June 10, 1992

Docket No. 50-346

DISTRIBUTION Docket File PDIII-3 r/f JPartlow JZwolinski JHopkins OGC ACRS(10) JLombardo PMadden

NRC&Local PDRs TMurley/FMiraglia BBoger JHannon PKreutzer EJordan GGrant, EDO FOrr EGreeman, RIII

LICENSEE: TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

FACILITY: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MEETING HELD ON MAY 14, 1992 TO DISCUSS FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AT DAVIS-BESSE (TAC NOS. M82089 AND M60995)

On May 14, 1992, NRC staff members met at Rockviile, Maryland, with employees of Toledo Edison Company (TE) to discuss fire protection for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. A list of attendees is included as enclosure 1. The handout used at the meeting is included as enclosure 2.

Topics discussed included removal of detailed fire protection requirements from Technical Specifications (TS), testing of equipment by the alternate shutdown remote capability, circuit supervision, fire detection upgrade modification, an Appendix R exemption for the containment annulus, and a potential TS change relating to deenergization of DH-7A and DH-7B for normal plant operation.

During the discussion, the licensee stated that alternate shutdown transfer switch position is verified daily and there is no need for periodic testing of the transfer switches. The switches were functionally tested postinstallation and had one complete surveillance test performed, which took about 2 years. For equipment qualification purposes, the switches would be either changed out or evaluated for continued life on a 20-year basis. The NRC staff stated that the transfer switches should be tested. The NRC staff further stated that Generic Letter (GL) 81-12 requested that the transfer switches be included in TS and GL 88-12 states that the transfer switches should remain in TS. The licensee agreed to review the difficultly of testing the switches for future discussion of this issue.

The NRC staff had no substantive comments regarding the remaining topics.

Jon B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate 111-3 Division of Reactor Projects 111/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures: As stated cc w/enclosures: See next page *LA:PDIII-3 PKreutzer 6/9/92

*See Previous Concurrence D:PDI11-3 JHannon & 6 /10/92 NACE FILE CENTER COPY

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666

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Jon B. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures: As stated

cc w/enclosures: See next page Mr. Donald C. Shelton Toledo Edison Company

CC:

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Enclosure 1

ATTENDEES May 14, 1992

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NRC/PDIII-3
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NRC/SRXB
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TOLEDO EDISON

FIRE PROTECTION MEETING

MAY 14, 1992

TE/NRC FIRE PROTECTION MEETING AGENDA

- 1. INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW
- 2. FIRE PROTECTION TECH SPEC REMOVAL STATUS
- 3. CIRCUIT SUPERVISION
- 4. FIRE DETECTION UPGRADE MODIFICATION
- 5. CONTAINMENT ANNULUS EXEMPTION STATUS
- 6. DH-7A AND DH-7B PROPOSED TECH SPEC CHANGE

MOD 91-0046 MODIFICATION GOALS


- LICENSING COMMITMENTS
- ELIMINATE SPURIOUS ALARMS
- ELIMINATE EXTRANEOUS DETECTION ZONES
- SEPARATE FROM SECURITY SYSTEM
- SUPERSEDE EXISTING DETECTION MODS

MOD 91-0046 BASIC SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

- MICROPROCESSOR BASED
 COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
- ADDRESSABLE DETECTORS
- DEGRADED MODE OF OPERATION
- USE OF EXISTING WIRING


MOD 91-0046 BASIC SYSTEM SCOPE

- REPLACE 9 EXISTING PANELS
- REPLACE APPROX. 681 DETECTORS
- CONVERT APPROX. 26 PANELS TO JT/JB
- REDUCE TOTAL QUANTITY OF BELLS
- ELIMINATE EXTRANEOUS DETECTION ZONES
- REPLACE CONTROL ROOM CRT AND PRINTER




- · STYLE 7 WIRING (IN/OUT).
- 18 AWG TWISTED SHIELDED WIRE; 1 PAIR.
- COMMUNICATIONS IS IN ONE DIRECTION.
- 10,000 FEET BETWEEN NODES.

4120 NETWORK



SYSTEM CAN STILL OPERATE WITH A FAILED NODE.

4120 NETWORK




 WHEN THE LOOP HAS AN OPEN OR SHORTED LINE, THE SYSTEM WILL COMMUNICATE IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.


CENTERIOR ENERGY

18

4120 NETWORK DEGRADED OPERATION



 WHEN THE LOOP IS BROKEN OR WIRE TO WIRE SHORT AT TWO DIFFERENT LOCATIONS, EACH SECTION WILL COMMUNICATE TO THE NODES CONNECTED PROVIDING TWO DEGRADED LOOPS.



DH-7A AND DH-7B INTRODUCTION

. DH-7A AND DH-7B ARE BWST OUTLET ISOLATION VALVES

DH-7A AND DH-7B ARE INTERLOCKED WITH DH-9A AND DH-9B

AMENDMENT 36 (01/24/81) PERMITTED MANUAL ACTIONS

REMOVAL OF POWER TO DH-9A AND DH-9B

SHIFT COMPOSITION

DH-7A AND DH-7B ALTERNATIVES

- MAINTAIN PRESENT MANUAL ACTIONS.
- DE-ENERGIZE VALVES DH-7A AND DH-7B BY OPENING MOTOR OPERATED VALVE BREAKERS AT THEIR MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS (MCCs).

DH-7A AND DH-7B BASIS FOR ACCEPTABILITY

- BWST LOW LEVEL PERMISSIVE FOR PUMP SUCTION TRANSFER OCCURS IN EXCESS OF 30 MINUTES POST-LOCA.
- BREAKER LOCATIONS FOR VALVE OPERATORS ARE LOCATED IN RADIOLOGICALLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS POST-LOCA.
- WITH POWER REMOVED, VALVE POSITION INDICATION IN THE CONTROL ROOM WILL BE AVAILABLE (AFTER MODIFICATION).
- OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR CLOSING DH-7A AND DH-7B BREAKERS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR CLOSING DH-9A AND DH-9B.
 BREAKERS FOR DH-7B AND DH-9B ARE ON THE SAME MCCs.

DH-7A AND DH-7B ACCEPTABILITY (CONT.)

- EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WILL SPECIFY THESE MANUAL ACTIONS. OPERATORS WILL BE TRAINED ON THESE ACTIONS.
- NO OTHER REQUIRED MANUAL ACTIONS OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM DURING FIRST HOUR POST-LOCA.