

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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Michael D. Lyster VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

MAY 15, 1992 PY-CEI/NRR-1498 L

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

> Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440 LERs 92-008

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 92-008 for the Perry Nuclear Pover Plant.

Sincerely,

Michael D. Lyster

MDL:CRE:ss

Enclosure: LER 92-008

cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Sr. Resident Inspector NRC Region III

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Operating Companies Cleveland Electric Illuminatin Taleda Edison

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On April 15, 1992, at 1300, Operations personnel discovered that a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Outboard Containment Isolation valve had been open and de-energized for approximately five hours without the Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4 Action being taken. The valve was locally opened as part of a tagout restoration but was not immediately re-energized. Approximately five hours later, when electrical power was restored to the valve, control room operators on the next shift discovered that the valve was open, and closed the valve using the control switch.

The cause of the event is inadequate procedure. Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP-1401) "Safety Tagging" does not provide the necessary detail of guidance, in some situations, to maintain administrative control of motor operated valves being restored under the tagout process. Specific guidance as to the restored position of components and sequence of restoration could have prevented this event.

A standing instruction has been issued to all licensed and nonlicensed operators prescribing the proper RETURNED CONDITION for motor operated valves being restored from the Safety Tagging process such that any actual positioning of the valve is performed remotely. The appropriate guidance will be included in PAP-1401 and all licensed and nonlicensed operators will be trained to the procedural change. As part of the established requalification training program, all licensed operators will be instructed on the lessons learned from this event.

NRC FOR	AN 366 A	U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
	LICENSEE EVENT REP TEXT CONTINUAT	PORT (LER) TION	EXTINATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP 530, U.S. NUCLEAR REQUILATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-D104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20502.
FACILITY	/ NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER IBI PAGE 131
			NUMERA NUMBER
Per TEXT IN /	ry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit	1 0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0	9 2 - 0 0 8 - 0 0 0 2 0 0 3
I.	Introduction		
	On April 15, 1992, at 1300, (Removal (RHR) System [B0] Ou open and de-energized for ap Specification LCO 3.6.4 Actio was in the third refueling of Reactor Pressure Vessel [RPV temperature at approximately reported under 10CFR50.73(a)	Operations personnel dis tboard Containment Isola proximately five hours w on being taken. At the utage in Operational Con J was at atmospheric pre 104 degrees Fahrenheit. (2)(i)(B).	acovered that a Residual Heat ation valve [ISV; had been without the Technical time of the event, the plant addition 5 (Refuel). The essure with reactor coolant This event is being
II.	Description of Event		
	On April 4, 1992, an RHR Syst (1E12-F0027A) was tagged close 1992, the tagout was signed it to restore the equipment from opened as part of the tagout immediately re-energized. A suspension of the tagout rest was opened, when electrical p operators on the next shift of valve using the control switch without control from the con- operators, core alterations of of the action a.3 for Technic	tem "A" Outboard Contain sed and de-energized for for clearance authorizat m the tagout. The valve restoration but the mot Control Room shift chan toration. Approximately power was restored to th discovered that the valv ch. During the five hou trol room and without kn had been in progress. T cal Specification 3.6.4.	ment Isolation valve plant testing. On April 15, ion and plant operators began (1E12-F0027A) was locally or control circuit was not age temporarily caused five hours after the valve te valve, control room we was open, and closed the ars that the valve was open howledge of the plant this constituted a violation
III.	Cause of Event		
	The cause of the event is ina (PAP-1401) "Safety Tagging" of some situations, to maintain being restored under the tage position of components and so event.	adequate procedure. Pla does not provide the nec administrative control out process. Specific g equence of restoration c	ant Administrative Procedure essary detail of guidance, in of motor operated valves guidance as to the restored could have prevented this
	Technical Specific tion LCO containment isolation valves one isolation valve OPERABLE 4 hoursIsolate each affect valve or blind flange.*O ALTERATIONS, handling of irra potential for draining the re valves closed to satisfy the basis under administrative co	3.6.4 Action a.3 states, shown in Table 3.6.4-1 in each affected penetr ted penetration by use o therwise,suspend all adiated fuel in the prim eactor vessel." The "*" se requirements may be r ontrols."	"With one or more inoperable, maintain at least ration that is ope and within of at least one closed manual operations involving CORE mary containment and with a note states, "Isolation reopened on an intermittent

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION	APPROVED DMB NO. 3140 0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BLADEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WYN THIS INFORMATED COLLECTION RECUEST 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN STIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP 5301, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE FARENDOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-DID4), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.								
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)						
		VEAR SEQUENTIAL AEVISION NUMBER NUMBER							
Perry Nuclear Power Flant, Unit 1	0 15 10 0 0 4 4 4 10	912 - 01018 - 010	0 13 00 0 13						
TEXT II more space is required, use existence NAC Form 3664 \$1177 Plant Administrative Procedure ("Administrative Controls are tho control system or component mani Specification Action Statements. Out-of Service tags per (PAP-140 the appropriate LCO Tracking She	PAP-0205) "Operabili se actions taken by pulations while oper These controls req 1), Safety Tagging, et." The 1E12-F0027	ty of Plant Systems" the Unit Supervisor ating in certain Tec uire the use of Dang and shall be documen A valve was removed	states, to hnical er or ted on from						

service under the Safety Tagging process; however, PAP-1401 did not include adequate guidance to ensure proper RETURNED CONDITION for motor operated valves during the restoration.

IV. Analysis of Event

The operability of the containment isolation values ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10CFR50. Although the RHR "A" Outboard Containment Isolation value was open during this event, the three values that provide the Inboard Containment Isolation function for this penet tion were energized and closed. This event is not considered to be safety significant.

V. Corrective Actions

A standing instruction has been issued to all licensed and nonlicensed operators prescribing the proper RETURNED CONDITION for motor operated valves being restored from the Safety Tagging process such that any actual positioning of the valve is performed remotely. The appropriate guidance will be included in PAP-1401 and all licensed and nonlicensed operators will be trained to the procedural change. As part of the established requalification training program, all plant licensed operators will be instructed on the lessons learned from this event.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].