


LOUISIANA

POWER & LIGHT Waterford 3 SES/P. O. Box B/Killona, LA 70066

August 31, 1984

W3K84-2054
Q-3-A35.07.61

Mr. John T. Collins
Regional Administrator, Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012



REFERENCE: LP&L letter W3183-0068 dated March 1, 1983


Dear Mr. Collins:

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3
Docket No. 50-382
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 61
"Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing"
Amended Final Report

In accordance with the requirement (of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Amended Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 61, "Linear Crack in Stainless Steel Tubing."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

Soe 
T. F. Gerrets
Corporate Quality Assurance Manager

TFG:CNH:ESH

Attachment

cc: Director
Office of inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

IE-27
11

8409200510 840831
PDR ADOCK 05000382
S PDR

Mr. John T. Collins
August 31, 1984
W3K84-2054
Page 2

cc: Director
Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. E. L. Blake
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. W. M. Stevenson
Monroe & Lemann
1424 Whitney Building
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. A. Cross
7910 Woodmont Avenue
Suite 1200
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

AMENDED FINAL REPORT OF
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 61R1
"LINEAR CRACK IN STAINLESS STEEL TUBING"

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes defects in 1/2" diameter stainless steel tubing SA213 Type 316. This tubing has been installed in some instrumentation lines at Louisiana Power & Light Company Waterford No. 3. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION

Mercury Company of Norwood Incorporated discovered a 1 1/4 inch long defect (crack) which exhibited several branches during attempts to pressurize the line to instrument PT-RC-0173 for Hydrostatic Test M262 on the reactor vessel coolant instrument lines. This through wall defect was found in the 1/2" diameter stainless steel tubing material manufactured by Sandvik Corporation of Scranton, Pennsylvania.

The defective tube was sectioned and subjected to macroscopic and liquid penetrant examinations by Ebasco Services Incorporated. A second defect which did not penetrate the tube wall was found on the tube ID surface approximately 8 inches from the through wall defect. This defect and the through the wall defect appeared to be manufacturing related and because of the safety class of the material Sandvik's manufacturing personnel were informed of the problem.

1. The chemical analysis and metallurgical samples indicate that the material complies with the requirements of SA 213 Type 316 with respect to composition, ferrite content, nonmetallic inclusion content and distribution. The analysis also indicates that no mixing of material heats occurred.
2. The cause of the defects was localized overheating of the billet material prior to extrusion of the tube hollow. This localized overheating resulted in partial melting and cracking of the billet material. During subsequent extrusion and cold forming operations the defective area was elongated resulting in the defects found in the material installed at the site.
3. Defects such as the two (2) found in the Waterford 3 Instrumentation Tubing caused by hot metal tears usually are of sufficient depth and exhibit such characteristic abruptness and raggedness as to be detectable by eddy current testing. This through wall defect should have been detected during production by hydrostatic testing.

DESCRIPTION: (Continued)

4. The production documentation for Heat 466023 Work Order 41952, which contained the defective tube, showed no rejects for hydrostatic testing (2500 psi on 5/9/81) or eddy current testing (performed on 5/11/81). Due to these facts the tube material from the suspect heat and work order were not considered to have been adequately tested for integrity.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Tubing from Heat No. 466023 Work Order 41952 has been installed in the Reactor Coolant, Safety Injection, Emergency Diesel Generator System and other Safety Related systems in which ASME Section III is applicable. These systems include Class 1E instrument installations. Failure of a tube from this heat of material installed in a Class 1E instrument loop may result in an inability of the loop to perform its safety function. Therefore, corrective action described herein is required for safe operation and shut down of the plant.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Sandvik's metallurgical analysis of the defective material concluded that the defects were the result of a processing rather than a metallurgical composition problem and were localized in one (1) tube. An analysis and statistical review of the NDE failure rate at Sandvik's facilities was performed by Ebasco Quality Assurance and found to be acceptable.

A total of four thousand four hundred sixty one (4641) feet of tubing from heat number 466023 was received on site and issued to Mercury for use in safety related systems. Five hundred six (506) feet was hydrostatically tested to 1000 PSI or greater with no rejections. Mil Standard 105D "Sampling Procedure and Tables for Inspection by Attributes" was used as the basis for analysis of these results. Due to the application of the tubing in question, Table II B "Single Sampling Plans for Tightened Inspection" was selected to determine the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) achieved by the sample size. An AQL of .040 was obtained.

An AQL of .040 provides a very high degree of confidence that the 1/2" stainless steel Sandvik tube from heat 466023, installed in safety class systems meets the technical requirements, and is therefore acceptable as currently employed in the plant. Additional confidence is built by the fact that Sandvik tube in safety class systems not tested at 1000 PSI or greater, was tested at the appropriate hydrostatic test pressures for its intended application without any defects being observed.

Nonconformance Report W3-3919 was initiated to track, document, and control the disposition for corrective action. Corrective action is completed and all documentation for Nonconformance Report W3-3919 have been reviewed, and closed.

This report is submitted as the Final Report.