ORIGINAL

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Agency:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Title:

Ohio Edison Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,

Unit 1, Facility Operating License No.

NPF-58); The Cleveland Electric Illuminating

Company, The Toledo Edison Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating

Docket No. License No. NFP-58)

50-440-A and 50-346-A (Suspension of Antitrust

Conditions); ASLBP No. 91-644-01A

LOCATION:

Bethesda, Maryland

DATE:

Wednesday, June 10, 1992

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
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2	NUCLEAR REGULA	ATORY COMMISSION	
3			
4	ATOMIC SAFETY AN	ND LICENSING BOARD	
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7	In the Matter of:	: Docket Nos. 50-440-A	
8	Ohio Edison Company	: 50-346-2	A
9	(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,	Abril 1	
10	Unit 1, Facility Operating	: (Suspension of	
11	License No. NPF-58)	: Antitrust Condition	s)
12			
13	The Cleveland Electric Illumi	nating:	
14	Company, The Toledo Edison Co	ompany : ASLBP No. 91-644-01-	Α
15	(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, U	nit 1 :	
16	Facility Operating License		
17	No. NPF-58		
18		x	
19		Nuclear Regulatory Commissi	on
20		Fifth Floor Hearing Room	
21		East-West Towers Building	
22		4350 Fast-West Highway	
23		Bethesda, Maryland	
24		Wednesday, June 10, 1992	
25			

1	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
2	argument on parties' summary disposition filings, pursuant
3	to notice, at 9:29 a.m.
4	Before:
5	The Honorable Marshall E. Miller, Chairman
6	The Honorable Charles Bechhoefer, Member
7	The Honorable G. Paul Bollwerk III, Member
8	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
9	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
10	Washington, D.C. 20555
11	
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13	
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15	Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., and Toledo Edison Co.:
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17	Department of Justice
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7	Joseph Rutberg, Esquire
8	Office of General Counsel
9	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
10	Washington, D.C. 20555
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PROCEEDINGS

[9:29 a.m.]

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JUDGE MILLER: The hearing will come to order, please. These facilities are new to me, but they seem to be convenient. I suppose that we will have an introductory identification by counsel both of themselves -- that's not a witness box, is it? It must be for multiple witnesses or something.

Anyhow, this hearing will convene subject to notice of hearing which was published in the Federal Register as 57 Federal Register 20,136.

Simply by way of background, I will note that the staff on May 1st, 1991 issued an order which also was published in the Federal Register which denied the applications previously made by Ohio Edison Company and others for license amendments that you are all familiar with.

We had a pre-hearing conference on October 7, 1991, and since then and pursuant to that order and the discussions that we had with counsel, with you ladies and gentlemen, there have been pending before the Board various motions, cross-motions, counter-motions, et cetera, et cetera, which we will ask you to identify for yourselves as we go around and identify counsel.

Identify for the record your own work product so

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	이 방문하다 하다 하는 것이 없는 것이 없다.
1	we'll know who's responsible for what motions, briefs,
2	points and authorities, points of light and whatever which
3	are now pending.
4	Essentially, there are two issues which are before
5	the Board as a matter of law by virtue of partial agreement
6	on identification of issues by counsel for the parties. The
7	first one which I will read into the record is the so-called
8	"bedrock" legal issue which was framed by counsel as
9	follows:
10	"Is the Commission without authority as a matter
11	of law under Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
12	42 U.S. Code Section 2135, to retain antitrust license
13	conditions if it finds that the actual cost of electricity
1.4	from the licensed nuclear power plant is higher than the
15	cost of electricity from alternative sources or as
16	appropriately measured and compared?"
17	That is the so-malled bedrock legal issue which
18	all of you will recognize.
19	In addition to that and a second matter, and
20	various of the parties have addressed the issue that was
21	raised by the City of Cleveland as to whether the licensee's
22	amendment request barred by four doctrines namely, res

judicata, collateral estoppel, laches, or law of the case

-- and those matters have been addressed by each of you,

too. Those were set up in the notice of hearing which I

23

24

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1 have identified.

Then there was a previous order picked up by reference actually which allocated the time for argument as follows. I'm assuming that it's still valid. If there have been any changes or requests, let me know, but I believe this would be still valid and governing. Applicants, 90 minutes, and a portion of that time could be reserved for rebuttal; NRC staff and Justice Dep rtment, 50 minutes; and other intervening parties, 40 minutes.

One counsel representing applicant Ohio Edison
Company and one counsel representing applicants Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Company and Toledo Edison Company may
present argument on behalf of applicants.

The Board prefers to hear argument from only one counsel for each of the other parties, and as you identify yourselves, please indicate for the record the name of the one counsel who will be addressing the Board this morning in that respect.

You will recall too that it was suggested that counsel for staff, Justice and intervenor should consult and arrive at an agreement concerning the division of the time allotted to the respective parties. We assume that you have done that and you may announce what your agreements are as you identify yourselves.

I think you know my name is Miller. Judge

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1	Bechhoefer to my right, Judge Bollwerk to my left are, of
2	course, known to all of you.
3	I'll ask now that counsel identify themselves, the
4	matters that I have alluded to and any of their associates
5	for the record, please. Let's see. We'll start with the
6	applicants.
7	MS. CHARNOFF: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My
8	name is Debbie Charnoff. I represent Ohio Edison. Sitting
9	to my right is Mr. Murphy from Squire, Sanders, who is
10	counsel for CEI and Toledo Edison. Collectively, we
11	represent the Applicants in this case.
12	We have filed two briefs that are relevant to the
13	issues pending. One is Applicant's motion for summary
14	disposition. The other is Applicant's reply to opposition
15	cross motions for summary disposition.
16	JUDGE MILLER: What were the dates of those, as
17	you go, please? I think the first one was January 6th, 1992
18	
19	MS. CHARNOFF: Correct.
20	JUDGE MILLER: and I think the second was May
21	7, 1992?
22	MS. CHARNOFF: That's correct.
23	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.
24	MS. CHARNOFF: With us today are a number of other
25	attorneys from our respective firms sitting behind us.

including my husband, Mr. Charnoff, from Shaw, Pittman, and
Mark Singley, who worked with us on the brief, as well as
Colleen Conry from Squire, Sanders. We also have Mary
O'Reilly here who is an attorney from Toledo -- from Toledo
Edison Company.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. Next.

us how you've allotted your time between the applicants, in terms of the 90 minutes -- how they decided to divide it up?MS. CHARNOFF: We have divided our time as follows: Mr. Murphy is going to take 20 minutes, and will be focused on what you've described, Chairman Miller, as the second legal issue. In addition, he may touch upon some of the other issues, particularly pertaining to the jurisdiction of other federal agencies in the anti-trust area, which is something on which he is much more expert than I.

I will take the balance of the time. What I would like to do with that 70 minutes is reserve 20 of it for purposes of rebuttal.

Bollwerk will be our timekeeper. We do have a clock here.

I think that the new podium also has a device where you can crank it up to alert yourselves. At any rate, we will be keeping time. If there should be anything unusual, we would take that into consideration. But, generally, the times, as

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1	set forth will be followed.
2	Anything further?
3	[No response.]
4	JUDGE MILLER: Next.
5	MR. MacGUINEAS: Good morning, Your Honor. My
6	name is D. Biard Mac Guineas. I'm with the law firm of
7	Volpe, Boskey and Lyons. We're here on behalf of the
8	limited Intervenor, Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc. We
9	have filed one relatively slim document, dated March 9,
10	1992, encaptioned Alabama Electric Cooperative's combined
11	cross-motion for summary disposition and response to
12	Applicant's motion for summary disposition.
13	It's my belief that I will take about 10 minutes
14	for my presentation.
15	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. Next.
16	MR. GOLDBERG: I am Rueben Goldberg. I represent
17	the City of Cleveland. Along with me today are Mr. Strother
18	and Ms. Brennan, of the firm, Goldberg, Fieldman and Letham,
19	P.C.
20	We filed two briefs. We filed originally a motion
21	for summary disposition of Intervenor, City of Cleveland,
22	Ohio, and answer in opposition to Applicant's motion for
23	summary disposition dated March 1992.
24	We have also filed a reply of City of Cleveland,
25	Ohio, to arguments of Applicants and NRC staff, with respect

to the issues of law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel and laches, and that's dated May 1992.

I have agreed with my colleagues, Mr. MacGuineas, and Mr. Straus, on a division of our 40 minutes. I have 20

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minutes and, as Mr. MacGuineas has told you, he has 10 minutes, and Mr. Straus has 10 minutes. We have also agreed that if I take less than 20 minutes, the time that I haven't used will accrue to Mr. Strauss, and what ! has left will accrue, additionally, to Mr. MacGuineas. And they've also generously told me that if I exceed my 20 minutes, they won't fault me.

JUDGE MILLER: That's fair.

MR. GOLDBERG: I think I've answered all of your questions, have I not?

"DGE MILLER: Yes, I believe you have, sir. I thank you, . Goldberg.

MR. STRAUS: I'm David Straus, of the law firm of Spiegel & McDiarmid. We represent American Municipal Power Ohio, Inc. We filed a brief of American Municipal Power Ohio, Inc., in opposition to Applicant's motion for summary disposition, and cross motion for summary disposition, dated March 9, 1992.

J'DGE MILLER: And you have 10 minutes more or less?

MR. STRAUS: It looks that way, doesn't it?

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1	JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Next.
2	MS. URBAN: I am Janet Urban, I am with the
3	Anti-Trust Division, United States Department of Justice. I
4	will be taking no more than 25 minutes of the 50 minutes.
5	My friends at the NRC can have whatever is leftover.
6	We filed one piece of paper response of the
7	Department of Justice to Applicant's motion for summary
8	disposition, and that's dated March 9th, 1992.
9	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.
10	MR. HOM: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Board
11	members. My name is Steve Hom, and I am counsel for the NRC
12	staff. With me today are also Sherwin Turk and Joseph
13	Rutberg.
14	We have filed two briefs. The first, dated March
15	9th, 1992, entitled NRC staff's answer, in opposition to
16	Applicant's motion for summary disposition and NRC staff's
17	cross-motion for summary disposition.
18	The second filing is dated May 7th, 1992 and is
19	entitled NRC staff's answer to the motion for summary
20	disposition of Intervenor, City of Cleveland, Ohio.
21	And, as Ms. Urban indicated, we will be taking
22	half of the 50 minutes alloted to the staff and the
23	Department of Justice.
24	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.
25	I believe that that covers all of the counsel of

1	record, as well as those who will be addressing the Board
2	today.
3	Anyone else that you wish to identify for the
4	record that hasn't been so identified hitherto?
5	[No response.]
6	JUDGE MILLER: Here's your chance. You've got fee
7	bills and all that kind of thing.
8	We will start off, then. I believe it will be
9	well, then, for the applicant, being the moving party in
10	this proceeding, having divided time as indicated, to lead
11	off.
12	So, Ms. Charnoff, I guess the podium is yours.
13	
14	ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS BY MS. CHARNOFF
15	
16	MS. CHARNOFF: Good morning, gentlemen.
17	We view this opportunity as primarily an
18	opportunity to answer any questions that you may have, but
19	we do today have some things we would like to say.
20	I think that the most important point that we want
21	to make or, at least, the point that we hope you will leave
22	here with is that the bedrock legal issue in this case
23	raises one rather straightforward issue of law, and that is
24	whether a high-cost nuclear power plant can create or
25	maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws.

1	We submit and we have demonstrated, we believe, in
2	our filings that logic, first and foremost, and essentially,
3	every available indicia that we could turn to led to only
4	one conclusion, the absence of a low-cost
5	facility or, to pool it another way, when a nuclear facility
6	is a high-cost facility, it simply cannot create or maintain
7	a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws.
8	The opposition has, in this case, endeavored to
9	make this, the bedrock legal issue, into something that it
10	is not or into a number of things, I should say, that it is
1.1	not, and we urge you to summarily reject these various
12	efforts.
1.3	First of all, we are not raising the so-called
14	nexus issue or issues, to be more precise which are
15	contained in a number of NRC cases, and let me review this
16	quickly with you.
17	We believe that, when you look at section 1 (c),
18	that there are three steps to analyzing the applicability of
19	that statute.
20	The first step is whether a facility creates or
21	maintains.
22	The second step is whether there is a situation
23	that will be created or maintained. This is sometimes

The third step is determining the proper remedy in

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called situational nexus.

the event you've answered the first two questions in the 2 affirmative. What is the proper scope of the remedy, and 3 that is sometimes called remedial nexus. The opposition, in their various filings, focus extensively on the competitive environment of various 5 applicants in various cases, the competitive situation, and 6 7 the conduct of the applicants in those situations. 8 All of this discussion goes to the issue of situational nexus. What is the situation out there in the 9 marketplace? Who is doing what to whom? That's not our 10 11 issue. Our issue is what we call the preliminary issue of 12 13 the incremental impact that a particular nuclear facility 14 will have, if any, on that situation. 15 Consequently, when the opposition refers to 16 language in the cases such as it's inappropriate to look at 17 the nuclear plant in isolation -- that's a Wolf Creek 18 statement; I believe it's ALAB 279, but it's from the Wolf 19 Creek decision -- that's really addressing a different question altogether. 20 21 That's addressing the narrowness, or the lack of 22 narrowness, if you will, of the situation that the agency 23 must look at in order to determine whether a nuclear

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facility's incremental impact will create or maintain that

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situation.

1	Thus, for example, there is a lot of language in
2	the cases about looking backwards and looking forwards,
3	looking to the past, the present, and the future.
4	All of this goes to figuring out what the
5	situation is, so that you can then assess what, if any,
6	incremental impact the nuclear facility has on that
7	situation.
8	In our case, for example, in the case of the Perry
9	and Davis-Besse facilities, the appeal board looked at the
10	prior conduct of the applicants, such as acquisitions of
11	municipal utilities, for example. That was part of their
12	look in order to define what the situation was.
13	I may be belaboring the point here, but I think
14	it's a very important point.
15	Once you define the situation, the issue
16	nevertheless remains whether the nuclear plant will, in some
17	way, contribute to that situation. That is the bedrock
18	legal issue. That is our issue. It is not nexus.
19	What is the bedrock legal issue. We have tried to
20	define it, or explain it, illustrate it, point to examples
21	of it in order to make clear what it is we are talking
22	about.
23	Our view is, in order for licensed activities to
24	"create or maintain" they must, in some affirmative way,

contribute to the owner's competitive situation, the owner's

25

1 competitive position in the marketplace.

As the Appeal Board said in Wolf Creek, "An agency must determine whether a facility can be used to the disadvantage of competitors." That is another way, I believe, of formulating the same point. Is the nuclear facility going to enhance the competitive position of its owners.

TUDGE BOLLWERK: Your point, I take it, is that the logic of all this is that unless it enhances the product owner's competitive position -- i.e., which higher electrical cost cannot do -- then the NRC has no authority, jurisdiction, however you want to put it, to have anything to do with the conditions that have been imposed in this instance.

MS. CHARNOFF: That is correct. I think, in the absence of a competitive advantage flowing from the use of nuclear power -- I am quoting now from Fermi, it is another rendition of the same point -- in the absence of that value, if you will, you are not creating or maintaining.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: There is a case called American Federation of Tobacco Groups versus Neal, which is cited by the Appeal Panel in the Davis-Besse Case, ALAB 560, 10 NRC 329, and, as I read that case, the language that is there, and the case in its entirety, that seems to indicate to me that, in fact, and we can look at it together, if you want,

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1	it says: The restraint of trade involving the elimination
2	of a competitor is to be deemed reasonable or unreasonable
3	on the basis of matters affecting the trade itself, not on
4	the relative cost of doing business.
5	What we are talking about here is a relative cost
6	of doing business, isn't it?
7	MS. CHARNOFF: I haven't looked back at that case.
8	Can you simply read the quote to me, again?
9	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I would be glad to.
10	Let me first put it in context, what was involved
11	here was a situation where a cooperative, a tobacco
12	cooperative was trying to buy time from an association to
13	put their tobacco on to the market, and the case makes clear
14	that in the absence of being able to buy that time, they
15	were basically shut out of th: market.
16	The association, which did not want to sell them
17	time, basically said, "They have lower costs in some
18	respects than we do. Therefore, we don't think we have to
19	provide them an opportunity to be involved in our market."
20	The court basically rejected that argument saying,
21	and maybe I will read a little bit more of this, "To say
22	that a board of trade whose members of monopolistic control
23	of the market may exclude an outsider who wishes to compete
24	therein merely because he has an advantage in taxes or
25	construction cost is to advance a proposition that has no

support in any decision with which we are familiar and none
has been cited in supporting it. Persons trading in and
controlling a market who have a heavy expense because they
operate in an expensive building would certainly not be
justified on that account in excluding from competition a
prospective competitor who is not burdened by such an
expense, but there would be just as much reason in this as
in permitting them to exclude him because his a warehouse or
factor was not subject to city costs and taxes."
This is the portion that is quoted in the Appeal
Board's decision in Davis-Besse, "A restraint of trade
involving the elimination of a competitor is to be deemed
reasonable or unreasonable on the basis of matters affecting
the trade itself, not on the relative costs of doing
business of the persons engaged in competition. One of the
great values of competition is that it encourages those who
compete to reduce costs and lower prices and, thus, pass on
the savings to the public. The bane of a monopoly is that
it perpetuates high cost and uneconomic practice at the
expense of the public."
This is a Sherman Act Section I Case, as I
understand it. Why doesn't that policy, which I understand
as "don't lock at the cost, look at the monopolistic
practices," have a great deal of application in this case?

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MS. CHARNOFF: Let me try to answer that in a

1 couple of different ways.

First of all, the hypothesis that somebody is shut out of the market suggests, in effect, that there are no alternatives. That is not the situation that we are dealing with here. Obviously, a nuclear power plant would not be high cost if it was not high cost relative to something else. So we are not talking about barriers to entry, to use, as I understand it, the anti-trust lingo here.

Secondly --

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Although, again, you have a situation, don't you, with the city of Cleveland, for instance, and this goes back to the Davis-Besse Case and the reason all of these conditions were imposed, where they are essentially hemmed in and, in the absence of the wheeling provisions that are here, they have no way to get power in, at least in terms of wheeling it unless they buy it from the applicant?

Is that not true?

MS. CHARNOFF: I don't know the answer to that. However, I don't think the answer to that answers the question that we are here to answer today, and let me explain why.

There is no doubt, and I don't know in what context this was raised in the Davis-Besse Case, but if it was raised in the context of determining whether the

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applicants had monopoly power, and the whole discussion of the competitive environment in that situation, we agree that a lot of traditional anti-trust analyses are used to assess what the competitive environment is, and what the relative positions are of competitors in that environment, but that is not the beginning and the ending point of analysis under 105(c). That is your standard anti-trust type of analysis, which then may lead to a conclusion that you need a standard sort of anti-trust remedy.

1.3

But Section 105(c) is not the same thing as that. Section 105(c) is concerned particularly with the impact of the nuclear facility on that environment, be it a monopolistic environment, or some other type of environment.

In Davis-Besse, there was no question but that the nuclear facilities were going to produce low cost power relative to available alternatives, and so we had already passed through the threshold of saying there was going to be —— if there was a "situation" inconsistent with the anti-trust laws out there, clearly those nuclear facilities were going to contribute in someway to that, so that the focus of the case was on the situation, if you will.

No matter how much you describe the situation, or the ways in which you describe it, and who has done what to whom, and who has shut out who, and I didn't pick up all the language that you cited, that is not determinative of the

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issue under Section 105(c). That tells you your situation, it doesn't answer the bedrock legal issue which is part of 2 the Section 105(c) analysis. JUDGE BOLLWERK: Doesn't the language seem to indicate, at least under the anti-trust laws, that cost is 5 not determinative, which is sort of, as I understand it, 6 7 your argument, at least here? 8 MS. CHARNOFF: Our argument is that cost is a necessary predicate. If you don't have a situation, cost 9 isn't going to do it either. You need more than one thing. 10 But in the absence of a nuclear plant that somehow 11 incrementally and adversely, from a competitive point of 12 view, impacts a situation, it doesn't matter what situation 13 14 is out there. One of the things we pointed to in our briefs is 15 the fact that in this industry virtually all licensees are 16 dominant in their service areas. If the only issue was 17 dominance, and monopolization, there would be no "whether 18 cause" -- what I call the whether clause, since the 105(c) 19 is phrased in terms of whether the licensed activities 20 create or maintain -- because it would be automatic, but 21 that is not the way the statute is written, and that is not 22 the intent of the statute. 23 24 To summarize our point here, we believe that the

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Step 1 analysis, which is the bedrock legal issue in this

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1	case, requires a determination that licensed activities
2	create or maintain. That in turn requires a showing that
3	licensed activities are competitively advantageous. In
4	order to be competitively advantageous, the licensed
5	facility must produce low-cost power.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let me question that for a
7	minute.
8	Are you saying that the just for an example now
9	are you saying that the environmental impact of the
10	nuclear plant is the same as the environment impact of a
11	similarly sized coal-powered facility?
12	MS. CHARNOFF: No, but I don't think that that
13	I have two different ways to answer that, Judge Bechhoefer.
14	Let me do so.
15	First of all, environmental costs, if you will,
16	are fed into the process or considered in the process in a
17	couple of different ways, in the NRC process. One is before
18	both applicants and the NRC decide to go with the nuclear
19	plant, they consider alternatives to the nuclear plant, and
20	one of the issues in deciding whether to build a nuclear
21	plant are not only the financial costs but the environmental
22	costs of the different choices that are made, of the
23	different possibilities that can occur.
24	Now, you can treat environmental as separate from

financial costs or you can put them together because the

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fact is environmental costs to a significant extent can be translated into financial costs -- how much will it cost to make something equivalent environmentally, so that process is fed in at the front end.

Once a decision is made to apply for a license, for example in our case, the cost that you are talking about, you have already passed through the hurdle of deciding that that is option that you want to exercise and I believe in the Section 105(c) analysis, first of all we are talking about competitive value, which is traditionally known as cost, and secondly, the decision by the consumer at that point to use or not use electricity is not governed by whether the particular electricity that is coming through to their home is environmentally -- has produced more or less environmental consequences, but the kind of cost that affects choices in the marketplace in the area of electricity is money.

In other words, someone will or will not be happy with their electricity bill because it costs more or less. There is no way because of the fungibility of electricity and essentially because they have already passed through the hurdle -- they may have opposed the construction of a nuclear plant because they didn't think it was as environmentally preferable, but once that plant goes into the system, people don't turn on and off their electricity

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1	depending on if they could figure it out, which it's not
2	possible to do whether it came from a nuclear plant or a
3	more environmentally preferable plant or less
4	environmentally preferable plant, depending on your vantage
5	point.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, I thought
7	MS. CHARNOFF: I don't think 105(c) that's a
8	long-winded answer to your question, but I don't think
9	105(c) is focused on costs other than financial costs and I
10	think that is the reason because it's concerned with
11	antitrust type impacts which are financial impacts.
12	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let me just read you a
13	statement now. This was a statement made in the hearings
14	leading up to the 105(c, It says
15	JUDGE MILLER: What page is that?
16	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I am reading now from page 436.
17	JUDGE MILLER: Page 436.
18	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I am not sure that is a
19	meaningful page for anybody else.
20	MS. CHARNOFF: This is the legislative history?
21	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes, this is from the hearing.
22	This is a statement by William R. Gould, who is a
23	Senior Vice President of Southern California Edison Company.
24	He says, "For our system nuclear plants do not
25	have a cost advantage on a mils per kilowatt hour basis over

1	fossil fuel units. Our company is now committed to build
2	only nuclear units for major generation resources in the
3	California south coastal basin, not because of an economic
4	advantage but because air pollution control considerations
5	dictate that after 1975" and this was about 1969 or -70,
6	1970 I guess "under existing air pollution control
7	regulations, large fossil fuel generating units may not be
8	built in this coastal basis."
9	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes.
10	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Now doesn't that contradict
11	something that you just said?
12	MS. CHARNOFF: No, I don't think so at all. Let
13	me try to explain why.
14	I am familiar with that, and let me tell you how I
15	view that.
16	The issue for any company including Mr. Gould's is
17	what are the options. Are there options, are there
18	alternatives and what are they?
19	Our thesis is that in order to create or maintain
20	a nuclear plant must be lower cost than available
21	alternatives. If a type of power plant is unavailable for
22	whatever reason, including the fact that it's environmental
23	impacts are too great, it's not part of our hypothesis.
24	That is no longer an alternative, so I think that the
25	environmental issue does determine which options are

1	available and in that sense which plants you are comparing
2	your nuclear plant to for purposes of deciding whether it is
3	higher cost or not. In other words, our phase two, what we
4	put off into phase two here is what is the cost of the
5	nuclear facility and what do you compare it to.
6	You have to compare it to available alternatives
7	and I would say that in that situation, if nuclear is the
8	lowest cost compared to available alternatives, which from
9	his discussion appears to exclude coal plants
10	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's correct.
11	MS. CHARNOFF: then nuclear may well be the
12	most competitively advantageous.
13	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But then let me ask you, this
14	is one of the ingredients that went into the legislative
15	history of Section 105(c). Congress had this before it when
16	it passed the provision that you are now saying depends I
17	guess solely on low cost.
18	I'm saying doesn't that doesn't this type of
19	material, and I have a slew of others here, which I will get
20	to sometime during the day, doesn't this indicate that
21	Congress might have been thinking of something other than
22	cost?
23	MS. CHARNOFF: I don't think so and this is what I
24	want to convince you of.

I think that that issue, the issue of other types

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1	of costs, may well be an issue before the NRC and it may in
2	fact have contributed to when those issues are considered in
3	the NRC licensing process. I do not believe it is a
4	consideration under Section 105(c). As we described,
5	clearly options that are not available are options that you
6	cor't compare anything with under Section 105(c).
7	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But if there are no options, no
8	viable options available, aren't the antitrust conditions
9	even more useful? I mean, doesn't an
10	MS. CHARNOFF: I would agree
11	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: an operator of a plant in
12	such an area have every opportunity to be inconsistent with
13	the antitrust laws heaven forbid I should use "violate."
14	MS. CHARNOFF: I would agree that if there were no
15	available alternatives for whatever reason including for
16	example environmental costs, but it might not only be
17	environmental costs there might be other reasons then
18	nuclear power is not going to be higher cost relative to
19	alternatives because there are no alternatives. In fact, no
20	matter how high priced it is, it may well be the lowest cost
21	available because it is the only one available.
22	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Therefore, cost is irrelevant,
23	and if it's irrelevant in that situation, why isn't it
24	irrelevant generally?

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MS. CHARNOFF: It's not irrelevant generally

1	because
2	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Or it's a factor, but it's I
3	shouldn't say irrelevant, but it doesn't have central
4	relevance as you are asserting.
5	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, it has central relevance
6	because of the fundamental we believe it's a truism that
	if you have two things that are exactly the same and one
8	costs more than the other, people will buy the cheaper one.
9	If you only have one, people will pay whatever they have to
10	get it.
11	JUDGE BOLLWERK: People will buy the cheaper one
12	if they can get it, but if there's a monopoly there that
13	says you're going to buy it at our cost, they will have to
14	buy it at the monopoly cost. Isn't that correct?
15	MS. CHARNOFF: They will buy the cheaper one if
16	they can get it. That's correct.
17	JUDGE BOLLWERK: But if there's a monopoly there
18	saying you will buy it at this cost, that's what the
1.	antitrust laws are all about.
20	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes, but if your commodity is more
21	expensive, they don't want it whether they can get it or
22	not. It doesn't matter whether they are blocked from
23	getting it. If I have an expensive whatever you want, a
24	widget, I mean, whatever object you want to talk about, it
25	doesn't matter whether people are blocked from getting it or

1	not.
2	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Well
3	MS. CHARNOFF: The issue under 105(c) is access t
4	nuclear power. If nobody wants the power because it's high
5	cost, it really doesn't matter for purposes of 105(c).
6	Now, I'm not going to say it's irrelevant
7	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Oh, I see. Somebody is clearly
8	buying the power from your facility, and you are saying it
9	has high cost, and I don't hear you saying that you are in
10	bankruptcy. You have a situation where you have high cost
11	and yet somebody is buying it. So I guess I don't
12	understand.
13	I mean, the theory, if you take yours to its
1.4	logical conclusion, you all would be bankrupt by now. Is
15	that
16	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I wish I could the answer
17	to that is complicated because of how power is used on the
18	system. Once you have invested the money in the facility
19	and it's baseload power, as I understand it, and I'm not a
20	rate person or, you know, I'm not sure I can answer this in
21	the detail that would be appropriate, but you're still
22	better off using that power than using plants which are

peaking plants, for example, where the costs to run nonstop

are higher. So I don't think it's -- I don't think the

answer is as you've described.

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1	But I think the fact of the matter is that if the
2	commodity is not competitively advantageous in some way,
3	which either means there's something unique about it, and
4	when you have a product like electricity that's fungible,
5	electricity from one plant is no more unique than
6	electricity from another
7	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Although transmission facilities
8	may be unique, which is something that goes into this mix,
9	doesn't it?
10	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, we do think that the NRC and
11	the NRC cases consider as a part of the package, if you
12	will, the transmission that goes along with the whole
13	project, but if you read the cases, there just isn't any
14	question that the reason they do that is because of the
15	issue of access to nuclear power.
16	Now, when you are describing the situation, again
17	going to a different issue than the issue we're talking
18	about, then you get into the whole world of what is the
19	entire position, including transmission, of a utility
20	company. But that's not the determinative issue under what
21	I've labelled Step 1, whether the licensed activities create
22	or maintain.
23	Judge Bechhoefer, I don't know if I've answered
24	your question.
25	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, I'm not sure that you

1 have, but --

2 MS. CHARNOFF: Let me just say something once 3 again and then I'll move on.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let's put it this way. I'm not sure you can view environmental affairs, for instance, or factors as a precondition, that you get out of the way before you get into anything else.

I think environmental factors -- there's always an applicant that will submit an environmental report and it will always say that it's preferable to alternatives and it may or may not be, but presumably it is. I mean, environmental statements say that it's no worse at least; different, but no worse. But are there not enough situations, then -- could you build a big coal fire plant in the middle of the City of Cleveland, or even out where your facilities are --

MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I think the environmental --JUDGE BECHHOEFER: -- from an EPA standpoint?

MS. CHARNOFF: Right. I think environmental considerations all along the way of the licensing process affect the choices that are made and the choices that are not made. But I think that whatever choices are made are what you compare the nuclear plant to, and, conversely, if a choice is not made or cannot be made for whatever reason, it's not an alternative. That means by definition it is not

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1	a viable alternative.
2	There are some well,
3	JUDGE MILLER: Go ahead. Continue your
4	argument.MS. CHARNOFF: I will move on.
5	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Go ahead. I may have some more
6	questions along this line later.
7	MS. CHARNOFF: There are a series of issues, legal
8	and factual, which the opposition makes which, in addition
9	to the nexus issues which I've endeavored to distinguish
10	from our issue, are also not issues that our issue raises,
11	and I think there's sort of an effort to muddy the waters
12	here by suggesting that our issue raises a lot of other
13	concerns that it does not.
14	The first one of these is, I believe, an issue
15	raised by AMP-Ohio, which is that applicants are somehow
16	asking you to re-write the statute or to otherwise do
17	something beyond your statutory authority.
18	This is a mischaracterization of our request.
19	What we are saying is that we believe Section 105(c) means
20	something in particular, and we are asking you to consider
21	whether it does or does not mean that. We believe that you
22	are particularly that this Agency and this Board as well
23	is exactly the type of tribunal that is supposed to consider
24	that kind of issue in the first instance, and that we're not

asking you to do anything other than that. We're not asking

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for a different statute. We believe the statute as written means what we're now saying it means.

Similarly, or on a slightly different bent of the same type of argument, the Department of Justice argues that all we're doing here is asking the Agency to exercise remedial authority, or remedial discretion is, I think, their expression, and to ask the Agency to somehow define itself as losing authority it once had doesn't make any sense.

I don't think either of those characterizations are fair characterizations, again, of what we're trying to do here. This is not a discretionary issue. The statute either means something or it doesn't mean something, and if it means one thing, we believe the outcome goes one way; if it means something else, the outcome's another. If in fact to create or maintain, licensed activities must be high cost -- must be low cost -- excuse me -- then that leads to one outcome. It's not an issue of discretion here; it's an issue of statutory interpretation.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Do you consider it a jurisdictional manner? We find that this Board -- assuming we were to agree with you and find that high cost has to be a finding within the statute, in order for the NRC to exercise its authority, is that a matter or the Agency's jurisdiction?

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1	MS. CHARNOFF: I think so. We've debated this.
2	We danced on the head of the pin within our own the
3	Applicants have, on that point. But, I don't believe
4	Saction 105(c) gives the NRC authority to impose license
5	conditions on its licensees, in the absence of a facility
6	that creates or maintains a situation inconsistent with the
7	anti-trust laws.
8	JUDGE MILLER: So, it would be jurisdictional?
9	MS. CHARNOFF: So in that sense, I do believe it
10	would be jurisdictional.
11	JUDGE MILLER: If there were an application
12	pending before the Board or before NRC for the first time,
13	would your position then be that 105(c) and 105(c)(5) should
14	be interpreted as you are urging it.
15	MS. CHARNOFF: Absolutely.
16	JUDGE MILLER: And, therefore, would not only be
17	an issue, and possibly a jurisdictional issue, but it's one
18	that the parties would all be required to address?
19	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes.
1.00	JUDGE BOLLWERK: So, they cannot waive it, in
21	other words or waive it by failing to raise it?
22	JUDGE MILLER: Jurisdiction.
23	JUDGE BOLLWERK: In other words, you can come in
24	any time in the proceeding and say, as a matter of
25	jurisdiction we've gone along, but now we've come up with

1	this issue. You have no jurisdiction here, therefore,
2	you're out. I mean, normally, jurisdictional issues, if
3	they're true jurisdictional issues, cannot be waived.
4	MS. CHARNOFF: Right. And this is subject matter
5	jurisdiction.
6	JUDGE BOLLWERK: So, you're saying it cannot be
7	waived?
8	MS. CHARNOFF: I don't believe so.
9	JUDGE MILLER: It cannot ever be waived.
10	MS. CHARNOFF: No, I don't believe so. The
11	reason, as we've said repeatedly in our briefs, the reason
12	this didn't come up is because the plants were all
13	anticipated to be low-cost. So, everyone just moved right
14	past the issue. It simply wasn't a
15	JUDGE MILLER: Suppose everybody was wrong or they
16	become more informed with the passage of time and change of
17	circumstances in that case that you are now arguing,
18	whatever the reason. If it is jurisdictional, in the sense
19	that there must be a certain issue, or low cost, addressed
20	and resolved whether rightly or wrongly by the NRC, then
21	isn't that a matter which could not be waived and which
22	would be both present, if there were an initial application
23	now. And you're reaching back into the history of this
24	thing where there was something that was not addressed
25	for whatever reasons, including assumptions, nonetheless was

1	overlooked. Isn't that your argument?
2	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, we believe yes. I mean, I
3	think that the legal issue, as resolved, for example, by
4	this Board, then would need to be applied in other cases. I
5	mean, you still have this what we put off to Phase II,
6	which is whether a particular facility, in fact, is low-cost
7	or high-cost, relative to alternatives. And that's a
8	different question the answer to that is is, I'm quite
9	sure going to be different in different situations.
10	JUDGE MILLER: That may well be. I am going to
1	give you some time out here, because I am getting things
12	that are beyond your present argument. But, nevertheless,
13	wouldn't that have the effect or the result of a widespread
14	pandemonium in the nuclear industry, when there are all
15	sorts of attitudes currently in different parts of the
16	country and so forth, as to the viability or desirability of
17	nuclear power?
18	If this were to be followed to its logical
19	conclusion as a jurisdictional matter, then wouldn't that
20	throw into serious question nuclear licensing, insofar as
21	there were anti-trust implications throughout the country?
22	MS. CHARNOFF: I hesitate to buy into that
23	characterization, because I don't think the sort of
24	pandemonium aspect that you've described is, in fact, what's

going to happen. This is something that we've talked about

25

1	in our reply brief, and I will just tough upon here, which
2	is that, contrary to some of the opposition's
3	characterizations that if you do this the sky will fall, the
4	sort of chicken little type of description
5	JUDGE MILLER: No. The chicken big.
6	MS. CHARNOFF: Chicken big. I don't see that as
7	realistic in any way, shape or form. And there there are
8	a variety of reasons for that, depending on what you're
9	talking about here. First of all, contrary to certain
10	descriptions by our oppositions, applicants cannot
11	unilaterally go in and do whatever they want with respect
12	to, for example, Wheeling. We can talk you know, that's
13	a good example to pick.
14	They simply don't have the ability to do that.
15	And, so you don't even have to reach the question of whether
16	they might want to or all this stuff the Justice Department
17	says out our incentive we're going to have more of an
18	incentive because we are less competitive, we somehow
19	have more of an incentive, and therefore, the anti-trust
20	laws ought to apply more severely to the underdog than to
21	the competitively advantage the person who is situated
22	advantageously. I think that's counter-intuitive.
23	JUDGE MILLER: That is what?
24	MS. CHARNOFF: I said counter-intuitive.
25	Illogical may be a simpler way to put it.

1	JUDGE MILLER: Oh, I see.
2	MS. CHARNOFF: The
3	JUDGE MILLER: It's not disingenuous is it? I
4	notice at least three times, and this goes back here is
5	it worse to be ingenuous, naive and so forth, or
6	disingenuous? I've never been able to decide where it
7	falls.
8	MS. CHARNOFF: I would say it depends on how
9	deliberate you are.
10	JUDGE MILLER: I guess.
11	MS. CHARNOFF: But there are other agencies, and
12	this is not something that I want to go into in great depth.
13	My co-counsel here may be able to do a better job of it.
14	But there is no question that, for example, we applicant's
15	have tariffs filed with FERC. We can't just ignore those
16	tariffs. We cannot unilaterally change those tariffs. We
17	have to go into FERC and get their approval of whatever
19	change we want to make and we ? ve to justify that change.
19	And FFRC is interested in the competitive impact of the
20	changes that we make.
21	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Given FERC's interest in this
22	matter, I mean, are we here sort of cleaning this up as a
23	legal matter, so then you can go to FERC? Why don't you go
24	to FERC first, get the willing provision, then come back to
25	us? Then the anti-trust provisions that are in the

1	licensing theory have some meaning. Right now it sounds to
2	me like what you're saying is that FERC is the one
3	despite what the NRC's provisions may be, FERC is the one
4	that really is controlling this matter.
5	MS. CHARNOFF: No, I don't follow that, Judge
6	Bollwerk. We have conditions binding us in both agencies.
7	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Right.
8	MS CHARNOFF: We're trying to disentangle
9	ourselves from this agency, and then we will deal with FERC
10	on FERC's terms, which do include consideration of the
11	issues that, for example, Judge Miller was worried about.
12	Are we going to be in a state of pandemonium here? My
13	answer is no, because there are lots of other people who
14	worry about these things, and worry about them in the
15	context of the entire industry.
16	The NRC's jurisdiction is very focused, as I've
17	said before, on the incremental impact of the nuclear
18	facility.
19	JUDGE BOLLWERK: So, the next stop is FERC then,
20	assuming you went here?
21	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, if we want to change those
22	conditions, we would have to go to FERC. I don't want to
23	suggest that the only issue here is Wheeling. I mean, there
24	are other obligations we have. For example, our client,
25	Ohio Edison, has explained to us all of the reserve capacity

	the state of the s
1	and what not that we have to maintain under these
2	conditions. And the standards for FERC on that issue might
3	be different.
4	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I guess my concern is, I mean, I
5	don't want this Board obviously doesn't sit here to rule
6	and this is
7	an interesting legal question. But, I guess I m
8	find out what the practical impact is. If your
9	that even if we remove all the license
10	with the NRC, the FERC is still standing there.
11	peccmes sort of academic, doesn't it?
12	MS CHARNOFF: No. We don't believe it is
	First of all, we do think it makes a difference
13	to a company how many agencies they're dealing with it.
14	That transmits to a money issue.
15	secondly, as I said, there are a lot of
16	not just the Wheeling. And, on the Wheeling
17	we don't know the outcome, to tell you the truth.
18	whether we would go to FERC; and B, II we
19	go to FERC what the outcome would be. What I want to assure
20	you here is that we can't unilaterally do that.
21	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, you could unilaterally
22	
23	start the process by going to FERC. MS. CHARNOFF: Yes. We can unilaterally seek to
24	do it, but we cannot accomplish it, not unless we want to
25	do it, but we cannot accompation

1	break the law.
2	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Is there any reason we should
3	wait until you go to FERC and sort of have these two things
4	proceed in tandem?
5	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I don't think what FERC will
6	or will not do has any bearing on what the NRC's authority
7	is or is not. So, my answer to that is no.
8	JUDGE MILLER: Give her some more time.
9	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would you have the NRC staff,
10	yearly, go and look at your cost to see, well, should these
11	conditions be reimposed or should there be applicable
12	conditions? Do you think that type of regimen is
13	contemplated by the statute, as written?
14	MS. CHARNOFF: You're describing, Judge
15	Bechhoefer, what I proverbially call the yo-yo effect, which
16	is an argument made, I believe, primarily by the NRC staff,
17	and again, I think this is a red herring.
18	Unfortunately for those companies who have built
19	and invested enormously in nuclear power, we don't have a
20	yo-yo effect.
21	We have nuclear power costs which are much higher
22	than those anticipated and which we can now pinpoint,
23	because certainly, the construction costs on operating
24	plants are fixed, and the operating costs are quite
25	reasonably ascertainable.

1	The only real variable in this type of analysis,
2	as far as I can tell, when I look at it, is the possibility,
3	which I think is very remote, that alternative sources of
4	power, their cost, might change in some unanticipated way.
5	If, suddenly, coal power the cost of coal
6	doubled or something like that, that's the type of
7	circumstance which I think would prompt a reevaluation under
8	105(c).
9	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What if coal were unavailable
10	due to the circumstances that were raised earlier?
11	MS. CHARNOFF: Exactly the same analysis. I think
12	that would prompt the same analysis if that meant that there
13	were no alternatives that were lower cost.
14	If the lower-cost alternative that was available
15	was coal and coal became unavailable, then you would be in a
16	different situation, but that's, frankly, why we fashioned
17	our license amendment request as a suspension, because we
18	could not remove entirely the possibility, however remote,
19	that alternatives would become so high cost that, no matter
20	how high cost the nuclear, it would still be lower than the
21	alternatives.
22	But that is not a realistic picture of the
23	marketplace. It simply is not, and so, you can throw this
24	out again as a Chicken Little type of a thing, that you're

worried, every year, people are going to have to come in and

25

1	reevaluate, because our costs go up and down.
2	Relative to alternatives, our costs do not go up
3	and down. Our costs are higher, and perhaps the most
4	telling indication of that is people like AMP-O don't want
5	to buy nuclear power, and that's because they have better
6	alternatives from a cost point of view.
7	JUDGE MILLER: Is that relevant, really?
8	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I just think that it
9	illustrates the point that we're saying. If nuclear power
10	was competitively advantageous, it would be desireable.
11	It's not. It's not desireable, and it's not desireable
12	because it costs more.
13	JUDGE MILLER: In interpreting the statute, you
14	don't need to go to Adam Smith, do you?
15	I guess my question is what you're asking, what
1.6	anyone in this argument is asking NRC to do is to either
17	reinterpret the statute or interpret it in such a way that
18	it has never been interpreted, although there have been more
19	than one anti-trust hearings within the supposed
20	jurisdiction of NRC and the 105(c) aspects of the Atomic
21	Energy Act.
22	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I would say, first of all
23	you said reinterpret or interpret I forget your exact
24	phrase.

25

JUDGE MILLER: Since your theory applies to either

1	20 years ago or now or in the future it's an all-purpose
2	theory
3	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes.
4	JUDGE MILLER: I guess it doesn't much matter.
5	I mean this is a tablet of stone, isn't it, that you are
6	telling us what it means, and you may surprise people, but
7	if you're correct, then it has all sorts of implications,
8	repercussions, and the like.
9	MS. CHARNOFF: That's right, and in fact, in our
10	brief, Judge Miller, we endeavored to show, for example,
11	that, as I said when I started speaking earlier, all
12	available indicators, indicia, suggest that this is what
13	everybody had in mind.
14	While it is true that the cases that are the
15	and let me set Fermi aside for a second, because Fermi is
16	different. This is not true with respect to Fermi.
17	But in the other traditional, if you will, NRC
18	anti-trust cases, the low-cost factor was built into the
19	analysis. To us, that's very consistent with our theory
20	that it's a necessary predicate to reaching the other issues
21	that are involved in 105(c).
22	JUDGE MILLER: Well, if I understand you, the fact
23	that everybody thought they didn't have to bring it up or
24	you could assume that this was a predicate and so forth,
25	both in the hearings and in the statute and what NRC did 20

1	or 25 years ago, I guess it's like the Constitution.
2	It may have been drafted, except for the first 10
3	amendments, in 1787. When you seek to analyze the
4	Constitution and to apply its principles in light of the
5	present environment, if you wish, of the government, are you
6	starting from scratch?
7	Is it something that the founding fathers
8	overlooked, and they should have said privacy and various
9	things of that kind that the Supreme Court may have
10	interpreted or found in there
11	MS. CHARNOFF: I would not use the word
12	"overlook," but I would use the expression "didn't focus"
13	particularly upon. It wasn't a controversial issue.
14	JUDGE MILLER: It was something they couldn't
15	focus on, like the airplane.
16	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, to some degree I don't
17	know if, analytically, they couldn't, but there is certainly
18	no need to.
19	There is absolutely no need to, because it was
20	understood, it was represented repeatedly, and the going-in
21	proposition why would people build nuclear plants, after
22	all, if they weren't competitively advantageous?
23	JUDGE MILLER: Somebody might have \$2 billion to
24	spend and say, gee, I'd just like to have a cooling tower
25	and a nuclear plant. I guess there's all kinds of reasons.

1	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Or they might if that's the only
2	way that they can get base-load power.) the environmental
3	considerations are such, that's the only kind of plant they
4	can build.
5	MS. CHARNOFF: But again, if that's true, then
6	it's still the most competitively advantageous.
7	JUDGE BOLLWERK: But it's not because of cost, and
8	that's what you're here telling us.
9	MS. CHARNOFF: It is because of cost, because it's
10	because, regardless of the cost, it's the only alternative.
11	The only way cost becomes, as you put it, irrelevant is when
12	there is no other option.
13	If it is the only baseload alternative, and there
14	is no other baseload alternative and, therefore, if you want
15	baseload, you take that whatever it costs.
16	If there are two, three, four alternatives, and
17	they all cost a different amount, you are going to want the
18	cheapest one.
19	JUDGE BOLLWERK: But the fact that this baseload
20	lower, which is only available through a highly costly
21	method, but is the only one because of environmental
22	considerations, that has nothing to do then with the
23	anti-trust laws.
24	MS. CHARNOFF: If it is the only one available,

then the bedrock legal issue remains the same. That is, I

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would answer the bedrock issue affirmatively, yes, that it requires a low cost facility relative to alternatives to create or maintain.

But if the facility costs a zillion dollars, it is still low cost relative to alternatives because there are no alternatives. It is the lowest option in existence, the lowest cost option in existence, as the only option in existence.

While the bedrock legal issue is answered in the same way, Phase II, if you will, comes out differently. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that it may cost a lot of money, you still are subject to anti-trust conditions because it is the lowest cost available however high cost it may be. It becomes a factual issue. It doesn't change the answer to the bedrock legal question.

JUDGE BECHHCEFER: I am not sure about this method of analysis. Are you saying that the anti-trust review provisions were put there only because of low economic cost, or are you talking about low other kinds of cost, because usually the environmental review is separate and apart from the anti-trust review.

There is some of this legislative history -- I
went over one thing earlier -- there are maybe a dozen
segments of these hearings which reference matters such as
environmental cost as a reason for putting in the anti-trust

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1 review provisions.

MS. CHARNOFF: No, I don't believe those are a reason for putting in. This is where I will disagree with you. I think that the environmental costs are very relevant to the consideration of whether there are alternatives, and what those alternatives are.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let me read you --

MS. CHARNOFF: I don't think that they are relevant to the consideration of whether a facility creates or maintains a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I am just looking for something here. There was a series of statements by a Mr. Charles Robinson, who is Staff Counsel for the General Manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, and he made this statement -- he made a couple of them, and I will read both of them.

It says: They are presuming the relative economics or the necessity to reduce atmospheric sulfur and nitrogen-oxides, or both, will establish nuclear generation as our principal source of electricity in the future. The small system must be afforded some means to enforce such participation or purchase in the event that other sources of equivalent wholesale energy are unavailable.

MS. CHARNOFF: Yes.

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1	JUDGE BECHNOEFER: Later on he says: II nuclear
2	energy is going to be the principal source of generation in
3	the future, as it appears to be for either economic reasons
4	or reasons of the need to prevent air pollution, this is
5	going to be the principal source of generation. Then we
6	want to be able to participate in it to whatever small
7	degree we can. In order to do that, we are going to have to
8	buy into a large plant because large plants are the only
9	economical kind of plant, or we are going to have to be
1.0	allowed to purchase a portion of the output of these plants
11	at cost.
12	That essentially is all we are seeking, a way of
13	enforcing this right. That was in favor of the anti-trust
14	review.
15	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes.
16	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That was a statement in favor
17	of the anti-trust review.
18	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes, I am familiar with these Judge
19	Bechhoefer.
20	Again, let me say that there are factors beyond
21	cost which determine what your options are in building.
22	Assume a company needs a baseload plant, they have to pick
23	what type of plant to use, and one of the factors is clearly
24	environmental.
25	If the environmental costs are so enormous that

1	that is not an option, it is not alternative, what 105(c)
2	does is asks you to compare nuclear with other viable
3	options, which means other options that are environmentally
4	acceptable because if it is environmentally unacceptable, it
5	is not an option.
6	The 105(c) analysis focuses on the monetary cost
7	and, therefore, the competitive value, the competitive
8	impact of the different alternatives.
9	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: As I say, these statements
10	which were in favor of 105(c) and which were one of the
11	predicates for 105(c) say that social costs, environmental
12	costs, are one of the reasons that section was put in the
13	statute.
14	MS. CHARNOFF: I am not disagreeing with that.
15	This is why I am struggling with you. I am not disagreeing
16	with the fact that there are many reasons why nuclear is
1.7	picked in the first instance, but before you are going to
18	put license conditions on it under 105(c), it has to be
19	competitively advantageous. That means it has to create or
20	maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws.
21	To that, we submit, it has to be low cost. The
22	environmental issue is not part of that 105(c) analysis.
23	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: As I say, the environmental
24	statements were part of the reason for 105(c) coming into

being. These were all statements made --

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1	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes, I am familiar with those
2	statements, but I don't think they are inconsistent with
3	what I am saying, and this is where I am struggling with
4	you.
5	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: They are advocating 105(c) to
6	take care of these problems.
7	MS. CHARNOFF: Let me take the situation the other
8	way. If you assume that a plant has a very high
9	environmental cost, it is not going to make it more or less
10	competitive if it is permitted to be built.
11	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I guess I don't understand what a
12	high environmental cost is?
13	JUDGE MILLER: Would you like to have a short
14	recess for all of us?
15	MS. CHARNOFF: I would appreciate it very much.
16	JUDGE MILLER: Let's take fifteen minutes, please.
17	[Brief recess.]
18	JUDGE MILLER: The hearing will resume, please.
19	Mrs. Charnoff, I think the Board Judge Bollwerk
20	may have one or two more questions. Then I think we're
21	going to give you an additional 10 minutes in order to cover
22	the balance of your planned argument, and then we'll proceed
23	on.
24	So, you may have the floor.
25	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I guess, in your reply brief, in

1	footnote 105, on page 45, you note that most of the
2	statements that we're talking about in the legislative
3	history were made by witnesses, not by committee members,
4	and I guess the statements that you do cite, at least in the
5	brief, made by members of Congress are really in the form of
6	questions, more or less. I'm not mischaracterizing what you
7	said, I take it.
8	MS. CHARNOFF: No. I think that's correct.
9	JUDGE BOLLWERK: All right.
10	Also, on pages 41 to 44 of your reply brief, you
11	indicate that there is nothing in the joint committee report
12	regarding the low cost of nuclear power. It's really an
13	analytical document, and it doesn't really discuss the
14	matter that you're raising. Am I mischaracterizing your
15	position in that regard?
16	MS. CHARNOFF: I say there is nothing expressed.
17	I don't know if I want to say there is nothing in, because I
18	think the reference in the joint committee report to
19	licensed activities creating or maintaining and they do
20	restate, virtually verbatim, the 105(c) standard.
21	One could argue that that's a recognition of cost,
22	and in that
23	JUDGE BOLLWERK: But there is nothing explicit
24	that says low-cost.

MS. CHARNOFF: No.

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	JUDGE BOLLWERK: All Fight.
2	Let me then ask you a question about and I
3	recognize you don't have this case in front of you, but I
4	will try to describe it as fully as I can.
5	There is a Supreme Court case called Kelly versus
6	Robinson. It's found at 479 U.S. 36, and specifically, on
7	page 50, I want to talk about footnote 13, and this is
8	background.
9	The question in that case was whether, under
10	Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code, an obligation to make
11	restitution imposed in a state criminal case as a condition
12	of probation was discharged by filing for bankruptcy.
13	It's a bankruptcy case, but what the Court was
14	involved in was looking at the legislative history of the
15	bankruptcy code to see if, in fact, this was the case, and
16	they found that they, in fact, did not find the legislative
17	history persuasive, and they made this statement.
18	"We acknowledge that a few comments in the
19	hearings and the bankruptcy law's commission report may
20	suggest that the languages bears the interpretation adopted
21	by the Second Circuit," and I would note that that is not
22	the interpretation they, in fact, agreed with in the end.
23	Then the Court goes on to say that, "None of
24	those"

MS. CHARNOFF: I'm sorry. Could you repeat your

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7	
2	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I'm sorry.
3	The Court says, "We acknowledge that a few
4	comments in the hearings and the bankruptcy law's commission
5	report may suggest that the language bears the
6	interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit."
7	This is the interpretation that, eventually, they
8	do not adopt; they disagree with.
9	MS. CHARNOFF: Who is the "they" when you say
10	"they did not adopt"?
11	JUDGE BOLLWERK: The Supreme Court.
12	MS. CHARNOFF: Okay.
13	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Sorry.
14	Then the Court goes on to say, "But none of those
15	statements was made by a member of Congress, nor were they
16	included in the official Senate and House reports. We
17	decline to accord any significance to these statements."
18	In light of that statement by the Supreme Court,
19	basically saying that hearing statements, if they're not
20	made by a member of Congress or are not somehow incorporated
21	into the Senate and House reports, have no significance,
22	what significance should we give to any of these statements
23	that have been cited?
24	MS. CHARNOFF: I wouldn't say "have no
25	significance." I would say that they are not necessarily

1 dispositive, and let me go through this a little bit. 2 First of all, when I was going back and preparing 3 a little bit for this oral argument, I noticed a statement in Wolf Creek which I, frankly, had missed before then, and 5 in Wolf Creek, the oppeal board makes the point that they view the joint committee report as addressing 105(c) in 6 7 several ways. Beyond the issue of the standard of whether you 8 have to have actual violations of the anti-trust laws or 9 10 not, they saw two points being raised by the language "licensed activities that create or maintain a situation 11 12 inconsistent with the anti-trust laws." Those two points 13 are these. 14 One, we're talking about the activities of -- the licensed activities of the licensee. We're not talking 15 about vendors, for example. That was their first point. 16 17 The second point they made is really very close, 18 in words, to the way we have phrased it over and over again, namely that you're talking about the licensed activities, 19 20 per se, the contribution of the nuclear power plant, per se. 21 Again, we're not talking about -- that doesn't say cost, but you get into this guestion of what is that 22 23 contribution, what does that mean to say it contributes to the situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws? 24

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So, I am qualifying slightly the statements we

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1	have made in our briefs that there is nothing in the joint
2	committee report.
3	The word "cost" is clearly not in there, and that
4	doesn't change, but as I understand the appeal board's
5	decision in Wolf Creek, they have interpreted the reference
6	to the 105(c) language as an acknowledgement of the focus of
7	licensed activities during what I call step one of the
8	105(c) analysis.
9	Now, I think, when you look at legislative
10	history, to go to the point, Judge Bollwerk, that you've
11	raised, I would wager to say you can find cases that use
12	legislative history every which way.
13	As I understand the rules for the use of
14	legislative history, if you go to a statute and you're
15	absolutely convinced, on the face of the statute, there is
16	only one possible interpretation, you need not go any
17	further.
18	That doesn't mean you can go any further, but you
19	need not go any further.
20	Then you go to legislative history. Obviously,
21	there is somewhat of a pecking order in legislative history
22	If you have absolutely dispositive statements by
23	the people who voted on the legislation, you look at that
24	before you look at other things. If you don't have that,
25	you move on, and this is essentially what we did in our

1	analysis.
2	I really was troubled, frankly, by, particularly,
3	the NRC staff's short shrift paid to the legislative history
4	Department of Justice, also in their effort to, in my
5	view, incorrectly characterize the legislative history,
6	because we think that, in contrast to your statement you
7	said that the Supreme Court, in your case, said there were a
8	few comments on the point in issue.
9	We don't just have a few comments, and I don't
10	think that's a fair characterization of the record at all.
11	I think, repeatedly, over and over, throughout the
12	legislative history, there is not information inconsistent
13	with that in the legislative history.
14	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I think the Supreme Court's point
15	here, if I'm reading it correctly, is, to the degree that
16	these statements were not made by members of Congress nor
17	included in the official Senate and House reports, that they
18	don't get any significance.
19	It's not a question of being there. It's a
20	question of who said them.
21	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I think that their point is
22	that they're not bound by them, not that they have no
23	significance.
24	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Why should we bound by them if
25	the Supreme Court doesn't feel it's bound?

1	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, we haven't argued that the
2	legislative we have not argued and I have tried to be
3	very clear on this that the legislative history controls.
4	What we've argued is that we believe logic
5	controls and that everything else available supports, is
6	consistent with the position that we are advocating.
7	We don't think that, because these statements were
8	made in the legislative history, that determines the
9	outcome, but certainly, we do think that, when you try to
10	sort of test our theory against all available evidence, that
11	evidence is fully consistent with our theory and, in fact,
12	inconsistent with the opposition's theory in the case.
13	JUDGE BOLLWERK: All right.
14	Why don't we give you 10 minutes to wrap up?
15	MS. CHARNOFF: Okay. I may not need that long.
16	We'll see.
17	JUDGE BOLLWERK: That's fine.
18	JUDGE MILLER: Then you'll give it over to your
19	colleague or your quasi-colleague.
20	MS. CHARNOFF: I would like to make one point, if
21	I could, before I go to the series of points that I had
22	prepared, for Judge Bechhoefer's benefit, I hope, and that
23	is, at the risk of repeating myself ad nauseam, I'd like to
24	say one thing, which is that, when you're talking about
25	environmental expenses the cost of adding scrubbers to a

1	coal plant, the cost of building a containment over a
2	nuclear power plant, or to look at it another way, the
3	environmental consequences of not doing those kinds of
4	things we account for those by actual dollar costs.
5	I alluded to this earlier, when I first addressed
6	the subject with you, that there are ways to translate
7	environmental issues into dollars by eliminating an
8	environmental problem through some sort of technological
9	technology will remove the problem and that technology costs
10	a certain amount of money.
11	So, a lot of environmental issues get translated
12	into costs of different options.
13	The situation that you pose is a hypothetical one
14	which, I should add, is not applicable in our situation at
15	all, where there are absolutely no alternatives, and the
16	reason you pose is environmental.
17	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would EPA allow a large
18	coal-fired plant to be constructed these days in the heart
19	of Cleveland, for instance?
20	MS. CHARNOFF: I would assume not in the heart of
21	Cleveland, but I would not assume that there would be no
22	coal option as a viable alternative. I mean we are
23	operating coal plants. So, clearly, coal is a viable

The analysis required by 105(c), not by the whole

option.

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1	Atomic Energy Act there are a lot of other provisions
2	which deal with a lot of other things, but what 105(c) is
3	focused on is the competitive advantage of nuclear versus
4	other alternatives, and that, we believe, is a cost
5	analysis.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would this be true if the
7	environmental costs were determined to be lower but other
8	costs are higher and the utility for one reason or another
9	elected to go not with maybe the lowest overall cost but
10	with the lowest
11	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes. I think the 105(c) analysis
12	would still only focus on the dollars. You don't get a
13	credit dollar-wise because you are environmentally
14	preferable or however you want to translate it. Whether you
15	are preferable or less preferable, I don't think that that's
16	considered in the in the 105(c) context. I don't want to
17	tell you nobody cares about it, which is the sense I have
18	that you're worried about. That's not the case.
19	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, what I'm worried about is
20	that the people who would testify with respect to 105(c)
21	mention the environmental differences and
22	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes, but they mention that
23	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: as a predicate for 105(c).
24	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, they mention it as leading to

their conclusion that nuclear is the most -- is the best

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alternative including the lowest cost alternative, dollar
cost, because there may have been an alternative out there
that they would have had to spend less on, but they couldn't
-- it's not available as a real option.

I think I should move on. I'm afraid I'm reperting myself.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, the only thing is if we get to the second part of the case, if we should agree with you on the law and we get to the second part, are we going to have to re-analyze the entire environmental position of Perry and Davis-Besse?

MS. CHARNOFF: No, because I think that if there is -- if there are five alternatives, each one has a dollar cost and that dollar cost already has built into it the environmental differences between them or among them.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Again, if there are five a sernatives, unless nuclear is the lowest, then we don't get an antitrust at all. In other words, let's say nuclear is the middle one rather than the highest one; are we into the antitrust laws, or is it only if it's the very lowest?

JUDGE MILLER: Well, the bedrock issue: Is the Commission without authority as a matter of law to retain, and so forth. So I think you could wrap up this phase and quickly move ahead unless you feel you've had the opportunity to cover all the points that you had planned in

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1	your initial address. You did save time, as I recall, for
2	rebuttal.
3	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Right. I would like an answer to
4	my question.
5	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, the answer is the bedrock
6	issue is in terms of whether it's higher. So I would say
7	
8	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Well, my question is let's say
9	it's higher than some but not than others; are we into
10	antitrust considerations or not?
11	MS. CHARNOFF: I don't think we are.
12	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Why not?
13	MS. CHARNOFF: Because I don't think
14	[Pause.]
15	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, frankly, I'll tell you, I
16	haven't thought about this because the facts in our case are
17	such that there are no alternatives, unfortunately, that are
18	or that there are lower cost alternatives available,
19	which is why people are not using the nuclear power.
20	Whether there may also be out there higher cost, I don't
21	think is relevant.
22	I mean, maybe somebody could build some plant that
23	we haven't even thought of yet which costs a trillion
24	dollars. That will not make our plant more competitive;
25	it'll just mean that they can't possibly sell power from

1	their plant.
2	So I think you could create a hypothetical where
3	there's a plant out there that's exorbitant which is also
4	not competitive. Its exorbitancy and lack of
5	competitiveness will not make ours more competitive.
6	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I mean, you can make up a
7	hypothetical. You've got coal, oil and nuclear. Let's say
8	coal's the lowest, nuclear is in the middle, and oil is
9	higher, and let's say that the increments between them are
10	not very great, but that nonetheless that's the way it comes
11	out.
12	MS. CHARNOFF: I don't think you're going to get a
13	competitive advantage in terms of being able to create or
14	maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws if
15	there are alternative baseload power available which is
16	cheaper. I just I don't see logically how you can
17	achieve that.
18	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Okay. You've got about three
19	minutes.
20	MS. CHARNOFF: Okay.
21	JUDGE BOLLWERK: This is the timekeeper; I'll let
22	you know that.
23	MS. CHARNOFF: I am going to go to my closing
24	remarks because I think we have, one way or the other,
25	covered most of the subjects I was going to cover.

As much as we've all, I'm sure, on our own danced a bit on the head of a pin with this case, I really like to think of this as a rather straightforward question, which is why I started this oral argument saying this is the issue, period, whether a low cost plant -- whether a high cost plant can create or maintain.

NRC to impose antitrust conditions on a licensee whose nuclear facility produces high cost power. While the world and the licensees may have anticipated that it would produce low cost power, not only are the licensees now possessors of facilities that are not competitively advantageous, but they are also subject to license conditions which other entities who don't happen to have a nuclear plant are not subject to. It's certainly not an incentive for getting into the nuclear business.

Because it makes no sense as a matter of logic and because we don't believe that was the original intention -- when you go to the legislative history and you go to the NRC cases and you go to representations made by the staff and the Department of Justice, we pointed to some DOJ advice letters, every indication that we could think of to look at, in our view, suggests that the issue under 105(c) was access to low cost nuclear power. That is no longer an issue because nuclear power is high and nobody wants access. So

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the purpose that these conditions served is no longer being served, and therefore it makes no sense to continue to impose them.

We don't believe that the relief we seek here is different in kind from a type of relief that the NRC rather automatically gives in very different context. That is, when the agency, either by rule or case-by-case basis, decides that its requirements don't make any sense anymore, it changes the requirements. I think that an agency has to do that in order for its actions to be meaningful, and that's what we're saying here.

We do not believe this is a radical idea. We do believe it is a different context. We do not believe it is a radical issue. Our answer to the bedrock legal issue is yes, because Section 105(c) does not give the NRC authority to impost anti-trust conditions on licensed activities that do not "create or maintain." If a high-cost facility does not create or maintain, there simply is no basis for posing conditions. That's our case.

Thank you gentlemen.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.

Mr. Murphy, I believe you're next. And I believe that you have allocated to yourself 20 minutes; is that correct, sir?

MR. MURPHY: Yes, sir. That's correct.

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JUDGE MILLER: You may proceed.

ORAL APGUMENT ON BEHALF OT THE APPLICANTS, BY MR. MURPHY

MR. MURPHY: Thank you. Good morning. My name is James Murphy, and along with Ms. Charnoff, I represent the applicants in this proceeding. I appreciate the opportunity to address you this morning.

I would like to try to put my client's position before you in as concrete a way as possible. Let me try to explain the current situation that we perceive ourselves to be in.

We have several nuclear power plants, Davis-Besse and Perry. Those plants today, and for a considerable time in the past, at least since the time of these applications, has produced electricity, a fungible commodity, at substantial, higher costs than alternatives available to our competitors and what the alternative cost would have be had the companies instead constructed fossil fuel plants. At least in the area of Northern Ohio and Central Ohio, there are indeed alternatives available to our competitors at considerably lower costs than the costs of nuclear plants that we have in operation.

Our position in this case is that, given that situation -- that present situation, and one that we think

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has persisted and will persist, is the license activity, that is the operation of the nuclear plant, and can that activity create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws? We think that when the situation is explained in the concrete, it answers a number of questions. We think, as Ms. Charnoff has argued, that it answers the fundamental -- I think I first used the word, unfortunately -- the bedrock issue. 10 JUDGE MILLER: Yez. You're the one that got that started. 11 12 JUDGE BOLLWERK: We won't hold that against you. MR. MURPHY: I have beaten myself numerous times. 13 14 But we think that it's answered yes. But we also think, and what I will try to address quickly, and then I'd like to 15 touch on some of the other very interesting questions that 16 you gentlemen asked today -- we think it also answers the 17 issues raised by the City of Cleveland: The collateral 18 estoppel, laches, and law of the case arguments. 19 What we are here asking for is relief, suspension 20 of the anti-trust license conditions, because of the current 21 situation, based on actual history. We do not perceive how 22 it can be argued persuasively that that issue was raised or, 23 indeed could have been raised during the 1970's, when the 24

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license hearings took place. Similarly, we do not perceive

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1	how we can be accused of laches when we brought these
2	applications in around the time Perry became fully
3	operational. But, perhaps more importantly, I would argue
4	to the panel that, in order to have laches, there has to be
5	reasonable reliance. And, as the NRC staff pointed out in
6.	its brief, to say that laches could apply in this situation
7.	would be, in effect, to say that a jurisdictional lapse at
8	the NRC, because of the situation we perceive, could
9	nonetheless, result in a continuation of the license
10	conditions. We don't perceive that to be the case at all.
11	Finally, with respect to law of the case, we
12	believe this is a separate proceeding. We do not believe
13	there is a law of the case. Indeed, one of the things I
14	find so enjoyable about this matter, in its entirety, is it
15	as the NRC staff said in one of its briefs, it raises
16	issues on the frontier of law and policy. We do not
17	perceive that there is any law of the case at all.
18	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are you casting aspersions on
19	our pre-hearing conference order?
20	MR. MURPHY: No. Indeed, I love the pre-hearing
21	conference order in that respect. I mean, I thought in
22	fact oh, I see what you mean. Yes. Yes. Somewhere in
23	my notes in this argument, I have wanted to say that the law
24	of the case is that this is a separate proceeding, and that
25	the City's argument, in that respect, is incorrect. I think

-- I don't want to be too facetious, but, indeed, I think that is true. I think it was an accurate statement in the pre-hearing order.

And it seems to me that that issue, as well as the collateral estoppel and laches issues, are not meritorious and should be rejected by the panel. And, consequently, we would encourage the panel to move on to the substantive issue raised by the bedrock issue.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Do you agree that the substantive issue is jurisdictional, as Ms. Charnoff has indicated that that's her position?

MR. MURPHY: Yes. I'm always afraid of that word for exactly the reason you raised -- and that is this idea that it can be raised at anytime, and as soon as it's raised, you know, everything sor: of falls apart.

I would put it a little differently. I'm not sure it's different in how it plays out. I would say that if we're able to prove what we believe to be true about the actual situation, that the Commission would be without continued statutory authority to maintain the license conditions. And so, I mean, if there is a difference in nuance here, it is, I guess, along the lines of if we want relief, we have to bring an independent proceeding asking for suspension of the license conditions.

And so, I wouldn't state at the moment that our

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nuclear cost became higher than alternative costs, this Commission was without jurisdiction, the l'cense conditions became invalid or anything of that sort. To me it obviously requires the filing of an application such as we did, a hearing on the facts, to determine whether, in fact, the actual costs are higher than the alternative and if, indeed, there are alternatives. And if those questions are answered in the affirmative, we believe the Commission would be without statutory authority to continue the license --JUDGE BOLLWERK: Well, is it an issue you can waive? In other words, if you don't raise it, it's waived? MR. MURPHY: Well, I think it's waived to the extent that if you don't file -- if we don't file an application on --JUDGE BOLLWERK: Let me put it this way, you file an application, as you did back in the late '70s, early '80s -- late '70s, I quess, and you simply -- it's not raised until let's say three-quarters of the way through the adjudicatory proceeding; is this the sort of issue that you can come in at any point, let's say there's a proceeding ongoing, and say, oh, by the way, you had no jurisdiction? 22 Because as -- because, we have a high-cost facility? 23 MR. MURPHY: I would be inclined to say no to that. I mean, I think -- we have -- I mean, I guess, at

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least, as I perceive what we are about is that we have an

obligation to raise this issue -- the issue that I'm talking about -- let me put it in a little different context.

The issue I'm talking about is, based on the actual operating history, we believe that the cost of the nuclear plant are higher than alternatives, and, therefore, that plant, that licensed activity cannot create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws. It doesn't give us any economic power. In fact, it is a detriment in the competitive fight.

At least, to my clients, this is as plain as it the nose on my face. But, obviously, the other side disagrees with me.

To get back to your point, we may find that that actual operating history as such, we would have the obligation to come forward and file a petition. Whether ten years ago we could have -- I don't perceive how we could have done what we are doing now. I mean at least as I perceive what we are doing now is we are coming before you gentlemen based on our actual operating costs. We are not coming here on a hypothetical situation at all.

In fact, one of the things I really want to emphasize to you is that for our clients this is indeed a serious, real problem. It is based on the current cost and operating situation out in northern and central Ohio. This is not in any respect an academic exercise.

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we believe that given the cost situation of the nuclear plants, the licensed activity, those plants not only can't create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws but they are hurting us in the competitive struggle, which indeed exists, and this is why we think we are entitled to relief. If we get that relief, the question was asked, what would happen next?

There are probably several things that would happen -- one, that licensed petitions would be removed, and one consequence conceivably could be on Wheeling.

JUDGE MILLER: On what?

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MR. MURPHY: On Wheeling. Third party wheeling.

These license conditions create an unqualified obligation to third party wheeling.

These license conditions create an unqualified obligation to wheel to third parties.

The FERC statute does not create an unqualified obligation. I believe the statute says something to the effect that FERC can order wheeling only where it would not disturb existing competitive relationships.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Isn't wheeling the real problem here, as a practical matter? I mean they haven't sought access to the power from the plant. They haven't sought an ownership interest. What is left that they are getting from the antitrust conditions but the wheeling authority.

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1	MR. MURPHY: I think that's right. I agree. I
2	mean if in fact part of the proof of the pudding that
3	these nuclear plants don't give us a competitive advantage
4	is nobody else wants a piece of them
5	I mean one of the things that the NRC Staff
6	emphasizes in its brief is how one gets economic power. They
7	said you could get economic power in three possible ways: a
8	patent, land they had some unique piece of land, some
9	kind of a central facility, or better cost structure.
10	Then they say, well, this is sort of they say
11	bulk power is sort of analogous to patents or land, but if
12	it were, if it were unique, if it were helpful in the
13	competitive struggle as presumably a patent is or a land
14	through which people must pass, other folks would want it.
15	Nobody wants, nobody's asked to buy the nuclear power and
16	indeed to some extent this case is about wheeling
17	JUDGE KILLER: Pardon me, how much does a wheeling
18	aspect affect your client in terms of cost, not necessarily
19	dollars and cents but how much of an economic factor is the
20	wheeling?
21	MR. MURPHY: The wheeling is an economic factor.
22	JUDGE MILLER: How significant? How much? How
23	can we measure it?
24	MR. MURPHY: I am not sure that you can measure it

in that kind of dollars and cents but under the general

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1.	antitrust laws, there
2	JUDGE MILLER: I thought the wheeling provision is
3	the major thing that has caused your client to make less
4	money or to lose money and to be where nobody wants your
5	product. I thought you had attributed it essentially,
6	significantly to the wheeling burden.
7	MR. MURPHY: No, I don't think
8	JUDGE MILLER: How significant is the wheeling
9	burden?
10	MR. MURPHY: I don't think it is the wheeling
11	burden
12	JUDGE MILLER: Per se?
13	MR. MURPHY: per se. What it is in part is the
14	higher cost of nuclear plants that hurt us in the
15	competitive struggle versus, relative to, the alternative
16	power sources that are indeed readily available to our
17	competition.
18	JUDGE MILLER: In that event, what significance
19	economically is the wheeling provision of the conditions?
20	MR. MURPHY: Because the wheeling enables the
21	wheeling enables people without using their own capital to
22	bring the power from one place to another.
23	JUDGE MILLER: How does that hurt your client?
24	MR. MURPHY: Because my client wher it constructed
25	those transmission lines invested its own capital and did

1	so, at least in some part, so that it could prevail in the
2	competitive struggle.
3	JUDGE MILLER: At what point in time did that take
4	place
5	MR. MURPHY: Well, the transmission line
6	construction has gone on continuously.
7	JUDGE MILLER: What's the oldest date you can lay
8	your hands on?
9	MR. MURPHY: I don't know what the oldest date -
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11	JUDGE MILLER: It's not a new phenomenon, is it?
12	MR. MURPHY: Of transmission lines? Of course
13	not. Of course not.
14	JUDGE MILLER: Well, I am curious as to what cost
15	it is other than the way you look at competitive factors. I
16	am interested in what cost penalty your client is under by
17	virtue of the wheeling requirements.
18	MR. MURPHY: Well, we believe we are under a
19	competitive disadvantage. That is, we are required to allow
20	our competitors without the use of their capital to use our
21	transmission lines.
22	I can assure you, sir
23	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do they pay for that?
24	MR. MURPHY: They pay for the incremental cost,
25	yes, but I assure you if we did not think that this was an

1	important proceeding, we wouldn't be here spending our
2	money.
3	JUDGE MILLER: We are all spending money and the
4	taxpayers' money is involved too. I don't think I've had a
5	clear-cut answer from you about wheeling.
6	In response to a question from Judge Bollwerk you
7	said yes, that was maybe one of the linchpins that seems
8	to be another term of art we've gotten into in the
9	adverse effect of these conditions upon your client.
10	When I seek then to find out, not dollars and
11	cents as such necessarily, but certainly in principle, it
12	doesn't seem to me that your client is hurt economically by
13	the obligation to wheel as wheel per se and wholly apart
14	from the big plans.
15	MR. MURPHY: Well, let me explain the concrete -
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17	JUDGE MILLER: Go ahead.
18	MR. MURPHY: how my client is hurt in the city
19	of Cleveland.
20	JUDGE MILLER: Tell me how it hurts.
21	MR. MURPHY: For years the city of Cleveland and
22	the Municipal Light System and CEI have competed for house
23	to house competition.
24	When Muni Light wants to expand its system, retail
25	evetem at the evnence of ours we presently because of

1	these license conditions have an obligation to wheel in
2	power for them so that they can compete with us, because
3	they don't have the high cost nuclear plant but indeed have
4	other available sources at considerably lower price of bulk
5	power.
6	They can use our lines to come in and sell their
7	power at lower lost than ours, rather than having to expend
8	their own capital to construct those transmission lines.
9	JUDGE MILLER: Is that a bad thing economically in
10	terms of the public interest?
1.1	MR. MURPHY: I would say this, sir, that the
1.2	antitrust laws are designed to protect competition.
1.3	JUDGE MILLER: Preserve competition in order to
1.4	protect the public interest.
15	MR. MURPHY: But that doesn't necessarily mean
16	trying to protect competitors or give competitors a free
17	ride on the basis of the capital invested by other
18	competitors.
19	JUDGE MILLER: Well, the Sherman and Clayton Acts
0.0	essentially are to remove impediments to reasonable
21	competition and then to let the competition and the
2.2	marketplace make whatever judgments will be made as a
23	result.
2.4	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I mean to some degree what I am

hearing here are arguments of why there shouldn't be

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wheeling as opposed to arguments about -- I mean what you are saying is there should be access to nuclear power, no wheeling provisions, and hasn't that already been decided?

I mean the wheeling provisions are in there. They are clearly consistent with what the NRC's authority is under the antitrust laws.

MR. MURPHY: The NRC's authority is premised on the proposition that the licensed activity can create and maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust law.

Absent that finding, the NRC does not have the authority to impose license conditions at all.

Our purpose in being here is to demonstrate that because of the high cost of the nuclear plants, relative to alternative costs, the NRC is without present statutory authority to impose license conditions. So, in a very real sense, we are talking about what the -- about the authority of the NRC given to it by statute.

In that sense, we are not talking about general antitrust situations or what might be good, had or indifferent to people; what we are talking about is what is the underlying premise for any NRC authority to impose antitrust license conditions.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Although, again, the Committee report on this particular provision says that the -- what the agency is to look at is whether the activity is

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1	inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the policies clearly
2	underlying those laws. Now, arguably and this goes back
3	to the American Federal of Tobacco Group's case that I read
4	earlier. It talks about the value of competition is to
5	encourage those who compete to reduce costs and lower prices
6	and thus pass on the saving to the public.
7	Those who are operating at a cost have a choice
8	under the antitrust laws. They can continue to do so and
9	take the chance that their monopoly that they will be
0	forced out of business, or they can lower their costs.
1	Isn't that what we're really here about?
2	MR. MURPHY: The Neal case, I think, was very
3	different. As I understand the Neal case, it was a
4	situation where a tobacco grower wanted to become part of
5	the auction. It wasn't able to. He couldn't compete at
6	all.
7	The defense that was interposed was that we don't
8	want the we, the group, don't want to let him in because
9	he has lower costs once he gets in. The essential thing was
0	that he couldn't compete without access to the market.
1	In that sense, it was a classic, concerted
2	refusal-to-deal case. What
3	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Can Cleveland compete without
4	access to the Wheeling provisions? I mean, isn't that what

this case is all about back in the --

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MR. MURPHY: No. I beg to differ. That's not what this case is about.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: All right.

MR. MURPHY: This case is about whether or not the nuclear plant, the licensed activity, is an essential facility. This case is about whether or not the license -- whether the city must -- whether the licensed activity has -- gives my clients a competitive advantage and if so, then this Commission has authority. It's not about whether or not there's Wheeling.

Wheeling wasn't a licensed activity. Indeed, in the city of Cleveland, I mean, we -- I tried -- one of my retired partners tried an antitrust case about a dozen years ago where the question was whether -- one of the questions was whether or not the city of Cleveland could compete without Wheeling.

The jury returned a verdict saying, yes, they could, on the premise that they could construct their own transmission lines over a distance of only about 30 miles along an already existing railroad right-of-way. So, we would argue plainly that they could compete, but I say that, but at the same time, I beseech you that that is not a matter before this panel, nor should it be.

The matter before the panel is whether or not the licensed activity, the operation of a nuclear power plant,

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1	in the concrete, the here-and-now, can create or maintain a
2	situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Our premise
3	is that because of the higher costs versus alternatives
4	available, it is not. Indeed, there are alternatives.
5	I think I've used up my
6	JUDGE MILLER: May I suggest that your time is up,
7	but I'm not going to be too technical. Can you, in
8	fairness, give us the substance of the remaining portion of
9	your argument in, say, five minutes?
10	MR. MURPHY: I think, sir, I have. I appreciate
11	your time.
12	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Let me just clarify one other
13	thing I want to make sure of: The reason I raise this
14	jurisdictional question is that in terms of the res judicata
15	and collateral estoppel arguments is that if, in fact, this
16	is jurisdictional, in the sense that it can be raised at any
17	time, then obviously res judicata or collateral estoppel, it
18	seems to me, don't apply.
19	MR. MURPHY: That's right.
20	JUDGE BOLLWERK: What I hear you saying is, no,
21	that is not a correct analysis, and, in fact, there are
22	arguments on res judicata and collateral estoppel that will
23	not collapse for that reason?
24	MR. MURPHY: I think that is right as to

collateral estoppel and res judicata. I mean, we believe as

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to those issues, that the issue that we are raising here today was not, and, indeed, could not have been raised at an earlier stag.

that is really the underlying premise of our's that collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply. I mean, the simple fact is that the so-called nexus arguments that were raised by our clients a dozen years or so ago, were that this -- that so long as we provided access to the nuclear plants, that the plants -- by way of ownership interest which our clients had offered -- that the -- that once we'd done that, there could be no nexus between the operation of the plant and the -- and a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

We also argued that the remedy had to be limited to access to the plant. The city's suggestion now that we argue that nuclear power has no cost advantage -- and I'm reading now from their brief, but they claim we argued before that nuclear power had no cost advantage and as a result, the requisite nexus between the licensed activity and the anticompetitive situation is lacking.

That's just not true and, in fact, one support for that is, the Department of Justice in its Appeals Board brief many years ago, says that the marketing of power from the subject nuclear units will enable applicants to lower their average cost of power. It is undisputed that the

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power available from the subject nuclear units is expected to be the cheapest base load power available to serve new and growing loads. 3 That was the premise on which the proceeding occurred a dozen years ago. What we're saving is, 5 gentlemen, it just hasn't turned out that way, and because 6 7 it hasn't, and because or costs are higher than available alternatives, our plants, the licensed activities, cannot 8 create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the 9 10 antitrust laws. 11 I'd be glad to answer more. I've abused my time limit. I apologize for that. 12 13 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I've got a question here. 14 MR. MURPHY: Sure. JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are these so-called higher 15 costs -- I realize that we'll perhaps have to determine what 16 17 those are later on -- but are they based on higher operating costs or higher capital costs or what? If you deleted the 18 19 capital costs, just looked at the operating costs, are the 20 nuclear plants then disadvantageous? 21 MR. MURPHY: The costs of which we speak, that we believe are the appropriate measure, are the total costs, 22 capital costs and operating costs. I a reluctant to say 23 too much for fear that I am saying something I am not 24

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certain of, but I do believe that the operating costs of at

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least one of the nuclear plants is higher than the operating costs of some of the fossil fuel plants, which, of course, is diametrically different from what most people would think.

one of the reasons why our clients take this matter so seriously is because their total cost of operating the nuclear plant are, in their view, so much higher than the alternatives available, whether based on other construction they could have done, or alternatives available to their competitors.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The reason I asked the question is because, at least the capital costs will probably lower the time, at least in the operating cases proceeding, fairly reliably, if not shortly after the --

MR. MURPHY: I think there is an answer to that that applies to both capital and operating cost. That is, that over time, with increased regulatory surveillance, capital costs and operating costs have gone up.

estimate, a fair estimate, at any time prior to operation, and, indeed, when we read the arguments of the city in this respect, it kind of infuriates us a little bit, I guess -- not really -- but because we know if we had come in here asking for relief in 1986, or 1984, before the operation of these plants, before we could demonstrate what the actual

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1	costs were, we know the city would have said, "How do they
2	know, they have to operate the plants for a while before
3	they really know what their total costs are going to be."
4	So we really don't believe that we were at all
5	party to bringing this proceeding.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But the fact remains that you
7	are saying that some of those higher than expected costs are
8	operating as distinguished from capital costs, which, of
9	course, capital costs depend on how long you have
10	appreciated over, and if you get a renewal, they drop
11	drastically, and et cetera.
12	MR. MURPHY: But it is definitely operating as
13	well as capital costs.
14	Thank you very much. I appreciate your time.
15	JUDGE MI! LER: Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
16	Let me irquire, who wishes to go next?
17	We are going to recess until 1:00 o'clock.
13	[Who.supon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing recessed to
19	reconvene at 1:00 o'clock p.m., the same day.]
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1	AFTERNOON SESSION
2	[1:00 p.m.]
3	JUDGE MILLER: All right. We'll start the
4	afternoon session. Let's see. Staff or Justice, or Justice
5	and Staff, or
6	MS. URBAN: Justice.
7	JUDGE MILLER: Let Justice I .on't say prevail,
8	but you may have the podium.
9	[Laughter.]
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11	ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF
12	THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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14	MS. URBAN: Good afternoon. I'm Janet Urban. I'm
15	with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
16	What I'd like to talk about since I have heard a lot of
17	questions on this particular topic earlier is market power
18	and the difference between having dominance in a market and
19	having assets that allow you to compete.
20	The applicants keep talking about how their
21	nuclear plant doesn't enhance their competitive position or
22	how it doesn't have any competitive value, and what they are
23	talking about is that this plant doesn't help them to win if
24	they are competing on a level playing field; it doesn't make
25	them cheaper, perhaps, than competitors.

But that isn't what the antitrust laws are about. The antitrust laws are about market power and abusive market power, and let me read the definition of monopoly which was stated by the court in U.S. versus Grinnell Corp.

JUDGE MILLER: Grinnell.

MS. URBAN: Grinnell. And was quoted in the 1984 case Aspen Skiing, which is one of the most recent antitrust cases except for the one that came down Monday. It says.

"The offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: 1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant power and 2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Then later in the case, the court goes on to state that "Monopoly power is the power to control prices or to exclude competition."

That's what we're talking about when we're looking at 105(c) in a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. We're looking at market power and potential abuse. You don't have to be an efficient competitor to have market power. In fact, monopolists are often not efficient. They don't need to be. They are able to use their market power to exclude competitors. That's why we think competition is so important in this country, because it produces and encourages efficiency.

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7	whether or not applicant's nuclear plant is
2	expensive or cheap, it can still contribute to a situation
3	inconsistent because it is large-scale baseload generation
4	and because, as the Licensing Board found and was affirmed
5	by the Appeal Board, the transmission of the applicants was
6	a part of the transmission and the generation were part
7	of applicant's system, and applicants have dominance in
8	their market whether or not this plant is expensive.
9	Mr. Murphy, I think, basically said it all when he
10	said that without Wheeling with Wheeling, the munis are
11	able to bring power in from somewhere else. In other words,
12	if applicants wouldn't allow use of their lines, the munis
13	can't get power. Applicants have dominance and the ability
14	to exclude competition whether or not the plant is
15	expensive.
16	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Ms. Urban, are the lines in
17	question sort of like public utilities unless they are made
18	available at some cost at least to anyone who seeks to use
19	them?
20	MS. URBAN: Under the cense conditions, they
21	have to. Under the Federal Power Act, no. The law has
22	never Congress has never made utility lines common
23	carriers.
24	JUDGE BECHHOEFEI: Okay.

JUDGE MILLER: They are not -- they have not

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1	historically been viewed as common carriers, and that's
2	still the state of the law.
3	MS. URBAN: That is still the state of the law. I
4	know there is legislation in Congress concerning
5	transmission, but it's floating around. Nothing has been
6	passed.
7	JUDGE MILLER: Every session, you get some.
8	MS. URBAN: Yes.
9	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
10	MS. URBAN: And if there are no questions on
11	market power, I guess let me just speak very briefly about
12	the statute, and the word "cost" is not in the statute.
13	There is no requirement under the statute that these plants
14	be low cost. There is nothing in the joint committee report
15	that says these plants have to be low cost, and I think
16	contrary to applicant's assertions, there is nothing in the
17	legislative history which would support an argument that
18	everyone knew these plants would be low cost. In fact,
19	different people had different views on the cost of the
20	plant and you can't look at these joint hearings and say
21	everyone had a common view.
22	JUDGE MILLER: Well, do you consider that there
23	are pote ial ambiguities in the statutes such as would lead
24	one to look to legislative history, or does the Department
25	say no, it's reasonably clear-cut; there is no ambiguity;

7	you don't even need legislative history?
2	MS. URBAN: The Department says that on the issue
3	of cost, whether or not a plant must be low cost for there
4	to be a situation inconsistent, the statute is extremely
5	clear. The word "cost" isn't in there; the word, you know,
6	"competitive position" isn't in there. The statute says
7	"whether or not a plant will create or maintain a situation
8	inconsistent under the antitrust laws," and, as was just
9	discussed, you don't have to have a low cost asset to have
10	market power.
11	JUDGE MILLER: Under that theory, why then would
12	you bother or clog up the record by looking at legislative
13	history? Wouldn't the Department simply stand on the
14	statute, the reasonable interpretation of it, and say the
15	heck with history?
16	MS. URBAN: Well, the Department certainly would.
17	I mean, of course, in our papers, we talked about the
18	legislative history, but we were responding to applicants.
19	Now, I don't think you need to get to the legislative
20	history, and if you want to look at it a little bit, I think
21	the joint committee report is sufficient. Certainly it's
22	not necessarily to look at those here.
23	JUDGE MILLER: Well, why would we want to look at
24	a little bit of the history if the whole subject of the

history is irrelevant because of the clearness and lack of

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1	ambiguity of the statute?
2	MS. URBAN: Well, I think
3	JUDGE MILLER: Just color, or
4	MS. URBAN: You know, as attorneys, obviously we
5	respond when someone raises an argument. It's in our blood
6	to respond to the argument.
7	JUDGE MILLER: I see.
8	MS. URBAN: But certainly, I would say that this
9	panel could make a decision based solely on the face of the
10	statute without ever having to get into the legislative
11	history.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Well, looking at the statute itself
13	apart for the moment from the legislative history, if there
14	were an application today for construction, whether it was
15	one step or two step, of a nuclear power plant and somebody
16	wasn't going to worry about what the board of directors said
17	or did to him, what would be the position of the Department
18	of Justice in reference to this question of this high cost
19	pain-in-the-neck commodity, nuclear power, nuclear electric
20	power? What would you do? What would be the criteria that
21	you would employ?
22	MS. URBAN: Well, I think we would do a two-step
23	criteria under the criteria talked about in Grinnell. We'd
24	first look and see whether the applicant has market power
25	and we'd look and see whether he abused it. You know, under

the Section 105(c), you have to do that third step, which is whether there is a nexus; that we would look at whether the plant would -- you know, if we found that there is market power and if we found that there is some abusive market power, then we would look and see whether the plant would another that market power.

We'd also obviously look to see, if there is an absence of market power, whether adding a plant and the transmission that goes with it would create market power and then would there be an abuse.

But, you know, we have to look at each separate case, and one would presume that if you're building a plant, just as if you keep running a plant you already have, there is some benefit somewhere. You are doing it for some reason. Again, the plant doesn't have to help you to win a fair competitive contest to give you dominance, to give you market power.

JUDGE MILLER: It helps, though, doesn't it?

MS. URBAN: Well, it helps you to win that

contest, but if you are a monopolist, you don't need to win

because you don't have to play fair. If you are a

monopolist, you can exclude your competition.

JUDGE MILLER: Does a monopolist automatically

JUDGE MILLER: Does a monopolist automatically wins, like good guys or whatever?

MS. URBAN: Well, they certainly have a leg up.

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1	JUDGE MILLER: They sure do.
2	MS. URBAN: I mean, you know, if you can stop
3	someone from competing with you, you're going to win. If
4	you're the only game in town, you win whether you are more
5	expensive or whether you're not.
6	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
7	Did you have a question, Judge Bechhoefer?
	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. Do you think that market
9	power could be enhanced or detracted from based on the
10	environmental impacts which flow from the production of the
11	electricity you're trying to sell?
12	MS. URBAN: Certainly. I mean, a good example
13	would be if a utility has, say, 3,000 megawatts of expensive
14	plant and anyone else who wants to build additional
15	generation can't get siting permits because there's no need,
16	there's already sufficient power in the area even if that
17	power happens to be very expensive and, you know, not
18	efficient in terms of cost.
19	JUDGE MILLER: Who would make that determination?
20	Is that for the states' power commissions?
21	MS. URBAN: I am not an environmental lawyer, but
22	if I recall from litigating this case, the states involved
23	have to give permission to build.
24	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
25	MS URBAN: Usually they have siting authority.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay. MS. URBAN: And I guess if you're impacting on 2 wetlands or something, then you are starting to worry about 3 the Federal environmental statutes. But that's not my area; 5 I'm sorry. JUDGE MILLER: That's okay. JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you know if there are any EPA requirements that govern the area that the Perry Plant 8 or the --9 MS. URBAN: I have absolutely no idea. I'm sorry. 10 11 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. JUDGE BOLLWERK: Do you have any comments on Ms. 12 Charnoff's point that a plant that may be more expensive 13 but, because of environmental factors, nonetheless falls 14 within the statute because it's -- or subject to antitrust 15 review because it's the only alternative that you have to 16 -- when it becomes the only alternative, the only cost, then 17 18 it's within the statu e, as opposed to when you are comparing costs? 19 MS. URBAN: Well, I think in both cases you're 2:0 within the statute. Again, I would go with a traditional 21 22 antillust theory and look at market power and abuse of market power. Once you build the plant, then the attorney 23 -- once a plant is to be licensed, the attorney general has 24

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the obligation to advise.

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We would advise looking at the whole picture and obviously take into consideration -- you know, we take into consideration what the system -- what the structure looks like of the industry in that market, and what the utility building the plant looks like, and what the plant and its transmission are going to do to that structure, and also look, you know, for abuse, because in order to be in violation of Section 2, you don't have o have just monopoly If you are a monopolist because you have the best product in the world and you are not using your market power to exclude competition, then you are not in violation. It's a very simplistic statement, obviously. [Pause.] JUDGE MILLER: Proceed. Have you run out of gas? MS. URBAN: Well, I think -- you know, I had a couple of things that I wanted to talk about and I think I

have talked about them, and if there are no --JUDGE MILLER: No, we are not urging you. We just

want to be sure you have a fair, full opportunity, a I suppose your time was over to --

MS. URBAN: Yes.

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JUDGE BOLLWERK: One other question. The Neal case that we talked about this morning, I think Mr. Murphy basically said that's a classic refusal-to-deal case and has

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1	nothing to do with this. Is that correct, or do you have
2	any comments on the Neal case and its application here?
3	MS. URBAN: I do not. T think I believe that
4	refusal to deal was an element of the proceedings in the
5	plant and refusals to deal are still good law, as you see in
6	Aspen Ski. You know, the refusal to wield power and the
7	refusals to grant coordination services I think could be
8	construed as refusals to deal. Other than that, I don't
9	have any comment.
10	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Are the court statements that I
11	read that's still good law as far as you're concerned?
12	MS. URBAN: I'm sorry, I have to hear them again.
13	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Okay.
14	Ms. URBAN: I'm sorry.
15	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I'll just read the one that was
16	in the Appeal Board's opinion. It says, "The restraint of
17	trade involving the elimination of a competitor is to be
18	deemed reasonable or unreasonable on the basis of matters
19	affecting the trade itself, not on relative cost of doing
20	business of the persons engaged in competition."
21	MS. URBAN: Yes, I would say that's still good
22	law. The way the courts are formulating and the way we
23	formulate it now is you look to see whether the activities
24	complained about are a reasonable business activity or
25	whether they have as their purpose and effect excluding

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1	competition. So it is the effect of excluding
2	competition is not sufficient to find an action a violation;
3	there also has to be some finding that this was not, you
4	know, done in the reasonable course of running 1 business.
5	And I think that's changed a little bit.
6	JUDGE MILLER: It's some kind of rule of reason?
7	MS. URBAN: Well, Section 2, I think, has always
8	been a rule of reason statute. I mean, you don't
9	JUDGE MILLER: I thought it was 1. Section 2?
10	MS. URBAN: Well, on Section 2, you've always
11	looked at the reasonableness of the action.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
13	MS. URBAN: There's no per se monopolization.
14	If there are no further questions, thank you.
15	JUDGE MILLER: Any further questions?
16	[No response.]
17	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. Are you relinquishing
18	your time to someone else?
19	MS. URBAN: I am relinquishing my time to my
20	fellow government employees and the NRC.
21	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.
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23	ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE NRC STAFF
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25	MR. HOM: Mr. Chairman and Board Members, my name

is Steve Hom and I'm counsel for the NRC Staff. I'll try
and make three brief points in response, not only to matters
that have been raised in the pleadings by the Applicant, but
also some comments made today:

The first point I'd like to address is the notion that cost advantage of this industry is the only sole competitive advantage a nuclear facility can provide to a utility. Most recently, in their reply brief, the Applicant stated, and I quote, "The only distinction among different producers of electricity is the cost advantage of one method of production over another. After all, no one cares whether their lights are working because their electricity comes from a coal plant or a nuclear plant."

JUDGE MILLER: What page is that?

MR. HOM: This is Applicant's reply at 32.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.

MR. HOM: I will continue to quote. "But a consumer does care if his cost of electricity is higher than his neighbor's." Now, the significance of this theme, according to the applicant's theory is that if there is no cost advantage provided by the nuclear facility, there can be no competitive advantage provided by that facility whatsoever. Therefore, without the possibility of a competitive advantage, there is no way that this licensed activity, the nuclear facility, can create or maintain a

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situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

The Staff has never taken the position that a customer or a consumer is not concerned with the cost of electricity. In fact, the Staff would probably be the first to admit that the cost of electricity is an important factor in the customer's decision to purchase electricity from any particular provider of that service. I'd like to emphasize the word, service, because I'll be addressing the point about the fungability of electricity shortly.

From their 1989 annual report, Ohio Edison makes
my point the clearest. In that '89 annual report, Ohio
Edison states, "It isn't necessarily price that drives
customer decisions. The quality and reliability of the
services we provide are as important to customers as price."

Now, again, the Staff is not arguing that cost can never provide a competitive edge in a competitive situation such as the electric utility industry. We are definitely always talking about here for the purpose of the bedrock issue, situational competition. Even though there may be some fairly dominant utilities, the whole purpose of the bedrock issue is comparing the cost of electricity from one supplier to another.

If you accept the position that the Staff takes, which is, class is not the only factor in determining competitive advantage, then as a matter of law, the

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Commission, under Section 105, still would have the authority to impose titrust license conditions, even if it were determined that the actual cost of the electricity from the licensed nuclear racility was higher than an alternative source.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Could you spell that out a

MR. HOM: Yes. The Applicant's position is that once you determine the cost of a facility is higher than an alternative competitor, as I take it, then that facility can never contribute to a competitive advantage. Therefore, if it can never contribute to a competitive advantage, there can be no -- I'm not sure what the term the Applicants use -- but there can be no nexus between the licensed activities and the creation or maintenance of an anticompetitive situation because that plant, in their theory, is that there is no way that this plant can contribute more of an advantage to a competitive situation that exists or could be created

The Staff is trying to focus on the bedrock issue which the parties here all spent actually several months formulating. Now, we're talking about the cost of electricity from one plant versus an alternative source as being the sole dispositive factor on whether essentially there can be a competitive advantage.

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As the Applicants have demonstrated, there can be at least one other competitive advantage provided by a nuclear plant, and that is reliability. In fact, I believe there is a District Court case that we've cited in our brief where that Court found in that record that coal plants were less reliable than nuclear facilities, in general terms.

One has to look at the customer, the consumer decisionmaking to determine what that customer feels determines his -- is going to be his or her choice in the selection of electric service. Now, there have been some statements that electricity is fungible, and I would agree, the Staff would agree that electrons may not be distinguishable from other electrons, and in that limited sense, electricity is fungible.

However, in the world of competition, we are talking about competition among electricity suppliers. One customer presumably knows that he or she or it is buying electricity from a certain supplier. In making that decision whether to select that service, that customer, according to Ohio Edison, at least, considers not only the cost or the price of that electricity, but considers other factors such as service, reliability.

Reliability, for one, to me, would be a very important factor. It's conceivable, therefore, that even though the cost of electricity from one nuclear facility may

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be higher than from an alternative source, hypothetically,

if that slightly higher cost electricity is much more

reliable than the alternative source, one consumer may make

a different decision than another consumer as to which

supplier he chooses.

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If you do not believe the Applicants that cost is the sole competitive advantage to be considered, then the Commission still has the authority to impose license conditions, if it determines on the basis of all factors, that that licensed facility may create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Hom, could differing environmental impacts from the production of one plant versus another, one source of electricity versus another, affect the competitive impact that a given facility might have?

MR. HOM: I believe that, depending upon the customer, if the customer is concerned at all where the source of electricity is coming from, and the customer, if it's important to a customer that they do not purchase this electricity from a plant, for instance, that contributes to acid rain, then I believe certainly that in the eyes of that customer, it is important, the environmental impact of a particular facility; if that's answering your question.

That, therefore, can have a bearing on the

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competitive edge one type of plant may have over another. JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you think that's one of the considerations that the framers of Section 170, the current 170 of the Atomic Energy Act had in mind when they put the provision in there for antitrust review? MR. HOM: Section 170, Your Honor? 6 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, the antitrust review 7 provision, the one that was put in --8 9 MR. HOM: That's Section 105. JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm sorry, in 1970, the Section 10 11 105, which is what I meant to say, which was put in 1970. I 12 got my numbers mixed. MR. HOM: Your Honor, it would be impossible for 13 14 me to stand here and say that I believe that certain members 15 of Congress had certain things in mind when they enacted the 16 statute, however, I believe that when they drafted the statute the way they did, with specific reference to certain 17 18 antitrust laws, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, that they intended that the Commission 19 refer and defer to the antitrust laws as developed under 20 21 those statutes and consider all factors relevant for any 22 given case or situation. The Sherman Act, for example, by analogy, was 23 written fairly broadly. Congress specifically did not 24

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intend to provide a laundry list of every consideration,

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1	every violation that would violate the Sherman Act.
2	left it to the courts to consider specific facts and
3	circumstances in every case to determine whether it would be
4	a violation of the antitrust laws.
5	I believe that it's safe to assume that Congress,
6	in enacting Section 105, had something not entirely
7	dissimilar in mind. My reference specifically to condition
8	a creation or maintenance of a situation inconsistent
9	with the antitrust laws as specified in Section 105(a), they
10	had in mind not to put specific limits, not to provide a
11	laundry list, not to say that you have to consider costs,
12	high costs, low costs, whatever, and that will dispositive.
13	Situations change, and I think Congress is well
14	aware of that, and the intention, as a general proposition,
15	was that the Commission would perform its role, consider all
16	factors relevant to a situation and make its determination.
17	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Let me put the question another
18	way. We've been focusing on ultimate customer, the consumer
19	of electricity. But Applicants make the point, why would a
20	utility build a high cost plant? It's never going to be
21	competitive. That's their basic point. What is your
22	response to that? Why would a utility build a high cost
23	plant?
24	MR. HOM: I don't know. I'm not in the position
25	of a utility to make that decision, but I think that there

could be other reasons that a utility would choose to build a plant that may be higher cost than another plant. For 2 instance, if the environmental considerations were such that it was more publicly acceptable, or they would have a greater chance to get their plant approved or whatever, then 5 they may, in fact, decide to choose a slightly higher 6 alternative tact and build a nuclear plant under the theory 7 that in the long run perhaps, we will be more competitive 8 with the cleaner plant, that we will not be accused of 9 contributing to environmental pollution and so on and so 10 11 forth. 12

That is not necessarily, obviously, a complete answer. I can't speak on behalf of the utilities in the United States, but as long as there is the potential that a plant or a utility chooses to do so for different reasons other than cost, then the Applicants cannot win on the bedrock issue.

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JUDGE BOLLWERK: Going back, you mentioned this to your colleagues, I guess Ms. Charnoff makes the point that when you choose a plant on the basis of a factor other than cost, I mean, that it has the highest cost and there are no other alternatives, therefore, it comes within the antitrust law. I mean, it's still within the statute, but that's the only instance when high cost, I guess, controls in some way.

I'm not sure I'm expressing your argument

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properly, but you heard it and maybe you can respond to it.

MR. HOM: Well, if there were only one plant to build, one type of plant to build, if I'm understanding this correctly, then I don't see how, number one, that even applies to the bedrock issue because we're talking about alternative sources, essentially, in the bedrock issue, a competitive situation.

If a plant is any particular existing competitive posture and it needs to obviously build greater capacity into its system, then I'm not sure how having that only one option necessarily excludes that plant from being able to contributed to the utility's competitive advantage, assuming it has one, if it has one or not. This is part of the entire analysis that the Commission goes through.

JUDGE MILLER: Is that your complete answer?

MR. HOM: As I understand the question.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: I guess what I wanted to get was your response to the points Ms. Charnoff made here about why a high cost plant might be within the antitrust laws, to the degree that it was the only alternative, maybe because of environmental considerations?

MR. HOM: Well, our position -- the staff's position is whatever the cost of the plan is, it still is -- there are still other factors that can be considered by the Commission, in making its determination whether to impose

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1	license conditions.
2	In other words, it's not the be all and end all.
3	As long as you have the ability to look further into the
4	matter beyond cost, then the Commission still would have the
5	authority to consider the entire situation and consider
6	whether conditions are appropriate.
7	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Well, maybe I can express it this
8	way. I guess your argument is that when environmental costs
9	are taken into account, even though it's a higher cost in
10	one way, and, in 'act, the lowest cost or the only cost
11	that's being considered. Do any members of the panel want
12	to help me? Am I misstating the argument?
13	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, I think the argument is
14	is if environmental factors operate to make the proposed
15	facility the only available facility, then you've only got
16	one alternative.
17	MR. HOM: Well, clearly, in that situation, and I
18	understand
19	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm just saying this is what I
20	expect what I understand the argument to be. I'm not
21	stating it as a fact. That is what I understand the
22	argument was.
23	MR. HOM: Well, the staff's position maybe I
24	can clarify it this way. The staff's position is that if

you had only one alternative -- if you had only one source

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1	of power to build, or if you had two alternatives, cost
2	would not necessarily be the end of the matter in
3	determining whether that plant could contribute to an anti-
4	competitive situation.
5	JUDGE MILLER: Would it have to be, in order to
6	come within the scope of the bedrock issue would it have
7	to be only? What if it were substantially, significantly,
8	95 percent?
9	MR. HOM: If costs were 95 percent of the
10	equation?
11	JUDGE MILLER: Uh-huh?
12	MR. HOM: I believe you would still have to
13	consider the other five percent in making the determination
14	whether conditions are appropriate or not. As long as you
15	have that five percent or even one percent, then cost is
16	not, as a matter of law, the only issue to consider.
17	JUDGE MILLER: What are the other issues then,
18	besides the 99 percent?
19	MR. HOM: Well, the other issues could be, as the
20	Applicants have stated, service reliability, for instance.
21	JUDGE MILLER: Reliability? How does that factor
22	in?
23	MR. HOM: Well, if a plant is to be built, and
24	it's of such hypothetically, of such high technology that
25	it's going to be the most reliable plant there ever was

1	built, then conceivably, to certain customers in the
2	marketplace, a customer may be willing to choose that plant
3	chose it, buy electricity from that supplier, knowing
4	that it has that very reliable plant, even though it may
5	cost \$10 a month or whatever high, more than the cost of
6	than electricity from a cheaper plant.
7	JUDGE MILLER: Do you think this is a reality in
8	the marketplace?
9	MR. HOM: Well, I believe that yes. Number
10	one, reliability is a very distinct reality in the
11	marketplace.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Well, we come across this
13	reliability argument rather recently. But, assuming that
1.4	there's no absolute on reliability, I suppose it's all a
15	matter of judgment and probabilities and so forth. In your
16	experience, is there that significant a difference in the
17	reliability of different types of plants in the present
18	market for the production and sale of base power?
19	MR. HOM: I believe that reliability is a very
20	important factor, judging from the difference in prices that
21	customers pay for firm power and interruptible power.
22	JUDGE MILLER: Yes, but that's with the same
23	producer possibly.
24	MR. HOM: I'm sorry?

JUDGE MILLER: I say those are differences in the

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1	type of merchandise you're buying.
2	MR. HOM: Right.
3	JUDGE MILLER: Or you can buy different prices of
4	the same commodity and pay more or less from the same
5	producer or seller.
6	MR. HOM: Your Honor, if there is no distinction
7	whatsoever, other than cost or price, no distinction
8	whatsoever, then the applicant's argument may hold greater
9	weight.
10	JUDGE MILLER: Now, wait a minute, let me get you
11	now.
10	MR. HOM: All right.
13	JUDGE MILLER: None whatsoever. Then their
14	argument ay hold greater weight. Now, is that as far as
15	you're willing to go logically?
16	MR. HOM: Well, it's a very theoretical argument.
17	JUDGE MILLER: Yes, it is.
18	MR. HOM: If there is no conceivable way, as what,
19	I believe you're boiling it down to, that there is any
20	perceivable advantage, from a customer's standpoint, to
21	supplier A and supplier B other than cost, then I believe
22	that there is well, I guess, as far as I would say right
23	now, is that I would have to rethink my position.
24	JUDGE MILLER: What would you say right now? I
25	didn't follow you. You said you were coming to some

1	conclusion and you backed off from it. What were you
è	talking about?
3	MR. HOM: No. I would say that we would have to
4	reevaluate our position.
5	JUDGE MILLER: Dh, I see. In other words, you
6	might change sides? The staff might change sides in this
7	particular controversy, I'm going to call it?
8	MR. NOM: Well, if you're giving me a
9	hypothetical, and I'd have to make a call on that, the staff
10	would at least consider changing sides. I don't believe
11	that's reality.
12	JUDGE MILLER: I see.
13	MR. HOM: I don't believe there's anything in the
14	world that is perfectly competitive, where cost is the sole
15	one and only factor in competition.
16	JUDGE MILLER: Well, my question to you then, I
17	think, was, in the real world, and looking at reality, do
18	you ever have a hundred percent, and do you need to have a
19	hundred percent in order to make value judgments in this
20	context?
21	MR. HOM: Do you ever have a hundred percent?
22	JUDGE MILLER: You never had a hundred percent, do
23	you assurance, reliability, whatever you want to name?
24	MR. HOM: No. I don't believe you do. But, I
25	believe you have some indication that, for instance, in the

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1	terms of reliability, one facility may be more reliable than
2	another.
3	JUDGE MILLER: All right. Now, what does the
4	staff believe is a reasonable basis for its position that
5	the reliability factor significantly favors nuclear power?
6	MR. HOM: What is the
7	JUDGE MILLER: Yes?
8	MR. HOM: the basis?
9	JUDGE MILLER: Yes?
10	MR. HOM: I can cite to you one case that I've
11	come across in research.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
13	MR. HOM: U.S. v. United Technologies Corporation,
14	U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio, 1977, where
15	the Court states: "Since the oil embargo"
16	JUDGE MILLER: What was the citation on that?
17	MR. HOM: This is September 9, 1977.
18	JUDGE MILLER: No, I mean, is that in the Federal
19	Supp. or what?
20	MR. HOM: This is out of the the copy I have is
21	1977-two trade cases.
22	JUDGE MILLER: Oh, is that a U.S. District Court
23	decision or what?
24	MR. HOM: Yes, District Court, Northern District
25	of Ohio.

1	JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Well, that's easy to report
2	it, if it's reportable in the Federal Supplement, isn't it?
3	MR. HOM: Sometimes not, Your Honor.
4	JUDGE MILLER: Oh, I see. This okay. Go
5	ahead.
6	MR. HOM: Quoting on page 72,647. "Since the oil
7	embargo of 1373, utilities have generally ordered only coal-
8	fired or nuclear steam systems where such were feasible.
9	While all fossil steam systems require both planned and
10	unplanned maintenance, coal-fired systems are especially
11	susceptible to reliability problems."
12	JUDGE MILLER: Coal-fired has susceptibility,
13	reliability problems.
14	MR. HOM: Right.
15	JUDGE MILLER: In the case of coal-fired, they
16	have to have adequate maintenance and so forth?
17	MR. HOM: Right.
18	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
19	MR. HOM: Now, I'm not saying I to clarify.
20	I'm not saying that reliability is a factor or the only
21	factor or the most important factor. The staff's position
22	is on the bedrock legal issue. If it is possible that it is
23	a factor
24	JUDGE MILLER: If it is possible that it is a

factor. You see, you're watering it down so much, I am

25

1	trying to see whether or not it's within the scope of our
2	consideration here.
3	Now, the position taken by the Applicants, as I
4	understand it, is that the Commission does not have
5	authority, as a matter of law, to retain these conditions,
6	if it finds that the actual cost from a license is higher
7	than the cost of electricity from alternative sources
8	MR. HOM: Right. In other words, the
9	JUDGE MILLER: is appropriately measured. But
10	that doesn require a hundred percent certainty of
11	anything, including cost, reliability or patriotism.
12	MR. HOM: Well, that considers that no other
13	factor is relevant to contributing to an arti-competitive
14	situation. And that's not the staff's position. The
15	staff's position
16	JUDGE MILLER: Well, it's the contention, I guess,
17	that no other factor is within the statutory language. In
18	other words, the creation or maintenance of a situation
19	inconsistent with the anti-trust laws say the activities
20	under the license. Now, those activities under the license
21	are what? How does the staff interpret that part of the
22	statute?
23	MR. HOM: The staff interprets
24	JUDGE MILLER: Whether start off with the term
25	"whether." Whether the activities under the license would.

1	MR. HOM: What is the staff's interpretation of
2	that?
3	JUDGE MILLER: Yes?
4	MR. HOM: Well, I think the Waterford Decision
5	said that there's not specific criteria to determine
6	activities under the license. It says, normally and, I
7	think in the Davis-Desse decision, the licensing board
8	rather succinctly said that the five plants to be licensed
9	would be the activities under the license in that situation.
10	I think the Waterford decision left it fairly open
11	that the Commission may consider various factors, given any
12	certain situation.
13	But, for the purposes of answering your question
14	today, I think we can assume right now that we're talking
15	about the nuclear facility in this case.
16	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
17	MR. HOM: Okay. Now, the phrase continues:
18	"would create or maintain a situation." The question
19	then becomes
20	JUDGE MILLER: Would create or maintain a
21	situation inconsistent would it have to be a hundred
22	percent certainty?
23	MR. HOM: No. No.
24	JUDGE MILLER: So, now you're willing to go less
25	than a hundred. How about 95 nercent? Where's your line on

1	reasonableness, rather than a mathematical statement of 90
2	or 92?
3	MR. HOM: The best I can cite to you is the Joint
4	Committee Report which says Congress intended this to be a
5	reasonable probability standard.
6	JUDGE MILLER: Who said that?
7	MR. HOM: The Joint Committee Report.
8	JUDGE MILLER: Yes, the report. But it was not
9	written into the statute was it?
10	MR. HOM: That's correct.
11	JUDGE MILLER: So, do you consider if it's not
12	written in the statute that it might have been left out for
13	logical reasons?
14	MR. HOM: If it was
15	JUDGE MILLER: It might have been rejected in
16	other words?
17	MR. HOM: I'm sorry, the question?
18	JUDGE MILLER: My question is, the fact that
19	something appears in a 20 or 25 year-old Joint Committee
20	Report to Congress, in the days when Congress was a
21	considerably different instrumentality, at least in terms of
22	nuclear power, does that really have any present
23	significance to the staff one way or the other?
24	MR. HOM: I believe yes, Your Honor.
25	JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. HOM: The Joint Committee Report, in particular, and this will get to my next point. The Joint Committee Report was a specific vehicle by the Committee to explain Section 105. With respect to Section 105(c)(5), they used that specific vehicle, the report, to explain their intentions clearly on reasonable probability and on what activities under the license would not -- was not intended to encompass, which I believe another party has already addressed today. It would not encompass the activities of contractors unless a utility was culpably involved in any anti-competitive activity.

Because the Joint Committee took the effort to specify those two points in Section 105(c)(5), in particular -- in particular, with respect to that phrase that you're asking me about now -- whether activities under the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws. I believe that that is a fairly clear articulation by the legislation -- legislators of legislative intent.

I grant you that, in every statute, not every single intention of Congress is necessarily spelled cut verbatim. But, here where you have the omission of cost from the statute, number one, you have another vehicle, the Joint Committee Report, which took great pains to say, with respect to this standard, we are pointing out that our

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1	intention is reasonable probability and not to include
2	contractors. And they stop there. And they do not say
3	anything there further about cost.
4	The staff's position is that there is no issue
5	about whether Congress intended somehow to put cost as an
6	absolute criteria, low-cost as an absolute make or break
7	criteria in the statue.
8	JUDGE MILLER: Now, you say absolute make or break
9	now, you're citing extremes again.
10	MR. HOM: Well, the bedrock issue is phrased in
11	terms of an extreme, Your Honor.
12	JUDGE MILLER: All right.
13	MR. HOM: It's phrased in terms of as a matter
14	of law.
15	JUDGE MILLER: Let's take a look. How do you
16	interpret? You helped to frame it, I think how do you
17	interpret this bedrock issue?
18	MR. HOM: I interpret it that if you find that the
19	cost of Davis-Besse is one dollar higher than an alternative
20	source "as appropriately measured," then there's noway,
21	according to the Applicants, that that facility can
22	contribute to the creation of maintenance of an anti-
23	competitive situation, or a situation inconsistent.
24	JUDGE MILLER: One dollar?

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MR. HOM: One dollar is what the bedrock --

1	JUDGE MILLER: One dollar per what?
2	MR. HOM: One dollar per any measurement that will
3	later be determined if we go to the next phase of this
4	proceeding.
5	JUDGE MILLER: Per kilowatt hour? One dollar per
6	Filowatt hour? You're giving me one dollar. I want to know
7	what your dollar is measured against.
8	MR. HOM: I could say one dollar per kilowatt
9	hou .
10	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
11	MR. HOM: And I'm sure the applicants can say some
12	other measure was more appropriate.
13	JUDGE MILLER: I want to know what the staff says.
14	MR. HOM: The staff
15	JUDGE MILLER: You're giving me the staff's view.
16	MR. HOM: The staff's position could be one dollar
17	per kilowatt hour. That would be sufficient under the
18	bedrock issue.
19	JUDGE MILLER: Now, tell me the staff's position.
20	Why should I think I've asked you this why should we
21	bother to look at the Joint Committee reports, if the
22	statute itself contains no ambiguity and no hint or one
23	percent of an ambiguity?
24	MR. HOM: You should not I'm not saying, Your
25	Honor, that the statute itself I think we're getting

1	confused here.
2	JUDGE MILLER: Well, I want to find out.
3	MR. HOM: The reference to legislative history, as
4	the Department of Justice mentioned, was only in response to
5	the Applicant's brief.
6	JUDGE MILLER: Well that doesn't make it any more
7	logical or illogical as an element of reasoning before this
8	Board, does it? Just because they say something, then you
9	have to counter it and so forth, and we have to decide who's
10	up at the top of the ballbat in terms of meaningfulness or
11	relevance?
12	MR. HOM: That was the primary reason we
13	JUDGE MILLER: That's the primary reason?
14	MR. HOM: Right.
15	JUDGE MILLER: Well, what percentage is that, 80
16	percent, 90 percent of the staff's reasoning?
17	MR. HOM: That we why we cited legislative
18	history or
19	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
20	MR. HOM: what the impact of legislative
21	history has?
22	JUDGE MILLER: Why you went into it at all?
23	MR. HOM: The principal reason was in response
24	our position is that the statute is clear. It had no
25	reference to cost, and that should be the end of the

1	question.
2	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
3	MR. HOM: But, as I point out, the Joint Committee
4	did, in the report, specifically point out two areas, none
5	of which were cost.
6	JUDGE MILLER: Well, if the Joint Committee Report
7	isn't in conflict with, it doesn't take precedence over the
8	statute as written, adopted, and signed by some president,
9	does it?
10	MR. HOM: That's where the statute is
11	JUDGE MILLER: So far as the staff is concerned,
12	we can just check out all these 25 year-old mutterings of
13	the Joint Committed?
14	MR. HOM: That's correct.
15	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
16	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Is it possible ambiguities or
17	uses of the terms "create" or "maintain" or "inconsistent"
18	I mean, could that : a justification for looking to
19	legislative history, to see what some of these terms mean?
20	MR. HOM: I believe, Your Honor, I would have to
21	concede that there may be different interpretations to those
22	words. Obviously
23	JUDGE MILLER: Which words? Go ahead.
24	MR. HOM: What Your Honor said, "create" or
25	JUDGE BECHHOFFED: "Create" or "maintain" or

1	JUDGE MILLER: I like to be specific, if you
2	would, for the record.
3	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, those words are just
4	words I took out of the statute.
5	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm just saying, are there
7	possible differing interpretations of those words which
8	would lead one to look to legislative history?
9	MR. HOM: I believe in any case, Your Honor, there
10	easily could be a situation where you have two differing
11	views.
12	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: "Situation" is another one.
13	MR. HOM: Correct.
14	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Another such word.
15	JUDGE MILLER: Well, then you are saying that
16	there is a possible ambiguity in the statute whereby you
17	would then be not only entitled but maybe even compelled to
18	look at the legislative history.
19	MR. HOM: Not
20	JUDGE MILLER: Now, you've taken two different
21	positions. Why don't you settle down on ore?
22	MR. HOM: Not with respect to costs, Your Honor.
23	We have never taken a
24	JUDGE MILLER: Not with respect to anything on the
25	interpretation of the statute. I'm asking you to look at

1	this statute. You're very familiar with it. I'll do the
2	reading into the record. "The Commission shall give due
3	consideration to the attorney general's advice" and so
4	forth.
5	MR. HOM: Right.
5	JUDGE MILLER: "And shall make a finding as to
7	whether the activities under the license would create or
8	maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws as
9	specified in Subsection A of this section."
10	Now, does this contain any potential ambiguities
11	or not in the staff's judgment?
12	MR. HOM: It is scmething that is open for
13	interpretation by the Commission.
14	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
15	MR. HOM: Did I answer your question, Judge
16	Bechhoefer?
17	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes, you answered mine.
18	MR. HOM: Okay
21	JUDGE MILLER: We'll give you
20	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I may have some others. I do
21	have some others.
22	JUDGE MILLER: Well, you don't have too many
23	others at this point, although at the end we'll give you
24	full opportunity. I'm going to extend your time by about
25	five minutes so that you may fairly present what you wanted

to have the record show in your presentation. MR. HOM: Only one more point, Your Honor. 2 3 JUDGE MILLER: Go right ahead. MR. HOM: Obviously, we stand by everything we've written in our pleadings. I just want to add one more 5 point. And we did discuss this; I just want to clarify this 6 7 today. The statute was drafted to require an antitrust B review .efore -- at the construction permit stage, in most 9 cases before an operating license was issued, before a power 10 11 plant could come on line and generate electricity, before 12 the actual cost of electricity could be determined. The bedrock issue is framed in terms of the actual cost of 13 14 electricity. 15 The staff's view is that given that scheme set up 16 by Congress to require the Commission to decide whether 17 conditions are appropriate before there could be any 18 determination whether there are actual costs of a plant is a 19 very strong indication that Congress had no intention whatsoever to have the actual cost of a plant be the pivotal 20 factor on a determination of whether conditions were 21 22 appropriate. Now, the bedrock issue is phrased in terms of 23

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retained antitrust conditions. The only question left in

the staff's view is whether there should be any substantive

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distinction between retaining conditions -- that is, whether the retertion of conditions can now be dispositive, the cost 2 can now be dispositive -- or should the standards for the imposition and retention of conditions be one and the same. The staff's position is that -- I'm making 5 reference to what I think counsel for Ohio Edison called the 6 7 yo-yo phenomenon -- the staff's position is that it would make no sense whatsoever if, all a sudden, after antitrust 8 9 conditions were imposed, after a long antitrust review proceeding, once a plant came on line and it could be 10 11 determined after the first day or week or month or year that 12 the actual costs then were higher than the so-called alternative source, all of a sudden the retention of those 13 14 conditions should turn on a different standard, a cost-base 15 standard only, rather than a standard that we believe is in 16 the statute, which is the Commission is to consider all

Those are all my remarks.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you sir.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I just wanted to follow up one

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JUDGE MILLER: I'm going to suggest that when we get through with everybody having a shot, that we have an

facts and circumstances and make a determination, a rule of

reason so to spear, as to whether this plant can create or

maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

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1	open session in which the Board may have other questions.
2	Are you willing to do it then?
3	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well
4	JUDGE MILLER: It's your choice.
5	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. I just wanted one quick
6	question.
7	JUDGE MILLER: Go ahead. Quick answer.
8	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What significance, if any, do
9	you accord to the fact that at the time Section 105 was
10	passed in 1970, the AEC had failed to make a finding of
11	practical value?
12	MR. HOM: What significance?
13	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If any.
14	MR. HOM: If any? I really don't know the I
15	don't have a position on the staff doesn't have a
16	position on that. The joint committee report which I
17	reviewed only seems to indicate that it was time consuming,
18	expensive. There were many delays. I'm not sure exactly
19	what was involved in the Commission's process in trying to
20	make that determination.
21	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you think the failure to
22	make a practical value finding meant that the old AEC
23	thought that those plants really weren't low cost?
24	MR. HOM: I 'eally don't have any opinion on that.
25	JUDGE MILLER: Are you familiar with that ongoing

1	argument historically that Judge Bechhoefer was mentioning,
2	the finding of practical value and so forth?
3	MR. HOM: I'm afraid I'm not that familiar, Your
4	Honor.
5	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
6	MR. HOM: I haven't been at the Commission very
7	long.
8	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, Section 105 replaced the
9	practical value
10	JUDGE MILLER: Yes. It became a Congressional
11	determination.
12	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes.
13	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
14	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes.
15	JUDGE MILLER: I take it you are not really
16	familiar with that as such?
17	MR. HOM: I am aware that it was omitted in 1970
18	and that the Commission was no longer required to make that
19	finding.
20	JUDGE MILLER: Was the well, I won't go into it
21	because it's not.
22	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. That was my basic
23	question.
24	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you, sir. Now, you may be

asked questions later by the Board; we reserve the right.

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1	But in the interest of getting everything on the surface as
2	it were, why, we thank you for your presentation.
3	MR. HOM: Thank you.
4	JUDGE MILLER: Let's see. Who is next now in the
5	order of things? I guess it's Mr. Goldberg.
6	
7	ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE
8	CITY OF CLEVELAND, INTERVENOR
9	
1	MR. GOLDBERG: Your Honor, my name is Reuben
11	Goldberg. I represent the City of Cleveland. It so happens
12	that the very first thing I was going to talk about was
13	practical value.
14	JUDGE MILLER: Is that right? Okay. Go ahead.
15	MR. GOLDBERG: I'd like to tell you the reason why
16	I chose that as the beginning.
17	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
18	MR. GOLDBERG: In their original motion, the
19	applicants did not talk about practical value in any manner,
20	sense, sense or form. The first time they talked about
21	practical value was in their reply, and in their reply, they
22	made certain claims to which we had no opportunity for
53	written response.
24	I've looked into the question of practical value
25	and a response must be made, and since we have a reporter,

you will have a written response.

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JUDGE MILLER: Very well.

MR. GOLDBERG: At Page 59 of their reply, the applicants proclaim as follows, and I quote: "By 1970, the statutory requirement for a finding of practical value had been overtaken by events. Numerous facilities licensed as research and development reactors were being constructed and going into commercial nuclear power plants. In short," and please listen very carefully to this sentence --

JUDGE MILLER: All right. We're focused.

MR. GOLDBERG: -- "the reality was by 1970 the technology and economics of nuclear power appeared to be sufficiently devaloped that reasonably accurate predictions about cost could be made. Accordingly, the statutory requirement for an agency finding of practical value was eliminated and the commercial licensing procedure, with its associated antitrust review, was initiated." End of quote.

The applicants then go on to conclude that this supports their bedrock issue as correct.

one would imagine -- and incidentally, those statements are footnote -- one would imagine that they were relying on the 1970 legislative history, but they were not. The first footnote relies upon a letter written in August 1966 by Chairman Seaborg of the Commission in response to a letter dated January the 20th, 1966 from Congressman

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Holifield, Chairman of the then Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy.

Chairman Seaborg was sending a response to a letter from the Congressman, and he had sent him a copy of the Commission's determination of December 29th, 1965 in which the Commission said, we can't make a determination of practical value even with respect to what I would refer to as tea kettle nuclear research and development plants.

Chairman Holifield then sent another letter to Chairman Seaborg and he asked for their opinion, the Commission's opinion, on eliminating the practical value requirement because he thought the time had arrived to consider that question, and he pointed out that he was linking that request with respect to the possible consideration in a session of Congress for an amendment which would eliminate the practical value requirement.

Chairman Seaborg's reply is devoted to answering the questions, one of which was, and I quote, "Is there a continued need for the requirement of a finding of practical value as embodied in Section 102?"

This question Chairman Seaborg answered in the negative, noting that, "The requirement for a finding of differences in treating between developmental facilities under Section 104(b) and commercial facilities licensed under Section 103 appears to have been based principally

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upon anticipated scarcity of nuclear materials and the

desire for a mechanism" -- these are the Chairman's words

-- "which would serve to designate the point at which a

facility type has reached the commercial stage and therefore
should not be eligible for further government assistance."

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Let me pause there to interpolate. He's pointing out reasons that have absolutely nothing to do with the bedrock issue.

He goes on, and I quote, "The reasons for making the distinction have either receded in importance or have been shown to have less significance than was previously attributed to them." End of quote. And he goes on, "In view of the present abundant supply of nuclear materials and the recent private ownership amendments to the Act permitting individuals to acquire and own special nuclear material, the reason based on scarcity can no longer be considered valid." End of quote.

Responding to the question whether a statutory distinction should be retained such as existed in the present Act, he answered this question also in the negative, that it would be not appropriate for the reasons already given.

He then goes on to discuss a major area in which the requirements of the Act are applicable only to licenses issued under Section 103. The answer refers to the

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1	necessity for, and these are his words, quote, "the
2	prevention of monopolies and restrictions of free
3	competition with respect to facility types which have
4	entered the commercial stage." Unquote. The very thing Ms.
5	Urban was talking about when she was presenting her
6	argument.
7	As the Joint Committee Report makes clear, over a
8	period of 24 years beginning in 1946 until 1970, as the
9	Board probably knows, in the original Act, there was a
10	requirement that a report as to practical value be made to
1.1	the President by the Commission. When that report was made,
12	the President was to submit it to Congress with his
13	recommendations and, following 90 day passed of the
14	submission to Congress, the licenses could be issued under
15	Section 103.
16	JUDGE MILLER: That never happened, did it?
17	MR. GOLDBERG: That never happened. They never
18	made a report. They just couldn't do anything.
19	In 1954, the practical value matter was changed to
20	a finding. The Commission had a requirement to make a
21	finding of practical value before you could go to licensing
22	under Section 103, and they couldn't do that.
23	Finally in 1970, Congress said, we've had enough
24	of that practical value and the efforts, and they threw it

out. It had absolutely nothing to do with supporting, as is

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1	claimed here today and in the reply by the applicants that
2	that supports their position that if a plant is high cost,
3	this Commission has no authority to impose license
4	conditions.
5	It's just incomprehensible to us that they would
6	have relied on a 1966 letter, on memoranda written by the
7	general counsel this is all in the reply from the
8	general counsel to the Commission dated 1964 it gets
9	older all the time and argue
10	JUDGE MILLER: Pardon me. What page of the reply?
11	Could you give that to me?
12	MR. GOLDBERG: It's Pages 57
13	JUDGE MILLER: It's the applicants' reply you're
14	now addressing?
15	MR. GOLDBERG: Pages 57 to 61.
16	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. Okay. I've got it.
17	MR. GOLDBERG: And you'll find the references in
18	the footnotes to 1964 memoranda, to 1966 letters.
19	JUDGE MILLER: Starting with Footnote 133 et seq.?
20	MR. GOLDBERG: Right.
21	JUDGE MILLER: Okay.
22	MR. GOLDBERG: And not only that, when they do
23	finally resort to the Joint Committee Report, do they look
24	at Page 13, where the reasons are given for the elimination?
25	No. They look at Page 9, which as nothing to do with the

reasons why it was eliminated.

I don't have to tell you why they vaited to put it in their reply, on the basis of what I have told you. They expected we wouldn't have an opportunity refer to it.

JUDGE MILLER: We are going to give everybody here today an opportunity to refer to anything within reasonable bounds that will help develop a sound and full record for the board, and for whatever appeals may ensure.

MR. GOLDBERG: I have responded to the practical value question.

JUDGE MILLER: Yes.

MR. GOLDBERG: When you read their motion, their original Motion for Summary sposition, and when you read their reply, they repeat ad nauseam a central theme. That central theme is that if a plant's cost is high cost, there can't be any anti-trust violations, and the Commission has no authority to impose anti-trust conditions.

The problem with their position is that they disregard the balance of the nuclear project, the transmission facilities that are associated with it, and without which transmission facilities those nuclear projects would have to sit there. They couldn't send the power anyplace. That is why they had to build those transmission facilities.

What was the result of building those transmission

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1	racilities, they became parriers to entry into the market of
2	anybody else. Let me call your attention to whether you
3	need
4	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Could you explain that a little
5	bit?
6	MR. GOLDBERG: Of course.
7	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Or develop it, perhaps.
8	MR. GOLDBERG: Let me put it to you this way, the
9	nuclear related transmission lines associated with the
10	construction of the nuclear units add to the applicant's
11	market share, and they raise barriers to the construction of
12	transmission facilities by others, and they make it more
13	difficult for competitors to deal with those.
14	In these circumstances, the cost of the nuclear
15	power is irrelevant. The increased market power raises
16	entry barriers, whatever the cost of the additional power.
17	I can relate that to the situation of the City of Cleveland.
18	The City of Cleveland was surrounded by the
19	transmission facilities of Cleveland Electric Illuminating
20	Company. The City of Cleveland was compelled to buy the
21	power just from Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company,
22	whecher it was low cost or high cost was beside the point.
23	They could buy it only from them because they had no access
24	to any other markets.

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It was the anti-trust license conditions that gave

1	them, for the first time, access to other markets, and I can
2	tell you that without that access there probably wouldn't
3	be, today, a municipal electric operation in the City of
4	Cleve! and.
5	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Could the City of Cleveland
6	have decided to build a transmission line from, say,
7	Cleveland to Niagara Falls, or wherever you get cheap power?
8	MR. GOLDBERG: I would doubt that very much.
9	Let me point out to you that the City of Cleveland
10	was given the right to ownership access of Davis-Besse and
11	Perry, they never were able to raise the money to buy any
12	ownership access. They certainly didn't have the morey to
13	build the kind of transmission facilities they would have
14	had to have built to get to sources that end up in Kentucky,
15	and stays even farther than that.
16	Actually, in Ottor Tail, the Supreme Court of the
17	United States found that Section 2 of the Sherman Act was
18	violated because Otter Tail Power Company had lost its
19	franchise in one or two of the cities, and those cities had
20	determined that they wanted to have a municipal distribution
21	operation. They needed transmission, and Otter Tail
22	refused.
23	They went to the Supreme Court, the District Court
24	first, and then to the Supreme Court of the United States,
25	and the Supreme Court of the United States held that this

monopoly of the transmission amounted to a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Laws, and that was without regard to what the cost of power might be.

All I have to do to relate it to Otter Tail is to substitute the name "City of Cleveland." That is exactly the situation we had, and we were saved from that disaster only by reason of the fact that this Commission found that the licensing of the projects would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws.

Let me also mention to you, I have heard it said by Mr. Murphy, and perhaps also by Ms. Charnoff, that they never raised the question of the Commission's authority to impose anti-trust license positions in the Davis-Besse and Perry proceedings.

Well, I am holding pages 126 and 127 of the appeal briefs to the Appeal Board in those cases, and in the text this appears, the Licensing Board points to the quote:

"Francounced effect on the overall economies" of nuclear generation, citing to the record, as a reason to assume that applicants will derive a competitive advantage by virtue of the Perry and Davis-Besse facilities. Footnote 147.

Now I will read the footnote: It should be understood that such a finding is an absolute prerequisite to the Licensing Board's structural analysis. That is the analysis of nexus. As Dr. Pace testified -- that was their

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1	expert economic witness there first must be made a
2	"determination of whether or not the nuclear plant offers to
3	its owners cost advantages of such a magnitude that those
4	excluded from access to the nuclear unit in question or to
5	similar units are at a significant competitive
6	disadvantage." If that is not the case, the analysis need
7	be carried no further. There is no authority for the
8	Commission to impose anti-trust license conditions.
9	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Isn't that the applicant's
10	argument now?
11	MR. GOLDBERG: The applicant used that same Dr.
12	Pace, and filed an affidavit as part of their pleadings in
13	support of their application, and he in that affidavit he
14	says the very same things.
15	They are telling you today that their position at
16	that time was different in degree and kind and, moreover,
17	they had also said at that time that even if there were some
18	advantages, they were going to be shared by the customers.
19	The fact that they also said that doesn't detract
20	one iota from the fact that they did make that contention.
21	Why did they bring in Dr. Pace with that kind of testimony,
22	if it was going to be low cost power?
23	The fact of the matter is that we have submitted
24	evidence of the rising costs in our reply on the preclusion

issues, which shows that they knew at early stages that the

25

1	costs were going way beyond what they had anticipated, and
2	we have shown that in our reply based upon exhibits, their
3	own exhibits, their own press releases.
4	Let me point out to you in connection with this
5	business of laches that we heard about this morning, Davis-
6	Besse was in operation in 1978, at that time, they knew what
7	the actual costs were. They waited ten years to file their
8	application.
9	Mr. Murphy said it was a very serious problem that
10	they were faced with, and yet they hadn't even filed it at
11	the same time that Ohio Edison filed, they filed in May
12	1988, whereas, Ohio Edison filed in September 1987.
13	At the moment, I must confess to you that I don't
14	know how much time I have used.
15	JUDGE MILLER: You have five more minutes.
16	MR. GOLDbERG: How much?
17	JUDGE MILLER: We are giving you an extension.
18	You have five more minutes.
19	MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you very much.
20	The applicants, in their original motion,
21	purported to analyze the Autorney General's advice letters
22	in very summary fashion, and NRC precedents, and argued on
23	the basis of their analysis that the Attorney General
24	himself had recognized the validity of the bedrock issue.
25	I wonder if the letters they referred to of the

1	Attorney General was his first letter with respect to Davis-
2	Besse I. My recollection was it was 1973. What they didn't
3	refer to was his letter with respect to Perry. With respect
4	to the Perry letter, he refers to his May 1973 letter, and
5	explains why he did not, in that letter, recommend an anti-
6	trust hearing.
7	He points out that there was pending before the
8	Federal Power Commission some application by the City of
9	Cleveland which would probably dispose of the problem
10	between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland Electric
11	Illuminating Company.
12	But by the time of his Perry letter, he had been
13	apprised by the City of Cleveland as to what had been going
14	on, and at that point he recommended not only an anti-trust
15	hearing with respect to Perry I and II, but with respect to
16	Davis-Besse I, II and III, and it was that proceeding in
17	which we actively participated that the license conditions
18	were imposed.
19	I thank the Board very much. If you have any
20	questions, I will be delighted to deal with them.
21	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I have one follow-up question,
22	sort of. Does the fact that they did not
23	Would you have said they should have raised the
24	question bark in the late '70s then?
25	MR. GOLDBERG: When we had the original decisions?

1	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Right.
2	MR. GOLDBERG: I say they did raise it, they
3	raised it to the Appeal Board in what I read to you. They
4	raised that question.
5	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are you saying the Appeal Board
6	then ruled on that question?
7	MR. GOLDBERG: They certainly did sub silentio for
8	this reason, that attacked the very right of the Appeal
9	Board to affirm the Licensing Board, and not only to affirm
10	those conditions, but actually to add an additional
11	condition which we had requested.
12	JUDGE MILLER: That was sub silentio, did you say?
13	MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.
14	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It is not in so many words
15	certainly.
16	JUDGE MILLER: That's correct. That is what it
17	means.
18	MR. GOLDBERG: They dealt. That was an issue that
19	was important to the outcome. It attacked the very
20	jurisdiction of the Commission.
21	Thank you very much.
22	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.
23	Let's hear the next one.
24	MS. CHARNOFF: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt,
25	but I wondered if we could take a break.

1	JUDGE MILLER: Yes, fifteen minutes.
2	MS. CHARNOFF: Ckay.
3	[Recess.]
4	JUDGE MILLER: Yes, sir you may resume.
5	You may proceed.
6	
7	ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF INTERVENORS
8	
9	MR. STRAUS: Thank you. My name is David Straus.
10	I am counsel for AMP-Ohio, which represents the interests of
11	its 75 municipal electric system members, about 40 of which
12	are direct beneficiaries of the license conditions here
13	because they are located in what's called the CCCT, the
14	Capco service territories.
15	You've had a lot of detail here this morning and
16	hundreds of pages of detail in the briefs. It's not my
17	intention to go into any detail that I can avoid. I thought
18	instead I would try to hit on a couple of the major themes
19	or a couple of the major problems I see in the Applicant's
20	position, especially as expressed for the first time in
21	their reply brief.
22	The first problem, a generic type problem, I think
23	a fatal one is the Applicant's discarding of the second
24	half of the test for "create or maintain." That's two
25	words, create or maintain, in Section 105.

The Applicants deal only with the creation of a situation inconsistent, not with the maintenance of one.

You'll see therefore that their entire thrust of their low cost argument is that absent low cost a utility with a nuclear plant cannot obtain or "enhance," to use Ms.

Charnoff's words, a competitive advantage. A site, for example, pages 6 to 7 of their reply brief, where they say and I quote, "The incremental impact on the marketplace of a less competitive product than is other ise available cannot enhance the product owner's competitive positions." Again, Ms. Charnoff in response to questions from the bench today repeated that enhancement of the competitive position was what she was examining, but the statute doesn't require enhancement of anti-competitive situation or situation inconsistent, just its maintenance.

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while we strongly believe that a situation inconsistent can in fact be created or enhanced because of market power absent low cost, it is absolutely clear that the addition of new bulk power supply by a utility already dominating the bulk power market can be maintained by the addition of that nuclear plant, even if that nuclear plant isn't the cheapest possible plant. Therefore, they can help continue in effect a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws without being that low-cost plant.

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The 1977 and 1979 decisions which established

these license conditions did not predict that these nuclear plants would in the future create or enhance a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Rather, in painstaking detail this agency described the situation inconsistent which already existed without these plants, a situation they reasonably believed would be maintained by activities under the license.

A finding of lower cost was not required by the statute, was not made. It was not necessary.

A second problem with the Applicant's position is their understandable attempts to separate the sanctions of the license conditions from their own activities. According to them, low-cost plants create situations inconsistent; higher cost plants do not. Their activities are presumably irrelevant.

At page 17 of their reply brief they describe their first part of their three-part test which they again described this morning as, quote, "determining whether a nuclear facility will create or maintain."

At page 61 they say that the issue posed by Section 105(c) is whether a particular facility is so advantageous, and again I quote, "that its construction and operation would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws." It's not the plant that is the problem; it's the activities of its owners which creats this

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situation, in the words of the statutes -- the activities, not the plant which creates the situation inconsistent.

The Applicants have so confused themselves while attempting to confuse you on this point that they make the preposterous claim on page 32, footnote 64, which Ms. Charnoff repeated again this morning, "But if Congress were concerned with market clout, with market share rather than lower cost" -- quote -- "it simply would have mandated license conditions for every nuclear plant."

No, it would not, not any more than it would have mandated license conditions for every low-cost nuclear plant under their theory of cost. Congress, unlike the Applicants, recognized that it is not the plants but what owners do with them that create anti-competitive situations.

Congress therefore had no reason to distinguish between those kinds of plants. The Applicants simply choose to ignore the decades of anti-competitive behavior which brought them here, trying to pin blame on plants and then pin blame only on low-cost plants.

A third major problem with the Applicant's position is their claim that they do not run afoul of the doctrine of Federal Power Commission v. Texaco cited in the AMP-Ohio brief. That case, as you may recall, prohibited an administrative agency from administratively modifying a statute simply because the underlying beliefs or the

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impressions that Congress had at the time it passed it may have changed. We cited other cases for that proposition.

They say no, we shouldn't be citing that case.

They are not trying to obtain a different interpretation or different statutory scheme. They say the statutory scheme was always this way, that things were so clear they didn't have to be stated.

Well, let's look at the statute that the Applicants are trying to create here. It's not just low cost that they are trying to read into the statute. I have tried to come up with a formulation of some statutory language, which is the statute the Applicants are urging on you here.

They say that the license conditions should be imposed when nuclear plants are less expensive than alternatives and when that lower cost creates or maintains a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws and even when the agency reasonably concludes that these situations exist if the nuclear plant turns out to be or becomes at any future more expensive than an alternative plant which could have been built, the license conditions should be suspended until it is once a ain less costly.

That is the statute that they ay is so clear that it need not have been spelled out in the statutory language or in the legislative history. Of course the law says none

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of that.

Under the Applicant's own test of statutory construction, set forth at page 85, that the rationality of a statute must be assessed. This strange statutory language or the interpretation which I just read to you clearly fails the test of rationality.

For the reasons that AMP-Ohio and others stated in their briefs, it is ludicrous to believe that Congress intended a scheme for this industry where the rights of customers, the rights of competitors could come and go as costs change and that this Agency would be required to conduct periodic, maybe annual, maybe semiannual, maybe biennial, reviews of nuclear power costs and costs of some alternatives, whatever they might be.

Rather, Congress clearly contemplated that what the NRC would do is examine the situation at the time the license was applied for, would determine if these plant owners were likely to use this nuclear plant in a manner consistent with prior behavior and inconsistent with the antitrust laws and if they so found to impose license conditions. Applicants are about 1 ears too late to argue that no license conditions should have been imposed on them.

But the Applicants in their brief and again this morning have down-played the "now you see it, now you don't" problem, which we continually raise in this case about

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1	license conditions. We are the ones, after all, that have
2	to live with them. We're the ones who will have our
3	interconnections reasonable sometimes and unreasonable other
4	times. Sometimes we can buy maintenance power and sometimes
5	we wan't. Sometimes we'll get transmission and sometimes we
6	won't. One of the license conditions requires the
7	utilities, the Applicants to plan for our disclosed
8	transmission needs. Does this mean that sometimes they plan
9	for them and sometimes they don't plan for them, depending
10	upon economics?
11	They deny that this will exist. They raise a
12	factual question, what was supposed to be a legal argument.
13	At pages 77 and 78 of the reply they make the
14	unsupported and certainly unsupportable assertion that there
15	is no reasonable risk that their nuclear facilities will
16	ever be low cost because all of the fixed costs, all the
17	capital costs are already sunk. Ms. Charnoff again this
18	morning said that what she called the yo-yo effect
19	possibility was remote. I respectfully submit that this is
20	just another example of the Applicant saying one thing
21	before one audience and another thing before another
22	audience because theses statements are expressly
23	contradicted with statements these Applicants are making
24	elsewhere.
25	The Applicants' brief, reply brief, at Footnote

256, tells us that we should go look at the Cleveland Plain
Dealer of April 12, 1992. They refer to that newspaper
article. Well, I usually do what I'm told, so I did see it.

That newspaper article has the following statement in it. I'll read it to you: "'The Clean Air Act will place additional costs on coal-burning plants, forcing rates to rise,' said Centerior's Lang." Centerior is the holding company which owns both CEI and Toledo Edison, two of the three Applicants. "He said Centerior would not face as much of a burden because 40 percent of its power is from nuclear plants. Lang said that those who switched to Municipal Power claim to have control of their destinies but they are rolling the dice. 'The short-term power is out there for another couple of years. They will probably be able to have some minimal savings. Well, when that period dries up, they are totally at the mercy of the power market.'"

This has nothing to do with cost. It has to do with market dominance where we're totally at the mercy of those utilities, the Applicants, which control all of the baseload power. That is what they are telling the Cleveland Plain Dealer, that the nuclear plants might be more expensive but wait till the Clean Air Act hits and those utilities are adding scrubbers, which are not an operating expense, they are a capital cost and a very big one at that. These utilities are predicting in public that the cost of

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the * nuclear plants are going to decline and get below these of coal plants.

1:

This isn't the only statement of the Applicants inconsistent with what they tell you here this morning.

October 30, 1989 issue of Electric Utility Teek, quote.

Edison concedes its rates are high. 'We recognize the cur customers are upset with us over rates,' said the eswoman, but efforts are underway to bring them the next year.' With 40 percent of its generation compased of nuclear power and 14 percent of coal plants with scrubbers, the company sees itself as a clean utility with better relative pricing if acid rain legislation is passed."

We all know that acid rain legislation was passed, and phase one begins in 1995.

Company. This is a document they prepared to distribute in the village of Chardon, Ohio, which was considering public power.

This is what CEI has to say -- this is January 30, 1992, a few months ago: "Due to our previous investment in nuclear power and our ongoing environmental improvement program, we expect relatively minimal rate increases (five to seven percent in total) to meet Clean Air Act standards.

Many other coal-dependent utilities in our region are facing emission reduction costs two to three times higher."

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Ohio Edison sings the same tune but it's not in this hearing room. In an Oh. Edison document prepared for distribution in the city of Rittman, October, 1990, this is what Ohio Edison says: "About 42 percent of Edison's generating capacity, its nuclear, oil and scrubbed coalfired units, won't need major additional environmental controls as a result of new Clean Air legislation. Some midwestern electric companies which haven't made similar investments as well as the government power systems they supply will be affected far more by the new legislation."

Finally, we have an Ohio Edison document prepared for the city of Medina, Ohio, another community thinking about going into the power business, dated April, 1988.

Again I quote Ohio Edison: "In effect AMP-Ohio knows its future ability to supply power and transport it to municipal electric systems is uncertain, especially with the significant impact new environmental legislation would have on the available supply of electricity it buys on the open market. These supply and transmission problems don't exist for Ohio Edison customers."

They are not talking about price. They are talking about supply and transmission problems (caated undoubtedly by Ohio Edison's monopoly over both supply and transmission, certainly a monopoly in the absence of these license conditions.

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1	Ohio Edison continues, and I will too this is a
2	quote: "Ohio Edison has completed its new plant
3	construction program which will have the effect of
4	stabilizing Edison rates well into the future. The first of
5	Edison's two new generating units, Perry I, was placed into
6	rates at less than one-third the evel that had been
7	predicted by some special interest groups" toting the
8	low-cost nuclear power, no doubt.
9	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Is that "had been placed in
10	service" or actual service costs?
11	MR. STRAUS: " was placed into rates at less
12	than one-third the level that had been predicted."
13	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay.
14	MR. STRAUS: Getting to a couple of
15	JUDGE MILLER: Are you ready to conclude?
16	MR. STRAUS: Yes, a couple of, two brief points
17	and a concluding sentence.
18	JUDGE MILLER: Go ahead.
19	MR. STRAUS: Ms. Charnoff discussed this morning
20	that if a plant was the only plant available irrespective of
21	cost because of environmental considerations, then probably
22	antitrust conditions might be appropriate because then there
23	would be no alternatives.
24	This is a part of the Applicant's confusing
25	alternatives to Ohio Edison at the time it chose to build

the plant and alternatives to the customers. In that situation neither had alternatives, but if Ohio Edison had available to it an alternative lower cost plant that it didn't build, or if other utilities in the area had lower cost plants, they are no more available to us than the environmentally unsound plant which wasn't built unless we have access to it.

The available supply for the customers is what we are talking about in terms of alternatives, not the alternative that the company could have built but didn't.

Mr. Murphy said that nobody wants this nuclear plant, that we had the right to buy into it and chose not to. That is not quite right. Shortly after the license conditions were issued, AMP-Ohio and municipal systems individually tried to pass a constitutional amendment in Ohio which would have permitted them to do exactly that. The Ohio constitution prohibits joint ownership between municipals and private entities. A municipal utility in Ohio cannot now and counsel has told us this when we tried, cannot now jointly own a plant. We could not buy a share of that plant.

We tried to get a constitutional amendment. 1
personally wrote a letter to the capital companies trying to
preserve our right to buy. While we tried to pass this
constitutional amendment, who opposed it? Ohio Edison, CEI

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1	and Toledo Edison created an entity called Citizens Against
2	Tax Exemption and raised lots of money and beat the
3	constitutional amendment, which would have permitted us to
4	buy into the nuclear plant.
5	Would we buy into it today? Not on a bet! Would
6	we have bought it then? Probably would have, if they had
7	let us raise the money.
8	In these cases the Applicants are trying to stave
9	off competition from communities which are contemplating the
1.0	creation of municipal power systems and from communities
11	which already have them.
12	This case is about competition, that kind of
13	competition. The license conditions have worked.
14	Competition is now flourishing and the Applicants just can't
15	stand it.
16	That's all I have, unless there are some
17	questions.
18	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. We may ask you a
19	question later, but we want to conclude the direct.
20	Mr. MacGuineas, I guess you are at bat now.
21	
22	ORAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENORS
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24	MR. MacGUINNESS: Your Honor, I am Squire
25	MacGuinness, and I'm here representing the Alabama Electric

Cooperative as a limited Intervenor for the purpose of briefing and briefly here discussing the substantive issue before the Board. I want to just take my time here to respond to Applicant's contention that their interpretation of 105(c) was never aired or articulated in the substantive antitrust reviews because it was universally conceded that nuclear power at issue in the license proceedings would be a low cost or was anticipated to be low cost, and therefore, the companies didn't raise the matter in the substantive licensing reviews, although it was just as jurisdictionally a prerequisite then as it is today, according to Applicant this morning.

In fact, that's not the case, and the reason that in our brief that we rely heavily on the 11th Circuit opinion in the Alabama Power Company case is that this second contention was raised in that proceeding and before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in the Alabama Power Company versus Nuclear Regulatory Commission that we cite in our brief, stated that Alabama Power argues that the NRC overstepped its authority in looking past the direct effects of the nuclear plant on the present or prospective competitive situation.

In fact, Alabama Power Company represented to the Court in its reply brief, that APCo submits the situation is necessarily limited by the phrase, "activities under the

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license," and the word, "situation," being the statutory language. Congress' concern arose from a perception that extraordinary cost advantages would result from the use of nuclear energy to generate electricity.

Alabama Power has demonstrated that construction - that that construction gives full effect to the
predominant concern of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
that by virtue of a perceived low cost output from nuclear
facilities, owners of such plants would, over the life of
the unit, obtain a decisive competitive advantage over their
rivals. They were making a contention there that, we
submit, is indistinguishable from the contention being made
by Applicants here today; that first, you have to look at
whether the nuclear facility itself is producing a
competitively low cost output before you can go on to look
at any of the other anticompetitive conduct on the part of
the Applicant or any of the other matters in the competitive
environment.

We submit that that was rejected by the Court of Appeals in the 11th Circuit very clearly, using the language that the statute clearly calls for a broad inquiry and common sense does not allow interpretations to the contrary. The Congress intended this broad inquiry using all available information. The traditional antitrust enforcement school was not envisioned and a wider one is put in its place. In

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other words, one did not limit one's view, even initially,
to an analysis of the cost of power coming, either
anticipated, or in fact, from the nuclear units that were
being licensed, but that you looked at the entire
anticompetitive environment produced by the Applicants'
conduct.

Chairman Miller, you will recall that many of the
facts in the Farley case went back to the 40's and up
through the 70's in gathering the data and the information
that permitted the necessary conclusion in that case that
there was a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you. I think we have some time for rebuttal reserved by Ms. Charnoff. Is that 20 minutes?

With that, I'll conclude. Thanks very much.

which would be exacerbated by the licensing of the plants.

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MS. CHARNOFF: It is. I hope that I won't use all that.

JUDGE MILLER: Okay, take your time. We're in good time so we want everyone to have -- I don't think that there was anyone else who reserved time. In any event, when counsel has the opportunity to present, the Board likes to open the matter up for general questions or things that may have been overlooked, so we make sure that everybody's had a full, fair, due process kind of hearing.

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Inasmuch as we're not going to have a trial, we'd like to have an adequate record for our own purposes and the 2 appellate bodies. You may proceed. 3 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS MS. CHARNOFF: If the Board will bear with me, I'm going to go over these points from my notes from the various parties. 9 JUDGE MILLER: Sure, no problem. 10 MS. CHARNOFF: I believe both the Department of 11 Justice and AMPO suggest that our position on the bedrock 12 legal issue ignores activities of the Applicants which they 13 14 contend are the critical inquiry under Section 105(c). I don't think we ignore that at all, and I want to make that 15 16 clear: We have said that Section 105(c) has three steps. 17 We haven't said it has one step, only our step; we said it 18 19 has three steps. Their focus on activities, and, for that 20 matter, as counsel for Alabama just argued, focusing on Farley, again, activities and the scope of the situation, 21 22 all of that goes to what we have described as Step Two; what 23 is the situation. 24 So, it's not that we've ignored it or we think we

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never reached that question. Our point is that you have to

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first establish that the licensed activities will create or maintain before you get into that. So, to continue to characterize our argument as suggesting that Applicants' activities are irrelevant, which is, I think, the word that counsel for AMPO used, is not correct. We're not saying it's irrelevant to Section 105(c); we're saying it's irrelevant to the bedrock legal issue, which is the first step in a 105(c) analysis.

I'd like to talk about something that the NRC Staff focused on. The NRC Staff wants to suggest that other competitive advantage is available by virtue of a nuclear power plant, our quality and reliability. I would like to challenge that, both as a legal matter, and for that matter, as a factual matter.

The issue of reliability which seemed to be the focus of the discussion here a little while ago, really goes to the entire system of the utility and their ability to interconnect effectively, their ability to provide backup power appropriately. It doesn't go to the licensed activity.

To the extent you're talking about whether a plant is operating or not operating at a given time, that either results in the consumer being provided with another source of power, or, to put it another way, a higher cost on an annual basis for that plant because it's used less often and

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has a lot of downtime, to put in NRC lingo, so I think that
the quote, "reliability factor," is being confused here,
both with the cost issue, because reliability translates to
cost, and to the question of reliability of one utility
company versus another, not one plant or one type of plant

versus another.

R

The other point I want to make about this is that our bedrock legal issue requires lower cost visa vis alternatives. And it requires -- we haven't determined yet - this is an issue of fact for the second phase of the proceeding, and it requires a determination of what do you compare the nuclear plant to? What is the appropriate comparison?

I would contend that the issue of reliability, to the extent it's relevant at all, is a fact issue; that is, what plant do you compare to what? You don't compare — perhaps you don't compare it — and I haven't analytically thought this out — but perhaps you don't compare a very unreliable plant to a very reliable plant. I must say that the Staff citation to a 1977 decision which we've not seen — it was not in their brief, this United Technologies case, to me is not compelling because, unfortunately, I don't believe nuclear plants have proved to be more reliable than other sources of baseload power.

I'd love to be proven wrong on that point, but in

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any event, I think it's an issue of fact. It doesn't go to
the bedrock legal issue. I don't think it detracts from the
fundamental issue that we think this case is about, which is
cost.

Turning to the city of Cleveland, first of all, the issue of transmission facilities being a barrier to entry and their argument that Otter Tail established under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Wheeling would be appropriate to respond to that type of situation, that's very much part of our argument; that there are other forums available and functioning which address the issue of transmission access and provide the remedy of Wheeling.

They cite the critical Supreme Court case on this point. That proves our point to some extent that the NRC does not stand alone here, and, in fact, the NRC's focus, by virtue of the very wording in question here, the particularized regime, as the case law says of Section 105(c), that the NRC's focus is somewhat different than that under the Sherman Act. It is a narrower focus. It is focused on the licensed activities, specifically.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Ms. Charnoff, isn't it, to some extent, broader when you consider the 10(2) language visa vis violation language which is part of those other statutes? Aren't the very circumstances that if the conditions were eliminated, a number of activities would not

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1	be subject to challenge or to questioning, which are subject
2	under the NRC conditions, just the fact that they go beyond
3	violations?
4	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I think that you're correct.
5	I hope that I have tried to be consistent here, and that's
6	why we talk about a different, rather than a narrower or
7	broader standard under the NRC regime. I think that the NRC
8	regime, unlike the general antitrust laws, the NRC regime is
9	focused on the incremental impact of a particular facility
10	on the, quote, "situation," the competitive situation in the
11	marketplace.
12	That's not in the general antitrust laws at all.
13	That is a requirement utterly absent from the general
14	antitrust law, something the opposition never seems to
15	mention. So that you are limited to that focus.
16	But once you go into that, once you pass the
17	threshold which we've described, of establishing that there,
18	in fact, will be an adverse incremental impact, then I agree
19	with you that the standard for conditioning the license
20	before the NRC, that standard is a lower standard than the
21	standard for imposing an antitrust remedy under the civil
22	antitrust statute.
23	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes, but from the other
24	standard, though, dropping the antitrust conditions, would
25	then reduce to some extent the antitrust protection

afforded certain ample higher utilities or Cleveland or anybody who sought access to power.

MS. CHARNOFF: We are being held to the standard that we re being held to, which, I agree, is tougher, presumably because the licensed activities create or maintain and NRC is very interested in not having its actions by virtue of licensing this nuclear plant — they don't want that action, the Government-sanctioned activity, to create an antitrust problem.

So, I agree that once you get through our threshold, our Step One Issue, there's a lower threshold.

But if there's no Step One Issue, if there is no incremental impact from the nuclear plant, our point is precisely this:

Why should we be held to a different standard than anybody else? That's our issue.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Although I take it, as Ms. Urban has phrased it, anyway, the impact that you're looking at is the effect on market power and how you use it; am I correct?

MS. CHARNOFF: I don't know.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: The focus of AMPO/Ohio and Ms.

Urban is that market power is the critical factor here, not cost, and if I'm understanding what they're saying, it doesn't matter what your costs are, as long as you're impacting on your -- you have market power or are having some impact because you're becoming a licensed facility and

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can use that market power in some way, in a way that violates the antitrust laws and that's all that's required.

MS. CHARNOFF: Maybe this will answer your point, because one of the other points that I wanted to make, Judge Bollwerk, is AMPO's assertion that we're not talking about maintaining; that our incremental impact language is only dealing with creating and not maintaining. That's not at all correct.

That is, we believe incremental impact is what maintaining means. You can't maintain unless you in some affirmative way, make some contribution to it. I don't know what other words in the English language to use. That they seem to suggest that it's a self-evident proposition that new bulk power, regardless of its cost, will maintain.

You know, I could build 20 plants and if they all cost twice as much as other available power, that is not going to give me anything, except it's going to make me a very costly company. There's this constant assertion in the briefs and again here today, that it's somehow intuitive or self-evident that now bulk power, per se, more bulk power, more power, will inherently maintain an anticompetitive situation under the statute. I don't think that's correct.

I don't think that's logical and I don't see why that is true. Our position is that it won't do that unless it's low cost bulk power, and that's why you always see

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1	those words in tandem in the cases and in the legislative
2	history and whatnot, because it has to be both. There's
3	nothing inherently valuable about bulk power.
4	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Well, or unless it is used in
5	that manner, I think is what they're saying. If it's used
6	in a manner that maintains those antitrust conditions, which
7	is what you have to look at, then
8	MS. CHARNOFF: What I'm saying is that it can't be
9	used. That's out point. It cannot be used.
10	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Okay, I see what you're saying.
11	MS. CHARNOFF: That's our point; it simply cannot.
12	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I think their response to that -
13	-without putting words in their mouths you don't know
14	until you look at it, but you can't say it simply because
15	it's not low cost if you're not going to use it that way.
16	MS. CHARNOFF: Well, I would say that that's not
17	logically consistent, and that's not consistent with any
18	experience that you want to cite to. I mean, we've tried -
19	-part of the reason our briefs have been so long is, we
20	tried to look at every source we could to see whether you
21	need that combination, and we think you do. Nobody has
22	shown us that you don't.
23	We just aren't aware of a situation anywhere where
24	bulk power that is high cost nevertheless maintains a
25	competitive situation as we understand that word; we just

1	don't see it.
2	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, wouldn't it be less
3	expensive to buy high cost bulk power under any
4	circumstances than to go in and build a new facility to make
5	such power under any circumstances? Your pricing would be
6	based, theoretically, on operating costs. You've already
7	spent the money on the facility and you're not going to get
8	that back, except maybe by doubling its life by adding to is
9	renewal or something.
10	You could cut costs drastically by depreciating it
11	over 60 years rather than 40 or whatever the figure are, and
12	there are a lot of ways that these things could be made to
13	vary, so
14	MS. CHARNOFF: I don't know if this is directly
15	answering you, but I think we're getting back to the point
16	that we talked about somewhat earlier, which is, if there is
17	no alternative
18	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm not saying no alternative;
19	there's always an alternative to build a new source.
20	MS. CHARNOFF: But if there's no alternative but
21	the high cost source that you have, and therefore you have
22	to build an alternative, then it may be more costly to build
23	an alternative, in which case nuclear power is low cost
24	relative to the alternative in which case the NDC's

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antitrust jurisdiction would be invoked.

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JUDGE BOLLWERK: Or you may just swallow hard and 1 2 accept the monopolistic practices that are being imposed on 3 you. I mean, isn't that the other alternative and isn't that what they're trying to avoid? 5 In other words, Cleveland gives in in this 6 situation and says, okay, we give up. We're going to buy 7 your high cost power because we don't have transmission 8 access of whatever the problem is. 9 MS. CHARNOFF: First, let me say that I think that 10 Clevelard. itself, in pointing to the Otter Tail case, made 11 the point that there -- that NRC is not the guardian of 12 transmission across the United States. That's not the 13 purpose of Section 105(c) and they also pointed out, there's 14 more than -- this has been a rational issue for many, many 15 years, and there is legislation pending, but the point is 16 that this is not the NRC's papese nor role. JUDGE BOLLWERK: But it may well be the guardian, 17 18 at least within the confines of the service area, unless 19 there's a nuclear power plant. I mean, that's what I guess 20 we're here about in large part. 21 MS. CHARNOFF: I think that if the nuclear power 22 plant exacerbates the situation by virtue of increasing the 23 competitive -- or advancing, enhancing, the competitive position of its owners, then the whole world of the licensee 24

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is open for consideration, including transmission. But

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1	transmission is not a licensed activity of the NRC; other
2	people license transmission.
3	The cases get into transmission because they're
4	looking at the entire situation, so they're looking at
5	everything joing on in the universe there.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. When you are applying for
7	a license before the NRC, you're transmission facility is
8	built to serve whatever the facility is, and is clearly
9	subject to review. It may not be license, but it's
10	certainly subject to environmental review.
11	MS. CHARNOFF: That's right, there are NEPA
12	considerations.
13	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, they have to pass muster
1.4	before us, as well.
15	MS. CHARNOFF: We do not license when you issue
16	a construction permit or an operating license, you're not
17	licensing specific transmission facilities.
18	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: No, but we're considering them.
19	They are a factor.
20	MS. CHARNOTF: You're considering them in very
21	specific ways. You consider them in your NEPA analysis and
22	when you look at the entire situation, in which a nuclear
23	plant will enhance the competitive marketplace, you look at
24	all of the transmission that's available.
25	THINGE BOLLWEPK: Do I understand you to be saving

that in the absence of the anti-trust, or for whatever reason the Licensing Board here had decided not to impose any kind of an access requirement in terms of ownership or power, but it simply put the Wheeling provisions in, that that was something the NRC could not do simply because that deals with only sort of transmission issues, and not access to the plant itself?

MS. CHARNOFF: No. That goes to remedial nexus, and I think that that was clearly established to not be the case in Farley. I beg to differ with counsel for Alabama on what Farley was all about.

Farley was about situational nexus and it was about remedial nexus. Once it is established that a licensed facility creates or maintains, and once it is established that there is a situation inconsistent with the anti-trust laws, it is very clear that the NRC has very broad authority to remely that situation in any way it sees fit, in any way that will, in fact, remedy it, and imposing Wheeling requirements is one such way.

Without going into great detail, I would like to just waive a big flag over what is probably about the last half of what counsel for AMPO said. Mr. Straus spent a lot of time talking about facts, which, first of all, I would like to suggest are outside the scope of the disposition of a Motion for Summary Disposition.

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1	Secondly, I really seriously beg to differ. I
2	can't put on an evidentiary case at this point, but his
3	suggestion that Ohio Edison, or applicants generally, have
4	said that the nuclear plants will be lower cost than the
5	coal plants, I would be very surprised if there is any such
6	statement, and the statements he read simply did not say
7	that.
8	The fact that he said that AMPO would not buy into
9	the nuclear plants on a bet, which I think is the phrase he
10	used, certainly suggests to the contrary.
11	The fact is that in the case of Ohio Edison, for
1.2	example, with which I am most familiar, the Perry Plant
13	represents about 7 percent, I believe that is the figure, of
1.4	the total system power supply. On the other hand, it
1.5	probably represents close to 25 percent of Ohio Edison's
16	costs.
17	So there is an enormous disparity between the
1.8	contribution, if you will, of the nuclear plant, and its
19	cost.
20	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Again, is that operating costs,
21	or is that construction costs?
2.2	MS. CHARNOFF: I believe that that is construction
2 3	costs. It does not even include It is rate based. I
2.4	believe that doesn't even include the operating costs. Of
25	course, when we are talking about costs, we are talking

1	about both.
2	The operating costs also are very, very high, much
3	higher than anticipated.
4	In general, I would like to say on this point that
5	all this discussion about comparing nuclear with other
6	things that is a Phase II issue. We have deliberately, and
7	all the parties agreed to divide the case into the legal
8	issue, the bedrock legal issue, and consideration of facts
9	such as what you compare what to for Phase II.
10	If you would give me one moment, I think that is
11	all I have, but I just want to double check my notes.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Sure.
13	MS. CHARNOFF: I would like to make one little
14	point, and that is that early on, I believe it was with my
15	co-counsel, there was discussion about Wheeling, and whether
16	that is what this case was all about.
17	I don't want to suggest Wheeling is not a part of
18	this case, but I do want to suggest, as Mr. Straus from AMP
19	Ohio pointed out, there are other issues, and controversies
20	that the license conditions address besides Wheeling.
21	One is interconnection point issue that I believe
22	Mr. Straus raised, and also the issue of availability of
23	back-up power which I raised earlier.
24	I am not as familiar, frankly, with the situation
25	with CEI in Toledo, but I can certainly say that it would

1	not be correct to reduce the whole importance of the license
2	conditions to the Pheeling provision.
3	Obviously, unfortunately, we are not talking about
4	the access to the nuclear plant provision, so there are some
5	provisions that are not implicated, but it is more than one.
6	JUDGE BOLLWERK: But the Wheeling are certainly
7	significant.
8	MS. CHARMOFF: I can only tell you what I know,
9	Your Honor, which is, Wheeling may become significant, but,
10	at least in the case of Ohio Edison, we don't have a lot of
11	confidence that it necessarily is.
12	JUDGE BOLLWERK: At least for your client, you are
13	saying it is not significant?
14	MS. CHARNOFF: I am not in a position to represent
15	that they would never go to FERC and ask to change the
16	Wheeling requirements that FERC imposes. However, they do
17	feel very strongly that they would have to satisfy FERC that
18	they are not doing this for any reason that is going to
19	create an anti-trust type problem.
20	JUDGE MILLER: In the case of Wheeling, are they
21	not compensated for at least the costs, the embedded costs
22	involved in providing Wheeling services?
23	MS. CHARNOFF: I wish I knew exactly what embedded
24	costs are.
25	JUDGE MILLER: I will strike that.


1	In other words, the re not losing money by
2	providing that service where compelled to do so either by
3	NRC requirements or otherwise, are they?
4	MS. CHARNOFF: I don't know. I can't answer that.
5	That is all I have.
6	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.
7	I believe at this time we will open up the floor
8	for the Board. First of all, since we have had the benefit
9	now of reading all of your briefs that have been filed over
10	a period of time, and your points of authorities, and having
11	heard the arguments of counsel, and their responses to each
12	other, now we would like to have the Board to have an
13	opportunity to follow-up, perhaps, on some things, or not,
14	as they wish.
15	But at least the opportunity will be there, and we
16	will also preserve the rights of all of you counsel to be
17	sure that the record is going to fairly reflect your own
18	positions insofar as there being any further necessity.
19	Judge Bechhoefer, you are up. Bring out your
20	quotations and have at them.
21	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I have referred to several
22	statements made during the hearings leading to Section 105
23	in the 1970 hearings, and they do include some of the
24	references to low cost power that we have seen referred to,

but they seem to have many other references, a couple of


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1	which I have already gone over.
2	I would like to have Ms. Charnoff, I guess,
3	comment on a couple of the other ones, like, Mr. Donnem of
4	the Department of Justice, a fairly famous speech he put in
5	the record, or that is in the record, stated, for
6	instance I will read this: Pre-licensing review of
7	plants for nuclear power plants he was talking about the
8	anti-trust review now is not only beneficial from the
9	usual anti-trust viewpoint of promoting cost reduction by
10	permitting undue lessening of competition, it also permits
11	the AEC to promote cost reduction by reducing, to the extent
12	possible, social costs that would not or could not be
1.3	adequately redressed by the power company.
14	That is in the same speech.
15	MS. CHARNOFF: I have the legislative history
16	here, could you tell me where you are reading because I am
17	having trouble following.
18	JUDGE MILLER: What is your page number?
19	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It is page 11 of the hearings,
20	the bottom of page 11.
21	To me, that would suggest that to the extent cost
22	is significant, it means not only economic cost, but also
23	social costs, or environmental costs, in other contexts, as
24	a separate cost item.
25	MS. CHARNOFF: I am only reading the paragraph

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)









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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)







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1 that you are referring to. While I have read Mr. Donnem's 2 statement, it has been a little while. 3 Let me say, what I think he is referring to is the value of pre-licensing review on any subject. You are 5 better off doing it before than during or after. I think 6 that is the point of this paragraph, and I don't think, when 7 he talks here about reducing social costs, he is talking 8 about doing that through 105(c). I may be misreading it. 9 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I am wondering whether I am 10 misreading it, or how it should be read is what I am really 11 trying to figure out. 12 MS. CHAPNOFF: I remain convinced -- I don't know 13 that I have convinced you -- that the 105(c) way of dealing 14 with environmental costs is, there are two things: One, 15 that environmental costs are translatable into dollar costs, 16 and so you can compare a coal plant to nuclear plant with whatever environmental protections are considered necessary 17 18 built into each plant. That is one way that costs are 19 compared. 20 You can compare environmental to environmental, 21 and you can translate those environmental into dollar to 22 dollar. That is one way that is implicitly part of a 105(c) 23 analysis of environmental costs. 34 The other way is, if an option is environmentally 25 unacceptable, it is not an alternative and, therefore, it is

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1	not available to compare to the nuclear options.
2	So those are the two ways that I think
3	environmental are indirectly built into 105(c), but I don't
4	think 105(c) intends to guarantee that an environmental
5	comparison be made for purposes of determining create or
6	maintain.
7	I think that the create or maintain language is a
8	way to compare dollar to dollar the cost of a nuclear plant
9	versus the cost of alternatives.
10	JUDGE BECHHOEF 3: To get into it more as a matter
11	of degree, such as Judge Bollwerk was referring to, what if
12	the environmental factors say a nuclear plant is preferable,
13	it doesn't say that other plants are unacceptable, say it is
14	preferable, and that at least a government agency would have
15	to look at that, but if a government agency chose to balance
16	other factors, they can still accept the somewhat less
17	favorable environmental plant.
18	MS. CHARNOFF: Under your situation, let's assume
19	a nuclear plant is environmentally preferable that will
20	immunize it from the 105(c) authority of the agency to
21	impose anti-trust restrictions on that plant, on that
22	license. The fact that it may be environmentally preferable
23	will not, if it is also low cost, protect it from license

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What I am saying is, if it is

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conditions.

1	environmentally preferable, whatever its cost, the
2	purchasers may seek that power.
3	MS. CHARNOFF: Yes, they may, but that is not the
4	issue under 105(c). Under 105(c) the issue is, should the
5	NRC impose anti-trust license conditions on it or not.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Wouldn't logic say that if it
7	is a preferable facility, and it is a large facility, and it
8	has a lot of power to offer, yes, there should be a
9	requirement of equal access, and the attendant conditions
10	that go along with it. I think the logic would say, and we
11	have used the word "logic" a lot, but my logic would say, if
12	it is at all different from other sources, given the
13	condition in the statute now, the conditions could be
14	imposed on that license.
15	MS. CHARNOFF: I would say that if it is a high
16	cost plant, but also environmentally preferable, it would
17	still not be competitively advantageous if there are other
18	alternatives, because people won't buy the power from that
19	plant no matter how environmentally preferable it is.
20	Witness the Perry Plant.
21	If the environmental status of nuclear was the
22	issue under 105(c) then a lot of people would be buying into
23	the nuclear plants versus coal, which is the usual baseload
24	alternative, but that is not what is happening. Why,
25	because of dollars.

1	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Or an instance where you need the
2	baseload power, and the only way to get it is the
3	environmentally preferable way to build a nuclear power
4	plant.
5	MS. CHARNOFF: Then you are saying there is no
6	alternative.
7	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Okay, I guess we are back to the
8	same thing.
9	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What about the fact that in
10	considering any large nuclear plant, go a couple of
11	paragraphs up on page 11 of Mr. Donnem's statement, the
12	paragraph toward the top of that page, where it says: So
13	far we have been focusing on the disposition of the power
14	of a single nuclear plant.
15	Then he talks about the largest generating plants,
16	and he goes into the fact that where you have a large unit,
17	such as a nuclear unit, you need a lesser number of back-up
18	plants, for instance, for firm power, and that kind of
19	thing. Why isn't that a reason to make at least the nuclear
20	plants susceptible to a create or maintain?
21	The very fact that a large plant is there and can
22	offer back-up power would make that power perhaps acceptable
23	at any price.
24	MS. CHARNOFF: I am not sure I completely follow

you, but I will say that I think all of this translates into

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1	dollars. This is all a dollar question. If you don't need
2	to have other plants, then you don't need to spend money on
3	other plants. If you don't need to have short-term demands
4	for power, you don't have to spend the additional cost for
5	that type of expenditure. I think all of this is a dollar
6	question.
7	One of the inherent values of baseload power is
8	that it is a lot, but a lot of expensive power doesn't do
9	you much good. It is a lot of low cost power that does you
10	a lot of good.
11	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If you are considering whether
12	to build new sources, and you have a lot of high cost power
13	lying around, isn't it always better to rely on what you
1.4	have in existence.
15	Are there any smaller
16	MS. CHARNOFF: It depends on how costly it is.
17	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are there any smaller utilities
18	that rely on your plants for back-up power, and only
19	purchase if they need it, which may never happen?
20	MS. CHARNOFF: AMPO, for example, takes 5 percent,
21	I believe is the statistic and correct me if I am wrong,
22	Mr. Straus takes 5 percent of its power from Ohio Edison
23	MR. STRAUS: You are wrong. Are you talking about
24	AMPO statewide, or just this facility in the Ohio Edison
25	service area?

1	MS. CHARNOFF: I believe in the Ohio Edison
2	service area. I thought the number that I had was 5
3	percent.
4	In any event, they are not taking baseload power,
5	I don't believe. I believe what they are taking is surplus
6	power.
7	JUDGE MILLER: Let's find out, and we can at least
8	clarify that point for the record.
9	What are they taking and to what extent, Mr.
10	Straus
11	MR. STRAUS: I believe that at the present time it
12	is correct that approximately 5 percent of the load in the
13	Ohio Edison service territory comes from Chio Edison.
14	However, that is because Ohio Edison has refused,
15	thus far, to offer to AMP Ohio the opportunity to purchase
16	short-term power, which is what we want to buy. AMP Ohio,
17	in fact, with the load in the Ohio Edison service
18	territory, buys power from, among others, Toledo Edison
19	Company lo and behold, another applicant.
20	It is not that we are avoiding nuclear utilities,
21	we aren't even avoiding the applicants, we are avoiding Ohio
22	Edison. Ohio Edison has been a problem for many, many
23	reasons, as stated in our brief, and if Ohio Edison would
24	sell us short-term power, we would be happy to buy it from
25	Ohio Edison. In fact, we are negotiating an agreement right

1	now with only Edison which would increase our purchases from
2	Ohio Edison.
3	But the important point is, we are buying power
4	from Toledo Edison, AMP Ohio is to sell to communities in
5	the Ohio Edison service territory. Toledo Edison, I think,
6	is more heavily nuclear than is Ohio Edison.
7	MS. CHARNOFF: But are you buying the whom sale
8	power rate which includes the cost of the nuclear plant?
9	I think that the rates that AMPO has sought to get
10	are rates with exclude the high cost of the nuclear plant.
11	MR. STRAUS: We have no ability to require any
12	utility to sell us power below the fully allocated cost of
13	that power. If Toledo Edison chooses to sell power
14	competitive, which it does, which Ohio Edison does not, then
15	we will buy it.
16	MS. CHARNOFF: You are not answering the question.
17	JUDGE MILLER: Hold it. I am getting too many at
18	a time.
19	First of all, let's get back to procedure. You
20	may ask each other questions through the chair.
21	Who wishes to ask a question of another?
22	[No response.]
23	JUDGE MILLER: That settled that.
24	Go ahead. You may complete your remarks, Ms.
25	Charnoff.

1	MS. CHARNOFF: I believe there is a question from
2	Judge Bechhoefer, and I was trying to answer that with an
3	illustration of AMPO, but now I have lost the train of
4	thought with respect to the question.
5	JUDGE MILLER: Well, you lost AMPO, too. Go ahead
6	and start over.
7	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The question was concerning the
8	other advantages of large power plants such as nuclear power
9	plants are such as are listed by Mr. Donnem in this
10	paragraph towards the top of Page 11.
11	MS. CHARNOFF: I would stick with the answer I
12	gave before. I think that the other advantages are
13	translatable to cost. That's what those things are all
14	about. And I think that the question that you asked me to
15	do with whether a small utility bought surplus power, I
16	think that I can say with some confidence that there is a
17	preference for buying power that does not include the cost
18	of a nuclear plant, and if there is a rate available which
19	doesn't include imbedded costs which would include the cost
20	of the nuclear plant, that's clearly the preference. Why?
21	Because the nuclear plant is so high cost.
22	JUDGE MILLER: Well, the preference is based on
23	money, I believe you said.
24	MS. CHARNOFF: Correct.

25

JUDGE MILLER: The preference is based upon money.

1	Ms. CHARNOFF: Exactly.
2	JUDGE MILLER: It gets down to money, which can
3	transmute other types of consideration, but
4	MS. CHARNOFF: Exactly.
5	JUDGE MILLER: Okay. Anything further?
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Give me a second.
7	JUDGE MILLER: Judge Bollwerk, while Judge
8	Bechhoefer is taking a second, would you like to fire some
9	questions?
10	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I don't have any questions. I
11	just have a comment, I think.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Go ahead.
13	JUDGE BOLLWERK: For my purposes, I just wanted to
14	thank the applicants for getting together and filing a joint
15	brief. I think it made it much easier for the Board to
16	focus on the issues in this case. I recognize it took extra
17	coordination on your part, but I certainly appreciate and I
18	just wanted you to know that we thought that was a very
19	useful thing that 3 done.
20	MS. CHARNOFF: Thank you. It's always nice to be
21	thanked.
22	JUDGE MILLER: While we're awaiting further
23	perusal of some quotations by my friend here, do any of you
24	have any questions for anyone else that you would like to
25	address through the Chair?

MR. STRAUS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to try to answer as factually as I can without getting argumentative a couple of questions about costs and rates that were asked which Ms. Charnoff couldn't answer.

JUDGE MILLER: All right. Proceed.

MR. STRAUS: You asked her, I believe, whether they get fully compensated on their transmission rate. Mr. Murphy had earlier incorrectly referred to an incremental transmission rate. He and I talked and he admitted that that was a mistake.

In fact, I'm involved in rate matters for all three of these utilities on the purchasing side, and I can tell you that in each case, CEI, Toledo Edison and Ohio Edison, they charge a fully imbedded rolled-in transmission rate, which means that they collect the return of capital through depreciation, return on capital through rate of return, and all of the O and M, and A and G expenses associated, on a proportionate basis; so that if the —— the load in the Ohio Edison territory is about five percent of the load on their transmission system, AMPO—Ohio pays five percent of all of Ohio Edison's transmission costs including return of capital and return on capital, and the same holds true for Toledo Edison and CEI, to the extent you might consider those facts relevant.

A similar issue came up. Ms. Charnoff said that

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Perry is seven percent of Ohio Edison's capacity and 23
percent of its costs, and then she retreated to rate base.

I would just like to say that the percentage of rate base and the percentage of costs, while related, are certainly not identical or even close to it because of depreciation and operating expense as opposed to capital expense from rate base included and so forth. I would warn you that that kind of comparison which she made in two different ways has to be looked at carefully.

That's all along that line.

JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.

Anybody else?

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JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I have a question I would like to ask Mr. Goldberg.

JUDGE MILLER: Shoot.

type questions that you have raised. Since the applicants seem to be claiming that a portion of the higher cost to which they are referring in describing the nuclear plants, a portion of it is based on operating costs and the contribution of operating cost to the higher than expected overall cost, how could they have sought the change that they are seeking, or how would they have had the information base to --

MR. GOLDBERG: I'm not sure that I understand --

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1	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: seek the change much earlier
2	than they actually did?
3	JUDGE MILLER: Do you understand the question?
4	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I said since some of the
5	JUDGE MILLER: We'll rephrase it. Thank you.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, since some of the excess
7	cost or high cost alleged high cost, I guess I should say
8	is based on operating costs and since operating costs
9	would not have been known before the plants went into
10	operation, how could the applicants have sought the change
11	they are seeking based on costs prior to the time they
12	actually sought it?
13	MR. GOLDBERG: Well, if I understood the question,
14	it's related to Davis-Besse, is it?
15	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, it's related to any of
16	the plants to which we've had claims. I think we had claims
17	both by Ms. Charnoff and by Mr. Murphy that the operating
18	costs of their plants were also much higher than they ever
19	expected.
20	MR. GOLDBERG: I think I'm right on this. So far
21	as capital costs are concerned, they are aware of those
22	capital costs even before the operating license is issued.
23	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, they have said, though,
24	that they are not basing this solely on capital costs; that
25	they also are their so-called high cost plants are based

1	on operating costs as well as
2	MR. GOLDBERG: I guess their operating costs would
3	not be they had no experience with operating costs;
4	they'd only have estimated operating costs prior to
5	operation.
6	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Correct. So wouldn't that make
7	the timing of their motions to suspend the conditions,
8	wouldn't that make it reasonable when they filed their
9	motion?
10	MR. GOLDBERG: No. No. As far as Davis-Besse is
11	concerned, they were in commercial operation in 1978. Their
12	application wasn't filed until ten years later. By any
13	standard, that's not a reasonable delay; that's a clear case
14	of laches.
1.5	As far as Perry is concerned
16	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, wouldn't it have taken
17	some time at least for operating costs to be ascertained?
18	Wouldn't you need a year or two
19	MR. GOLDBERG: A couple of years at the most.
20	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay.
21	MR. GOLDBERG: So while we're talking about that,
22	if you want me to say eight years, I'll say eight years, and
23	I'll say eight years is still too long.
24	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. Now, what about the
25	other plant?

1	MR. GOLDBERG: The other plant they went into
2	commercial operation in November, 1987. They filed their
3	application to suspend in September even before commercial
4	operations. So in September, they must have felt
5	sufficiently knowledgeable about their operating expenses,
6	and they certainly were knowledgeable about their capital
7	expenses long before they got the operating license.
8	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. So are you claiming that
9	they're too late as well?
10	MR. GOLDBERG: Oh, yes. They certainly are. As a
1.1	matter of fact, we have laid out with respect to Perry in
12	our reply on the subject of laches some exhibits provided by
13	Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company showing the
14	ascendancy of costs from the early 1970s all the way up
15	through '83, if I recall, perhaps even later than that, of
16	capital costs. They knew those capital costs were going up.
17	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, that's capital costs, but
18	I'm saying they're claiming both capital and operating.
19	Maybe they wouldn't have found their motion if only the
20	capital costs
21	MR. GOLDBERG: Well, I would venture to say that
22	the capital costs alone are a sufficient basis for their
23	claim in other words, high cost.
24	JUDGE MILLER: While you are there, Mr. Goldberg,
25	how are you making out with your appeal? The Board hasn't

1	had any information, so maybe
2	MR. GOLDBERG: It's dormant, as far as I know.
3	JUDGE MILLER: It's dormant?
4	MR. GOLDBERG: We've heard nothing.
5	JUDGE MILLER: That's life. Okay. Thank you.
6	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I think the term is "under
7	advisement," probably.
8	JUDGE MILLER: Anybody else?
9	MR. STRAUS: This is sort of a free for all at
10	this point?
11	JUDGE MILLER: It's free for all.
12	MR. STRAUS: Okay. Ms. Charnoff accused me of
13	introducing facts into the record concerning Ohio Edison's
14	projections of unscrubbed dirty coal which was contemporary
15	with their nuclear plants.
16	I'm not the one who started it. On Pages 77 to 78
17	of their reply brief, they made the claim that these costs
18	were so much higher that they could never be low cost in
19	comparison. This was in response to our statement that
20	Congress could not rationally be said to have created a
21	situation where the conditions can come and go. This was a
22	theoretical proposition back in 1970. Congress wouldn't
23	have done that, they said. They came back with a factual
24	assertion that the costs are so much higher, don't worry
25	about it. My factual response was simply and it was

1	their own words, not mine was simply in response to their
2	factual assertion.
3	I neglected to say earlier that I do have copies
4	available for the parties and the Bench of those documents
5	from which I read, should you care to have copies.
6	JUDGE MILLER: Well, you read the data and figures
7	into the record, didn't you?
8	MR. STRAUS: That's right, but I don't want there
9	to be any concern that I took them out of context.
10	JUDGE MILLER: All right. Unless there's some
11	question raised, we will rely upon your representations as
12	counsel. We have no problem with that.
13	Well, I think we're
14	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I have one more for Mr. Hom.
15	JUDGE MILLER: Okay. I was just going to say
16	we're moving forward with all deliberate speed.
17	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay.
18	JUDGE MILLER: I wasn't going to shut it off.
19	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Oh, okay.
20	JUDGE MILLER: Go ahead, sir.
21	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I would like to ask Mr. Hom
22	whether he shares the projected it was projected by some
23	party, the maybe I guess it was projected by the staff
24	the administrative costs of looking over the cost
25	situation if we should hold that costs are crucial; the

thing that was referred to by one of the counsel as a red herring when I asked the other counsel. I want the staff to comment on that a little bit.

MR. HOM: Well --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Following the cost year by year or month by month as the case may be.

MR. HOM: We did raise a point in our brief that if what the applicants are saying is true, then technically speaking, as a matter of law, there would be an enormous burden on the system every time costs fluctuated relative to alternative sources, whatever those would eventually be defined to be.

Although Ohio Edison may state here today that they wouldn't see themselves coming here -- I'm not sure exactly how they characterized it, but I was under the impression that they essentially told the Board not to worry about them coming in here more than every few years to determine costs -- I don't think that Ohio Edison can speak for every other utility that is now subject to antitrust license conditions, and it's conceivable that there are relative costs that fluctuate on a fairly frequent basis. If that were true, then it would appear that if Ohio Edison is correct, utilities would essentially be knocking on the door every day to have a review of their costs vis-a-vis their competitors.

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1	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, even if they didn't,
2	would the staff feel compelled to itself keep an eye on
3	comparative costs?
4	Like, for instance, would you feel it necessary to
5	have various licensees file routine laports on current costs
6	of running various facilities and current knewludge of what
7	other types of facilities cost to run? I mean, would we
8	have a new reporting requirement as at least a theoretical
9	outcome of a change such as is suggested? I would think
10	maybe we would have to.
11	MR. HOM: Well, I would certainly say that there
12	is that potential, but I would presume that an applicant or
13	a utility would under these circumstances be keeping track
14	of their cost to their benefit and would let the staff know
15	any time they deemed it appropriate to have costs re-
16	evaluated and reconsidered.
17	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, I don't think they would
18	invite the antitrust conditions back, so that if their cost
19	dropped too much, I'm not sure how forthcoming the
20	information would be.
21	[Laughter.]
22	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But I would think almost the
23	staff would have to set up some sort of a systemic reporting
24	requirement in order to police the cost to know whether the
25	antitrust conditions had to go back.

1	MR. HOM: Are you talking about whether they had
2	once been suspended and then we
3	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. 1'm talking about this
4	is what I'm talking about.
5	MR. HOM: I would imagine that there could
6	possibly be some requirement imposed in order to do so.
7	Otherwise, it would be, I presume, left up to anyone else in
8	the marketplace to bring the increase in cost to the staff's
9	attention. I really can't answer what is feasible at this
10	point.
11	JUDGE MILLER: Judge Bollwerk I think has an
12	inquiry.
13	JUDGE BOLIWERK: I just have one more question. I
14	don't want to extend this any further, but one quick
15	question. Can someone give me a situation or explain to me
16	a situation in which this whole question about the high cost
17	of a nuclear power plant and the effect on an antitrust
18	review would ever be raised in an initial licensing
19	proceeding, because if I understand what you're saying, if
20	it's high cost, you're not going to be building the plant
21	anyway.
22	MR. MURPHY: I think that's essentially correct.
23	One of the things that struck me when I was working on the
24	brief was the assertion by the Department of Justice back in
25	their hrief in front of the Annellate Roard that everyhody

-- that it was undisputed, I think was the language that
this nuclear power from these units would be the lowest cost
base-load power available.

Absent some extraordinary reason, such as an environmental constraint, I don't think any company would deliberately construct - high cost plant -- a higher cost plant than the alternatives available to the company at the time.

It does seem to me that, in answer to your specific question, I would think almost inevitably that this issue would be raised after a period of operation when indeed the costs were shown to be higher than the alternatives available and relief from the antitrust condition would be sought at that time.

JUDGE BOILWERK: So this is always, at least in the way you have framed this question, it's always going to be a post-licensing question?

MR. MURPHY: Yes. I think that's essentially right. I think it's a question of whether we have the right to obtain a suspension of the license condition when indeed the operating history of the plant shows that the costs are higher than the alternatives available.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: Okay. Ms. Urban, I think you are

25 MS. URBAN: Yes.

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1	J	UDGE BOLLW	ERK:	I see	two	hands	up. I	want	to	go
2	with Ms. Ur	ban first.	I	think s	he's	ready.	Then	Mr.		
3	Straus, per	haps we'll	go	over to	you.					

MS. URBAN: I've been thinking about this question of when would a utility build an expensive nuclear plant, and one answer is that they may not build one, but they may acquire one through a merger, and if a utility is non-nuclear to begin with, then they would be, I believe, and the NRC can correct me if I'm incorrect, they would be subject to an initial antitrust review.

Then the next question is, of course, why would a utility buy a high cost nuclear plant? And the answer is because if they short of power or if they anticipate needing power in the next few years, it's cheaper to buy a high cost nuclear plant than build their own.

The other reason they might buy a high cost nuclear plant or even perhaps build one -- I suspect I could construct some kind of moderately reasonable scenario where they'd build one -- is that they may be willing to pay a monopoly premium so that they have, for example, all of the generation within the area. That way, they can charge rates which make up the cost of the plant and make up the monopoly premium -- in other words, the additional cost that they are paying -- so that they get the 1,000 megawatts and someone else doesn't.

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Perhaps you could construct some kind of again reasonable scenario where they might build under those circumstances. Perhaps there is one site left within the area and someone else is going to put a plant on it if they don't, so they go quick and dirty, you know, build as fast as they can, and perhaps that means they build at a higher cost than if they had waited a few years.

But, you know, there are reasons and there are reasons in fact that are anti-competitive for doing this, which is, again, to acquire all of the generation so that you have a monopoly in that generation, and then it doesn't matter if you paid a premium because you can charge rates to recoup that payment because you are the only game in town again.

JUDGE BOLLWERK: MR. Straus, I'll allow you to reply, if you want.

MR. STRAUS: I was going to say, on the other side of the coin from you question was if everyone assumes back in 1977, '79 that these were much lower priced, based on plants tan anything else available to the municipal utilities and the states, why in the world would there have been any problem? Why would we have needed Wheeling, other than Wheeling access to the plant, itself? Why would we have needed wheeling access to other systems? To avoid the lowest cost power in the world? Apparently not. Apparently

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there was a contemplation that the nuclear plant would be
more expensive or less expensive, and that's why you have a
licensing proceeding not knowing or sure, and that's why you
have Wheeling conditions, which say you can have Wheeling
not only to this nuclear plant, but you can Wheelings, you
can buy it from somebody else. They wouldn't want to buy it
from somebody else less cheap.
So, the contemplated cost at the time of the
licensing proceeding raises more questions than just
wondering why would you ever have one in the first place.
JUDGE BOLLWERK: If you all would like to respond?
MS. CHARNOFF: I want to say a couple of things.
One, I would like to say that the comments by the NRC staff
counsel on the administrative costs, which were presented as
a matter of law, technically speaking, are not matters of
law, which, of course, this issue is. They are matter of
facts, which this issue is not. I would object I simply
diragree with the Chicken Little scenario, and, as an
eentiary point in this case, would like to have the
opportunity to show that that's not what this hearing is
about. It gets very frustrating. Because when I do answer
on the basis of fact, Mr. Straus, for example says you're
talking about fact; and when we don't answer, we leave
unanswered all of these allegations about the sky is

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falling, the sky is falling.

so, let me say that I don't want to belabor the point here. But, I do think that these issues of fact are not pending before the Court, are not part of the bedrock legal issue. To the extent that they're questions that need to be answered to decide whether to lift the particular conditions that are involved in the case of Perry and Davis-Besse, they will have to be answered in Phase Two of this proceeding, and we will all have an opportunity equally to present facts on those points.

Now, the Department of Justice hypotheticals which I find extraordinary in their imaginitiveness, also do not address -- when you fit them into the framework of the bedrock legal issue, fit our model to a tee. That is, if building another plant is more costly than a so-called high-cos. nuclear plant, then the nuclear plant is the lower cost alternative, period. And if the only alternative power available is power from a plant that has to be built, then the nuclear plant is going to provide a competitive advantage presumably. I don't think that's a situation out there. That's what phase two is about. Whether there are viable alternatives that are lower in cost -- but, in any event, the scenario described doesn't challenge the analysis that we've set forth in our bedrock legal issue.

JUDGE MILLER: Well, let me say that -- and I'll recognize you in a moment -- that was one of the questions

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that I, at any rate, had in mind when you all told me that
it was a bedrock issue which would solve everything, at
least as far as the Board was concerned, and you would
happily accept it. Those who felt they'd won would be
happy; those who felt they hadn't would go up on appeal.
Those are the kinds of things where you were specifically
asked, are you sure that there are no sub-issues of a
factual nature or collateral matters.

Now, to the extent that collateral matters of a factual nature have been gone into, I think the Board is going to have to disregard them, unless all of you stipulate that they may be considered. When you go through the record, the transcript, I would like to have all of you consider those matters which seem to be beyond the scope of the bedrock issue, matter of law matter which we are here discussing.

I think that -- we don't want to create a kind of a hybrid here, partly legal, partly factual, partly dream stuff. So, I, and I'm sure the Board would appreciate, if you wish to ask the Board to disregard any of the matters, since there will be no hearing as such until this bedrock issue is resolved, address it in writing to the Board, with copies to all concerned. Because I think there has been -- since this has gone on, I'm not at all sure that the bedrock approach fully encompasses. But, since everybody

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felt and believed that it did and would, very well.

But, I think you better sort out now any mixed questions or mixed issues of fact and law. And if any have been handled as such here today, you may call it to the Board's attention when you have an opportunity to study the transcript. Because there is to be no hearing unless and until the bedrock issue has been decided -- as I recall, the offer made to the Board by counsel by all parties.

So, we're going to conclude this shortly, but I'm going to -- I want to be sure that we've touched all bases before we do. Excuse me.

[Discussion held off the record.]

JUDGE MILLER: Yes, all right.

Judge Borwick suggested that the -- that you would screen out any motions to strike or to disregard that were not fundamental to your position. In other words, there's no sense trying to go through the whole record and comb out the small fleas.

But, I think we've had some very interesting language -- new wine in old bottles. I mean, these terms are perhaps not original, but they're colorful -- like yo-yo and Red Herring, and chicken little and short shrift, and sub silentio and NRL lingo among others. So, to the extent that those might require a deeper understanding than suggested superficially by the t rm, you could let us know.

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	Buc, it is true.
2	Now, we are asking you to address, after you've
3	had a reasonable opportunity to read the transcript,
4	anything further with copies to we don't want to prolong
5	the considerations. So, we'd ask for you to be both
6	expeditious and if any of you feel that you must respond
7	to something someone else had raised, please do it promptly
8	within a matter of five days or something.
9	[Discussion held off the record.]
10	JUDGE MILLER: Yes. Judge Bechhoefer has
11	indicated, we're not asking for additional briefs now. And
12	you don't even have to say anything if you don't want to.
13	But, to the extent that some of these matters appear
14	significant. Ms. Charnoff mentioned you mentioned one or
15	two where you felt that you were being put into a position
16	of confronting factual matters in the course of an argument
17	strictly on the legal merits that were being present.
19	Certainly you would be entitled to present that to the
19	Board, in a short form, as I say, not in a brief or
20	anything. And be sure you copy everybody, including,
21	specifically, those that you feel may have treaded in this
22	particular area.
23	Are there any further questions now?
24	MS. CHARNOFF: Chairman, can I clarify two quick
25	points?

1	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
2	MS. CHARNOFF: One is that we have, in our reply
3	brief, to some degree, in some of the circumstances in there
4	may be complete overlap. I'm honestly not sure till I read
5	the transcript
6	JUDGE MILLER: #11 right.
7	MS. CHARNOFF: where we think issues are raised
8	are factual issues. And we will
9	JUDGE MILLER: Yes.
10	MS. CHARNOFF: not repeat ourselves, needless
11	to say.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Yes. I recall that there are some.
13	MS. CHARNOFF: The second point is, you bowled me
14	over with your five days. We weren't planning to get the
15	transcript, frankly, until something like that.
16	JUD'E MILLER: Well, Mr. Reporter, how soon are
17	you going to have this transcript available to this nice
18	people?
19	THE REPORTER: It can be available daily.
20	JUDGE MILLER: It's available daily if you want it
21	daily, and this is the day. Yr can get it as a daily, if
22	you like.
23	MR. STRAUS: Judge, I think what you said was that
24	if somebody you didn't set a date for filing such
25	pleadings, you simply said a response within five days. I

%	think if you said make it 15 days from today to file. Daily
2	transcripts are awfully expensive. This would be a long
3	one. I would profer just to get a five-day transcript.
4	JUDGE MILLER: This is only one day a one-day
5	daily.
6	MR. STRAUS: It seems like a long day.
7	JUDGE MILLER: I see. Pardor me. How long does
8	it take to get it out normally, without expediting it?
9	THE REPORTER: I'm not sure. I don't usually do
10	these hearings. I heard that it was ordered faily by
11	somebody, so.
12	JUDGE MILLER: We did, NRC. She does dailies.
1.3	All right. We think that you will probably get
14	your copies within say less than five days. Those of you
15	who wish to or are willing to pay the monopolistic charges
16	or costs, there is only one reporter in town, may get a
17	daily. I mean, it will be available.
18	I would say is 15 days all right?
19	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: From now, yes.
20	JUDGE MILLER: All right. Fifteen days overall
21	sounds rea onable. You'll probably get your transcript even
22	in due co. se. I don't know how good the mails are. But
23	you'd probably get it within five days I'd say. If you need
24	it sooner you can order it. Five days then from the date
25	you from today five days. And five days from the date

1	that you and others received the copy. Where you feel that
2	further comment, again, not briefing it, nothing long and
3	tedious is necessary, shoot it in. You'll have five days
4	for that.
5	So, you've got five days to receive it, five days
6	to read and write it, and a final five days to get all
7	matters into us.
8	MR. STRAUS: I'm confused. I thought you said 15
9	days.
10	JUDGE MILLER: Yes. That is 15. Five times three
11	is 15.
12	MR. STRAUS: No. I thought you said 15 from today
13	to file the request?
14	JUDGE MILLER: Oh, no.
15	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes, I thought that was what
16	you said.
17	MR. STRAUS: Judge Miller, despite the fact that
18	the reporting service will have the transcript available
19	tomorrow for you, they will not mail it to me for five more
20	days, and that will take a couple of days in the mail to get
21	it. If you're telling me I should order it expedited
22	transcript, I guess I'll have to do it.
23	JUDGE MILLER: No. I'm not telling you that.
24	But, instead of relying on U.S. Mail, you can sure get an
25	overniter for about nine dollars, can't you?

1	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That will cost him about \$500
2	to get the quick one.
3	JUDGE MILLER: I'm not suggesting the quick one.
4	I'm saying that the quick and dirty one that you can
5	expedite the mail delivery by doing it overnite from the
6	time the quick and dirty is available, you can, in another
7	24 hours, get it to you.
8	MR. STRAUS: Only if the reporting service is
9	willing to do it, and they're not.
10	JUDGE MILLER: Well, if you ask them, and you pay
11	for the UPS, I'll bet you they'll do it. Do you really
12	think it's going to be that much time and effort required to
1.3	comb through here and get out factual matters? Did we
14	really get into it that extensively?
15	MR. STRAUS: No. I just don't want to have just
16	one day to do it. And that's what you're doing. If you say
17	10 days today, it's probably going to give us about one day.
18	I don't think
19	JUDGE MILLER: No. I said 15 days from today.
20	Fifteen days from today. You know, figure it out any way
21	you want to.
22	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Does anybody happen to have a
23	calendar? I don't have one. Does that fall on a weekend,
24	or is it that would be the 25th?
25	MR. GOLDBERG: No. That would be a Thursday.

1	JUDGE BOLLWERK: Okay.
2	JUDGE MILLER: Well, maybe the following Monday.
3	what's the date? Anyway, this will speed it up.
4	JUDGE BOLLWERK: That would be Tuesday the 30th
5	of June, that's I'm sorry, Monday the 29th of June, that
6	would be the first Monday after.
7	JUDGE MILLER: All right. Let's make it the 29th
8	of June, 1992 that this whole thing is accomplished and you
9	have in our hand and remember, you're going to have to
10	pop for a little bit, because I'm in Florida in our
11	hands, so that we can we'll be reading the transcript as
12	well, as well as going through it. We have read and will
13	re-read all of the briefs, I assure you that. We'll
14	consider your arguments.
15	Now, since this decision is going to be
16	dispositive, we want to be sure that you've had a full
17	opportunity to make your record. And the ball will be in
18	our court.
19	Each member of the Board has read everything
20	that's been filed to date. But, if we intend to reread
21	substantial portions, in conformity with the points that
22	you've made here today, we have open minds, and open mouths,
23	I guess. So, anything anyone thinks should be in the
24	record, in addition to and besides the factual matters,

which you contend should not be considered by the Board in

25

1	the hearing on determinations as a matter of law.
2	Okay? Thanks very much for coming. I appreciate
3	it. I appreciate the effort.
4	MR. OTTINGER: Judge Miller?
5	JUDGE MILLER: Yes. Just a minute. He has
6	something he wants to put on the record. Yes. Go ahead.
7	MR. OTTINGER: Thank you very much.
8	My name is Greg Ottinger. I'm with the law firm
9	of Duncan & Allen. I'm here today on behalf of the City of
10	Brook Park, Ohio, whose intervention was denied without
11	prejudice September 19th at a pre-hearing conference.
12	JUDGE MILLER: Yes, I remember.
13	MR. OTTINGER: Since that time, the City has held
14	a referendum which passed, establishing a municipal electric
15	department within the city governing structure, under the
16	Ohio Constitution, to actually establish a municipal
17	electric system. The City needs to act by ordinance, which
18	it did in late April. That ordinance needs to sit 30 days
19	to give the population a chance to circulate a referendum
20	petition. That 30-day period has run. We're just a couple
21	of days after that right now.
22	So, the short of it is, the City of Brook Park
23	will be in the next by Friday, let's say, filing another
24	motion to intervene. So, I'm warning all the parties, don't

send your files to storage yet.

25

1	Thank you.
2	JUDGE MILLER: I suspect no one will send his or
3	her files to storage yet, in terms of both the possible
4	further actions of this Board and potential appeals.
5	JUDGE BOLLWERK: I take it you're aware of the
6	requirements that have to be met for late intervention?
7	MR. OTTINGER: Yes, sir.
8	JUDGE BOLLWERK: All right.
9	JUDGE MILLER: Very well.
10	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: And I guess I would say don't
11	rely on your statement today. Try to include it in your
12	material whatever is relevant to that.
13	MR. OTTINGER: Yes, sir. Thank you. That's why
14	we won't have it until Friday. We're going to look at the
15	transcript and the law very carefully.
16	JUDGE MILLER: Very well.
17	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay.
18	JUDGE MILLER: Thank you.
19	Anything further?
20	[No response.]
21	JUDGE MILLER: If not, we stand adjourned. Thanks
22	very much.
23	[Whereupon, at 4:20 o'clock p.m., the above-
24	entitled hearing was adjourned.]

25

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Ohio Edison Company

DOCKET NUMBER:

50+440-A 50+346-A

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Bethesda, Maryland

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Marilynn Estep

Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.

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Herry Mahoney

Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.