

WOLF CREEK

NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

John A. Bailey
Vice President
Operations

June 8, 1992

NO 92-0167


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Station Pl-137
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 92-010-00

Gentlemen:

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) concerning a Technical Specification violation.

Very truly yours,


John A. Bailey
Vice President
Operations

JAB/aem

Attachment

cc: A. T. Howell (NRC), w/a
R. D. Martin (NRC), w/a
G. A. Pick (NRC), w/a
R. D. Reckley (NRC), w/a

9206150004 920608
PDR ADOCK 05000482
S PDR

411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (316) 364-8831

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**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A) (17)

INTRODUCTION

On May 8, 1992, at 1530 CDT, Control Room operators were informed by Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) personnel that the instrumentation channel associated with pressure transmitter ALPT38 [BA-PT] was never in the tripped condition as required by Technical Specification 3.3.2. The inoperable pressure transmitter had previously been bypassed which defeated the action of placing the channel in the tripped condition. Technical Specification 3.3.2 requires, in part, that with an Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) [JE] instrumentation channel for low auxiliary feedwater pump (AFWP) [BA-P] suction pressure inoperable, operation may proceed until performance of the next required Analog Channel Operational Test provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(p)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Pressure transmitter ALPT38 is one of three transmitters that indicates water supply pressure from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) [KA-TK] to the AFWPs and initiates switchover to the Essential Service Water System [BI] should the supply from the CST be interrupted. Switchover is initiated when two of the three pressure transmitters indicate low AFWP suction pressure in conjunction with actuation of an AFWP. By placing an inoperable instrumentation channel in a tripped condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2, switchover is initiated when one of the two remaining operable pressure transmitters indicates low AFWP suction pressure. Tripping of an instrumentation channel is accomplished by disconnecting a lead on the bistable for the affected channel. By placing an inoperable instrumentation channel in bypass, switchover is initiated when the two remaining operable pressure transmitters indicate low AFWP suction pressure.

On May 8, 1992, at 0527 the Control Room received an "ESFAS Not Normal" alarm which began cycling on and out. I&C personnel were immediately contacted to investigate the reason for the alarm. During an initial investigation, it was discovered that AFWP Header Pressure Transmitter ALPT38 was cycling full scale which resulted in the alarm. At 0555 CDT, pressure transmitter ALPT38 was bypassed in order to prevent a spurious actuation of the ESFAS and at 0605 CDT the instrumentation channel was placed in the tripped condition in accordance with procedure OFN 00-008, "Instrument Malfunctions", to satisfy Technical Specification 3.3.2. The Control Room operators failed to realize that with the pressure transmitter bypassed that the channel could not be placed in the tripped condition.

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A subsequent investigation by I&C personnel at 0823 CDT determined that a 15 volt power supply in ESFAS cabinet SA036C (JE-CAB) had failed. This resulted in pressure transmitter ALPT38 cycling full scale. At 1405 CDT, I&C personnel completed the replacement of the 15 volt power supply and Technical Specification 3.3.2 was exited when pressure transmitter ALPT38 was restored to operable status and its associated instrumentation channel restored from the tripped condition.

At 1530 CDT, Control Room operators were informed by I&C personnel that when the instrumentation channel for pressure transmitter ALPT38 was tripped with the pressure transmitter bypassed that the channel was not in the tripped condition as required by Technical Specification 3.3.2. The action of placing the channel in the tripped condition was defeated when pressure transmitter ALPT38 was placed in bypass. Therefore, a violation of Technical Specification 3.3.2 occurred.

ROOT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A review of this event has identified several factors which contributed to the failure to comply with Technical Specifications. Licensed personnel failed to realize that with the pressure transmitter bypassed the channel could not be placed in the tripped condition to comply with Technical Specifications. Also, procedure OFN 00-008 did not provide any guidance to ensure that the pressure transmitter was not bypassed prior to placing the channel in the tripped condition. A review was conducted following this event to determine if any similar situations exist. This review determined that the requirement in Technical Specification 3.3.2 to have the inoperable AFWP header instrumentation channel tripped within one hour is unique, in that the three AFWP header instrumentation channels can also be bypassed simultaneously. Technical Specification 3.3.2 requirements for other instrumentation channels which can be bypassed allow these inoperable channels to be bypassed instead of tripped to satisfy the Technical Specification requirements because of a difference in logic circuitry.

Procedure OFN 00-008, "Instrument Malfunctions", has been revised to include a note to ensure that the affected inoperable AFWP header instrumentation channel is not bypassed while the channel is in the tripped condition. This Licensee Event Report will be included as part of licensed requalification training to licensed personnel. This training will be completed by August 31, 1992. This Licensee Event Report will also be included in Operations Required Reading to ensure that all licensed personnel are cognizant of the details of this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Wolf Creek Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 015000482	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="3" style="text-align: center;">LER NUMBER (3)</th> </tr> <tr> <th style="width: 33%;">YEAR</th> <th style="width: 33%;">SEQUENTIAL NUMBER</th> <th style="width: 33%;">REVISION NUMBER</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">92</td> <td style="text-align: center;">010</td> <td style="text-align: center;">00</td> </tr> </table>	LER NUMBER (3)			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	92	010	00	PAGE (3) 04 OF 04
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

At the time of this event, the plant was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent Reactor power.

There have been no previous similar occurrences. At no time did conditions develop that may have posed a threat to the health and safety of the public. The two remaining operable AFWP header pressure transmitters were operable and capable of indicating water supply pressure from the CST to the AFWPs. There was no damage to plant equipment as a result of this event.