq. Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412

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cc: Palmetto Alliance 2135½ Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29206

> Mr. Jesse L. Riley Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207

Catawba Nuclear Station Fire Protection Program SER Comments

Supplement 2

 Section 9.5.1.5, <u>General Plant Guidelines - Control of Combustible</u> <u>Material</u> - Page 9-2, paragraph 2. "The two 150 lb cylinders associated with the reactor coolant pump drain tanks are also seismically restrained."

<u>Comment</u> - The two 150 lb cylinders are located in the hydrogen storage shed in the plant yard. Excess flow valves are provided in discharge piping. An analysis has been conducted to assure that, in case of pipe rupture in the Auxiliary or Reactor Building, hydrogen concentration would be less than 2%. This information was provided by correspondence of April 25, 1984 to H. R. Denton from H. B. Tucker.

2) Section 9.5.4.1, <u>Emergency Diesel Engine Auxiliary Support Systems</u> (General) - Page 9-4, paragraph 1. "Subsequently, the applicant in telephone conversations with the Staff stated that the detectors were not seismically qualified."

<u>Comment</u> - Following the subject conversation, seismic qualification of detectors was reviewed. The review determined that carbon dioxide system detectors meet Catawba seismic qualifications.

Supplement 3

 Section 9.5.1.5 General Plant Guidelines <u>Building Design</u>, page 9-8, paragraph 2. Next to last sentence refers to "steel sleeve."

<u>Response</u>: (Editorial Comment) The steel sleeve is embedded in the wall but does not protrude beyond the surface of the wall.

 Section 9.5.1.5 General Plant Guidelines <u>Control of Combustibles</u>, page 9-10, paragraph 2 (last on page). Refers to hydrogen piping in Reactor Building.

<u>Response</u>: Hydrogen piping is also present in the Auxiliary Building. Analysis has confirmed that release due to a pipe failure would result in less than 2% concentration by volume.

 Section 9.5.1.7 Fire Detection and Suppression Fire Detection, page 9-13, paragraph 5. Sentence 5 states that valve position circuit will be functional.

<u>Response</u>: Since we are required to lock the subject valves open and inspect them on a monthly basis, we do not plan to test tamper switch circuit continuity. This is acceptable per Standard Review Plan 9.5-1. Section 9.5.1.7 Fire Detection and Suppression <u>Fire Protection</u> <u>Water Supply System</u>, page 9-14. Sentence 3 states that "applicant committed to install a one-hour fire rated wrap on the conduit and supports (emphasis added).

. . .

Response: Reference February 10, 1984 correspondence from H. B. Tucker to H. R. Denton, response to Item 7. We committed to wrap conduit but not supports. We do not consider potential for fire under the intake structure (i.e., in the lake) to be severe enough to result in damage to conduit supports.

5) Section 9.5.1.8 Fire Protection for Specific Plant Areas Other Plant Areas, page 9-16, paragraph 2, sentence 2. "... pump is separated from water (emphasis added) driver pump...".

Response: (Editorial Comment) Should be "motor driven pump".