

January 30, 1996

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-IV-96-005

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region IV staff in Arlington, Texas on this date.

Facility

Wolf Creek Nuclear Oper. Corp.
Wolf Creek 1
Burlington, Kansas
Dockets: 50-482

Licensee Emergency Classification

X Notification of Unusual Event
Alert
Site Area Emergency
General Emergency
Not Applicable

Subject: WEATHER-RELATED NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT

On January 30, 1996, with the reactor at 98 percent power, operators began a controlled power shutdown because of decreasing circulating water level in the pump house bays. The decreasing levels occurred because of icing on the intake screens. The icing occurred as a result of the screen wash system spray in conjunction with near 0 degree F ambient temperature and locally high winds. At 3:37 a.m. (CST), the licensee manually scrammed the reactor from 80 percent power because a low-flow service water pump began to cavitate.

Following the manual scram, 5 control rods failed to fully insert. Rod F6 remained 18 steps out, Rods H2 and H8 remained 12 steps out, and Rods K6 and K10 remained 6 steps out by digital rod position indication (Note: Each step is 5/8 inch). Twenty minutes after the reactor trip, Control Rods F6, H8, and K10 rod bottom lights illuminated indicating the rods had fully inserted. Fifty-eight minutes following the scram, Control Rod H2 indicated fully inserted, and seventy-eight minutes following the scram Control Rod K6 indicated fully inserted.

Following the scram, the licensee emergency borated, as required, because all rods did not fully insert. The main steam isolation valves were manually fast closed due to the imminent loss of circulating water to the condenser. Subsequently, the licensee initiated decay heat cooling by feeding the steam generators with auxiliary feedwater and steaming through the atmospheric relief valves. The licensee is cooling down the reactor to hot shutdown.

Following the scram, reactor coolant iodine spiking was noted. The magnitude of the iodine spiking is believed to be consistent with the known 3-6 leaking fuel rods.

In addition, the licensee had declared the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable at 5:14 a.m. (CST), because of a packing leak. The 2 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are in service. Mechanics initiated repairs and expect the TDAFW to be available later today.

310020

9601310083 960130
PDR I&E
PNO-IV-96-005 PDR

IE34
0/1

At 8:46 a.m. (CST), the licensee declared an NOUE with the loss of the Essential Service Water (ESW) Train A due to icing. ESW Train B remains in service. The licensee dispatched maintenance personnel to place space heaters in the ESW pump house to reduce the icing. Also, the licensee will be replacing circulating water screen shear pins which broke as a result of the ice loading. Preparations are being made to place canopies over the traveling screens.

At 9:09 a.m. (CST), Region IV began monitoring plant conditions from its Incident Response Center. The Region IV resident inspector is onsite. To provide additional resident inspector backup and additional technical expertise, Region IV is also dispatching to the site another senior resident inspector and a region-based inspector.

The licensee reported that there are no adverse road conditions in the vicinity of the plant.

Region IV has informed the states of Kansas and Missouri and FEMA Region VII.

The licensee has issued one press release, when the NOUE was declared, and plans to update that release soon.

This information herein has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of 12 p.m. (CST).

Region IV has informed the EDO staff, AEOD, NRR and PA. A Commissioners' technical assistants briefing was conducted at 12:30 p.m. (CST).

Contact: Dale Powers
(817)860-8195

William Johnson
(817)860-8148