

**PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT**

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PERRY, OHIO 44081  
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**Michael D. Lyster**  
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

MAY 15, 1992  
PY-CEI/NRR-1498 L


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Perry Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-440  
LERs 92-008

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 92-008 for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

Sincerely,

  
Michael D. Lyster

MDL:CRE:ss

Enclosure: LER 92-008

cc: NRC Project Manager  
NRC Sr. Resident Inspector  
NRC Region III

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Operating Companies  
Cleveland Electric Illuminating  
Toledo Edison

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1) Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050004401 PAGE (3) 03

TITLE (4) Loss of Administrative Control of Containment Isolation Valve Results in Technical Specification Violation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES
04	15	92	92	008	00	05	15	92	
								DOCKET NUMBER(S): 050000	
								50000	

OPERATING MODE (9) 5 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: Henry L. Hegrat, Compliance Engineer, Extension 5185 TELEPHONE NUMBER: 215 250-3737

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)  YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH:    DAY:    YEAR:   

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 15, 1992, at 1300, Operations personnel discovered that a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Outboard Containment Isolation valve had been open and de-energized for approximately five hours without the Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4 Action being taken. The valve was locally opened as part of a tagout restoration but was not immediately re-energized. Approximately five hours later, when electrical power was restored to the valve, control room operators on the next shift discovered that the valve was open, and closed the valve using the control switch.

The cause of the event is inadequate procedure. Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP-1401) "Safety Tagging" does not provide the necessary detail of guidance, in some situations, to maintain administrative control of motor operated valves being restored under the tagout process. Specific guidance as to the restored position of components and sequence of restoration could have prevented this event.

A standing instruction has been issued to all licensed and nonlicensed operators prescribing the proper RETURNED CONDITION for motor operated valves being restored from the Safety Tagging process such that any actual positioning of the valve is performed remotely. The appropriate guidance will be included in PAP-1401 and all licensed and nonlicensed operators will be trained to the procedural change. As part of the established requalification training program, all licensed operators will be instructed on the lessons learned from this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P 830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0500044092	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		92	008	00	02	OF	03

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A (1/17))

I. Introduction

On April 15, 1992, at 1300, Operations personnel discovered that a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System [B0] Outboard Containment Isolation valve [ISV] had been open and de-energized for approximately five hours without the Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4 Action being taken. At the time of the event, the plant was in the third refueling outage in Operational Condition 5 (Refuel). The Reactor Pressure Vessel [RPV] was at atmospheric pressure with reactor coolant temperature at approximately 104 degrees Fahrenheit. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

II. Description of Event

On April 4, 1992, an RHR System "A" Outboard Containment Isolation valve (1E12-F0027A) was tagged closed and de-energized for plant testing. On April 15, 1992, the tagout was signed for clearance authorization and plant operators began to restore the equipment from the tagout. The valve (1E12-F0027A) was locally opened as part of the tagout restoration but the motor control circuit was not immediately re-energized. A Control Room shift change temporarily caused suspension of the tagout restoration. Approximately five hours after the valve was opened, when electrical power was restored to the valve, control room operators on the next shift discovered that the valve was open, and closed the valve using the control switch. During the five hours that the valve was open without control from the control room and without knowledge of the plant operators, core alterations had been in progress. This constituted a violation of the action a.3 for Technical Specification 3.6.4.

III. Cause of Event

The cause of the event is inadequate procedure. Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP-1401) "Safety Tagging" does not provide the necessary detail of guidance, in some situations, to maintain administrative control of motor operated valves being restored under the tagout process. Specific guidance as to the restored position of components and sequence of restoration could have prevented this event.

Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4 Action a.3 states, "With one or more containment isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.4-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and within 4 hours...Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange.\*...Otherwise,...suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment and with a potential for draining the reactor vessel." The "\*" note states, "Isolation valves closed to satisfy these requirements may be reopened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls."

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)  Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   4   4   0   9   2	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			0   0   8	-	0   0   0   3	OF 0   3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP-0205) "Operability of Plant Systems" states, "Administrative Controls are those actions taken by the Unit Supervisor to control system or component manipulations while operating in certain Technical Specification Action Statements. These controls require the use of Danger or Out-of Service tags per (PAP-1401), Safety Tagging, and shall be documented on the appropriate LCO Tracking Sheet." The 1E12-F0027A valve was removed from service under the Safety Tagging process; however, PAP-1401 did not include adequate guidance to ensure proper RETURNED CONDITION for motor operated valves during the restoration.

IV. Analysis of Event

The operability of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10CFR50. Although the RHR "A" Outboard Containment Isolation valve was open during this event, the three valves that provide the Inboard Containment Isolation function for this penetration were energized and closed. This event is not considered to be safety significant.

V. Corrective Actions

A standing instruction has been issued to all licensed and nonlicensed operators prescribing the proper RETURNED CONDITION for motor operated valves being restored from the Safety Tagging process such that any actual positioning of the valve is performed remotely. The appropriate guidance will be included in PAP-1401 and all licensed and nonlicensed operators will be trained to the procedural change. As part of the established requalification training program, all plant licensed operators will be instructed on the lessons learned from this event.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].