

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4	PAGE (3) 1 OF 1
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TITLE (4)
Reactor Scram from Reactor Pressure Vessel High Pressure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
08	10	84	84	050	00	09	05	84	NA		
									DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
									0 5 0 0 0		
									NA		
									0 5 0 0 0		

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	20.402(b)	20.408(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	80.73(e)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 5	20.408(e)(1)(i)	80.73(e)(1)		80.73(e)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
	20.408(e)(1)(ii)	80.73(e)(2)		80.73(e)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 386A)
	20.408(e)(1)(iii)	80.73(e)(2)(i)		80.73(e)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.408(e)(1)(iv)	80.73(e)(2)(ii)		80.73(e)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.408(e)(1)(v)	80.73(e)(2)(iii)		80.73(e)(2)(viii)	
	20.408(e)(1)(vi)	80.73(e)(2)(iv)		80.73(e)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Kurt W. Uhlir, extension 639	TELEPHONE NUMBER 815 357-6761
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
X	J J	P C	G O 8 4	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

A Unit 2 Reactor Scram occurred on August 10, 1984, at 0753 due to Reactor Vessel high pressure during performance of Control Valve Surveillance Startup Test STP-24-2. The Maximum Combined Flow Limiter of the Electro-Hydraulic Control system limited the opening of the #1 bypass valve to compensate for increased pressure when the #1 control valve was cycled closed. Therefore, reactor pressure exceeded the scram setpoint of 1043 psig. Reactor water level dropped to near -50 inches and a half isolation signal was received as well as a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Auto Initiation and a "B" Reactor Recirculation pump trip on an ATWS signal. All actions occurred in accordance with system design. Safe plant conditions were maintained at all times. Procedures will be revised.

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

A Unit 2 Reactor Scram (SC) occurred on August 10, 1984, at 0753 due to Reactor Vessel high pressure during performance of Main Turbine Control Valve (TA) Surveillance Start-up Test, STP-24-2. The reactor was in Run Mode, at 95% power.

II. CAUSE

With all four control valves at approximately 48% open, the number 1 control valve was cycled closed per Start-up Test STP-24-2, Turbine Valve Surveillance Test. As the number 1 control valve was cycling closed the control valve demand was increasing from the Pressure Regulator Signal (JJ) as reactor pressure was increasing, thus demanding control valves 2, 3 and 4 to go full open. Due to the characteristics of the function generator and the stroke length of the full arc admission control valves, control valves 2, 3 and 4 were not capable of passing the total steam flow, thus causing reactor pressure to increase. Load reference was set at its maximum end prior to the start of STP-24-2 to ensure that the control valves would handle the whole transient as specified in the procedure. Due to the fact that the load reference setting was at its maximum end, the ceiling limiting circuit of the control valve amplifier took control of the control valve position prohibiting load reference from ever controlling, consequently preventing the bypass valves (JI) from responding until the pressure regulator signal had become greater than the control valve amplifier ceiling limiting signal. The pressure regulator signal at this point had become great enough that the maximum combined flow limiter took control limiting bypass valve capability and allowing reactor pressure to increase to its scram setpoint of 1043 psig, resulting in a reactor scram. The sudden pressure increase caused a reactor level drop to near -50 inches and some low level switches tripped causing a half isolation signal (JM). A "B" Reactor Recirc pump (AD) trip on an ATWS signal and a RCIC (BN) pump auto initiation subsequently tripped the main turbine.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

The event was of minimal significance as the maximum combined flow limiting circuit and the Turbine Control System responded according to design. The "B" Reactor Recirc pump and RCIC pump responded according to a low reactor level condition. Level and pressure were restored to normal shutdown conditions.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. The System Engineer and Instrument Mechanic Department evaluated the Load Control Circuit, the maximum combined flow limiting circuit and the ceiling limiting circuit of the control valve amplifier to verify that the circuits were aligned per General Electric recommendations.

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A's) (17)

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION (Continued)

2. Control valve testing conducted per LOS-RP-M4 will be performed at power levels no higher than 90%.
3. The following recommendation will be incorporated into LOS-RP-M4 for control valve surveillances.
 - a. Verify that load reference is not run to its maximum end prior to the start of the control valve surveillance, for this would limit the capacity of bypass valve operation.
 - b. Per the Shift Engineer's discretion raise the maximum combined flow limiter prior to the start of the control valve surveillance to ensure that bypass valves will not be limited at higher power levels.

AIR 1-84-67132 will track these corrective actions.

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

No similar occurrences have occurred.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Kurt W. Uhlir, 815/357-6761, extension 639.



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September 5, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #84-050-00, Docket #050-374
is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR
50.73.

CE Sargent

ja G. J. Diederich
Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO - Records Center
File/NRC

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