

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Davis-Besse Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 4 6

PAGE (3)

1 OF 02

TITLE (4)
INOPERABLE FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION BETWEEN SERVICE WATER PUMP AND VALVE ROOMS.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																										
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)																								
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OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
POWER LEVEL (10) 094	20.402(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.406(b)	50.36(a)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(a)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
												X											

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Jan Stotz	AREA CODE: 419, NUMBER: 259-1500

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
B	MID	PIEN	Z9919						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 8, 1984 while a contractor was preparing to permanently seal a fire barrier penetration, a Q.C. inspector noted the temporary sealing was inadequate. The penetration was added to the firewatch that was established for the area. The penetration was packed with eleven inches of Kaowool and sealed, restoring the penetration to the design rating. The consequences of the deficient fire barrier are minimal. Fire detection and fire suppression systems are installed on both sides of the wall. There was no visible opening and the combustible loadings of the rooms is negligible.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YE..A	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Occurrence: On August 8, 1984 while a contractor was preparing to permanently seal a fire barrier penetration, a Quality Control inspector noted that the temporary sealing was inadequate. The penetration was created by the discharge pipe of the Cooling Tower Makeup Pump P116-1 passing through the wall, separating the service water pumps and valve rooms. The wall is twenty-four (24) inches thick. The penetration was found temporarily sealed with approximately four (4) inches of Kaowool on the pump room side but nothing on the valve room side. The standards call for at least eleven (11) inches of Kaowool in the wall. The gap around the pipe is one-half inch. This penetration was added to the list for Fire Watch Patrols already established in this area. The Fire Watch Patrol is required to satisfy the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10 whenever a fire barrier penetration is inoperable.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The penetration had been improperly temporarily sealed some time in the past. It had gone undetected until now because of the black rubber insulation applied to the pipe which butted up against the wall and covered the gap around it. The improper sealing could only be detected by pulling back the insulation and probing the penetration. The penetration had been identified as being temporarily sealed and was on a work list to be permanently sealed as part of FCR 81-054. This FCR added the backup service water pump and required the upgrading of some of the service water pump room walls.

Analysis of Occurrence: The consequences of the deficient fire barrier are minimal. There was no visible opening which could have caused a draft to occur during a fire. Fire suppression and fire detection systems are installed on both sides of the wall. The combustible loading in both rooms is negligible.

Corrective Action: The penetration was permanently sealed per Maintenance Procedure MP 1405.03 under Maintenance Work Order MWO 1-84-1611-00 with a total of eleven inches (5½" on each side) of Kaowool on August 8, 1984. The penetration was then caulked and inspected on August 13, 1984.

All penetrations in the wall were inspected and no additional discrepancies discovered. It should be noted that this penetration may have been temporarily sealed prior to enforcement of present guidelines for temporary and permanent sealing of barrier penetrations. The station now uses ST 5016.13, Visual Inspection of Penetrations of Fire Barriers and Negative Pressure Boundaries, to ensure proper sealing.

Failure Data: Previous reports of improperly sealed fire barrier penetrations were reported in NP 33-83-79 (LER 83-058)

Report No: NP-33-84-11

DVR No(s): 84-119



September 7, 1984

Log No. K84-1154
File: RR 2 (NP-33-84-11)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

LER No. NP-33-84-11
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: August 8, 1984

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report NP-33-84-11, which is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73, to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'SM Quanno'.

Stephen M. Quanno
Plant Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/bec

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator,
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

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