

APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/84-15

Docket: 50-458

Permit: CPPR-145
Category: A2

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities (GSU)
P. O. Box 2951
Beaumont, TX 77704

Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS), Unit 1

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, LA

Inspection Conducted: June 1, 1984, through July 31, 1984

Inspector: *R. E. Farrel*
D. D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector

8/2/84
Date

Approved: *J. P. Jardon*
J. P. Jardon, Chief, Project Section A,
Reactor Project Branch 1

8/14/84
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted June 1, 1984, through July 31, 1984
(Report: 50-458/84-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of site tours; review of training/qualification requirements for GSU engineering personnel; review of system punch list activities; IE Bulletin followup, and status of preoperational test program. The inspection involved 67 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified in the area of system punch list activities (paragraph 4).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

- *W. K. Anders, Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer, Quality Systems
- *C. L. Ballard, Supervisor, Quality Engineering
- W. J. Cahill, Jr., Senior Vice President, River Bend
- *T. C. Crouse, Manager, QA
- *D. L. Davenport, Plant Security Supervisor
- *P. J. Dautel, Licensing Staff Assistant
- *J. C. Deddens, Vice President, River Bend
- L. A. England, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- *C. E. Foster, Assistant Plant Security Supervisor
- *P. E. Freehill, Superintendent, Startup and Test
- *P. F. Gillespie, QA Engineer, Quality Systems
- *P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager Services
- *T. O. Gray, Director, Operations QA
- *J. R. Hamilton, Supervisor, Site Engineering Group
- *R. W. Helmick, Project Engineer
- K. C. Hodges, Supervisor, Quality Systems
- G. V. King, Technical Materials and Plant Services Supervisor
- *J. R. Kinzer, Security Supervisor
- *P. G. McGill, Senior Electrical Engineer
- *W. H. Odell, Director, Nuclear Training
- *R. N. Taylor, QA Engineer, Quality Systems
- *P. F. Tomlinson, Supervisor, Operations QA
- M. W. Walton, Technical Assistant to Project Engineer

Stone and Webster (S&W)

- *W. I. Clifford, Senior Construction Manager
- *F. W. Finger, III, Project Manager Preliminary Test Organization (PTO)
- *C. A. Goody, Resident Manager
- *B. R. Hall, Assistant Superintendent, Field Quality Control (FQC)
- L. Long, Turnover and Punch List Coordinator
- *R. L. Lykens, QA Program Administrator
- S. Sanders, Senior Records Clerk
- C. L. Shoemake, Engineer, PTO
- *R. L. Spence, Superintendent, FQC

The NRC senior resident inspector (SRI) also interviewed additional licensee, S&W, and other contractor personnel during this inspection period.

*Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview. NRC Security Inspector, C. A. Evans, also attended the exit interview.

2. Site Tours

The SRI toured areas of the site during the inspection period to gain knowledge of the plant and to observe general job practices. The SRI took a specific tour of the residual heat removal system (RHS) with the assigned preliminary test organization (PTO) engineer. This system is under the control of PTO through an equipment release. The system punch list (SPL) was reviewed and certain items were selected by the SRI to review during the system tour. The PTO engineer was knowledgeable of the system and was able to provide background information/documentation for the SPL items. It was noted by the SRI that the SPL was lengthy (approximately 800 items), but no problems were identified with traceability of individual items reviewed.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

3. Training/Qualification Requirements for GSU Engineering Personnel

This area of inspection was conducted to determine the training and qualification requirements established for GSU engineering personnel within the project engineering group onsite and within the nuclear plant engineering group at Beaumont, Texas. The SRI discussed this with GSU engineering management and it was noted that no specific Quality Assurance (QA) program commitments exist at this time for training and qualification of these engineers. Administrative guidelines exist for qualification of certain "levels" of engineers and training is conducted on a case-by-case basis.

The SRI reviewed River Bend Project Procedure (RBPP) 1.8, Revision 3, "Qualification and Training Records," which stated that section supervisors shall prepare a qualification matrix for each position description in accordance with their department qualification procedure(s). This had not been accomplished for project engineering or nuclear plant engineering. The SRI also reviewed selected qualification and training records for project engineering personnel and found inconsistencies with these records. The primary problem noted was that the employee background information was not accurately entered on the RBPP 1.8 forms. A GSU internal audit of licensed operator training/qualification was conducted prior to the SRI review of this area and similar problems with qualification matrixes and training/qualification records were identified by GSU. The SRI attended the GSU exit meeting where the GSU findings were discussed and he was later assured that the findings would be addressed on a generic basis for all River Bend project groups. This will be considered an open item (Open Item 8415-01) for the SRI to monitor GSU corrective actions during a future inspection.

4. System Punch List Activities

This area of inspection consisted of a review of SPL activities. The RHS was selected for a review of completed SPL items. Project Test Program Directive (PTPD) 5.6, Revision 3, "Punch Lists and Work Items Tracking During Equipment Release and Testing," requires that after PTO acceptance of the equipment release, the construction deficiency report (CDR) will be used to report that required activities have been completed. The CDR completion instructions require a description of the item, description of corrective action taken, initiator's signature, supervisor's signature, field quality control's (FQC) signature, and identification of any retest requirements.

The SRI reviewed the latest RHS SPL against a previous historical issue and items were selected for a review of the CDR files. This review revealed that procedural requirements for completion of the CDR form were not being implemented. For example, deficiencies noted included failure to describe item, failure to describe corrective action, lack of initiator's signature, lack of supervisor's signature, lack of FQC's signature, and failure to identify if retest was required. This failure to follow procedures was identified by the SRI as a violation (8415-02).

The licensee QA department took immediate action as a result of this violation and issued a quality assurance finding report (QAFR) for initiation of corrective action. The corrective action in this report will be followed up during a future inspection.

5. IE Bulletin Followup

This area of inspection was conducted to continue the review of licensee action on IE Bulletin information. Certain IE Bulletin files were requested from GSU licensing out of Beaumont, Texas for SRI review.

The following status is provided for the bulletin files reviewed:

(Open) IEB 79-08 Events Relevant to Boiling Water Power Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident. This bulletin makes several recommendations that relate to plant staff activities at RBS such as training review, procedure review, etc. This bulletin was not available in plant staff files and plant staff had not completed action on the recommendations made. This bulletin will remain open for the SRI to verify plant staff action at RBS.

(Open) IEB 79-09 Failure of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breakers in Safety-Related Systems. This bulletin identified problems with type AK-2 circuit breakers which employ an internal undervoltage trip device and the bulletin made recommendations for special preventive maintenance requirements. GSU letter RBG-6504 to the NRC states that type AK-2 breakers are utilized in 480 volt safety systems at RBS, but the design for undervoltage protection eliminates the trip device internal to the circuit breaker.

Therefore, GSU concluded that the special preventive maintenance requirements of this bulletin are not necessary. This bulletin will remain open for the SRI to review the design of undervoltage trip protection at RBS for the GE type AK-2 circuit breakers and to review a sample of selected breakers to determine that no internal undervoltage trip device is utilized.

(Open) IEB 79-10 Requalification Training Program Statistics. This bulletin was apparently addressed to all power reactor facilities with an operating license and it was not available in GSU files. This bulletin will remain open.

(Closed) IEB 79-11 Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems. This bulletin identified problems with Westinghouse type DB-50 and type DB-75 circuit breakers. GSU letter RBG-6772 to the NRC states that these type circuit breakers are not utilized at RBS. This bulletin is closed.

(Open) IEB 79-12 Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities. This bulletin makes recommendations that relate to plant staff activities at RBS such as training review, procedure review, etc. This bulletin was not available in plant staff files and plant staff had not completed action on the recommendations made. This bulletin will remain open for the SRI to verify plant staff action at RBS.

6. Status of Preoperational Test Program

The SRI reviewed the status of the preoperational test program and the following information was provided by the GSU startup and test department:

. Equipment releases to PTO	173 of 389 (14 safety-related)
. Equipment turnovers to GSU	99 of 389 (11 safety-related)
. Test procedure drafts complete	165 of 178
. Test procedure approvals complete	142 of 178
. Preliminary testing completion estimate	36%
. Preoperational/acceptance tests completed	41 of 178
. Preoperational/acceptance test results approved	5 of 23
. Total testing completion estimate	22%

7. Exit Interview

An exit interview was conducted July 20, 1984, with licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and discussed the inspection findings.