

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): **Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2** DOCKET NUMBER (2): **05000397** PAGE (3): **1 OF 04**

TITLE (4): **Failure to Sample Standby Service Water**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
08	14	84	84	088	000	09	06	84			05000
											05000

OPERATING MODE (9): <b>2</b>	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10): <b>000</b>	20.402(b)	20.406(e)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(e)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)		
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(e)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)			
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)			
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)			
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: **R. L. Koenigs, Compliance Engineer** TELEPHONE NUMBER: **509 377-2501** AREA CODE: **509** Ext. **2279**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS
A	I L M P N		K O 2 0						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):  YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO  
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH: | DAY: | YEAR: |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 400 spaces - approximate - fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 08/14/84 it was determined that the Residual Heat Removal Standby Service Water Monitor Loop B (SW-SR-43) had been inoperable since 08/07/84 because of a leaking pump seal at the sample rack. Sampling as required by Technical Specification 3.3.7.11 was not being performed and was not fully implemented until 08/23/84. In this period of time, the plant made several start-ups, operated at a maximum of about 650 MWe, and stood in hot standby.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		8 4	- 0 8 8	- 0 0 0	2	OF	0 4

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Plant Mode - 2<  
b) Power Level - 0%\*

\*Conditions at time of discovery.

Event

On 08/14/84, a check of the process monitors found that the pump for the Standby Service Water (SW) Monitor Loop B (SW-SR-43) was not running. Therefore, there was no flow through the sample chamber. This is not an unusual condition because the sample pumps must be manually turned off when there is no flow through the standby service water loop to protect the pump seals. However upon further investigation, it was determined that the monitor had been declared inoperable by the Shift Manager on 08/07/84 because of a leaking pump seal. Due to misunderstandings and inadequate communications concerning the status of the monitoring and the Standby Service Water Systems, grab samples as required by Technical Specification 3.3.7.11 had not been taken from 08/07 through 08/14/84. Upon finding this conditions, HP/Chemistry was instructed to obtain samples as required.

Except for 08/11/84, there was flow through loop B of the Standby Service Water System for at least a short period of time each day from 08/07 to 08/14. The primary purpose of this monitor is to detect leaks in the RHR-HX-1B heat exchanger which could contaminate the standby service water. From 08/07/84 through 08/12/84, there was flow through RHR-HX-1B for approximately 18 hours. During this period of time, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System was operated for suppression pool cooling, suppression pool level control, and Technical Specification surveillance activity. At about 0420 on 08/13/84, RHR-HX-1B was started in the shutdown cooling mode. This mode of operation continued through about 0500 on 08/14/84. At this time the RHR-HX-1B was taken out of service and not returned to service until approximately 1640 on 08/18/84.

A followup investigation of the sampling program found that loop B of the SW System was taken out of service at about 1230 on 08/14/84 which was before HP/Chemistry had the opportunity to sample. Except for about 14 hours of operation for Technical Specification Surveillance testing, Loop B remained out of service until approximately 1630 on 08/18/84. A sample was obtained on 08/16/84 when the system was not in service.

On 08/18/84 at about 1630 the Standby Service Water System was placed in operation and continued to operate through at least 08/26/84. A sample was obtained on 08/18/84 after the Standby Service Water System was placed in service. Again because of misunderstandings and inadequate communication, there was no sample taken on 08/19/84, 08/20/84 and 08/21/84 and only one sample on 08/22/84. RHR-HX-1B, which had been removed from service at about 0500 on 08/14/84, was placed in service at about 1640 on 08/18/84. The RHR continued to operate in the suppression pool cooling mode, shutdown cooling mode or for suppression pool level control until about 0345 on 08/23/84. At about 0615 RHR-HX-1B was again placed in the shutdown cooling mode.

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		84	0818	010	03	OF 04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3054 (17))

On 08/23/84 the problems were resolved and the required samples were and continue to be obtained.

The misunderstandings arose because of several factors and involved control room operators as well as station and contractor HP/Chem Techs. Factors contributing to the misunderstanding are as follows:

- o The control room operators assumed that HP/Chemistry would sample the Standby Service Water until notified otherwise.
- o In some instances HP/Chemistry would check with the control room to find out if the RHR-HX-1B was in service. If it was not, it was assumed that no sample was required and that the control room would notify them if sampling was again required.
- o In some instances it was assumed that since the sample rack was turned off and tagged prohibiting operation, the RHR heat exchanger and the Standby Service Water loop was also inoperable.

Procedures were adequate. If the situation or actual Plant condition had been recognized and the Technical Specification correctly interpreted this event could not have occurred.

Immediate Corrective Action

A sampling program was initiated on 08/07/84 and again on 08/14/84. However, because of poor communications the Technical Specifications requirements were not always met until 08/23/84.

Further Corrective Action

The operational conditions which require sampling have been clarified and the HP/Chemistry personnel informed.

The need for control room operators to notify and communicate with the chemistry laboratory have been reinforced with operations management. Caution tags, requesting the control room operators to notify chemistry when the Standby Service Water is turned on or off, are in place.

Maintenance is currently replacing the faulty pump seal.

Presently, it is necessary to manually shut off the sample racks when the standby service water is not in service, otherwise the sample pump seal is damaged. A Plant Modification Request (PMR) to intertie the sample rack pump operation to the standby service water pump operation will be submitted.

A Technical Specification change will be made to clarify conditions under which sampling is required.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A's) (17)

Safety Significance

The Standby Service Water System is normally a closed loop circulating through the spray ponds. The samples that have been taken indicate that there was no release of radioactivity to this closed loop.

There are no safety consequences associated with this event since no evidence of leakage existed.

## Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397  
September 6, 1984


Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-088

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 84-088 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours,



J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 84-088

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V  
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC - Site (901A)  
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI  
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