



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-440

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 80
License No. NPF-58

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Centerior Service Company, Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, and Toledo Edison Company (the licensees) dated November 2, 1995, supplemented January 26, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-58 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 80 are hereby incorporated into this license. The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.


3. Further, the license is amended by the addition of license condition, Paragraph 2.C.(10) to read as follows:

(10) Primary Containment air lock penetrations may be open during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel within the primary containment, except when moving recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days), provided the following conditions exist:

- One door in each air lock is capable of being closed.
- Hoses and cables running through the air lock employ a means to allow safe, quick disconnect or severance, and are tagged at the air lock with specific instructions to expedite removal.
- The air lock door is not blocked in such a way that it cannot be expeditiously closed.
- A designated individual is available to expeditiously close the air lock door.

4. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 90 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Jon B. Hopkins, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

- Attachments: 1. Pages 5 and 6 of the license*
2. Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of issuance: February 2, 1996

*Pages 5 and 6 are attached, for convenience, for the composite license to reflect the change.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 80

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-58

DOCKET NO. 50-440

Replace the following pages of the License with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of changes.

Remove

5
6

Insert

5
6

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications including the issued but not yet implemented Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove

3/4 6-6
3/4 6-6a
B 3/4 6-2a
B 3/4 6-2b

ITS 3.6-3
ITS 3.6-6

Insert

3/4 6-6
3/4 6-6a
B 3/4 6-2a
B 3/4 6-2b

ITS 3.6-3
ITS 3.6-6

(7) Detailed Control Room Design Review (Section 18, SSER #10)

CEICO shall implement the remaining activities to complete the Detailed Control Room Design Review and correct all human engineering discrepancies (HED's) identified in Attachment 1. Attachment 1 is hereby incorporated into this license.

(8) Emergency Planning (Section 13.3, SSER #10)

In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's final rule (44 CFR Part 350) indicates that a major substantive problem exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of emergency preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2) will apply.

(9) Deleted

(10) Primary Containment air lock penetrations may be open during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel within the primary containment, except when moving recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days), provided the following conditions exist:

- One door in each air lock is capable of being closed.
- Hoses and cables running through the air lock employ a means to allow safe, quick disconnect or severance, and are tagged at the air lock with specific instructions to expedite removal.
- The air lock door is not blocked in such a way that it cannot be expeditiously closed.
- A designated individual is available to expeditiously close the air lock door.

D. CEICO is exempted from: 1) the requirements of Section III.D.2(b)(ii), containment airlock testing requirements, Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, due to the special circumstance described in Section 6.2.6 of SER Supplement No. 7 authorized by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii); and 2) the requirements of Section IV.F., Full Participation Exercise, of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, due to the special circumstance described in the Exemption, dated November 6, 1986. These exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety and are consistent with the common defense and security. The exemptions are hereby granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With the granting of these exemptions, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

- E. CEICO shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are entitled: "Perry Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan", with revisions submitted through September 11, 1987; "Perry Nuclear Power Plant Guard Training and Qualification Plan", with revisions submitted through August 12, 1986; and "Perry Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plan" (Chapter 8 of the Security Plan), with revisions submitted through May 15, 1986. Changes made in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 shall be implemented in accordance with the schedule set forth therein.
- F. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specification or Environmental Protection Plan, CEICO shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within 24 hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System with written follow-up within thirty (30) days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c) and (e).
- G. The licensees shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.
- H. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on March 18, 2026.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Original signed by:

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachments/Appendices:

1. Attachments 1 - 2
2. Appendix A - Technical Specifications
(NUREG-1204)
3. Appendix B - Environmental Protection
Plan
4. Appendix C - Antitrust Conditions

Date of Issuance: November 13, 1986

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.6.1.3 Each primary containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
- Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
 - An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 2.5 scf per hour at P_a .

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and #.

ACTION:

- With one or both air locks having:
 - an inoperable interlock mechanism, for each affected air lock,
 - Maintain at least one OPERABLE air lock door closed* and within 24 hours lock one OPERABLE air lock door closed.
 - Operation may then continue provided that at least once per 31 days, one OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed*.
 - one inoperable air lock door, or, both one inoperable door and an inoperable interlock mechanism, for each affected air lock,
 - Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed** and within 24 hours lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
 - Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that at least once per 31 days the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed**.

Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT

When handling recently irradiated fuel in the primary containment, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

* Entry into and exit from the air lock(s) or primary containment, including through a "locked closed" door, is permitted under administrative controls.

** If one or both air locks have one inoperable door, entry into and exit from the air lock(s) through the OPERABLE door is permitted under administrative controls to perform repairs of the affected air lock components. Also, if both air locks have one inoperable door, entry into and exit from primary containment is permitted under administrative controls for 7 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION #, suspend handling of recently irradiated fuel in the primary containment, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

- b. With a primary containment air lock inoperable in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 or 3, except as a result of an inoperable air lock door and/or interlock mechanism, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
- c. With a primary containment air lock inoperable, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION #, except as a result of an inoperable air lock door and/or interlock mechanism, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or suspend all operations involving handling of recently irradiated fuel in the primary containment, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT (Continued)

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS (Continued)

In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of LOCAs are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these Operational Conditions. Therefore, maintaining primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is only required during situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated; such as during operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel, or during handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. Due to radioactive decay, handling of fuel only requires primary containment air lock OPERABILITY when the fuel being handled is recently irradiated, i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous seven days.

An allowance has been provided within Action a.1 for access into or through the containment air locks when an interlock mechanism in one or both air locks is inoperable. Action a.1 requires that at least one of the two OPERABLE doors for each affected air lock be maintained closed, and if the interlock mechanism has not been restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, one door must be locked closed. The provisions of footnote * may be utilized for entries and exits. The administrative controls of footnote * allow the unlocking and use of the air lock provided that an individual is stationed at the air lock, dedicated to assuring that at least one OPERABLE air lock door remains closed at all times. This allowance is provided to address those situations when the use of an air lock with only an inoperable interlock mechanism may be preferred over the use of the other air lock, such as when the other air lock has an inoperable door.

An allowance has also been provided in Action a.2 for access into or through the containment air locks when one air lock door in one or both air locks is inoperable. The first sentence of footnote ** provides that entry and exit through the OPERABLE door on one or both air locks is permissible under administrative controls for the performance of repairs of the affected air lock components. The second sentence of footnote ** provides for entry into and exit from the containment for activities other than just the repairs of affected air lock components under administrative controls, but only permits these entries when both air locks have an inoperable door, and limits such use to a 7 day period. The administrative controls for the second sentence shall define limits on entry and exit, in order to minimize openings of the OPERABLE door.

The administrative controls for both sentences of footnote ** include provisions that after each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be promptly closed. The allowances of footnote ** are acceptable because of the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door will be open for entry into and exit from the containment.

The air supply to the containment air lock and seal system is the service and instrument air system. The system consists of two 100% capacity air compressors per unit and can be cross-connected. This system is redundant and extremely reliable and provides system pressure indication in the control room.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT (Continued)

3/4.6.1.4 MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM

Calculated doses resulting from the maximum leakage allowance for the main steam line isolation valves in the postulated LOCA situations would be a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines, provided the main steam line system from the isolation valves up to and including the turbine condenser remains intact. Operating experience has indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness of the MSIV's such that the specified leakage requirements have not always been maintained continuously. The requirement for the leakage control system will reduce the untreated leakage from the MSIV's when isolation of the primary system and containment is required. An LCO 3.0.4 exception is provided to permit changes in Operational Conditions when the Inboard MSIV-LCS subsystem becomes inoperable due to condensate buildup between the MSIVs when the plant is operated below 50% rated thermal power.

3/4.6.1.5 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the unit. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 15 psig in the event of a LOCA. A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on primary containment to secondary containment differential pressure ensure that the primary containment peak pressure of 7.80 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 15.0 psig during LOCA conditions or that the external pressure differential does not exceed the design maximum external pressure differential of +0.8 psid. The limit of -0.1 to +1.0 psid for initial positive primary containment to secondary containment pressure will limit the primary containment pressure to 7.80 psig which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analysis.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitation on containment average air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 185°F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis.

3/4.6.1.8 DRYWELL AND CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM

The use of the drywell and containment purge lines is restricted to the 42-inch outboard and 18-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves. These valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations. The term sealed closed as used in this context means that the valve is secured in its closed position by deactivating the valve motor operator, and does not pertain to injecting seal water between the isolation valves by a seal water system.

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Locks

LCO 3.6.1.2 Two primary containment air locks shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment,
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

-----NOTES-----

1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs of the affected air lock components.
2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.
3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment-Operating," when air lock leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>A. One or more primary containment air locks with one primary containment air lock door inoperable.</p>	<p>-----NOTES-----</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Required Actions A.1, A.2, and A.3 are not applicable if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered. 2. Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable. <p>-----</p>	<p>(continued)</p>

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. (continued)	C.3 Restore air lock to OPERABLE status.	24 hours
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.	D.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u>	12 hours
	D.2 Be in MODE 4.	36 hours
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment, or OPDRVs.	E.1 Suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment. <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	E.2 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.	Immediately