

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| FACILITY NAME (1): Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 | PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 2 |
|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|

TITLE (4):
RHR Relay Not Included in Surveillance Procedure.

| EVENT DATE (6) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----|------|-------------------------------|--|------------------|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | | DOCKET NUMBER(S) |
| 08 | 07 | 84 | 84 | 038 | 00 | 09 | 06 | 84 | | | 0 5 0 0 0 |
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THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|--|
| OPERATING MODE (9): 1 | 20.402(b) | 20.406(a) | 90.73(a)(2)(iv) | 73.71(b) |
| POWER LEVEL (10): 11010 | 20.406(a)(1)(i) | 90.36(a)(1) | 90.73(a)(2)(v) | 73.71(e) |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(ii) | 90.36(a)(2) | 90.73(a)(2)(vi) | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(iii) | X 90.73(a)(2)(i) | 90.73(a)(2)(vii)(A) | |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(iv) | 90.73(a)(2)(ii) | 90.73(a)(2)(vii)(B) | |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(v) | 90.73(a)(2)(iii) | 90.73(a)(2)(ix) | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| NAME L.A. Kuczynski - Nuclear Plant Specialist III | TELEPHONE NUMBER |
| | AREA CODE: 71117 514 121-1317 1519 |

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPROS | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPROS |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|
| A | B10 | 1112 | A11019 | N | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH: DAY: YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 7, 1984, with the Unit at 100% power, Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) personnel identified that the relays which control the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Shutdown Cooling Mode Isolation on high area differential temperature had not received surveillance testing since January 27, 1982. The surveillance was successfully completed on August 8, 1984 at 1415. I&C has reviewed additional documentation regarding the adequacy of I&C surveillance tests and found no further discrepancies.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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|---|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|----------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | |
| | | 8 4 | - 0 3 8 | - 0 0 | 0 2 | OF 0 2 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

In recognition of the need to improve the Station's Surveillance Program, the Surveillance Program Task Force (SPTF) was formally established on June 21, 1983. The SPTF ultimately became involved with identifying and resolving generic 'philosophical' issues integral to the Surveillance Program, while an off-shoot (the Surveillance Procedure Review Group (SPRG) was established to provide a detailed technical review of surveillance procedures. Among other things, this technical review resulted in the issuance of Surveillance Task Force Action Items (SAI) which identified to the responsible work groups discrepancies in or improvements to their surveillance procedures to assure compliance with Technical Specification requirements.

As a result of one of the SAI's dated May 8, 1984, procedure SI-249-505 was prepared by May 28, 1984, to fulfill the 18-month logic system functional test of the B21-K6A and B relays in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) leak detection high temperature channels on Unit 2. A check of the equivalent Unit 1 procedure revealed a similar circumstance and SI-149-505 was also prepared by May 28, 1984. The immediate need to verify compliance with the Technical Specification surveillance frequency for Unit 1 was overlooked by I&C personnel at that time. SI-149-505 was issued on August 1, 1984. The need to perform the surveillance was recognized at approximately 1430 on August 7, 1984. Operations personnel complied with the requirements of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.2 immediately upon their verification of the circumstances of the event. SI-149-505 was successfully completed by 1415 on August 8, 1984. The date of the last confirmed testing of the affected relays was January 27, 1982 during the performance of a Startup Test Procedure. SI-149-505 has been entered into the appropriate tracking system to assure its performance within the proper time interval in the future.

The B21-K6A and B relays act to cause closure of the Reactor Head Spray Inboard and the Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation valves upon sensing high area temperature or high differential temperature in the area ventilation system for the RHR pump's location. The high temperature would be indicative of a breach of the reactor coolant pressure boundary in the area. Even if the B21-K6A and B relays had malfunctioned, diversity of trip initiation signals for an RHR line break is provided by high flow and reactor pressure vessel water level instrumentation. However, it is reasonable to assume that, since the relays operated properly when tested, they would have responded correctly if called upon. Also, it should be noted that existing surveillance procedures did test the remainder of the high area/high differential temperature instrumentation associated with this isolation channel for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. These surveillances have been completed in a timely fashion.

The extensive Surveillance Program review accomplished by the SPTF and SPRG effectively met the goal of improving the confidence level in the Station's Surveillance Program. The fact that the B21-K6A and B relays were not properly tested was identified, but due to personnel oversight on the part of the I&C Section management (utility, non-licensed personnel), they were not included in the appropriate surveillance procedure (a cognitive error). I&C has reviewed additional documentation regarding the adequacy of I&C surveillance tests and found no further discrepancies.



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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September 6, 1984

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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-038-00
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLA-2299

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 84-038-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), in that a relay in the Residual Heat Removal System isolation circuitry was not included in a regularly scheduled 18-month surveillance procedure.

H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

LAK/pjg

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