Wayne H. Jens Vice President Nuclear Operations



Fermi-2 6400 North Dixle Highway Newport, Michigan 48168 (313) 586-4150

August 24, 1984 EF2-69667

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reference:

(1) Fermi 2

NRC Docket No. 50-341

(2) Letter, D. A. Wells to J. G. Keppler, September 9, 1982, EF2-59393

Subject:

Final Report of 10CFR50.55(e) Item 77 "1 Inch 3000# Carbon Steel Pipe Couplings and Caps"

This is Detroit Edison's final report of Item 77, "Linear Indications in 1 Inch 3000# Carbon Steel Pipe Couplings and Caps." Item 77 was originally reported as a potential deficiency on August 10, 1982, and was subsequently documented in Reference (2).

Description of Deficiency

During a warehouse inspection, Quality Control personnel identified linear indications in 1 inch 3000# carbon steel pipe caps manufactured by Capitol Manufacturing Company. The linear indications were identified in caps from Heat Number (HT) 0680. Records indicate that 195 caps had been received, of which 65 had been installed. A liquid penetrant (PT) examination was performed on 25 of the caps in storage, all 25 caps exhibited rejectable indications. Based on these inspections, all HT 0680 caps were considered rejectable. These caps were purchased by Wismer & Becker from Chicago Tube and Iron.

In addition, 200 l inch 3000# carbon steel pipe couplings from HT 0680 were also received by Wismer and Becker, of which 77 had been issued for installation. A liquid penetrant examination was performed on 20 of the couplings

AUG 30 1984

IEN7

Mr. James G. Keppler August 24, 1984 EF2-69667 Page 2 in storage, 12 exhibited rejectable indications. Based on these inspections all uninstalled couplings were considered rejectable; installed couplings required further examination. Analysis of Safety Implications Defects in carbon steel pipe couplings and caps could cause failure of the coupling or cap. Failure of these components could cause loss of safety component functions or system pressure boundary integrity, thus adversely affecting the safe operation of the plant. Corrective Action The following corrective actions have been taken to correct this deficiency: The total number of caps and couplings received at Fermi 2 from Heat Number 0680 was determined. PT inspections were performed on the warehouse stock caps and couplings. Unused caps and couplings from Heat Number 0680 were collected, segregated and removed from the Fermi site. Based on the results of the PT inspections, all HT 0630 0 caps installed in safety related systems were removed. PT examinations were performed on all couplings installed in safety related systems. Couplings containing rejectable indications were removed. corrective actions were documented and implemented on Deviation Disposition Requests, in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program. This is Detroit Edison's final report on this item. If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Lewis P. Bregni, (313) 586-5083. Sincerely, Mayne Allens cc: Mr. P. M. Byron Mr. R. C. DeYoung Mr. R. C. Knop