Station Support Department

10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)

PECO ENERGY

PECO Energy Company
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Docket Nos. 50-277
50-278

License Nos. DPR-44
DPR-56

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Additional Information Concerning the Alternative Repair Plan In Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)

References:

1. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), dated September 16, 1994
2. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to USNRC, dated September 26, 1994
3. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to USNRC, dated February 14, 1995
4. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to USNRC, dated June 22, 1995
5. Letter from J. W. Shea (USNRC) to G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company), dated July 27, 1995
6. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to USNRC, dated August 17, 1995
7. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to USNRC, dated August 28, 1995
8. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to USNRC, dated September 5, 1995
9. Letter from G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company) to USNRC, dated September 19, 1995
10. Letter from J. W. Shea (USNRC) to G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECO Energy Company), dated October 16, 1995

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Dear Sir:

In the above Referenced letters, information was exchanged regarding the repair plan for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3 core shroud, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3), in the event that such a repair is determined to be necessary. This repair plan was approved in a Safety Evaluation dated October 16, 1995 (Reference 10). In review of the Safety Evaluation, PECO Energy has identified several statements contained in the Safety Evaluation that should be clarified:

1. Several locations within the Safety Evaluation use the term "shroud head flange" synonymously with "shroud flange." As an example, the Safety Evaluation states that "the upper spring assemblies of the tie rod stabilizer assemblies are attached to the core shroud head flange by means of brackets which are installed into slots machined in the flange." This characterization is inaccurate in that the actual design of the modification has the tie rod assemblies attaching to the shroud flange with slots machined into the shroud head flange. These slots fit over the attachment points on the shroud flange. No connection is made to the shroud head flange.

2. The Safety Evaluation infers that the mid-span tie rod support contacts the side of the reactor vessel and the core shroud. In fact, the mid-span tie rod support contacts the side of the reactor vessel but does not contact the shroud. The mid-span tie rod support is used to increase the natural frequency of the stabilizer rod thereby reducing any flow induced vibration. Stability of shroud cylindrical sections is maintained by the installation of all four tie rod stabilizer assembles. The upper and lower springs within the assemblies will restrict the lateral core shroud displacement during postulated accident conditions.

3. Although the Safety Evaluation identifies that the ANSYS model was used for modeling the tie rod stabilizer assemblies, the Safety Evaluation did not identify that the commercial program Cosmos was used for modeling the lower springs on the tie rod stabilizer assemblies.

4. The Safety Evaluation incorrectly identifies that four holes are machined through the core shroud support plate. This statement is incorrect in that eight attachment holes are machined into the core shroud support plate. Two holes are machined at each of the four locations on the core shroud plate.

5. The Type XM-19 materials were procured to ASTM specification A479. The materials were solution annealed as discussed in the Safety Evaluation, however, the Safety Evaluation identifies that the annealing was followed by forced air cooling to a temperature below 500° F. The actual forced air cooling was to a temperature below 800° F.

6. The Safety Evaluation identifies that "vertical separation for any and all welds is precluded except for the postulated design event consisting of a main steam line break loss of coolant accident combination with a design basis earthquake." This statement should refer to a the "maximum credible earthquake" and not the "design basis earthquake."

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

M. C. Kray for
G. A. Hunger, Jr.,
Director - Licensing

cc: T. T. Martin, Administrator, Region I, USNRC
W. L. Schmidt, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, PBAPS