NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|
| Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 | 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3 | 1 OF 0 2 |

TITLE (4)

Failure to Verify Containment Integrity

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | DOCKET NUMBER(S) |
| 0 7 | 1 7 | 8 4 | 8 4 | 0 0 5 | 0 0 | 0 8 | 3 0 | 8 4 | | 0 5 0 0 0 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 0 5 0 0 0 |

| OPERATING MODE (9) | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 20.402(b) | 20.405(c) | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | 73.71(b) |
| POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 0 | 20.405(a)(1)(i) | 50.36(a)(1) | 50.73(a)(2)(v) | 73.71(c) |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(ii) | 50.36(c)(2) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(iii) | X 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(iv) | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(v) | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(x) | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| NAME | TELEPHONE NUMBER |
|---|---|
| Roger W. Ouellette, Assistant Engineer - Licensing | AREA CODE 7 0 4 3 7 3 - 7 5 3 0 |

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

| SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) | | EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) | MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | X NO | | | | |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)


On July 31, 1984, it was discovered that Containment Integrity had not been completely verified following the performance of Periodic Test PT/1/A/4200/02F, Refueling Containment Integrity Verification on July 17, 1984. The test was being performed to satisfy the surveillance requirement that Containment Integrity be verified 72 hours prior to any core alterations. The closed position of valve 1VY-21 (Containment Hydrogen Purge Inlet Blower Test Vent) was not verified due to a procedure discrepancy in which the valve location was stated as being outside containment rather than inside. While performing the periodic test, the location discrepancy was noted and a procedure change was submitted concerning the location of 1VY-21. The procedure change was approved and implemented.

The activities associated with this incident dealt directly with the initial fuel loading of Unit 1. Fuel loading (and Mode 6) began on 7-19-84 at 0536 hours.

This incident is classified as an Administrative/Procedural Error. It is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, Section (2)(i)(B). The incident violates Technical Specification Section 3/4.9.4, in which Containment Integrity is to be verified 72 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during core alterations.

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | |
| Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 | 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3 | 8 4 | — 0 0 5 | — 0 0 | 0 2 OF 0 2 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Periodic Test PT/1/A/4200/02F, Refueling Containment Integrity Verification, is to be performed at least once every 7 days during core alterations and 72 hours prior to the start of core alterations (fuel loading) as are periodic tests PT/1/A/4200/02C, D, E, G, and H, all dealing with Refueling Containment Integrity Verification. The checklist of the Periodic Test Procedure outlines Containment Isolation Valves (and associated vents and drains) according to Containment Penetration Number. It also distinguishes valves as being inside or outside containment by placement under the appropriate column heading. The Operator performing the test has the option of verifying isolation from inside or outside containment for each penetration by entering time, date, and initials for the appropriate valves.

Valve 1VY-21 (Containment Hydrogen Purge Inlet Blower Test Vent) is located inside Containment. However, the checklist had valve 1VY-21 listed in the "outside" column. On 7-12-84, a Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) had verified valve 1VY-21 as being closed and initialed the checklist as such. The actual location specified on the checklist (elevation and polar coordinates) was used to find the valve. As a result, the discrepancy between inside and outside containment was not noticed and no further action was taken. On 7-27-84, while performing the periodic test, another NEO noted this discrepancy and submitted a procedure change form. The change was approved and implemented, and the valve was verified closed. On 7-31-84, the completed procedure of 7-27-84 was reviewed, and it was discovered that because of this procedure change, the verification of 7-17-84, was incomplete. On that day, an "inside" verification was also performed of which valve 1VY-21 was still shown as outside containment and was not verified. The date 7-17-84, was within 72 hours of beginning core alterations.

This incident did not cause any release of radioactive material, radiation exposure, or personnel injuries. It is considered to be an isolated case.

Upon discovery of the location discrepancy for valve 1VY-21, a procedure change form was submitted to correct the location from outside to inside containment.

The procedure change has been approved and implemented.

The procedure change to correct the location of valve 1VY-21 was verified as being adequate by implementing the change and verifying the closed position of the valve.

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident because even though valve 1VY-21 was not verified as closed on 7-17-84, it was verified closed on 7-27-84. Also, the fuel of the initially loaded core had not been irradiated at the time of this incident.

DUKE POWER COMPANY
P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

August 30, 1984

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Docket Nos. 50-413

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 413/84-05 concerning Failure to Verify Containment Integrity. This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker

RWO:slb

Attachment

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

American Nuclear Insurers
c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library
The Exchange, Suite 245
270 Farmington Avenue
Farmington, CT 06032

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cc: Palmetto Alliance
2135½ Devine Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29205

Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law
P. O. Box 12097
Charleston, South Carolina 29412

Mr. Jesse L. Riley
Carolina Environmental Study Group
854 Henley Place
Charlotte, North Carolina 28207