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June 4, 1992
JAFP-92-0439

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 92-023-00 - Both Reactor Building Ventilation Effluent Monitors Inoperable

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) and (v).

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. W. Verne Childs at (315) 349-6071.

Very truly yours,

HARRY P. SALMON, JR.

HPS:WVC:KA:lar

Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I
USNRC Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

Cert # P 064 705 480

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NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4): Loss of Both Reactor Building Ventilation Effluent Radiation Monitors Due to Operator Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	0 5	9 2	9 2	- 0 2 3	- 0 0	0 6	0 4	9 2		0 5 0 0 0
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OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
W. Verne Childs, Senior Licensing Engineer	AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 6 0 7 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

EIIS Codes are in []

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. On 5/5/92, both reactor building ventilation effluent radiation monitors [IL] were secured for a 9-minute period when an auxiliary operator failed to restart sample pump A before deenergizing the redundant sample pump. Having both reactor building ventilation effluent monitors inoperable is a violation of Radiological Effluent Technical Specification 3.1. The event was caused by personnel error involving procedure non-compliance and lack of self-verification. Personnel failed to follow procedures which would have started and/or verified the sample pump started before beginning work on the next pump. Inadequacies in written work request instructions and work practices were also evident. Personnel involved have been counseled for improper use of procedures.

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Description

During preventive maintenance lubrication of the reactor building ventilation effluent radiation monitor sample pumps [IL] on May 5, 1992, with the plant in the cold condition for refueling, personnel failed to restart monitor sample pump A (17P-36A), following lubrication, before deenergizing the redundant monitor sample pump B (17P-36B) resulting in both radiation monitors being inoperable concurrently. Nine (9) minutes elapsed before one of the sample pumps was restarted, allowing an unmonitored flow path to the environment during this time. This condition is a violation of Radiological Effluent Technical Specification, Section 3.1, which requires that the reactor building ventilation effluent flow path be continuously monitored for gaseous release to ensure that 10 CFR 20 limits are not exceeded. There were no core alterations or fuel movement in progress, and the secondary containment [NG] was not required during the 9-minute period of reactor building ventilation effluent radiation monitor inoperability. The refuel floor ventilation effluent radiation monitors were operable as a back-up at the time of the event to monitor for any release during refueling activities.

Cause

The cause of the event was personnel error involving procedure non-compliance and failure to self-check. The auxiliary operator did not refer to the system operating procedure when returning sample pump A to service. He incorrectly assumed that closing the breaker alone would start the pump because he thought that only particulate monitors had local start/stop switches. The operating procedure would have had the operator start the pump at the associated sample pump skid after closing the breaker.

Contributing factors to this event were that the operator did not self-check by verifying control room alarms cleared with his actions, and the mechanic did not follow the pump lubrication procedure which required running the pump after greasing. In addition, the preventive maintenance work request specifically stated that protective tagging was not required, thus control of equipment status was the responsibility of the auxiliary operator. In addition, supervision did not provide directions in sufficient detail for the complexity of the task. Specific, rather than general direction, should have been given to the individuals on how to accomplish the task and to keep the control room informed of equipment status.

Analysis

The function of the reactor building ventilation effluent radiation monitors is to provide continuous monitoring of the reactor building exhaust flow path to ensure gaseous releases are maintained below 10 CFR 20 limits. Radiological Effluent Technical Specification, Section 3.1, requires that at least one monitor be operable while the flow path is in service. With both reactor building ventilation effluent radiation monitors inoperable, due to the sample pumps being inadvertently deenergized, there is no method to ensure that these limits are not exceeded. The monitors also function to isolate the secondary containment and start the standby gas treatment system [BH] on a detected high radiation reading. Without the monitors, secondary containment isolation and diversion of exhaust flow to the plant stack could have been prevented or delayed for postulated LOCA or high energy line break accidents as assumed in the FSAR. As a result, this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and (D).

Corrective Action

1. Control room personnel immediately notified Chemistry when indication of low sample flow on both reactor building ventilation effluent radiation monitors was received. Chemistry personnel found the sample pumps for monitors A and B not running and started the pumps at the local skids to return the system to service.

2. The auxiliary operator involved has been counseled and will be disciplined for improper use of procedures. The mechanic involved has been counseled for improper use of procedures and Operations and Maintenance supervision has been counseled on providing proper communication to their subordinates.

3. As immediate actions to improve equipment status control, the preventive maintenance scheduling database for lubricating all process radiation monitor sample pumps has been revised to require protective tagging and to address all applicable sections of the working procedure. Other methods to improve equipment status control are currently being evaluated. The preventive maintenance database for other components will be reviewed for similar inadequacies and corrective actions determined (due date November 1, 1992).

4. The preventive maintenance scheduling database will be revised to generate separate work requests for each safety division of process radiation monitor sample pumps to prevent redundant monitoring equipment from being worked under the same work control document (due date June 30, 1992).

5. This event will be reviewed by all other operating shift personnel and maintenance staff.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events

LER-91-016 reported a similar event in which effluent radiation monitoring was made inoperable due to personnel errors.