



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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May 21, 1992
RBG- 36863
File Nos. G9.5, G15.4.1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458/Report 92-06

This letter provides Gulf States Utilities Company's (GSU) response to the exercise weakness noted in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-458/92-06. This letter describes GSU's corrective actions regarding the weakness observed during an inspection conducted on March 2-5, 1992.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. L.A. England a. (504) 381-4145.

Sincerely,

W.H. Odell
Manager - Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

LAE/TWC/TCC/WMS/kvm

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ATTACHMENT

Response to Weakness 50-458/9206-01

REFERENCE

Letter - A.B. Beach to J.C. Deddens, dated April 14, 1992

DESCRIPTION

During one of the walkthroughs, one exercise weakness was identified concerning protective action recommendations to offsite authorities. After a general emergency had been declared, one crew transmitted a notification message form to offsite authorities which contained three different protective action recommendations. One of the protective action recommendations was more conservative than the recommendation generated by the dose projection computer, which was based on actual release rates. A second protective action recommendation was less conservative than that generated by the dose projection computer program. A third protective action recommendation called for the evacuation and shelter of upwind sectors and failed to recommend evacuating the downwind sectors.

The failure to make accurate protective action recommendation to offsite authorities was identified as an exercise weakness.

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY'S RESPONSE

One crew failed to make accurate protective action recommendations to offsite authorities by issuing three different protective action recommendations. This occurred because the emergency director misread the protective action recommendation flowchart and because of confusing "wind to" and "wind from" directions, picked the wrong scenarios. This resulted in providing recommendations that were more conservative, less conservative, and using upwind sections instead of downwind sections.

Message Number 4 used scenario number 30 which was 180 degrees off in wind direction, the proper scenario number should have been scenario number 15. Message number 4 also showed on line 5 sections for shelter and evacuate that did not correspond to the scenario number 30 that was used. These three mistakes caused the failure of control room emergency responders to make accurate protective action recommendations.

The importance of using the correct wind direction, scenario number, and ensuring that line 5 on the message is correct with the scenario number used will be emphasized in training for the control room staff as well as other emergency response organization members as necessary.