

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 7 4	PAGE (3) 1 OF 1
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TITLE (4)  
Reactor Scram Caused by Vendor Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER (5)
08	05	84	84	04	7	08	21	84			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1

POWER LEVEL (10) 0.85

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	20.406(e)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	60.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/>		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME James H. Foster, extension 324	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 815 357 1676

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS
A	J J	Z Z Z Z	Z Z Z Z	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (18)

On August 5, 1984, at approximately 1900, Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 85% power. At this time STP 22-2 (Power Ascension Data) was being completed to measure turbine control valve demand signal versus successive turbine loads.

A General Electric Startup individual, while checking out a suspect DVM (Digital Volt Meter), inadvertently connected the DVM so that it caused the control valves to go shut. When the control valves shut, a pressure spike occurred in the Main Steam system; five main steam by-pass valves opened; three main steam pressure relief valves opened; and the Unit 2 reactor scrambled on high neutron flux. Subsequent trips and actions happened as expected to shut down the reactor to a stable temperature and pressure.

There are no probable consequences to this occurrence because all system safety devices were operable and operated correctly so as not to exceed any system parameters and succeeded in shutting down the reactor in a safe and timely manner.

The General Electric Startup individual was given additional individual training by his supervisors to only utilize LaSalle County Station Startup procedures during future testing.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  LaSalle County Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4 8 4	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	0 4 7	d 0	d 2	OF 0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 288A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

Unit 2 was operating at approximately 85% power at the time a General Electric Startup individual was taking millivolt readings of the main turbine control valve demand signal. The General Electric Startup individual erroneously connected a Digital Volt Meter (DVM) to the main turbine control valve demand signal test points (JJ) and caused the turbine control valves (TA) to go shut. After the turbine control valves went shut the main steam by-pass valves (JI) and main steam relief valves (SB) operated correctly to limit main steam pressure and the Unit 2 reactor scrammed on high reactor flux (IG).

Subsequent trips and actions occurred as expected to shut down the reactor to a stable temperature and pressure.

II. CAUSE

On August 5, 1984, at approximately 1900, Unit 2 reactor was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 85% power. At the time of this occurrence, STP 22-2 (Power Ascension Data) was being obtained by reading the turbine control valve demand signal at successive turbine loads. A General Electric Startup individual was taking the above mentioned turbine control valve demand signal data with a portable Digital Volt Meter (DVM).

The turbine control valve demand signal millivolt readings on the original DVM were questioned and it was decided another DVM should be connected to the turbine control valve demand signal to verify that the original DVM was operating correctly. The second DVM was connected, the reading taken, and then the original DVM was reconnected to the turbine control valve demand signal test points. The final hookup to the original DVM was mistakenly made to the milliampere terminals versus the millivolt terminals, causing a zero turbine control valve demand signal which caused the turbine control valves to go shut.

When the turbine control valves shut, a pressure spike occurred in the main steam system, five main steam by-pass valves opened, three main steam pressure relief valves opened, and the Unit 2 reactor scrammed on high neutron flux. Subsequent trips and actions happened as expected to shut down the reactor to a stable temperature and pressure. The General Electric Startup individual reported his actions immediately and recovery from the scram exhibited no problems.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

There are no probable consequences to this occurrence, because at the time of this occurrence all system safety devices were operable and operated correctly so as not to exceed any system parameters and succeeded in shutting down the reactor in a safe and timely manner.

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FACILITY NAME (1)  LaSalle County Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		VER 1	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	- 0 4 7	- 0 0	0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The offending digital volt meter was removed. The General Electric Startup individual was given additional individual training by his supervisors to only utilize LaSalle County Station Startup procedures when doing future testing.

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A similar high reactor pressure transient due to a problem with the turbine control system was documented in LER 374/84-035-00.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

James H. Foster, (815)357-6761, extension 324.



**Commonwealth Edison**  
LaSalle County Nuclear Station  
Rural Route #1, Box 220  
Marseilles, Illinois 61341  
Telephone 815/357-6761

August 21, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #84-047-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

G. J. Diederich  
Superintendent  
LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director  
INPO-Records Center  
File/NRC

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11