U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/92006

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company

Edison Plaza

300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 42652

Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Inspection At: Davis-Besse Station

Inspection Dates: April 20-24, 1992

Inspector: James R. Kniceley James R. Kniceley

Physical Security Inspector

5/13/92

5/13/92

Approved By:

James R. Creed, Chief Safeguards Section

Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 20-24, 1992 (Report No. 50-346/92006(DRSS)) Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced physical security inspection involving Management Support; Protected and Vital Area Barriers: Access Control-Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications: and a review of previous inspection findings. Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined. We concluded that the security program is well implemented and is well managed. Licensee management attention to and involvement in the security program are good. Resources are adequate and reasonably allocated. Security personnel observed were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. Tested security equipment performed as required. The licensee continues to be proactive regarding upgrades to and evaluation of their existing security system.

DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the inspector interviewed other licensee employees and members of the security organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the Exit Interview conducted on April 24, 1992.

*L. Storz, Plant Manager, Toledo Edison Company (TECo)

*G. Grime, Manager, Industrial Security, TECo

*A. Schumaker, Supervisor, Access Co trol and FFD Manager, TECo

*M. Stewart, Manager, Nuclear Training, TECo

- *G. Bradley, Associates Licensing Representative, TECo G Skeel, General Supervisor Security Operations, TECo
- B. Smith, Security Training Instructor, TECo M. Cooper, Security Training Instructor, TECo

J. Waddell, Security Investigator, TECo

*D. Reese, Nuclear Security Operations, Supervisor, TECo

*P. Vaughn, Security Support Analyst, TECo *D. Alley, Quality Assurance Auditor, TECo

*R. Maier, Security Compliance Investigator, TECo

*N. Peterson, Engineering-Licensing, TECo

*B. Levis, Senior Resident Inspector - NRC Region III

2. Entrance and Exit Interviews

- At the beginning of the inspection, Mr. G. Grime, Manager, Nuclear Security and other staff members were informed of the purpose of this visit and the functional areas to be examined.
- b. The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on April 24, 1992. A general description of the scope of the inspection was provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit interview.
 - The licensee was informed of and acknowledged the inspector's comments that no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
 - (2) The inspector commented that the Quality Assurance Department's security audits and surveillances were effective and added to the overall strength of the security program
 - (3) The inspector commented that the security program continued to be well implemented and well managed.
 - (4) The inspector commented that the contract security force members who were questioned and observed during this inspection

were knowledgeable and proficient in performing their assigned duties.

- (5) The inspector commented that the proposed installation of the leo-capture system would greatly in rove their assessment abilities.
- (6) The inspector commented and the licensee acknowledged that their tactical response training and exercises were good and they are preparing for the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE).
- (7) The inspector commented that the plant housekeeping practices looked good. The protected area as well as in-plant security areas were well maintained.

3. Program Areas Inspected

Listed below are the core inspection areas which were examined by the inspector within the scope of these inspection activities in which no violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified. These areas were reviewed and evaluated as deemed necessary by the inspector to meet the specified "Inspection Requirements" (Section 02) of NRC Inspection Manual Inspection Procedure 81700 as applicable to the security plan. Sampling reviews included interviews, observations, testing of equipment, documentation review and, at times, drills or exercises that provided independent verification of meeting security commitments. The depth and scope of activities were conducted as deemed appropriate and necessary for the program area and operational status of the security system.

Number Program Area and Inspection Requirements Reviewed

81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors

- a. Management Support: (02.01a) Degree of Management Support; (02.01b) Change to Security Plans Properly Reported and Do Not Reduce Security Effectiveness; (02.01C) Program and Corrective Action System for Annual Audits; Qualifications and Independence of Auditors.
- b. Protected and Vital Area Barriers: (02.02a) PA and VA Barriers Meet Commitments and Provided Required Penetration Resistance; (02.02b) Isolation Zones Adequately Maintained; (02.02d) Assessment Aids Functional and Effective and Meet Commitments.
- c. Access Control-Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles: (02.03a) Positive Access Control to include: Proper Identification; Adequate Search Upon Entering PA; Badges Displayed; Visitors Escorted; Emergency Access to Vital Equipment; VA Access is Duty Related; (02.03b) Packages Searched and Properly Authorized; Controls for Containment Access; (02.03c) Vehicles Properly Authorized, Searched, and Controlled; Access to Vehicle Gates Controlled.

- d. Alarm Stations and Communications: (02.04a) Alarm Stations
 Adequately Equipped with Alarm, Surveillance, and
 Communications; Continuously Manned and Independent Functioning
 Capability; (02.04b) No CAS Interfering Operation! Activities:
 (02.04c) Alarm Stations Have Continuous Communication
 Capability with Guards and LLFA.
- 4. Physical Security Program for Power Reactors (IP 81700):

Some positive observations regarding the licensee's security program were identified and are discussed below:

a. Although the licensee is in full compliance with security plan commitments, they are continuing to improve their contingency response capabilities and to prepare for the NRC Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE).

The OSRE will evaluate licensee mock exercises, response personnel, target locations and communications response in the alarm stations. The OSRE will focus on the interaction between operations and security in establishing priorities for protection of equipment and on defensive strategies used to respond to an external threat.

The inspector determined by observation and interviews that good progress is being made in preparation for OSRE.

- b. The inspector determined through interviews and observations with security and plant personnel that there is a high level of security awareness within the plant work force which contributes to a positive attitude towards security and a continued reduction in personnel errors. This is attributed to the involvement and support of site management to continually strive to reduce personnel errors involving compliance with security procedures.
- c. The licensee's reconfiguration of their protected area (PA) fence and installation of a new Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) has greatly improved alarm and assessment capabilities. The new PIDS has proven to be virtually immune to nuisance alarms caused by weather conditions and small animals. The proposed installation of a video capture system should greatly improve assessment capabilities.