NRC Form 366 (9-83)

UPDATED REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE July 13, 1984

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Diesel Generator 3B Started Inadvertently During Special Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 6	1 6	8 4	8 4	— 0 0 7	— 0 1	0 8	2 8	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Jimmy B. Walker	AREA CODE 2 0 5 — 7 2 9 - 0 8 6 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During performance of Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction 37, diesel generator 3B was inadvertently started. The automatic start signal was caused by shorting two terminals of an HFA relay being replaced as part of the procedure. In a second attempt to complete the procedure the diesel was again started. The second start was also caused by shorting two terminals of a HFA relay together.

The root cause was personnel error and procedural deficiency. Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction 37 was successfully completed on July 16, 1984. The relay was changed out without the diesel generators starting. Therefore, we conclude that the cause of the second diesel generator starts was also that of shorting two terminals on the HFA relay together.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6	8 4	— 0 0 7	— 0 1	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On June 16, 1984, unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power, unit 2 was in shutdown, and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. This event affects unit 3 only.

During performance of Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction 37, diesel generator (EK) 3B was inadvertently started. The procedure includes replacement of an HFA relay (RLY), TRB-3, and defines the sequence in which wires are to be lifted from the relay. Coil wires on terminal 13 were to be lifted first. Terminal 13 is located behind terminal 11 (part of the automatic start circuit of diesel generator 3B). During the initial attempt to lift the wires from terminal 13, electricians accidentally shorted terminals 11 and 13 through a screwdriver. This caused diesel generator 3B to automatically start. Efforts were made to insulate terminal 11. The electricians again attempted to lift the wires from terminal 13 per the procedure. Again diesel generator 3B started. The diesel automatic starts did not affect the availability of the diesel to perform its design safety function.

The procedure was revised to require diesel generator air-start motors to be tagged out during relay changeout. This will prevent a diesel generator start if another start signal is generated. The circuit will be monitored during relay changecut to identify any additional start signals, and any such signals will be investigated.

On July 16, 1984, Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction 37 was successfully completed. The procedure was performed as originally written with the exception noted above concerning tagging out the air-start motors. Terminal 13 on the HFA relay was insulated so that it could not be shorted to terminal 11. By taking this precaution, the TRB-3 relay was changed out without starting the diesel generators. Based on this, it has been determined that the root cause of the diesel generator starts was personnel error and procedural deficiency.

Previous Similar Events - None

Responsible Plant Section - EM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P. O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 28, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 - DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-296/84007 R1

The enclosed updated report provides details that concern the inadvertent start of diesel generator 3B during special testing. This report was originally submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

G. T. Jones
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center
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Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BF

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