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C. K. McCoy
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Georgia Power
the southern electric system

June 4, 1992

ELV-03804
000439

Docket No. 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INADVERTENT
GROUNDING OF CIRCUITS IN THE GENERATOR

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which occurred on May 14, 1992.

Sincerely,

C. K. McCoy

CKM/NJS

Enclosure: LER 50-425/1992-010

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. W. B. Shipman
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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NRC Form 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 5	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INADVERTENT GROUNDING OF CIRCUITS IN THE GENERATOR

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQ NUM		REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
												0 5 0 0 0
0 5	1 4	9 2	9 2		0 1 0		0 0	0 6	0 4	9 2		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)			
POWER LEVEL	9 8	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
	AREA CODE	
MEHDI SHEIBANI, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE	706	826-3209

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (16)

On May 14, 1992, personnel were testing the main generator power system stabilizer (PSS) following the unit's return to service after a refueling outage. After completion of the testing, test personnel removed a test lead from a pin on an extender board in the regulator cubical and inadvertently touched another pin. This grounded the 15-volt dc power supply which supplies circuit board control power, disabling both the direct control and automatic control equipment. Generator excitation was lost, and a turbine trip occurred followed by a reactor trip at 1347 EDT.

The causes of this event include: the use of test leads that, while they are commonly used, were not adequately insulated and a personnel error on the part of a vendor technician in making an inadvertent pin contact. Insulated test leads will be utilized for future testing of this type.

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) occurred.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 (power operation) at 98 percent of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On May 14, 1992, personnel were testing the main generator power system stabilizer (PSS) following the unit's return to service after a refueling outage. The PSS supplements the voltage regulator in controlling generator excitation under varying generator speed and voltage conditions. After completion of the testing, test personnel removed a test lead from a pin on an extender board in the regulator cubical and inadvertently touched another pin. This grounded the 15-volt dc power supply which supplies circuit board control power, disabling both the direct control and automatic control equipment. Generator excitation was lost, and a turbine trip occurred followed by a reactor trip at 1347 EDT. The main feedwater (MFW) system isolated, and the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system actuated, as designed. Control room personnel observed the actuations as they occurred and stabilized the steam generator (SG) water levels. Normal unit operation resumed in Mode 3 (hot standby).

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The causes of this event are as follows:

1. Although the test leads in use at the time were the ones that would normally be used, this event showed that they were not adequately insulated for preventing this type of incident.

2. A cognitive personnel error was made when test personnel (a vendor representative) inadvertently touched the wrong pin when removing a test lead. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location which contributed to the occurrence of this event.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The reactor trip occurred as expected following a turbine/generator trip. The AFW system actuated, and control room personnel responded to restore the unit to normal operation. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Insulated test leads will be utilized for future testing of this type and appropriate personnel will be reminded by June 30, 1992, of the importance of using the correct test lead connectors. Additionally, by June 30, 1992, other generator card frames/cabinets will be examined for similar applications (where shorting of test leads could create a unit trip hazard), and the use of insulated test leads or other appropriate changes will be made as necessary.

2. "Unit Trip Hazard" signs have been placed on the doors of the regulator cubical, and by June 30, 1992, the extender boards will be labeled with appropriate caution signs regarding the use of insulated leads with these types of boards.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Previous Similar Events:

   None

2. Failed Components:

   None

3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:

   Main Generator System - TB
   Reactor Protection System - JD
   Main Feedwater System - SJ
   Auxiliary Feedwater System - BA