## ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL PREHEARING CONFERENCE

OPEN MEETING

Location: Bethesda, Maryland

Date: Friday, September 7, 1984

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## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 3 4 : Docket No. 50-338-OLA-1 5 50-339-OLA-1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL 50-338-OLA-2 6 PREHEARING CONFERENCE 50-339-0LA-2 7 8 September 7, 1984 9 4350 East West Highway 10 Bethesda, Maryland 11 12 Hearing in the above entitled matter convened 13 at 9:00 a.m. 14 15 BEFORE: 16 JUDGE SHELDON J. WOLFE, Chairman 17 JUDGE JERRY KLINE 18 JUDGE GEORGE FERGUSON 19 APPEARANCES: 20 On Behalf of the Applicants: 21 MR. MICHAEL W. MAUPIN 22 On Behalf of the NRC Regulatory Staff: 23 MR. HENRY J. MCGURREN MR. LEON ENGLE 24 On Behalf of the Concerned Citizens Group: 25 MR. JAMES DOUGHERTY

## PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE WOLFE: Good morning. Pursuant to the board's order of August 28, 1984, this supplemental prehearing conference, special prehearing conference, is now in session.

In case OLA-1, applicant requests amendments to its North Anna operating licenses to permit the receipt and storage of 500 spent fuel assemblies from its Surrey power station.

In case OLA-2, applicant requests amendments to its North Anna operating licenses to permit the expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity.

To my left is Administrative Judge Ferguson. To my right is Administrative Judge Kline, and I am Administrative Judge Wolfe, Chairman.

Going straight ahead from the bench here, would you identify, counsel, identify yourselves for the record?

MR. MCGURREN: Representing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, my name is Henry J. McGurren.

On my right is Leon Engle, who is the staff's project manager on this case.

MR. MAUPIN: My name is Michael Maupin. I represent Virginia Electric & Power Company.

MR. DOUGHERTY: My name is James D. Dougherty. I represent the Concerned Citizens of Louisa County.

JUDGE WOLFE: Are there any preliminary matters to be discussed before we proceed argument?

MR. MAUPIN: None from the staff, your honor.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. Dougherty? I think at some time during the course of the argument, Mr. McGurren, it would assist the board if you would identify a citation in your August 15, 1984 response, and footnote four, at the end of the first paragraph of that footnote four, says a reference to Section 3.2.6, and also at page 4-4 of the staff's Safety Evaluation Report, in that first paragraph there's also a reference to Section 3.2.6.

If you can now or during the course of argument, if you could identify what that section has reference to, what document it's part of.

MR. MCGURREN: Your honor, I believe the reference is to this document, the Safety Evaluation itself, and that section appears on 3-8.

JUDGE WOLFE: 3-8?

MR. MCGURREN: And it's entitled "Cask Rupture."

During the course of the argument, we'll check into

that a little further, just to make sure, your honor.

But I believe that is the reference that's being made.

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, I have a problem then, if

that's what was intended, the Table of Contents for the SER speaks to 3.2.5, captioned, "Case Case Ruptured."

And that's at page 3-8. And even assuming for present purposes that when you reference 3.2.6, that comes at the conclusion of the sentence where it's concluded that attempted sabotage, even if successful, would not produce serious radiological consequences.

So you go back to "Cask Rupture", which is now 3.2.6, in the SER, that section does not speak to sabotage.

So figure that one out and let us know during the course of argument what the citation is to.

And as a preliminary matter, turning to you, Mr. Maupin, I think the latest word we had from you with respect to the expected loss of full core reserve at the Surrey plant, has there been any updating since that letter of October 13, 1983?

MR. MAUPIN: Yes. Is that letter, Mr. Chairman, referring to 1986?

JUDGE WOLFE: I believe that's right. Let's see here.

MR. MAUPIN: I could bring six briefcases full of documents up here and the first one you'd ask about would be one I'd left at home.

(Laughter.)

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes, therein you advised that VEPCO has now completed the reevaluation, it indicates that VEPCO will not lose full core reserve during the outage scheduled for 1985 after all, but will lose it instead during the Surrey Unit 1 outage scheduled for early 1986.

Need that be updated, or is that set?

MR. MAUPIN: I think that information is still accurate, and I would only add what I guess that letter did not say, that is, as I recall, the margin by which full core reserve will be preserved in the spring of 1985 is on the order of 2 to 3 assemblies, so that if for any reason the company were to be required in the spring of 1985 refueling to remove permanently spent fuel assemblies that is currently planning to reuse in the following cycle, that can change.

I don't think I can suggest that that change will occur, but simply that the margin of the spring of 1985 is small.

JUDGE WOLFE: In that self same letter, Mr. Maupin, you indicated that there was some effort to negotiate with the Department of Energy with respect to, I guess, what, a pilot program or some sort of problem dealing with dry cast storage at Surrey.

Has there been any development along those lines

since October 13, 1983?

MR. MAUPIN: Yes, sir. In late March of 1984, DOE and Virginia Electric reached an agreement, a so-called cooperative agreement, on a dry cask demonstration program.

The first order of business has to be execution of that contract on the selection of...well, let me back up and tell you what the contract called for.

The demonstration program was to go ahead basically on two fronts. The first front called for Virginia Electric to purchase dry casks manufactured by different vendors and to send them to a DOE site that was not named in the contract.

It was to be, I think, as the party intended, a site either in Nevada or a site in Idaho.

What the program contemplated was up to five casks would be sent to the DOE site, that as those casks arrived at the DOE site and were checked out and put in place, VEPCO would send spent fuel from its Surrey power station to the DOE site for storage in those casks.

DOE performed a number of tests on them that would be designed to see other casks perform under less limiting conditions than the NRC might be expected to apply to a licensed cask.

It was contemplated by the agreement that the casks at the DOE site would not require an NRC license. The agreement also provided that beginning with the third or fourth cask, that the parties would consolidate fuel in those casks, roughly doubled the amount of fuel that was put in casks, and see how the cask responded under those conditions.

All in all, it was contemplated that as many as 144 assemblies might be shipable to the DOE site under those arrangements.

The second front called for Virginia Electric to continue to pursue its efforts to secure a license from NRC for which it applied, I think, in late 1982, October 1982.

Virginia Electric proposes to build a correcte pad at that site and then buy casks that are licensed by NRC and to store fuel under more limited conditions in those casks at the Surrey site.

We are now in the question and answer period about the licensing process.

I think the company had hoped when it entered into the agreement with DOE that it would be able to shift sufficient number of assemblies from Surrey to the DOE facility to Nevada or Idaho in time to preserve the loss of Yull core reserve beyond the spring of 1986.

Would you please stop me if this was more than you ever wanted to hear on the subject?

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, go ahead.

MR. MAUPIN: In fact, to go back to the point where I departed, the first order of business was to select the DOE site.

The DOE site that had been selected is the site in Idaho, and my understanding is that that site cannot be prepared for participation in this project as promptly as it was thought the Nevada site could be prepared.

The bottom line of all of this is that the Idaho site has been selected and I think right now, under the most optimistic view that Virginia Electric has, it would be very late in 1985 or sometime in early 1986 before we could actually start shipping assemblies from Surrey to Idaho.

As I recall, the margin by which full core reserve would be launched in the spring in early 1986 is on the order of 50 to 55 assemblies.

And I suppose that even if the company could begin shipping assemblies to Idaho in late '85 or early '86, it is unlikely, very unlikely, that they could ship as many as 55, because you've got to have three casks in place in order to accomplish that.

Let me add just one thing. The company has

actually ordered three casks, and the first of those is scheduled for completion later this year.

So this is a real ongoing project in which Virginia Electric has made a very substantial commitme ...

JUDGE WOLFE: Can you advise, if you know, when VEPCO and/or the Department of Energy anticipate that the demonstration program with five dry casks will be finalized, completed?

MR. MAUPIN: You mean completed in the sense...

JUDGE WOLFE: In the sense that...

MR. MAUPIN: All of the details worked out or fully performed?

JUDGE WOLFE: Fully performed.

MR. MAUPIN: I think the termination date called for in this contract is 1988. Perhaps I ought to add it is a part of this agreement, as far as the company is concerned, that once the fuel goes to Idaho or wherever, it does not come back.

DOE will be permanently responsible for the fuel just as it would have been in any event under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act from whatever date in the future.

DOE will simply take responsibility for this fuel at an earlier date. 1988 is the termination date.

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, let's see if I can get a

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handle, then, on what these dates are. The date that the, what, the first two or three casks will be in place at the Idaho site is when?

You talked late or mid-'86? What was your date again on that?

MR. MAUPIN: I don't think I said it precisely that way. We had certainly hoped that that would be the case, but with the selection of the Idaho site, I think we are now in a position where the cask will be completed in late 1985.

We had planned to have it shipped directly to the DOE site. The problem that has arisen since the execution of the contract is that the DOE site may not be prepared to receive it at the time that it is complete.

And I am considerably more confident about when the cask will be completed than I am about when DOE will be prepared to receive it.

But I believe that present thinking would be about mid-1985 before DOE would be in a position to receive that.

I have with me Steve McCay, he's from Virginia
Electric. He makes an important distinction.
Physically, DOE could accept the cask at this site and put it somewhere on the site, I'm sure.

I was talking in terms of the ability to receive a cask and use it to load fuel, and it would be later in 1985 before that could be possible under the present estimates.

JUDGE WOLFE: So then the demonstration program itself per contract is to be concluded when? The contract.

MR. MAUPIN: Concluded?

JUDGE WOLFE: Terminated.

MR. MAUPIN: Concluded in 1988.

JUDGE WOLFE: So that there would be, what, about a two-and-a-half-year time spread during which the fuel would be inserted in the cason or cask and, what, would it be above ground or below ground?

MR. MAUPIN: No, it would be above ground.

JUDGE WOLFE: Above ground.

MR. MAUPIN: Yes, sir, and...

JUDGE WOLFE: And that performance demonstration with the spent fuel inside the cask, the duration of that would be what? Two, two and a half years before the expiration of the contract?

MR. MAUPIN: Before the expiration of the contract, but in terms of what DOE would do with the fuel after that, it may well leave it in the cask indefinitely, until they had something else to do with it.

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They may move it from that cask to some other storage facility or do something else with the cask. Let me say precisely the same sort of arrangement is proposed for the Surrey site under the second front that I described, the licensed facility at Surrey, you buy these large casks and put 20, 24 assemblies in them and put them on a pad on the Surrey site and with adequate security provisions, of course, and certain monitoring, leave them there until the fuel...until there is a respository available for the fuel.

Taking the date set in the Waste Police Act, that's 1998.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. Would you advise the board, then, is it now necessary for the board to proceed to consider case OLA-1 with respect to the application to receive and store spent fuel assemblies from Surrey and store these at the spent fuel...

MR. MAUPIN: Let me begin with a resound...

JUDGE WOLFE: ...at North Anna.

MR. MAUPIN: Let me begin with a resounding "yes."

It is important to emphasize, and I believe that I said before, a copy of the settlement agreement provided the basis for the withdrawal of Louisa County.

Didn't I send you that?

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes.

MR. MAUPIN: It might be helpful to begin by refreshing our memories on what was in that agreement.

The company made a commitment in that agreement with Louisa County, a contractual agreement which really reflected the public commitments it had been making prior to that time, that it would use its best efforts to pursue a program with the Department of Energy such as the one I've described. And I think it is doing that.

They will use its best efforts to have NRC issue a license for a dry cask facility at Surrey, and I think the company is using its best efforts to do that.

And upon succeeding with one or both of those undertakings, it will as quickly as it reasonably can utilize those methods for dealing with Surrey fuel and avoid shipping Surrey fuel to North Anna.

The company has clearly made that contractual commitment and that commitment to the public.

The difficulty we have is that we have never been...what we're talking about, of course, is basically the loss of full core reserve, is the possibility that it would not be available when we needed it and we would need it and the unit would have to be taken of; the line for some period of time.

Now whatever the probability of that and the

consequences, the economic consequences would be enormous.

So the company's approach throughout, from well before the time when OLA-1 and OLA-2 proposals were filed, and then to have options available for avoiding the loss of full core reserve at Surry and in fact it has three options.

But one of our concerns from the outset was that even if we could get into the DOE program, that program was not going as quickly as we had hoped, and indeed, the events are sort of bearing out that concern, because we had hoped, for example, that the Nevada site would be selected where they were ready to deal with this material in fairly short order, and that didn't work out.

So we're already looking at a delay. We are already in a situation where if we had to rely solely on the DOE program, we do not believe we could avoid the loss of full core reserve by the spring of 1986.

On the NRC license front, it may well be that a license could be issued in sufficient time for us to use the Surrey facility and never have to ship the fuel assembly to North Anna and I think the company would like nothing better.

But as I understand it, no dry cask facility or dry

cask has been licensed for use in the United States.

Anytime you are blazing a trail with the NRC, you are,

I think, understandably cautious of what your estimate
of what the future will bring.

And we simply have not been confident that that facility will be in place in time to enable us to avoid the loss of full core reserve.

Now if we deal solely with those two options and don't have shipping, there is a third option. When we get to the end of 1985 or early part of 1986 and say, "Here we are. Neither option 1 or option 2 is available."

Do we then come back and have this prehearing conference and embark on a process of several months, several months during which the plant will be sitting there with full core reserve capacity?

It seems to me the rational answer to that question should be "no." So it's very important that we go ahead with this decision.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. Any comment by other counsel? If not, we will proceed to hear the oral argument on the contentions with concerned citizens.

We have read in both cases the contentions of concerned citizens, initially submitted on July 30, 1984 and revised on August 14 of this year, with

respect to the basis for contention 4 in OLA-1.

We've also read the applicant's and staff's responses. We don't have to go into that again. Mr. Dougherty, you may proceed to present any responding arguments upon each contention, beginning with case OLA-1.

Respond to the applicant's and the staff's written responses, and on completion of your argument, as to each contention, we will then hear from the applicant and the staff responding to your argument.

All right. We'll begin, then.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Thank you, Judge Wolfe. Before getting to the merits, I'd like to address the point that you last made.

There are a lot of issues here and some of the arguments will be lengthy and complex, and it's my idea that it may facilitate an understanding of these issues if we deal with each contention one at a time.

JUDGE WOLFE: That was my suggestion.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Oh, I understood you...

JUDGE WOLFE: No. In OLA-1, complete your argument on your first contention.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Fine.

JUDGE WOLFE: Then we will hear from applicant and staff. Then you go on to your next contention.

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MR. DOUGHERTY: Fine, that's what we'll do, then.
JUDGE WOLFE: Yes.

MR. DOUGHERTY: I'd like to make one general comment about our contention before I discuss number one.

That is that I think in some respects, the responses filed by the staff and by VEPCO mischaracterize the nature of our contentions or the bases.

The reference we made in the basis for contention 1, for example, referred to a risk of sabotage, and this was criticized by the other parties as not being specific, not including a scenario, and what not.

I'll get to this later, but you don't have a sabotage contention. We don't have any contention, really, that if we were to prevail on it, would prevent the shipping of spent fuel to North Anna.

We have not claimed, for example, that the risk of sabotage is so great that the fuel should not be shipped.

We have not claimed, as did Louisa County earlier on, that the risk of corrosion in the spent fuel pool in North Anna, occupational exposures would be so great that this board should reject the application filed by VEPCO.

Our contentions, each and every one of them, deal strictly with procedural compliance with NRC rules.

We've asked for an Environmental Impact Statement, for example. Once an EIS is prepared, that's the end of our case, that spent fuel can be shipped.

We've asked for a compliance with security requirements. Once that plan has been developed, and it's in compliance, then the fuel can move.

All we've asked for in all of our contentions is just that they meet the NRC requirements before they ship the fuel.

I just think it's helpful to keep that in mind as we go through all of the contentions.

Contention 1 asserts that an EIS is required and must be prepared by the staff before the NRC can grant the application.

I think the basis for that contention sets out our factual case pretty well.

We have retained the services of an expert, Dr.

Martin Resnicof, who may be one of the leading
authorities in the field on the environmental and human
impacts associated with spent fuel transportation.

And we intend to put on a full case demonstrating that the risks in this kind of proposal are significant, and therefore, the EIS is required.

I don't see any reason at this point to go into all the possible risks of environmental impacts. One or two issues have arisen in the pleadings filed by the other parties that I'll address later.

The key issue with contention 1 is the alleged effect of Table S-4, to the extent to which that table regulation may eliminate the Commission's obligation or the staff's obligation to conduct the environmental assessment here.

And I'd like to address the applicability, the alleged applicability, of Table S-4.

My argument is that Table S-4 is not applicable at all to the case, the proposed shipping project, and there are several independently valid reasons why it's simply irrelevant to what we have in front of us.

I'd like to go through them. There are two or three reasons why they don't apply.

First reason is that Table S-4 is part of Section 51.20 of the Commissions Rules. Section 51.20 doesn't affect this case.

Section 51.20 deals with the environmental report that must be submitted by an applicant when seeking a construction permit.

It affects the Environmental Impact Statement that will then be prepared by the staff. In this case we are

not concerned with a construction permit application.

We're not concerned with the Environmental Impact Statement, on its face, the rule doesn't apply, Table S-4 doesn't apply.

Now I admit, in fact, in my opinion it's the case that Table S-4 does have a somewhat broader application than the Environment Report prepared by the company.

And that demonstrated in the preamble to Table S-4, where the rule was promulgated in '75, the Commission had the preamble to the rule, where it described its function and what not, and I'd just like to read that briefly, especially what the Commission said.

Table S-4 governs not only the Environmental Report, but also the Impact Statement prepared by the staff.

What they said is that the proposed rule would allow applicants in their Environmental Report and the Commission in its detailed Environmental Statement, in other words, the Impact Statement, to account for the environmental effects of transportation of spent fuel.

So it deals with the Environmental Report and Environmental Impact Statements at the CP stage.

It doesn't deal with license amendments to spent fuel.

The Commission went on to say in the same

statement, "The purpose of this proceeding [and this was the rulemaking proceeding leading to the promulgation of the rule] was to determine certain elements to be factored into impact statements, in particular, licensing proceedings." I think that covers the point.

It deals with EISs and we don't have one here.

When we do, let's talk about Table S-4, but in the meantime, it doesn't excuse the staff of its obligation to look at the environmental effects of this project.

Now not only does Table S-4 deal with the impact statement, it deals only with the specific segment of the impact statement, and that is the cost benefit analysis, or EIS.

Every EIS has a section on cost benefit analysis which they try and balance the economic benefits of a power reactor against the environmental costs.

And to make this point, I'll need a few minutes. The history of this cost benefit requirement in the context of S-4 begins with the appeal board's decision in, I think it's ALAB 73.

And that's when the appeal board said for the first time that Environmental Impact Statements in addition to the narrative analysis of environmental effects, the CPs, must also have a section addressing the cost benefit. You must balance cost against benefits and it derives its requirement from a section known as NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, that talks about comparing cost and benefits, 1022B.

And so the Commission endeavored shortly thereafter to come up with a way of quantifying environmental effects.

And what they did was they promulgated Table S-3 and Table S-4. Now, S-3, as I'm sure you know, deals with the environmental effects of the fuel cycle in mining, milling, all the way through ultimate disposal, and assigns numbers to these environmental effects.

And it permits a portion of those impacts to each reactor, and so that allows you to do this cost benefit analysis.

Table S-4 is in the same nature. It quantifies the effects of transportation and then permits the staff to engage in this cost benefit balancing process.

I'd like to read from the preamble to Table S-4.

I'll give you a citation of what I'm reading from.

It's 40 Federal Register 1005, January 6, 1975.

I'm reading on page 105, in column two, the
Commission stated, "This proceeding addresses a
procedural question involving the implementation of
NEPA's requirement for cost benefit analyses and impact

study."

The Commission said at the outset we're talking about cost benefit analyses, and that particular segment of impact statement.

It made the comment to the same effect when it proposed Table S-4 in 1973. I won't read it, but the citation is 38 Federal Register 3334 at 3335, column one, February 5, 1973.

So it just doesn't apply. You don't have an impact statement and we're not seeking a cost benefit analysis.

There is nothing in the rule to require a cost benefit analysis in the context of license amendments or environmental analyses, environmental assessments such as the one we have in front of us.

So we're talking apples and oranges here. This whole argument by the staff and VEPCO is misplaced.

Now, there is another reason why it doesn't apply. Even if what I've just gone through weren't the case for some reason, even if we attempted to apply Table S-4 to this case, by its own requirements, by the text of S-4, you can see that it doesn't apply for another reason.

I'd like to refer you to Table S-4, Section 51.20 G2.

In my book, that is page 521. In Wash 38, in Table S-4, the Commission recognized it couldn't attempt to quantify all the environmental impacts of all the forms of transportation of spent fuel.

It set certain bounding limits. Well, the bounding limits are set out there in Sub ii. There are five different conditions that must be met before Table S-4 can apply.

One is that if the reactor is bigger than 3000 megawatts thermal, it doesn't apply as a spent fuel reactor.

It also provides that if the fuel is the uranium beyond 4%, it doesn't apply. Well, Sub iii...

JUDGE WOLFE: Where are you reading from now, please, Mr. Dougherty?

MR. DOUGHERTY: The '84 rule on page 521 at the top righthand corner. This is Section 51.20 G23. This is the third of five elements which must be met before Table S-4 applies.

Part 3 there provides that the average level of radiation from the irradiated fuel from the reactor does not exceed 33,000 megawatt days per ton.

In other words, they limited S-4 to the movement of spent fuel that falls below a certain burn factor. If you burn the fuel beyond that point, it's got a higher

inventory of fission products, it's hotter, or something, it's not covered by WASH 1238. That is 33,000 megawatts.

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Now I'd like to refer you to the environmental assessment submitted by the staff in July. The July 3 document, page 23 of that document, it's on Table 4-1.

On Table 4-1, the fifth line, the staff indicates that the burn-up rate for the spent fuel in question is 36,000 megawatt days per ton.

It's a higher burn-up rate. Apparently VEPCO is on an 18-month cycle and it's simply using its fuel longer than what was anticipated back in '72 or '73 when WASH 1238 was performed and '75, when the fuel was promulgated.

They weren't anticipating this more toxic fuel would burn longer and therefore they put that condition in the table.

But that reason doesn't apply to this fuel under any circumstances.

Now because it has these limiting conditions on the table, the Commission accepted in some cases certain kind of fuel which would not be covered, and addressed the question of what to do when your fuel falls outside the scope of the table.

They first addressed that when they proposed the

rule in 1973 in this citation.

The Commission said there in a proposal that in some cases the characteristics of the reactor fuel or wastes for the condition of transport may not fall within the scope of the environmental survey, in other words, may not fall within the scope of Table S-4.

In such cases, the Commission said, the applicant would be required to provide in his environmental report a full description of and analysis of environmental effects of such transportation.

And the Commission would include in this environmental statement the cost benefit analysis specific to that case.

Now one thing that this says is that we are talking about EISs and cost benefit analysis, but the key point I'm trying to make is that a new analysis, site-specific analysis must be made in that case in which the fuel is not covered by the rule.

This is such a case, so you need a sitespecific...well, according to this, we need a sitespecific cost benefit analysis, but my point is that
Table S-4, again, doesn't apply.

When the Commission issued a final rule in 1975, it addressed the same topic and stated that it deliberately excluded from the rule language addressing

procedures to be followed for transportation outside the scope of the rule.

The staff had proposed language that would cover fuel that wasn't covered by that table, and the Commission decided not to cover those cases.

They said this. "Regardless of the methodology used for assessing the environmental effects of such transportation, any assessment...and again, transportation means transportation of fuel not within the scope of the rule, like this 36,000 fuel we're talking about.

Any assessment would be subject to separate consideration in individual licensing cases if it covers transportation of a type which is outside the scope of the rule.

What it called for is individualized consideration. You can't rely on this numerical formula on the table. You must look at it individually.

So to sum up, there are three reasons why S-4 doesn't apply. It can only apply to impact statements, even then it only applies to cost benefit analyses.

It wasn't intended to be a shortcut for environmental review required by NEPA. NEPA requires a hard look at environmental effects.

And impact statements contain that hard look, that full narrative analysis, and then they have a cost

benefit analysis, and that's what S-4 is designed to do.

It's not an escape route for the staff to say,
"Well, these impacts are covered by Table S-4," and
therefore not looking at the environmental impacts.

That wasn't its purpose. Finally, even if some attempt was made to use Table S-4 by its own terms, it doesn't apply.

Now, I would hope that that would cover the issue, but there's one fly in my ointment, and that is the decision by the licensing board in Cataba, in which it implied that Table S-4 did in some way relieve the staff of its obligation to look at environmental effects.

Now, Cataba was only an aside. I doubt, although I don't know, I doubt that this careful look at the history of the rule was presented to the board.

Certainly if it was, it wasn't discussed by the board. There is no indication that it approached the proper application of the rule correctly.

Secondly, I presume that the fuel in that case fell within the scope of the Table, it was low burn up or moderate burn up fuel, below than 38,000 megawatt day per ton, and therefore the rule arguably applied.

In other words, in this case it's different because we're talking about fuel that's not covered by the rule.

Secondly, the licensing board in Cataba implied, actually it stated, that if the intervenors could demonstrate that there were other incremental impacts from the proposed transportation plan, that they would have an opportunity to address those effects when they'd proceed.

In other words, they recognized the possibility that there is a ruling for further discussion of incremental, supplemental environmental effects associated with this kind of transportation project.

I think there the board is on the right track.

There's been a lot of talk and pleading on this case and in other decisions about whether or not Table S-4 in its assumptions in the 1,000-mile shipping radius or shipping route going from the reactor to the repository or what not, somehow embraces this little 117-mile hike that's been proposed here, that somehow it sort of swept up and it does the job anyway.

I submit that that's not a proper approach. When the Environmental Impact Statements for these plants were written and when Table S-4 was issued, the Commission was not anticipating playing musical chairs with spent fuel.

They expected it to go from reactor to reprocessing facility or repository. It made no attempt to cover

shipping.

And to say that, well, this is n't much of a move and therefore swept in, it doesn't take account of the possibility that that will begin.

Five years from now, who knows what the circumstances will be, and maybe we'll want to move it to New Jersey.

You know, buy space there. Move it to Florida. There is no limit on any of this, so we don't know what's going to happen.

And at some point the logic breaks down. I moving this stuff across the countryside, you have to look at the environmental impacts.

They haven't been addressed today.

JUDGE WOLFE: There would have to be an application in that case, would there not, to transport once again from one site to another?

MR. DOUGHERTY: That's right, but presumably the staff would make the same argument then that they're making now: "Well, this is covered. We looked at the shipment from reactor to repository and this all falls within."

They could make that argument in every stage. At some point the logic breaks down. That shipment from reactor to reactor clearly doesn't hold water, and if

you apply that reasoning logically, it breaks down here.

This is where we're making the first diversion.

This is where we're moving this stuff in a way that was never anticipating.

And simply what we want to look at is the effects associated with this segment. If they want to ship it to someplace else, let's look at that segment.

That pretty much covers my treatment of S-4. A couple of arguments have been raised concerning the sabotage issue.

In the basis for contention 1, we mentioned sabotage is possible. It's one of a variety of environmental risks, human health risks that arise when you move spent fuel, and that it, together with the other impacts, cumulatively produce a significant amount of environmental impact, and that's why we need an EIS.

We're not saying that the risk of sabotage is so great that this stuff should not be shipped, and we don't intend to litigate sabotage fully.

We have not come up with a scenario in which the Red Brigade or someone captures a truck and opens it and what not, because we don't think that this is necessary.

Sabotage is a basis for our contentions; not a contention. The specificity requirements of Section 2.714 that were raised in the response by the staff don't apply to a basis.

In fact, I think at one point they say that there's no basis for this. Well, this is our basis, and if we provide a basis for the basis, then they may ask for another basis.

That's not the requirement. We're simply saying that sabotage could happen, and that's why this is a dangerous action.

There is no grounds for striking this or for the contention itself. It's just a possibility and we prepare to discuss probabilities or consequences in a general statistical way.

But we don't intend to go through scenarios and litigate that question endlessly.

The staff also made one minor point that they felt that we had no basis, plus they said we hadn't...I think they said we had no basis for the claim...that's right, that error by VEPCO employees might somehow lead to release of radioactive material.

Somewhere we said they might forget to close the cap. Again, this is a basis we're talking about. You don't need endless bases for a basis.

Secondly, if I had to provide a basis for the possibility of error by the company employees, I think I can point to the recent instance in Louisa County where a truck carrying fuel to the plant went off the road and overturned in a field.

Apparently the driver fell asleep at the wheel.

The state is still investigating. Accidents do happen.

Sometimes they're dangerous.

And that's all we're saying, is that it's a possibility of another of the total environmental risks that we have here, and I don't think an extended discussion of bases for employee error is called for by the rules.

And hat's the extent of my discussion on contention 1.

JUDGE WOLFE: Let me see if I can understand at least your broad scope of your argument. What if the staff had issued an Environmental Impact Statement?

Would you then withdraw? Would you then have withdrawn your contention 1 in case number OLA-1?

MR. DOUGHERTY: If the staff were to prepare an EIS, that would meet our...that would satisfy our contention.

Yes, I think withdrawal is possible. I haven't considered the possibility. But it's certainly

worth ...

JUDGE WOLFE: Wasn't that the thrust of your argument?

MR. DOUGHERTY: We're asking for an EIS. And if they do one, then we've got it.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: Well, let me take approximately...

JUDGE WOLFE: Excuse me just one moment. I don't know if I understand that counsel have been discussing this case, trying to agree on the admissibility of contentions.

I assume without having been advised otherwise that what you're now stating on the record was discussed perhaps if not in detail, was at least discussed generally with the staff and applicant's counsel.

Is that correct, Mr. Dougherty?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Yes, Judge Wolfe, it is correct.

JUDGE WOLFE: The reason I'm asking is we will hear oral argument. If arguments are advanced by any counsel that are too complex or really not been gone into during prior off-the-record discussions, if anyone wants to not only respond in oral argument, to respond in writing, which may be necessitated by reason of additional research, you may so bequest.

However, absenting such request, why, we'll just

proceed on the basis of what we hear in oral argument today.

MR. DOUGHERTY: If I could respond briefly, Judge Wolfe. As I recall, we discussed the application on Table S-4 in very general terms and very briefly.

The issue is complex, and we weren't prepared at the time we met to go into any detail.

I regret that I have to go through this kind of elaborate legal argument with oral citations and what not, but as I read the NRC rules, we are not given an opportunity to provide a written response to the response that we receive.

And so I apologize, but I think I was confined by the rules.

JUDGE WOLFE: My comment or questioning was not being critical of you, Mr. Dougherty. All that I'm indicating is that in my view, oral argument, if any counsel wants to respond in writing, they may request leave to do so and we'll grant it.

All right. Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: Let me begin by saying something I'm not sure is relevant to any of this. You asked a question about the shipment to New Jersey.

I think at the risk of being overly precise, I don't think a license would be required to transport

spent fuel to New Jersey.

I think a license might very well be required on the part of the receiving point, New Jersey, to receive and store the material.

I don't need to reargue the points that we argued and lost last year, but I think my statement is accurate.

Let me begin with the factual argument that we just neard. It is true that on page 23 of the Environmental Assessment, there is the use of a calculation of a burn up fee of 36,000 megawatt days per metric ton of uranium.

I may have to...the board may want an affidavit from me on what I'm about to say, but first of all, on its face, page 23 deals with spent fuel modifications to the North Anna pool, probably assuming the use of North Anna fuel, but in any event, it deals with the estimate release rate of crypton 85.

Just on its face, I would think, that you'd want to take a fairly conservative burn up fee. In any event, my understanding is, and I suspect in light of the staff's conclusion that each of the five parameters set out in 51.52 is satisfied, I suspect that there are no plans to ship any fuel from Surrey to North Anna that has a burn up of great r than 33 megawatt days per

metric ton. I believe I'd been advised to that effect by the company and I can confirm that unless perhaps Mr. Engle can confirm it or deny it, when the staff's turn comes.

There is a whole range of fuel burn ups actually in the Surrey pool. And I think the company's plans are not to ship any fuel over 33,000.

I've tried to cut through all of Mr. Dougherty's arguments before that. I am pretty much left with this.

It is true that Section 51.52, which kicks off the requirement that Table S-4 be applied for determining the cost benefits of transportation of spent fuel, does refer to proceedings for construction permits.

As you recall, going back again to the point that I made about not needing a license to ship to New Jersey from an operating station, and I'm not here rearguing the points I made earlier, when one gets an operating license, at least, and the board is saying, I think in 51.52, the Commission was saying before you ever get to the operating license, in the construction permit stage, we want you to look at transportation.

When we got the license, when anyone gets a license on operating power stations, included in that license is the authorization to ship.

Putting aside the question of whether the receiving point is authorized to receive it, we have here authorization to ship.

My guess is that...it's only a guess, but it seems to me a reasonable guess, is that the Commission tackled Table S-4 it contemplated a future in which shipment could be made to reprocess.

It contemplated a system under which the operating license would take with it the authorization to ship the fuel out of the station that burned it.

So I'm sure it seemed perfectly adequate to the Commission to say that if we look at this at the construction permit stage, that's the time to look at it because they're not going to have to look at it again.

Why have a regulation that deals with shipment to some point other than reprocessing plants because everyone assumes, as I recall, at that time, that's where it was going.

But there is no earthly reason that I can think of, no rational reason why if all five of the parameters are met, parameters set out in 51.52 A, there is no earthly reason that I can think of why it makes any difference in terms of the effects on the environment, whether those shipment are made from Surrey,

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Charleston, South Carolina, or whether they are made from Surrey to North Anna and then to Charleston, say, to Carolina, or wherever, so long as those parameters are met.

The statement of consideration in the 1975 Federal Register in which Table S-4 was adopted, the Commission also said the environment survey would serve as a primary database...this is on 1005, also...for the amendment considers and assesses the contribution of environmental effects from transportation of fuel and solid waste for typical light water cooled nuclear power reactor. Period.

And that's precisely what we have here. So we made no reference to this...vell, I guess we made one reference but haven't made any arguments based on it.

No arguments in our response to Mr. Dougherty's contentions to the effect that an environmental analysis of shipments was done when Surrey was licensed, but it was.

Now we find in addition, it passes muster under Table S-4. Why on earth go into all of that riagmarole another time?

I don't think that's what the Commission intended when it adopted Table S-4 and I can't think of any reasonable basis for doing it.

And I must confess, I'm not really sure I understand the significance of the fact that Table S-4 calls for or provides a listing of cost and benefits included in an impact statement or whatever.

Because I guess my answer is, "So what?" Cost and benefits and fundamentally whether those costs are significant, suppose they will have a significant effect on the human environment is precisely the question that the NRC staff is trying to answer when it does its environmental assessment.

In short, the staff can choose Table S-4 precisely the reason for which it was created, to evalute the environmental effects of shipments of spent fuel from an operating license, operating reactor to some other point.

Let me just add one thing which I think sort of picks up on the last question that Judge Wolfe asked.

I guess to sort of get a hold on precisely where we are, then, we heard the arguments on contention one of OLA-1.

We seem to be here. We have a contention that is based purely on a legal argument that the use of Table S-4 is improper.

I guess there's nothing...if that answer is right, then where we are is that we have to go back to the

drawing board, the staff has to do an environmental impact statement.

That doesn't follow. I suppose the staff would then have to go back and do an environmental assessment not relying on Table S-4, and might well still conclude that the environmental effect of transportation are neglible, as they almost certainly would.

In any event, the short answer is, "Table S-4 applies."

JUDGE WOLFE: Table S-4 what?

MR. MAUPIN: Table S-4 applies.

JUDGE WOLFE: What would you, in light of Mr. Maupin's argument, Mr. Dougherty, and I must advise counsel as you all know, when a judge asks questions, you mustn't think the judge has made a solid final judgment.

However, the question seems to be directed for seeking information; we have made no determination in this case whatsoever.

But Mr. Maupin indicated something, that should the staff, for whatever reason, go back to the drawing board and draft an environmental impact statement, I take it your position would be what with respect to whether or not the staff should rely on Table S-4 under those circumstances?

MR. DOUGHERTY: You're asking me, Judge Wolfe?

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes, Mr. Dougherty.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Well, what...let me just step back a minute. If you recall, your honor, the lengthy proceeding we had two years ago or a year and a half ago concerning the board's jurisdiction to consider environmental effects, in the briefing, in the arguments, in the appeals and etc., which we thought we finally won.

The upshot was that the staff was to look at the environmental effects of moving the spent fuel from Surrey through my clients' neighborhood to North Anna.

That's really why we're in this case. We're concerned about the effects of this stuff on my clients' health and on their environment, and we want to look at the possibility of accidents or the other environmental effects associated with it.

And when the staff, after the year-long process, came out with this environmental assessment and what we found, we quickly turned to the Table of Contents, looking for environmental effects, and we found this three-fourths of a page full of numbers saying, "We used Table S-4."

It made us wonder what we had been fighting for over the last year, because there is no analysis, no

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discussion, there is no look, and that is really what we want.

I agree with Mr. Maupin that what probably would be required and what was required was an environmental assessment as a precursor to an environmental impact statement.

And in that assessment, some narrative discussion, some ... there must be some evidence that the staff has considered the environmental effects of this.

They have to evalute the effected population, the densities, the nature of the local environment, accident probabilities, accident consequences, and perhaps sabotage, that kind of thing.

We want some discussion. We want ... my client wants to be reassured that these risks are manageable, and that's I think all that's required.

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, the specific answer, though, to my question?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Well, your question was could they use Table S-4? No, we think not. It doesn't apply.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. All right, Mr. McGurren.

MR. MAUPIN: Excuse me, may I ask just one point that he brought up? I'm not sure that that was a proper characterization of what the board did in response to that briefing.

It seems to me the table...I must say I've not reviewed that in the last several days. It seems to me the question of the applicability of Table S-4, though, is left open by the board, by you.

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, I, too, have not read the memorandum or order that you refer to. I have not read it recently.

I do know that the board was concerned that...I recollect that Table S-4 had not been in existence back in 19...what...

MR. MAUPIN: '71, '72.

JUDGE WOLFE: Whatever. And we didn't know what values the staff had used, and we wanted to assure ourselves as to the environmental impact and the values that were used to make that assessment.

Well, all right, Mr. McGurren.

MR. MCGURREN: Your honor, I think it's appropriate that I first address the point made by Mr. Maupin, if I may reference the board's memorandum and order concerning the issues briefed, dated June 10, 1983, pages six and seven.

If I may read, "At this juncture in the proceeding, having insufficient information, we waive the staff's issuance of the environmental impact appraisal in August, 1983, which we trust will include a

consideration of Table S-4 as well as consideration of other environmental impacts."

So I think in response to Mr. Maupin's question, I think the board did have in mind consideration of Table S-4.

If I may move on to address some of the points raised by Mr. Dougherty, with regard to the factual issue, that referenced by Mr. Dougherty concerning the 33,000 burn up rate, Mr. Maupin is correct that the NRC staff in its environmental assessment stated that all sections of 51.52 in essence were met, and that Table S-4 was the appropriate table to use for the situation.

We also agree with the licensing board in Cataba that Table S-4 is appropriate for use here, and I cite particular to page 17 NRC 292, where the board, rejecting an intervenor's contention, stated, "This board rejected Palmetto 14 because we saw no reason why Table S-4 should not apply to the transport of spent fuel to Cataba just as well as to a hypothetical fuel reprocessing plant."

So we believe, your honor, that application of S-4 is appropriate here, and we also agree with Mr.

Maupin's statement that the purpose, the Commission purpose of S-4 was to identify effects, the values for the effects of transportation of spent fuel.

And if I can find the appropriate section of the statement of considerations. Bear with me a minute.

In the very first paragraph at the end, I believe, this is the same portion that was read earlier by Mr. Dougherty.

I think it's clear that what the Commission had in mind was the accounting for the environmental effects of the transportation of fuel and waste by using specified numerical values contained in the table.

We don't believe that the Commission had in mind that these guys could only be used in a "environmental impact statement," the final environmental impact statement.

We think what the Commission had in mind was, and their concern was identification of values that could be used in any environmental assessment that would be trying to account for impacts of transportation of spent fuel.

And we also believe that the Commission had in mind for persons who were concerned that these values were not appropriate, the section of 10 CFR 2.718, which allows a party to petition to show that particular rule is not applicable.

And I believe that that option is open to an intervenor to indicate where in these values it's not

appropriate for a particular case.

And that section was referenced by the Commission in its statement of considerations, stated in 40

Federal Register 1005, published January 6, 1975.

Another matter, your honor, that I would like to address is Mr. Dougherty's statement with regard to 10 CFR Section 2.714, on the point of the specificity for basis stated by the intervenor in support of a contention.

I think it's clear, your honor, that 2.714 B requires, and I'll read a portion of this section, "the contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in the matter and the basis for each contention be set forth with reasonable specificity."

It's not, your honor, just that the contention be set forth with reasonable specificity, but also that the basis be set forth with reasonable specificity.

If I have just a second to make sure I've addressed the points I believed are raised.

The only other matter which I would like to address is that the argument made by Mr. Dougherty concerning cost benefit balance, I think what the Commission had in mind was not the cost benefit balance as a whole but really identification, as I stated earlier, of the values for the effects and impacts of transportation

regardless of how they would be used, whether they'd be used in a cost benefit balance or as in this case just to determine where there's a major federal action, as the staff did in its environmental assessment.

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JUDGE WOLFE: Anything more on contention 1?

MR. DOUGHERTY: I'd like to have one minute, Judge.

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Table S-4 is a cost benefit tool.

Its purpose is not, as the other counsel have contended, to substitute for an environmental analysis.

It's a supplement to the environmental discussion in the impact statement. This is made clear by the record by the proposed rule as well as the final rule, and some light I think is shed on it by the Supreme Court in the famous Vermont Yankee decision and if memory serves well, that's 435 US 519, in which they described Table S-3.

They just suggest that this is to be used for the cost benefit analysis section, it's a supplement to a full environmental analysis that's required in every case.

Secondly and finally, I think that the bankrupty of the argument that Table S-4 does apply in this case is suggested by the language used in these arguments.

If you refer to the quoted section of the Cataba

opinion that the board said, "Well, we see no reason not to apply Table S-4," but they never pointed to a rule that said it applies here.

And the response to our contentions filed by VEPCO says nothing in CCLC's contention so much as hints as why Table S-4 should be deemed inapplicable.

They don't have an informative case here, and I think the arguments have demonstrated that Table S-4 is irrelevant.

JUDGE WOLFE: One final question to you, Mr.

Dougherty. In your submissions to the board and in your argument before the board, which at the initial special prehearing conference, and indeed after the board issued its memorandum of June 10, 1983, did you raise this argument before the board?

Now as you remember, we, in the memorandum of June 10, 1983, understanding that the staff was going to proceed with an environmental appraisal rather than an environmental impact statement, stated in substance...and I'm reading from the top of page six of this memorandum of June 10, 1983, "this juncture in the proceeding, having insufficient information, we await the staff's issuance of the environmental impact appraisal in August of 1983, which we trust will include a consideration of Table S-4 as well as a

consideration of other environmental impacts if any."

So my question is, did you bring this up during the initial oral argument? And did you bring this to our attention after we had issued this memorandum wherein we said we trust that in the issuance of its environmental impact appraisal, the staff will take into consideration Table S-4?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Judge, the question that we briefed and argued was whether or not the board has jurisdiction to consider the environmental effects of the transhipment.

The specific question was not to what extent if any does Table S-4 relieve the staff of its NEPA obligation.

The question is do environmental effects fall within the board's jurisdication.

The board decided yes. It did not resolve the question of Table S-4 and its effect on the staff's environmental obligation.

JUDGE WOLFE: But we did say we trust...

MR. DOUGHERTY: I understand.

JUDGE WOLFE: ...that the EIA would include a consideration of Table S-4.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Well, I understand that, as well as other environmental impacts.

JUDGE WOLFE: If you're correct and the board was wrong, the staff was wrong, and it would seem to me that this should have been brought to our attention sometime before now, because there's been a lot of spinning of wheels...not spinning of wheels, but passage of time.

MR. DOUGHERTY: I can't argue with that, Judge.

This may not be much of a defense, but I can't recall
any stage at which further pleadings or arguments were
contemplated by the board.

I think at some point the submission by me of a legal argument concerning the staff's NEPA duties would have been improper.

I also have to say that we expected to see some discussion of the environmental effects of this proposal.

We thought we'd won a victory we set for the appeal, and we expected to see some treatment of it.

Whether or not a reference to Table S-4 would be included in the environmental analysis, we didn't know, and frankly didn't care, but we expected to see some environmental analysis.

And it wasn't until we got that document that we realized that there was nothing there.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right.

MR. MAUPIN: Judge, may I add a couple of points?

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes.

MR. MAUPIN: Three, in fact. First of all, it is true that Table S-4 is a summary. Table S-4 is based on a lengthy environmental analysis underlying the analysis set out in WASH 1238, which is dated December 1972, and supplement one to that document, which is dated April 1975.

The second point I want to make, and this is what I was groping for at the end of my first time around, but I couldn't quite pull together, it is this.

Mr. Dougherty's arguments that he's made this morning, I suggest, have nothing to do with the contention that he's made.

The contention that he's made is that an environmental impact statement is required. The argument that he's making this morning is that Table S-4 should not have applied.

And the point I want to drive at is that even if youy grant him that, that Table S-4 does not apply, and you should not grant him that, it does not follow that an impact statement is required.

It would merely follow that the staff has to go back and take its one-page description of environmental effects, which utilizes Table S-4, and look at them

afresh.

Take Surrey, Louisa, see how many people are there and what kind of casks are going to be used, but it seems to me his arguments have little to do with the contention number one that is set out here.

Now perhaps contention number five does, but we'll get to that later.

The third point I want to make is by way of summary, simply that if you by your decision embark us on a process in which we do look precisely at the Surrey to Louisa shipment, I suggest, with all due respect, you'll be launching us on precisely the kind of course that the Commission wanted to avoid when it adopted Table S-4, and precisely the course that the Cataba board refused to embark on.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. We'll proceed now with argument on contention two in the case of OLA-1. We'll have a five-minute recess.

(Whereupon a short recess took place.)

JUDGE WOLFE: All right, Mr. Dougherty, contention two.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Contention two asserts that VEPCO has not shown that the shipping cask to be used to transport Surrey spent fuel to North Anna meet NRC standards.

Essentially what we said in our basis was that there was simply no evidence that either VEPCO or the cask manufacturer had obtained NRC approval of the casks.

In its response, I should say in an attachment to the response or contentions, VEPCO has provided us with the actual certificates which apparently were issued either late '83 or sometime in 1984 and as far as we're concerned, that meets our contention, and we're prepared to fold our tent on this one.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. You withdraw contention two in case OLA-1, is that agreed?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Yes, sir.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. It's so ordered that contention two in OLA-1 is allowed to be withdrawn.

All right. We'll proceed, then, with contention three in OLA-1.

MR. DOUGHERTY: In contention three, neither VEPCO or the NRC staff has adequately considered the alternative of constructing a dry cask storage facility at the Surrey station.

This is the contention that got us off on that massive tangent of a year and a half ago.

The key legal issue was whether or not the NRC is required by NEPA to consider alternatives to actions

which may not produce significant environmental impacts.

If they don't, if they will not create significant effects, they do not trigger the EIS requirement, and then there is no requirement to consider alternatives, or so the argument goes.

And we went back and forth. I'm certainly not going to rehash all of that. In its memorandum of June 10, 1983, the board decided not to resolve that issue finally and instead to await the issurance by the staff of its environmental assessment.

And at that point, to revisit the issue, I suppose, I'm not sure what the board's plans are or were, but as I expected, the conclusions made in the environmental review so far are that in the staff's opinion no EIS is required and that if we follow their argument, VEPCO's argument, then staff is not subject to an obligation to look at dry cask as an alternative.

As a practical matter, aside from the legalisms here and the question of NEPA, we all know that a dry cask is an important alternative.

They are, as far as I know, they are pouring cement down there even as we speak. Well, some wheels are turning someplace.

It's certainly something that we all like to see

and as a practical matter, something we should be considering as an alternative to this.

The question, of course, is the narrow legal one of NEPA's reach, depending on the environmental significance of this.

Well, let me just repeat briefly. We think we assert with as much vigor as we can, as we have from the outset, that NEPA's requirement to consider alternatives apply to this action.

So I'm not sure where to go. I think we need a decision by the board that the problem of all this is that we have challenged the adequacy of that conclusion.

We have claimed that an EIS is required, and we have challenged the adequacy of their environmental assessment.

And until we have a judgment, at least if the board follows this reasoning that's been suggested by the staff and VEPCO that we have to await the determination of whether or not this whole action requires an EIS before we decide what kind of alternatives analysis is required, then we really have to litigate contention one and possibly contention five to a conclusion.

And then we'll know whether or not there is an

obligation to look at alternatives.

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We're going to be on hold here until we resolve the other contentions and I suggest, as I have from the beginning, that we not defer the resolution of this issue, that we just address it and resolve it.

And our views on it are well established in the record.

A footnote to this is in its recent response to August 14th response to our contention, the staff contended that the environmental assessment actually does an adequate job of looking at the dry cask alternative.

My rejoinder is that that word does not appear in the statement; there is no consideration of dry cask storage.

There is no consideration there at all. So I guess I don't have much of a response.

I guess we're in sort of a limbo here. Maybe some other counsel has a proposal.

JUDGE WOLFE: The staff did refer to and rely on the final generic environmental impact statement on the handling and storage of spent lightwater power reactor fuel, also known as NUREG 0575, isn't that correct?

MR. DOUGHERTY: That's correct, Judge. But if NEPA requires some look at alternatives, that's not it.

That's not enough.

And I should say that in the specific context that we face, we've got an applicant that's going forward with a dry cask storage program as a reference to some aged document.

It's not what we need here. Let's evaluate the possible wisdom of shipping only part of these 500 assemblies.

Let's investigate putting the proceeding on hold for six months. Let's look at what we can do to get a green light for the dry cask storage that's now somewhere in progress.

We just want to see some discussion of that. We really see that as the answer to this whole program.

And we're afraid, frankly, that if we defer this contention forever, that we'll go down and litigate the other contentions, I guess, and at some point dry cask will arrive, and this entire proceeding will be mute.

And we will all have litigated our hearts out for no reason. So we say let's get it up front now, let's examine it, let's look at the cost and benefits of dry cask.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: Well, first, it seems to me that...it seems quite clear to me that unless contention one is

admitted, or contention five is admitted, to put it the other way, if those two contentions are rejected, then contention three must necessarily be rejected.

Jim is right. We briefed this point thoroughly in the briefs we filed in response to your two questions.

Just to summarize, I think it is as clear as can be from the appeal board's decisions that unless the proposals involve a major federal action significantly affecting the human environment or unless there is an unresolved question involving the use of resources, then no description or analysis of alternatives is required.

The first point, whether the first test is met, depends obviously at the threshold on whether you admit contention one and perhaps contention five.

The very least we can say, as I began by saying, if you turn them down, the first test for requiring a discussion of analysis is not satisfied.

On the question of the unresolved...as to whether there is a question for the use of resources and unresolved conflict over the use of resources, there is not a hint of a suggestion in the contentions or in the argument we heard this morning that there is any such question.

And so it seems to me clear that the second test is

not met. And it is that analysis that I conclude that unless you admit conclusions one or five, contention three must be rejected as well.

Now if you were to contrary to our arguments admit those contentions, then it seems to me, for one of them, at least one of them, then it seems to me that contention three is at least an appropriate contention.

The troublesome point, of course, is that having admitted contention three, before you can resolve it, you have to resolve contention one and contention five.

We are getting to the point, from my clients' point of view, where we want to get the show on the road, that is, the legal show on the road, and I would say the way to proceed at this point is that if you admit one or five, you would admit three.

And the parties might very well decide at that point, certainly we might decide that we'd like to just go ahead and prepare testimony on the dry cask alternative on a contention basis.

In other words, I would not put off contention three dealing with it at all until after the question in contention one has been answered.

Does that make sense? Not that it's a wise suggestion, but do you understand what I'm suggesting?

JUDGE WOLFE: Hm...

MR. MAUPIN: I guess I would only add, this is a real curiosity in this case, in every case I know of dealing with alternatives, the applicant felt very strongly that he should permitted to do what he wanted to do in lieu of doing anything else.

And the intervenors are saying, "No, you should do A, B, or C, or all of them, rather than doing what you want to do."

We have here a situation, and you've already given me an opportunity to explain why, and we are not talking about dry cask as an alternative in the classical sense that I just described.

We're talking about it as something we would prefer to do. We would be delighted if we could have permission to put those casks at Surrey and to begin loading them sufficiently early that we could avoid having to ship any assemblies from Surrey to North Anna.

And we would be delighted if we were able to ship assemblies to Idaho, such that we could avoid the loss of full core reserve in the spring of 1986.

It is only because we are uncertain as to the availability of those options that we want to go ahead. The case is perhaps all the more curious because the concerned citizens say at the end of the statement of

the basis for contention three, if necessary, a limited number of spent fuel assemblies could be shipped from Surrey to North Anna so that the dry cask storage facility could be completed before a full transhipment program becomes necessary.

Now in fairness to Mr. Dougherty, I'm sure that there is a substantive and informed difference between our application for permission to ship 500 and his statement that a limited number could be shipped.

I simply point out what I know has already occurred to you. This is a fairly alternative argument that you're approaching in contention three.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. McGurren?

MR. MCGURREN: Your honor, I really believe that there is not much more that I can say than is already said in our response to contention three.

The short of it is that we think that we have satisfied our regulation with regard to discussion of alternatives.

We don't believe that intervenor has indicated in accordance with 2.714 necessary specificity to have a good contention.

That's the short of our position. And rather than go through what is stated here, I say that that's all we have to say on that, your honor.

JUDGE WOLFE: Anything more on this contention three?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Yes, Judge, I'd like to make two quick remarks. Mr. Maupin's discussion or proposal that we grant three conditioned on the board's acceptance of contentions one and five is really a rehash of VEPCO's and the staff's legal argument from the outset.

That is that a look at alternatives is only required if you have to do an EIS. I just want to be clear that that's all based on their view of NEPA, and we disagree with that assumption of what the law requires.

We think that we should go forward with three in any case and that this position of one and five is irrelevant to that.

But again, that's an issue that the board has to decide.

Secondly, VEPCO has criticized the basis for the contention because it doesn't allege that there are unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.

There are some authorities that say that that's a threshold, and unless you have such unresolved conflicts that there's no requirement to consider

alternatives under Section 1022E of NEPA.

Other authorities, of course, differ and say there is no threshold and no...well, without getting into that, it may be that we haven't specifically used those buzz words, but what we said in this contention and throughout is that this is a major federal action.

There are very substantial environmental effects here and whatever threshold must be crossed to trigger this 1022E requirements to look at alternatives, we allege that it's crossed by a very large margin.

We are claiming that there are very substantial environmental effects associated with these proposals, and that the staff must look at alternatives regardless of its EIS obligation.

So let's not get into a very delicate argument over what threshold has to be alleged and what not. We think there's a very major action, and therefore 1022E applies.

JUDGE WOLFE: Proceed, then, with contention four in the case of OLA-1. Mr. Dougherty?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Judge, I launch into a discussion of this contention with some trepidation because circumstances seem to be changing and then there are a lot of issues that yet to be resolved here.

As you know, we submitted a revised basis for this

contention several weeks ago in which we went through the routing approval application that had been submitted by VEPCO, and identified the areas in which we contend that it does satisfy the requirements of part 73.

Now apparently VEPCO has another plan or segments of a plan that perhaps haven't coalesced into a plan yet that it is working on to assure that these shipments do comply with part 73 and it's reluctant or quite possibly forbidden to release them to us because of varius regulatory conditions and propose that we consider the possibility of some sort of order from the board that ... Mike should probably address this because he understands the ins and outs of this better.

But the short of it is that we are interested in security. We agree with the Commission that security is important in shipping this stuff.

It's going to be moving right through the neighborhoods of my clients and we are concerned about the rest of this stuff.

We're willing to accept the offer, in essence. We still have to work out the arrangements. Exactly what sort of requirements might be imposed by this board if it were to require a protective order for what it is exactly that VEPCO wants to feel secure about this

information. But at this point we are inclined to agree to the confidentiality requirements and the rest.

And beyond that, I suggest Mike take the ball on this. Is that right?

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: Well, it seems to me number one, I would hope that the board would go ahead and decide on all the other contentions that we've discussed this morning and not postpone proceeding until we have resolved finally what to do about contention four.

I think with respect to contention four, it seems to me the way to proceed is this. I am proceeding on the basis that something like the Diablo Canyon solution to the disclosure problem would be called for.

I am proceeding on the assumption that in the final analysis, if you want to release the protected portions of the physical protection system of Mr. Dougherty, we have to have the board order us to do it.

We ought to have the board order us to do it. I suggest that we proceed by having Mr. Dougherty and I see what sort of progress we can make on coming up with a protective order and perhaps including affidavits of non-disclosure in the hopes that we could present to the board a protective order that the board would be agreeable to enter.

I think Mr. Dougherty and I have to face up to the question of what kind of expert...who, in fact, it will provide, propose to use, and I think it is possible that we might have to come back to the board and quarrel over the acceptability of their experts.

It is also possible that we would not. I think we have to give it a try.

Now I believe that the way, that the understanding on which Jim and I would be proceeding is that if we get the expert here and the expert would look at the physical protection system subject to the conditions of whatever order we would have persuaded you to enter, he will do so in good faith.

And I believe he will because you can evidence that having seen the certificates of compliance for the cask, and that included that he withdraw that contention.

I believe his proposal is to review the company's physical protection system in good faith and conclude at that point whether he wants to contend that there are firmly inadequacies in it or not.

So it seems to me we might well come back to use step one of the protective order and step two, then with a suggestion that the plan looks all right, we can forget about contention four or the plan has

shortcomings A, B, and C, and we should argue about those.

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We should have a hearing on those, perhaps. I saw this coming when I filed my response to revised contention four and the possibility that the fact that we are dealing with safeguarded material may threaten to hold up the rest of this proceeding. I desperately hope to not do that.

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, it appears to me that there has been some dancing around on this in this area. Mr. Dougherty was concentrating on the spent fuel transportation moving plan and what it contained or didn't contain, when all along what was a concern was the physical protection plan.

And counsel seemed to be passing one another in the night on that one.

MR. MAUPIN: Let me speak to that. I plead guilty to that. Not out of any bad faith, but I think about the best I can say is that the long passage of time of these two staff documents we're aborning, I think it at least lulled me into a posture that we could wait until those documents came out and then begin to wrestle with contentions and where we go from here.

I don't think I for one, until I saw Jim's contention four and then I sent him the routing

document, the so-called spent fuel transportation plan, I don't think it was until that point that I really started to see the deeper implications of the problem.

The fact, as I pointed out in my response, that the spent fuel transportation plan is but one relatively small part of the physical protection system.

I had thought there was a reasonably good chance of when Jim saw the spent fuel transportation plan that he could conclude that while there is a plan in effect, we wanted some evidence of that.

He didn't conclude that, and I think we all have a better handle now on just what we're dealing with.

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, in any event...

MR. MAUPIN: There has not been any intentional dancing around to the point, but there has quite clearly been some inadvertant dancing around the point.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. Do you have anything to add, Mr. McGurren, on this?

MR. MCGURREN: Very little, your honor. As you know, we did respond to intervenor's contention four and we didn't believe there was sufficient basis to support the contention.

We do believe, however, that the approach suggested by Mr. Maupin would be a good approach, if I understand it correctly, that would be assuming that a protective order can be agreed to by all the parties and the board, that Mr. Dougherty look at the plan.

That would certainly be an approach that the staff would find to approve. The only concern I might have is that it doesn't sound like the staff would play a part in developing the order.

We would like to be a part of any negotiations you have.

MR. MAUPIN: Maybe Mr. McGurren would like to do all the first drafts.

(Laughter.)

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. I think suggestion of counsel is well taken. The board after hearing the balance of arguments, will proceed to rule on whether contentions that are now at issue, with the exception of contention four, in case OLA-1, counsel will confer, will draft for the board's review and acceptance a proper protective order, and whatever affidavits of non-disclosure are necessary, or resolve between themselves whether the person or persons or consultants that Mr. Dougherty wishes to have review this safeguard information are qualified and competent people.

You will then proceed to submit the protective order and the underlying non-disclosure affidavits to the board.

And I see no problem with this procedure whatsoever. If there is, bring it to the board's attention and we'll proceed and rule on what is placed before us.

Any other problems with this contention now? And I have no doubt Mr. Dougherty and other counsel that support that, if after reviewing this safeguard information, you don't have any problems or serious questions, you will so advise the board that you withdraw contention four.

Is that correct?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Yes, it is, Judge.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. We now proceed to...when do you think you can get together and confer and bring this back to the board?

Next ten days or so? Two weeks?

MR. MAUPIN: I'd prefer to say two weeks, although
I'm the one anxious to proceed swiftly because the
contingency I have in mind is the identify of the
expert.

I simply...I can postulate that we can agree on forming the order pretty quickly, but I can see that question, both his need to contact one and the need to evaluate his or her qualifications, that's a couple of weeks.

JUDGE WOLFE: Then I would assume that the protective order would speak to the necessity for in-camera submissions, in-camera hearing on this very sensitive safeguard information.

Is that correct, Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: I believe it would, yes, sir.

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes. All right. We'll proceed then with contention five.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Contention five is the new contention. It addresses the environmental assessment that was released by the staff probably two months ago.

The case law in the federal courts, at least, and quite possibly in NRC proceedings, sets out certain requirements that apply to environmental assessments.

Just as you have rules governing environmental impact statements, they must adequately address alternatives and what not, other rules apply to environmental assessments.

They're not as rigorous, of course, but they are rules, and what we've done is compare the staff's environmental assessment against standards that have been developed for the adequacy of environmental assessment.

And we've alleged three ways in which we think the environmental assessment is inadequate.

Essentially it doesn't address the environmental impacts of shipping the spent fuel, and the way we've described that is by saying that the environmental as essment does not evaluate the risk of accident, in other words, the probability, and then it doesn't evaluate the consequences of an accident if one were to occur.

A third flaw we've identified is there is no discussion of alternatives. Now in a different contention, the staff implied that the discussion of alternatives was adequate.

But since the existence of a parallel VEPCO plan to store fuel in a dry cask facility is never mentioned, then we submit that clearly it isn't adequate, and the reference to that other document doesn't suffice.

Now in our statement of basis, we have gone through the assessment and described these deficiencies, but essentially you're talking about something that doesn't exist.

If there is no discussion of alternatives, it's hard to describe exactly what's wrong with it, simply not there and it should be.

Now, VEPCO and the staff have objected to this contention in a total of something like four sentences between them, not counting VEPCO's legal difficulty

with the requirement to consider alternatives within an environmental assessment that we have discussed before in its claim that the contention is inspecific and lacks basis.

We think that as much as you can say about that assessment is in our contention and in the basis, there is no discussion of accident probabilities, no discussion of consequences.

So there is nothing in there dealing with environmental effects, really, except for that Table S-4 exercise.

And that's our big problem with it, is that we expected some treatment of the real world environmental effects, the real threats that are posed to my client and their families and neighbors.

And it's not in there, and that's our big problem, and again, we think that an alternatives examination is required and that it should be in the assessment, and it's not, and therefore the assessment is defective for that reason.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: This is the contention that all of Mr. Dougherty's arguments with respect to contention one in fact tend to support.

By that I don't mean they're valid. I mean

logically, the arguments that Table S-4 is improperly used goes to the question of whether the environmental assessment is adequate.

They really don't go to the question of whether you have to do an environmental impact statement. And the answers are therefore the same answers that you heard me citing before.

The answers to A and B are that the risk of accidents and the consequences of accidents are considered adequately in the environmental assessment because of the use of Table S-4 and the discussion of dry cask or indeed other alternatives is not required for the reasons we have given you in response to contention three.

That is to say this is not a major federal action sufficiently affecting the human environment. And number two, there are no unresolved conflicts as to resources that Mr. Dougherty, despite the passage of an enormous amount of time, and had adequate opportunity to review these documents, has pointed out.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. McGurren?

MR. MCGURREN: Your honor, as we stated in our response to contention five, as we state in this same document in response to contention one and three, we believe that there is no basis for contention five.

The use of S-4 was adequate and the discussion of alternatives was adequate.

JUDGE WOLFE: Any more to be said on this?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Since I have the opportunity, I guess I don't disagree that the S-4 argument that we were making earlier have some bearing on this contention.

I make that contention with confidence, though, because I think we're correct on those issues.

In the abstract, I don't agree that an environmental assessment is the same thing as a negative determination as the single decision not to do an EIS.

An assessment is a living document that must contain certain things, and that's really what we're driving at here.

It doesn't have that summary analysis of environmental impacts.

I'm not sure that this distinction is that important right now, and so I won't go into it.

In any event, the assessment must look at alternatives and that's a question that's apart from the S-4 issues.

Whatever the resolution to S-4 as it applies to this case, we submit that that assessment must look at

dry cask, and nothing that's been said today undercuts that thesis except the continuing legal dispute as to Section 1022E of NEPA. That's it.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. We'll proceed now, then, to case number OLA-2. And I don't know how counsel want to proceed with this, whether they want to proceed with contentions one and then two and then three, or to consider them together.

But we'll proceed unless there is some agreement between counsel, we'll deal with oral arguments on each contention, then.

MR. DOUGHERTY: I think that's probably the best way to go, Judge.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right.

MR. DOUGHERTY: This should go pretty quickly. A lot of this has been covered before.

Let's not going into the EIS issue again. We've made our stand on that in the context of OLA-1. Let me say that in VEPCO's response to this contention, they raised the same objections that they raised to contention one in OLA-1.

And all those issues, I think, are largely deserved. However, in the basis of this contention, we make the added claim that the proposed modification of the spent fuel pool is linked with the proposed

transhipment affair.

Therefore, when evaluating the need of the staff's obligation to prepare an EIS, you must look at the two together.

There is really one proposal. VEPCO has challenged that argument, citing the new power case, cited on page 13, and arguing in essence that it's fair to segment these two, it's fair to look at the environmental consequences and make that EIS judgment separately, that there is no link, use the so-called utility test.

Well, my response to that is twofold. First of all, even if one were to apply the independent utility test, it doesn't help them here.

Secondly, the independent utility test that was enunciated in the Duke Power...I'm not sure if that's McGuire or Coney or what, I guess it's both, in any case, that test isn't properly raised here.

Now, what happens a lot in NEPA cases or NRC proceedings in which NEPA issued a raise is that an intervenor typically looks at one action that's before a board or before a court and say, "Well, yes, that may look small, but you're really thinking about doing something else, too." And you have to evaluate both.

There's something going on in the next county or a different river or you're going to be doing something

five or ten years from now, and this is really one big project, recognize it as such and do an EIS.

And the response that has been developed by the courts and NRC licensing boards is that well, if what we have here is discrete, and it's not clearly just a fragment of some bigger project, if it has independent utility, then we'll look just at this and disregard this argument about this other proposal.

It's removed in time or distance, or both. That's exactly what happened to McGuire. The intervenor claimed, "You're going to move 300 assemblies now, but you've got a secret plan for cascading shipments in the year to come. And you should get that out."

I think it was only with great difficulty that the intervenor ever really identified the existence of this secret plan.

And the response, here we have a proposal that makes sense, it stands by itself, here's what's on the table and here's what we'll look at.

It rejected the claim that this is all one big project. This case is different.

In this case we have two proposals, the applications were submitted virtually simultaneously, they were noticed simultaneously and it's because logically they make sense or part and parcel of the

same idea.

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The idea is to move spent fuel from Surrey to North Anna, increase the capacity of the pool and that solves the problem.

I really don't think there's an expectable argument that the two projects are distinct.

That argument, though, is that it makes sense to increase the capacity of North Anna even if you don't move the spent fuel, because it extends their full core reserve date from something like 1998 to 2005 or something, I'm not sure.

But it makes sense to modify that spent fuel, regardless of your shipping proposal.

I guess I can't disagree with that, although we would probably oppose such a license amendment application in any case.

But there is some use to that. But that's one half of the coin. The other half of the coin is what utility is there in shipping 500 spent fuel assemblies to North Anna if you don't increase the capacity of the pool.

That shipment has no independent utility of the pool expansion even though the pool as mentioned may have utility independent of the shipping proposal.

My understanding, and I'm sure I'll be corrected

and I hope I am, is that right now the inventory of spent fuel at North Anna is in the range of 250 to 300 assemblies.

Their total capacity is 966. That leaves them with...again, I'm speaking roughly...700 vacancies.

Now if you then ship 500 Surrey assemblies to the North Anna pool, that gobbles up 500 of the remaining 700 vacancies.

You're down to 200, which is about one off-load and then full core reserve.

So without a proposal to increase the capacity, it doesn't make any sense at all for 500 Surrey assemblies in that pool.

And it's clear that VEPCO's concerned about loss of full core reserve in that kind of proposal would cramp, so that the two proposals are really one. And I think that's apparent on the face.

MR. MAUPIN: Well, I am going to make the unrespectable argument that in fact there is independent utility.

First of all, admittedly in somewhat different circumstances, the appeal board in Cony-McGuire listed four different ways that a spent fuel burden power station might try to deal with that spent fuel in short run.

It said in the process of that discussion that reracking has manifest the independent utility. I think it is manifest in this case.

To repeat what Jim just said, looking at the OLA-2 proposal, if not a Surrey assembly is ever shipped to North Anna we would extend the full core reserve loss date from 1989 until 1998 under the current estimate.

We all know that...I'm reasonably confident we all suspect that a waste repository will not become available before the turn of the century.

That being so, we are going to need additional space at North Anna and this will provide us with additional space.

On the OLA-1 side, I cannot represent to you that the company would ship 500 assemblies to North Anna if the spent fuel rack capacity increase for North Anna were denied.

But the company might very well ship, for example, the 60 assemblies it would need to preserve that loss of full core reserve for that spring of '86 outage and get another cycle out of one of the Surrey units while waiting for the coming on of one of the dry cask options.

It might well be able to ship enough to get it through several more refueling cycles, something short of 500.

It is perhaps less manifest but still clear in these circumstances that each of these proposals have value independent of the other.

Now I think the important thing to do in the last analysis is to focus on OLA-2, focus on OLA-2.

The independent utility of that is clear. What is also clear is that not a single objection on the merits, technical and environmental, to OLA-2, to the OLA-2 proposal has been made by concerned citizens.

And you know, as a second part of that test of the Cony-McGuire case, the first part is the independent utility and the second question they ask is, "Will the board by declining (to put it in the context of this case), by declining to have a hearing on OLA-2, will it prejudice the outcome of its deliberations on OLA-1, if you should find they are valid contentions and a hearing is required on OLA-1?"

And I cannot think of any way that by what I propose should come out of this hearing, this prehearing conference, it seems to me there is no rational basis for holding a hearing as required for OLA-2.

If you reach that conclusion, the staff presumably would issue a license amendment and we would go ahead

and put those racks in.

And I cannot, for the life of me, see how that would have any prejudicial effect on the way you would come out in resolving the issues under OLA-1.

JUDGE WOLFE: Have you finished?

MR. MAUPIN: Yes, sir.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. McGurren?

MR. MCGURREN: On the point raised here by Mr. Dougherty with regard to the staff's consideration of OLA-1 and OLA-2 proceedings together, as we noted in our response to the intervenor's contention, we did just that.

We did consider in combination the impacts of both the OLA-1 and OLA-2 applications.

So we think that on this point, that issue is mute, although we do agree that if you were going to go further, that there is independent utility to an OLA-2 request.

That's all we have, your honor, on that point.

JUDGE WOLFE: Anything more, Mr. Dougherty?

MR. DOUGHERTY: Yes, Judge Wolfe. One point. The essence of our contention here is that an EIS is required.

In addition, we make the legal argument that when evaluating the need for an EIS and in preparing the

EIS, we must look at both of these together. It's a legal argument. The two are linked.

JUDGE WOLFE: How are they linked?

MR. DOUGHERTY: As I said, the shipment of 500 assemblies from Surrey to North Anna makes no sense without changing the capacity, increasing the capacity of North Anna.

The two were seen as a joint solution, as a single solution to VEPCO's storage problems at Surrey.

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, I think Mr. Maupin is making the point that the enlargement of the spent fuel capacity at North Anna in and of itself is a necessity over time to take care only of North Anna's spent fuel.

Now his argument is, well, regardless of how the board rules with respect to case number OLA-1, since there is really no contention addressed specifically to the request to enlarge the spent fuel pool at North Anna, that application namely in OLA-2, should be without more granted.

You would admit that you have no contention

'irected to the request for the enlargement of the

spent fuel pool at North Anna, isn't that correct, Mr.

Dougherty?

MR. DOUGHERTY: No, it's not, Judge Wolfe. We have two contentions here. We accuse the staff of

violations procedural requirements. They have not complied with NEPA.

We haven't, as Mr. Maupin said, we have not challenged the proposal on substantive technical grounds.

That's right. But we certainly have objections to it. I should say this. I submit perhaps a little too cavalierly that standing by itself, the proposed increase in capacity of the spent fuel pool has no utility at all.

They have a capacity of 966 now, an inventory of perhaps 700 assemblies less than that, a lot of time.

Now, what are the alternatives over that five- to ten-year period? I'm not familiar with the numbers. Certainly we know that VEPCO is building a dry cask storage facility at Surrey.

If that works, it's going to catch fire around the country and it's really going to catch fire at VEPCO. We agree this is probably the optimum way of storing this stuff.

We'd love to see one built at North Anna, and we would certainly expect that VEPCO give that serious consideration, even regardless of what happens at Surrey.

We assume that that's in the works. But in any

case, there are other alternatives, shipping it elsewhere, DOE demonstration projects, who knows what's going to come up that's going to relieve them of that problem.

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We do not have an inevitable need for modifying this spent fuel pool. But in any case, the prudent business course, it would seem to me, would be to wait until the crunch comes, or at least a couple of years before the crunch comes, and then see what your options are.

Maybe North Anna will go down in a couple of years as Surrey did for steam generator replacement, and the generation of spent fuel will be diminished.

Maybe these other alternatives will come through.

And there's no need now in 1984 or 1982, when this application was originally filed, to once again double your capacity.

It was not a coincidence or not an act of foresight that you sought approval for another increase. This was a plan that was developed in conjunction with the shipping plan.

And I submit that's the only reason that they would do it, at least at this time.

MR. MAUPIN: Judge Wolfe, may I just point out that we have have two years to raise contentions about

alternatives for dealing with North Anna's fuel.

There aren't any contentions about whether the reracking itself, so that some alternative of dealing with the North Anna fuel, whether there's some technical problem with the North Anna fuel.

All of these contentions, all of these specific contentions go to the effects of shipping.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. Proceed with contention two under OLA-2.

MR. DOUGHERTY: Well, Judge, in this contention we claim that neither VEPCO nor the staff has adequately considered the alternative of constructing a dry cask storage at Surrey as an alternative to the reracking and shipment combination proposal.

I think that this contention and its basis were transferred to the miracle of word processing from the beginning of the document to the back.

I think it's the same thing, and I think we've covered it. Perhaps that's not the case. But just to quickly sum up and then wait for the response, the environmental assessment has virtually no discussion, I submit no discussion to dry cask storage and as far as we know, at least on the record, there's been no analysis at all by the staff for the possiblity of deferring this project or modifying or somehow trying

to keep it open for dry cask.

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And as in OLA-1, we think that's required. That's our position.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: Well, our argument is the same. As I understand it, these are the three contentions that have to do with what to do with the Surrey fuel.

I don't think they are involved or should be involved in the environmental analysis or the question of whether or not the license at North Anna for increased fuel storage capacity, and my answer would be the same on contention three.

I suspect my answer would be the same on contention three.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. McGurren?

MR. MCGURREN: Your honor, our response to OLA-2 contention two is the same as our response to OLA-1 contention three.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right.

MR. MCGURREN: Contention three, OLA-1.

JUDGE WOLFE: Have we now concluded argument on the contentions?

MR. DOUGHERTY: I don't think so. Judge. I think we still have yet to address number three in OLA-2.

JUDGE WOLFE: Oh, I thought...

MR. DOUGHERTY: Oh, they covered that in their statement. Well, I didn't, and my comment is the same as theirs.

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes.

MR. DOUGHERTY: A rehash.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. I would like counsel to advise me whether Mr. Dougherty's position and argument with respect to Table S-4 and the inapplicability of that table to any proceeding other than a construction permit proceeding, that is one of your arguments, is it not, Mr. Dougherty?

MR. DOUGHERTY: That's correct, Judge, one of several.

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes. And could you advise me now whether this has ever been raised? I am unaware of it. And whether it's been ruled upon by the appeal board, by the Commission, or before any federal court?

MR. DOUGHERTY: If you're talking to me, Judge, I would prefer to do more complete research before expressing an opinion on that.

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes. Mr. Maupin?

MR. MAUPIN: You excluded licensing boards from that. Didn't you?

JUDGE WOLFE: Well, I didn't intend to.

MR. MAUPIN: Well ...

JUDGE WOLFE: So licensing boards as well.

MR. MAUPIN: If the question is precisely has that argument been made...

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes.

MR. MAUPIN: ... I guess the only case I would know of in which it might have been made would have been the Cataba case.

We could certainly find out, I think, if it had been made in a proceeding.

JUDGE WOLFE: Mr. McGurren?

MR. MAUPIN: I'm limiting myself to cases reported in bound volumes. I can't say that I've been through the slip opinions in the last couple of weeks.

MR. MCGURREN: Your honor, I don't know if this addresses your question directly, but in my research that I did in preparation of our response to the intervenor's contentions, I believe that the Cataba cases that I cited, one being 15 NRC 566 and one that the applicant cited, 17 NRC 291, which were licensing board decisions, I believe that that...and I think it's evident, if you take a quick look at those cases, that those were OL cases.

So in part response to your question, wherein those boards ruled that S-4 was appropriate, or put another way, that the contention challenging S-4 was

inappropriate, it's clear that certainly in an OL stage, the use of Table S-4 is appropriate.

And in addition, in both of those proceedings that I mentioned, there was the further aspect of moving fuel not to a reprocessing plant but moving spent fuel to another utility.

JUDGE WOLFE: You don't know really whether that
was raised before those two licensing boards, do you?
MR. MCGURREN: Well, the Palmetto contention 14...
JUDGE WOLFE: Sorry?

MR. MCGURREN: Palmetto contention 14 was challenging the use of Table S-4 for the movement of spent fuel not to the ... the use of Table S-4 to evaluate the movement of spent fuel from one reactor to another.

They were saying that S-4 would be used for that and as I remember, the Cataba board said, "No, you're wrong, we believe that S-4 is appropriate for that use."

And that's the case I cited, where that was 17 NRC at 292, where the board said, "This board rejected Palmetto 14 because we saw no reason why S-4 should not apply to the transport of spent fuel to Cataba as well as to a hypothetical fuel reprocessing plant."

JUDGE WOLFE: What were you reading from there?

It's not from your submission to the board, is it? Or is it?

MR. MCGURREN: No. This is licensing board decision 83 8B, Duke Power Company, Cataba, 17 NRC 291 at page 292.

This reference was made in Mr. Maupin's response to intervenor's contentions. Not this particular reference, but this case was referenced by Mr. Maupin.

(Simultaneous conversation)

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. The board has been conferring. The board would like to have supplemental written briefing.

Our attention has been directed to at least one licensing board case or decision.

But we would like further research to be made upon this point, namely, whether there have been any licensing board, appeal board, Commission, federal court rulings on the question of whether Table S-4 applies only in construction permit proceedings, or whether that table is applicable in amendments to operating license cases.

And further, the board invites further briefing, if any, that the parties think is necessary beyond that which has already been argued today on this question as to why or why not Table S-4 is applicable in an

amendment to an operating license proceeding.

MR. MAUPIN: Mr. Chairman, may I say part 50 is an amendment, the most recent CFR volume of part 10, published, that volume revised it says on its face it was revised January 1, 1984.

I think I'm going to accept your invitation on that second point, particularly, because I believe looking at the predecessor provision of part 50...

JUDGE WOLFE: What section, please?

MR. MAUPIN: I'm sorry, part 10, section 50, which deals with the implementation of NEPA by NRC.

JUDGE WOLFE: Uh-huh.

MR. MAUPIN: I believe that when we look beyond...

JUDGE WOLFE: Now you're speaking of part 50, not 51?

MR. MAUPIN: I'm talking ... I am talking of 10 CFR Part 51. That's right.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right.

MR. MAUPIN: I'll try to do better in the brief. I believe that the section on construction permits is followed by the section that talks about the operating license stage and says that the applicant files an environmental report that incorporates, discusses the same matters only to the extent that they differ from those discussed or reflect new information in addition

to that discussed in the final environmental impact statement and then in Section 51.40, subpart C, entitled "Materials, Licensing, and other Actions," that I feel may deal with operating license permits, I've just got a hunch that when we follow this process on beyond the construction permit, we're going to find that these regulations do contemplate in the licensing amendment just what was done here.

At any rate, I will...just what the staff has done here, I will pursue that.

In short, what I'm saying is that I believe that I for one have focused too narrowly on 51.52A itself in its reference to construction and permit, chased the rabbit beyond the construction permit stage and the subsequent stage.

The answer may very well be in the regulations.

JUDGE WOLFE: Hm. All right.

MR. MAUPIN: Explicitly by implication.

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes. I would like for counsel to simultaneously file briefs in response to the board's queries here.

Two weeks from today? And with five days thereafter given for any counsel to respond to the initial briefs of any other counsel.

All right? Mr. McGurren, have you checked out that

section citation I asked you about at the early portion of this conference?

MR. MCGURREN: Well, it appears, your honor, that as you stated, the Table of Contents of the safety evaluation 3.2.5, it says "Cask Rupture," when you look at the document itself is 3.2.6, so there has been some sort of a numbering error.

I haven't figured out exactly how the numbering error occurred. It looks like my quick analysis is that the Table of Contents outline is incorrect.

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes, but once again, then, if you look at 3.2.6, which speaks to cask ruptured, is that citation which supports an argument on sabotage?

MR. MCGURREN: On that point, I thought you were addressing two points...

JUDGE WOLFE: Yes.

MR. MCGURREN: I was addressing the one point first. Let me get to the page of our response. And while I'm getting there, I'll try to talk at the same time.

I think your observation is correct that 3.2.6 does not deal directly with sabotage, the means by which a cask might be ruptured.

I said, "See also that section for purposes of whatever might cause a breach of the cask," here's

what 3.2.6 has to say about the consequences that were analyzed of such a breach, not necessarily sabotage breach. but another type of breach.

JUDGE WOLFE: I see.

MR. MCGURREN: So I wasn't trying to say this is a sabotage breach.

JUDGE WOLFE: I see.

MR. MCGURREN: But I thought the board might be interested in that section as well.

JUDGE WOLFE: Uh-huh.

MR. MAUPIN: Correct me if I'm wrong. My impression was that the Sandia...I noted that problem, too, but I believed that these citations to the Sandia report 3.2.6 referred to reports that were largely directed towards evaluating the consequences that might flow from sabotage.

JUDGE WOLFE: All right. I don't know that there is any more that need be discussed at this special prehearing conference.

The board will memorialize what took place at this supplemental special prehearing conference.

We will receive your supplemental briefings. Then we will proceed to rule on the proposed contentions, after we get your supplemental briefs.

In the meantime, counsel will confer with respect

to contention four in OLA-1, and do that which the board has requested, namely, to agree on a protective order and affidavits of non-disclosure or whatever, present that to the board for its approval and issuance.

I see nothing more now to be discussed unless the counsel has something else to present to the board or discuss.

Anything more? All right. The special prehearing conference session is now closed.

(Whereupon, the meeting closed at 12:10 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS

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This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the NRC COMMISSION

In the matter of:

SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL PREHEARING CONFERENCE

Date of Proceeding: FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1984

Place of Proceeding: BETHESDA, MARYLAND
were held as herein appears, and that this is the
original transcript for the file of the Commission.

MELBA REEDER

Official Reporter

Official Reporter - Signature

DEBORAH REID, TECHNI-TYPE
Official Transcriber

Debrah Mud-Telhni-Type Official Transcriber - Signature

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