NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
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TITLE (4)
Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 8	0 8	8 4	8 4	0 1 0	0 0	0 9	0 5	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 9 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Keith Wire, Operations Manager	AREA CODE 4 0 2 — 8 2 5 - 3 8 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

The main steam line break detection system sensed a high temperature in the steam tunnel and generated a Group I isolation signal. The Group I isolation signal caused the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) to shut. After the MSIVs left the open position by ten percent, the reactor protective system generated a reactor scram. All safety systems operated as required and no personnel errors were noted. The high temperature in the steam tunnel was subsequently determined to be due to inadequate main steam line insulation in the steam tunnel necessary to support full power operation during the hot summer months. Added insulation on the main steam lines has been effective in preventing any further unwanted Group I isolation signals from being generated by the main steam line break detection system.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During high power operation of the reactor plant during peak summer temperatures, the main steam line break detection system sensed a high ambient temperature in the steam tunnel room in the vicinity of the main steam lines. The main steam line break detection system logic actuated as it should have for the condition sensed which resulted in a closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

The reactor protective system (RPS) logic upon detecting the MSIVs had left the full open position by ten percent or more, generated a reactor trip as required for the plant condition. All safety systems responded properly. No personnel errors were noted during the reactor trip and subsequent plant recovery. Adding more temporary insulation to the main steam lines has been effective in preventing any more events of this kind. The main steam lines will be permanently insulated as needed in order to prevent recurrence and in order to significantly reduce the ambient temperature in the steam tunnel.

One system did not operate as planned for the conditions that existed during the scram. Operation of electric circuit breakers 1AS and 1BS would normally automatically transfer power to the startup transformer after a generator trip from the normal station service transformer (which supplies station power during generator operation). Breakers 1AS and 1BS did not automatically operate to transfer power to the startup transformer. As a result, the critical busses automatically shifted to the emergency transformer power supply rather than the startup transformer. Those loads not on the critical distribution system were energized twelve seconds later when a control room operator manually operated breakers 1AS and 1BS in order to supply electric power from the startup transformer which is the preferred source of power for all station loads when not generating.

Subsequent electrical checks, testing, and simulation of the conditions which cause breakers 1AS and 1BS to shift automatically from normal to startup power did not reveal any faulty components or operating problems with the 1AS and 1BS breakers. A determination was made that the 1AS and 1BS breakers will operate reliably. Additional verification of the automatic power transfer feature of these breakers is planned to be performed again during the next planned shutdown currently scheduled for September 24, 1984.

This occurrence presented no adverse consequences from the standpoint of public health and safety and has no generic implication.

Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
P.O. BOX 98, BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA 68321
TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

CNSS840339

September 5, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Cooper Nuclear Station Licensee Event Report 84-010 is forwarded as an attachment to this letter.

Sincerely,

P. V. Thomason

P. V. Thomason
Division Manager of
Nuclear Operations

PVT:lb
Attach.
cc: J. T. Collins
L. G. Kuncl
J. D. Weaver
L. R. Berry
INPO Records Center
ANI Library

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