

June 3, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-327
and 50-328

Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Dr. Mark O. Medford, Vice President
Nuclear Assurance, Licensing & Fuels
3B Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Dr. Medford:

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT CORRECTIONS, SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
(TAC NOS. R00430, R00431, M77378, M77379, M77453, M77454, M79900,
AND M79901)(TS 88-03, 90-01, AND 91-13)

By letter dated March 30, 1992, the Commission issued Amendment No. 157 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 147 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 respectively. Also, by letter dated March 31, 1992, the Commission issued Amendment No. 158 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 148 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79.

Upon implementation of these amendments, it was discovered that a few clerical errors had inadvertently been included. Enclosed are technical specification pages that have been revised to incorporate the appropriate corrections. None of these changes affect the basis for any of the conclusions reached in the safety evaluations for the amendments. We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
Revised Technical Specification pages

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

OFC	PDII-4/LA	PDII-4/PM <i>DL</i>	PDII-4/D <i>DL</i>		
NAME	MSanders <i>MS</i>	DLaBarge	FHebdon <i>FH</i>		
DATE	6/3/92	6/3/92	6/3/92		

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cc:

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Distribution

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Local PDR

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G. Lainas 14-H-3

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OGC 15-B-18

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements. This precludes the need to cycle the valves with full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to operable status.

Testing of PORVs in HOT SHUTDOWN is required in order to simulate the temperature and pressure environmental effects on PORVs. In many PORV designs, testing at COLD SHUTDOWN is not considered to be a representative test for assessing PORV performance under normal operating conditions. In addition, testing PORVs in HOT SHUTDOWN would provide added assurance of valve operability for low-temperature overpressure protection.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12 hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that 150 kw of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that the plant will be able to control reactor coolant pressure and establish natural circulation conditions.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to provide surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.