

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT:
PREVIOUS REPORT DATE: 8-31-83

CONTROL BLOCK: [][][][][][][][][] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0][1] [N][C][B][E][P][1] (2) [0][0]-[0][0][0][0][0][0]-[0][0] (3) [4][1][1][1][1] (4) [][][][] (5)

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

[0][1] REPORT SOURCE [L] (6) [0][5][0]-[0][3][2][5] (7) [0][1][1][4][8][3] (8) [0][8][2][2][8][4] (9)

REPORT SOURCE 60 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0][2] During a Unit 1 refueling outage, required ASME Sextion XI laboratory testing of the

[0][3] unit safety relief valves (SRVs) revealed six of eleven valves opened at higher than

[0][4] specified setpoints. These valves, 1-B21-F013B, D, E, F, K, and L, which opened at

[0][5] pressures ranging from 1126 to 1158 psig, are of the two-stage pilot-operated design.

[0][6] This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.

[0][7]

Technical Specifications 3.4.2, 6.9.1.9b

[0][9] SYSTEM CODE [S][H] (11) CAUSE CODE [E] (12) CAUSE SUBCODE [B] (13) COMPONENT CODE [V][A][L][V][E][X] (14) COMP. SUBCODE [F] (15) VALVE SUBCODE [B] (16)

[17] LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [8][3] (21) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0][0][2] (24) OCCURRENCE CODE [0][3] (28) REPORT TYPE [L] (30) REVISION NO. [1] (32)

ACTION TAKEN [D] (18) FUTURE ACTION [Z] (19) EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] (21) HOURS [0][0][0][0] (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [Y] (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [N] (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [T][O][2][0] (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1][0] Corrosion buildup on the pilot disc and seat surfaces of each subject valve prevented

[1][1] them from opening at their specified setpoints. The valve vendor inspected, repaired,

[1][2] and adjusted each subject valve to set pressure requirements and the valves, Model

[1][3] No. 7567F, were returned to service. Improved maintenance practices concerning the

[1][4] SRVs of both Units 1 and 2 were implemented in May 1984.

[1][5] FACILITY STATUS [H] (28) % POWER [0][0][0] (29) OTHER STATUS [NA] (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY [B] (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [Periodic Testing] (32)

[1][6] ACTIVITY CONTENT [Z] (33) [Z] (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA] (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA] (36)

[1][7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0][0][0] (37) TYPE [Z] (38) DESCRIPTION [NA] (39)

[1][8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0][0][0] (40) DESCRIPTION [NA] (41)

[1][9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z] (42) DESCRIPTION [S] (43) PDR 8409100048 840822 05000325 PDR

[2][0] PUBLICITY ISSUED [N] (44) DESCRIPTION [NA] (45)

NAME OF PREPARER: M. J. Pastva, Jr.

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NRC USE ONLY

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-002

Facility: BSEP Unit 1

Event Date: January 14, 1983

ASME Section XI laboratory testing of Unit 1 safety relief valves (SRVs) revealed six of the eleven valves, Target Rock Corporation Model No. 7567F, opened in excess of their individual set pressures.

<u>Valve No.</u>	<u>Set Pressure (psig)</u>	<u>Opening Pressure (psig as tested)</u>
1-B21-F013B	1125	1150
1-B21-F013D	1105	1119
1-B21-F013E	1105	1157
1-B21-F013F	1095	1126
1-B21-F013K	1115	1134
1-B21-F013L	1125	1158

Corrosion buildup on the pilot disc and seat of each subject valve caused binding between the two components which prevented the subject valves from opening at their specified setpoints. A contributory factor to this problem also results from the valves' pilot rod and guide areas being constructed of stellite 6 which, used together, possess a high coefficient of friction. This phenomenon has been observed with two-stage SRVs in other operating plants which have not been cycled for extended periods of time (in excess of three months).

The valves were repaired by the vendor and reinstalled and returned to service.

The BWR Owners' Group has recommended improvement in maintenance practices which are directed at the specific causes of setpoint drift. These improved maintenance practices have been implemented as of May 1984. It is felt these improved maintenance practices will help reduce the frequency of future similar events.

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

84 AUG 27 P 1:43

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, NC 28461-0429
August 22, 1984

FILE: B09-13510C
SERIAL: BSEP/84-1782


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, GA 30323

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-325
LICENSE NO. DPR-71
SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-83-002

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.9b of the technical specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1, the enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted. The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and both are in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977.

Very truly yours,



C. R. Dietz, General Manager
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

RMP/sdl/LETC1

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung
NRC Document Control Desk

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