

Exhibit B

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

License Amendment Request Dated May 7, 1992

Proposed Changes Marked Up
On Existing Technical Specification Pages

Exhibit B consists of existing and new Technical Specification pages with the proposed changes highlighted on those pages. The existing pages affected by this License Amendment Request are listed below:

TS-x11
TS.1-2
TS.3.4-2
TS.3.6-1
TS.4.4-2
Table "c" 4.4-1 (Pages 1 through 5)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSLIST OF TABLES

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CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

1. Penetrations required to be isolated during accident conditions are either:
 - a. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or
 - b. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Specifications 3.6.C and 3.6.D.
- ~~2. Blind flanges required by Table TS.4.4.1 are installed.~~
2. The equipment hatch is closed and sealed.
3. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.M.
4. The containment leakage rates are within their required limits.

COLD SHUTDOWN

A reactor is in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition when the reactor is subcritical by at least $1\% \Delta k/k$ and the reactor coolant average temperature is less than 200° F.

CORE ALTERATION

CORE ALTERATION is the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel, which may affect core reactivity. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.7.A.6. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

- 3.4.B.1.d. A minimum of 100,000 gallons of water is available in the condensate storage tanks and a backup supply of river water is available through the cooling water system.
- e. Motor operated valves MV-32242 and MV-32243 (Unit 2 valves MV-32248 and MV-32249) shall have valve position monitor lights OPERABLE and shall be locked in the open position by having the motor control center supply breakers physically locked in the off position.
- f. Manual valves in the above systems that could (if on) is improperly positioned) reduce flow below that assumed for accident analysis shall be locked in the proper position for emergency use. During POWER OPERATION, changes in valve position will be under direct administrative control.
- g. The condensate supply cross connect valves ~~C-41-1 and C-41-2~~, to the auxiliary feedwater pumps shall be blocked and tagged open. Any changes in position of ~~these~~ this valves shall be under direct administrative control.
2. During STARTUP OPERATION or POWER OPERATION, any one of the following conditions of inoperability may exist for each unit provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued until OPERABILITY is restored. If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified, place the affected unit (or either unit in the case of a motor driven AFW pump inoperability) in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours and reduce reactor coolant system average temperature below 350°F within the following 6 hours.
- a. A turbine driven AFW pump, system valves and piping may be inoperable for 72 hours.
- A motor driven AFW pump, system valves and piping may be inoperable for 72 hours.
- c. The condensate storage tanks may be inoperable for 48 hours provided the cooling water system is available as a backup supply of water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
- d. The backup supply of river water provided by the cooling water system may be inoperable for 48 hours provided a minimum of 100,000 gallons of water is available in the condensate storage tanks.
- e. The valve position monitor lights for motor operated valves MV-32242 and MV-32243 (Unit 2 valves MV-32248 and MV-32249) may be inoperable for 72 hours provided the associated valves' positions are verified to be open once each shift.

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to the integrity of the containment system.

Objective

To define the operating status of the containment system for plant operation.

Specification

A. Containment Integrity

1. A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200°F unless CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is maintained.
2. If these conditions cannot be satisfied, within one hour initiate the action necessary to place the unit in HOT SHUTDOWN, and be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

B. Vacuum Breaker System

1. Both valves in each of two vacuum breaker systems, including actuating and power circuits, shall be OPERABLE when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required (except as specified in 3.6.B.2 and 3.6.B.3 below).
2. With one vacuum breaker inoperable with respect to its containment isolation function, apply the requirements of Specification 3.6.C.3, to the isolation valves associated with the inoperable vacuum breaker.
3. One vacuum breaker may be inoperable with respect to its vacuum relief function for 7 days.

C. Containment Isolation Valves

1. Non-automatic containment isolation valves shall be locked closed or shall be under direct administrative control and capable of being closed within one minute following an accident when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required (except as specified in 3.6.C.3 below).
2. Automatic containment isolation valves, ~~listed in Table TS.4.4-1~~ including actuation circuits, shall be OPERABLE when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required (except as specified in 3.6.C.3 below).
3. With one or more of the containment isolation valve(s) ~~listed in Table TS.4.4-1~~ inoperable, within four hours:
 - (a) restore the inoperable valve(s) to operable status or,
 - (b) deactivate the operable valve in the closed position or,
 - (c) lock closed at least one valve in each penetration having one inoperable valve.

2. Initial and periodic type B (except airlocks) and type C tests of penetrations (~~Table TS.4.4-1~~) shall be performed at a pressure of 46 psig (Pa) in accordance with the provisions of Appendix J, Section III.B and Section III.C, and Specification 4.4.A.5. The airlocks shall be tested initially and at six-month intervals at 46 psig by pressurizing the inner volume. In addition, when CONTAINMENT system INTEGRITY is required, each airlock shall be tested every 3 days if it is in use by pressurizing the intergasket space to 10 psig. Type B or C testing is not required for the following penetrations and valves:
 - a. Instrumentation penetrations.
 - b. Steam, feedwater, steam generator blowdown and auxiliary feedwater penetrations.
 - c. Safety injection, RHR, cooling water, and component cooling water system valves which are not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.
3. Type A tests will be considered to be satisfactory if the acceptance criteria delineated in Appendix J, Section III.A are met.
4. Type B and C tests will be considered to be satisfactory if the combined leakage rate of all components subjected to Type B and C tests does not exceed 60% of the La and if the following conditions are met.
 - a. For pipes connected to systems that are in the ABSVZ auxiliary building special ventilation zone, (~~Designated ABSVZ in Table TS.4.4-1~~) the total leakage past isolation valves shall be less than 0.1 weight percent per 24 hours at pressure Pa.
 - b. For pipes connected to systems that are exterior to both the shield building and the ABSVZ auxiliary building special ventilation zone, (~~designated EXTERIOR in Table TS.4.4-1~~) the total leakage past isolation valves shall be less than 0.01 weight percent per 24 hours at pressure Pa.
 - c. For airlocks, the leakage shall be less than 1% of the La at 10 psig for door intergasket tests and 5% of the La at 46 psig for overall airlock tests.
5. The retest schedules for Type A, B, and C tests will be in accordance with Section III.D of Appendix J. Each shield building shall be retested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for its containment. The auxiliary building special ventilation zone shall be retested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for Unit 1 containment.
6. Type A, B and C tests will be in accordance with Section V of Appendix J. Inspection and reporting requirements of each shield building test shall be the same for Type A tests. The auxiliary building special ventilation zone shall have the same inspection and reporting requirements as for the Type A tests of Unit 1.

~~UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS~~

Penetration Number	Penetration Description	Penetration Designation (Note 3)	Type of Test
1	Pressure Relief Tank to Gas Analyzer	ABSVZ	C
2	Pressure Relief Tank Nitrogen Supply	Exterior	C
3A	Dead Weight Tester	Note (1)	-
3B	Pressure Instrument	Note (1)	-
4	Primary Vent Header	ABSVZ	C
5	RC Drain Tank Pump Discharge	ABSVZ	C
6A, 6B	Steam lines	Note (2)	-
(6C, 6D in Unit 2)	Bellows	Annulus	B
7A, 7B	Feedwater lines	Note (2)	-
(7C, 7D in Unit 2)	Bellows	Annulus	B
8A, 8B	Steam Gen Blowdown	Note (2)	-
(8C, 8D in Unit 2)	Bellows	Annulus	B
9	RHR Loop Out	Note (5)	-
9	Bellows	Annulus	B
10	RHR Loop Out	Note (5)	-
10	Bellows	Annulus	B
11	Letdown line	ABSVZ	C
11	Bellows	Annulus	B
12	Charging line	ABSVZ	C
13A, 13B	RC Pump Seal Supply	ABSVZ	C
14	RC Pump Seal Return	ABSVZ	C
15	Pressurizer Steam Sample	ABSVZ	C
16	Pressurizer Liquid Sample	ABSVZ	C

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS

<u>Penetration Number</u>	<u>Penetration Description</u>	<u>Penetration Designation (Note 3)</u>	<u>Type of Test</u>
17	Loop B Hot Leg Sample	ABSVZ	C
18	Fuel Transfer Tube (4)	ABSVZ	B
18	Bellows	Annulus	B
19	Service Air (4)	ABSVZ	B
20	Instrument	Exterior	C
21	RC Drain Tank to Gas Analyzer	ABSVZ	C
22	Containment Air Sample In	ABSVZ	C
23	Containment Air Sample Out	ABSVZ	C
24	Spare		
25A	Containment Purge Exhaust (4)	ABSVZ	B
25B	Containment Purge Supply (4)	ABSVZ	B
26	Containment Sump "A" Discharge	ABSVZ	C
27A-1, 27A-2	Steam Generator Blowdown Sample	Note (2)	-
27B (51 in Unit 2)	Fire Protection (4)	ABSVZ	B
27-1, 27-2 (27C-1 and 27C-2 in Unit 2)	OILT Instruments	ABSVZ	B
27D	Spare		-
28A, 28B	Safety Injection	Note (5)	-
29A, 29B	Containment Spray	ABSVZ	C
30A, 30B	Low Head SI Suction from Sump B	ABSVZ	C

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS

<u>Penetration Number</u>	<u>Penetration Description</u>	<u>Penetration Designation (Note 3)</u>	<u>Type of Test</u>
31	Accumulator Nitrogen	Exterior	C
32A, 32B	CC to RC Pumps	Note (5)	-
33A, 33B	CC from RC Pumps	Note (5)	-
34	Electrical Penetration	Annulus	B
35	SI and Accumulator	Note (5)	-
36A,B,C,E	Spares		-
36D (50 in Unit 2)	Instrumentation	Note (1)	-
37A,B,C D	Cooling Water to Fan Coil Units	Note (5)	-
38A,B,C,D	Cooling Water from CC to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger	Note (5)	-
40	CC from Excess Let- down Heat Exchanger	Note (5)	-
41A, 41B	Containment Vacuum Breaker	Annulus	C
41C	Spare		-
42A-1	Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control Air Supply	Annulus	C
42-2	Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control Vent	Annulus	C
42-3	Sample to Gas Analyzer	Exterior	C

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS

<u>Penetration Number</u>	<u>Penetration Description</u>	<u>Penetration Designation (Note 3)</u>	<u>Type of Test</u>
42B (53 in Unit 2)	Inservice Purge Supply Valves (6)	ABSVZ	C
42B (53 in Unit 2)	*Inservice Purge Supply Blind Flange(4)	Annulus	B
42C (54 in Unit 2)	Containment Heating Steam (4)	ABSVZ	B
42D, 42E	Spare		-
42F-1 (42E-1 in Unit 2)	Heating Steam Condensate Return(4)	ABSVZ	B
42F-2 (42E-2 in Unit 2)	Heating Steam Return Vent(4)	ABSVZ	B
42G	Spare		
43A (52 in Unit 2)	Inservice Purge Exhaust Valves(6)	ABSVZ	C
43A (52 in Unit 2)	*Inservice Purge Exhaust Blind Flange(4)	Annulus	B
43B,C,D	Spares		
44	Containment Vessel Pressurization (4)	ABSVZ	B
45	Reactor Makeup to Pressurizer Relief Tank	ABSVZ	C
46A, 46B (46C, 46D in Unit 2)	Auxiliary Feedwater	Note (2)	-
47	Electrical Penetration	Annulus	B
48	Low Head SI	Note (5)	-
49A	Instrumentation	Note (1)	-
49B (55 in Unit 2)	Demineralized Water (4)	ABSV	B

*Testing required following modification to inservice purge system of each unit during 1983 refueling outages.

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS

Penetration Number	Penetration Description	Penetration Designation (Note 3)	Type of Test
50-1	Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control Air Supply	Annulus	C
50-2	Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control Vent	Annulus	C
50-3	Sample to Gas Analyzer	Exterior	C
	Equipment Door	Annulus	B
	Personnel Airlock	Annulus	B
	Maintenance Airlock	Annulus	B

Notes:

- ~~1. Instrumentation lines. No Type B or C testing required.~~
- ~~2. Steam and feedwater lines. Type C testing not required since valves are not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.~~
- ~~3. Penetration Designations~~
 - ~~ABSVZ — pipes connected to systems that are located in the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone~~
 - ~~Exterior — pipes connected to systems that are exterior to the Shield Building and ABSVZ~~
 - ~~Sealed — pipes that will be sealed by water in space between isolation barriers following LOCA~~
 - ~~Annulus — penetration that would leak to the Shield Building annulus following LOCA~~
- ~~4. These penetrations have blank flanges. Penetrations 18, 25A, 25B, 27-1, 27-2, 27C-1, and 27C-2 have blind flanges on the inside only. Penetrations 42B, 43A, 52, and 53 have a blind flange in the annulus only.~~
- ~~5. Safety injection, RHR, cooling water, and closed cooling water system valves not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.~~
- ~~6. The leakage test for this penetration is only required prior to use of the inservice purge system.~~

Exhibit C

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

License Amendment Request Dated May 7, 1992

Revised Technical Specification Pages

Exhibit C consists of revised pages for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Technical Specification with the proposed changes incorporated. The revised pages are listed below:

TS-xii
TS.1-2
TS.3.4-2
TS.3.6-1
TS.4.4-2

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

<u>TS TABLE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
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3.5-2	Instrument Operating Conditions for Reactor Trip
3.5-3	Instrument Operating Conditions for Emergency Cooling System
3.5-4	Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions
3.5-5	Instrument Operating Conditions for Ventilation Systems
3.5-6	Instrument Operating Conditions for Auxiliary Electrical System
3.9-1	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation
3.9-2	Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring instrumentation
3.14-1	Safety Related Fire Detection Instruments
3.15-1	Event Monitoring instrumentation - Process & Containment
3.15-2	Event Monitoring instrumentation - Radiation
4.1-1	Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Test of Instrument Channels
4.1-2A	Minimum Frequencies for Equipment Tests
4.1-2B	Minimum Frequencies for Sampling Tests
4.2-1	Special Inservice Inspection Requirements
4.10-1	Radiation Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) Sample Collection and Analysis
4.10-2	RFMP - Maximum Values for the Lower Limits of Detection
4.10-3	RFMP - Reporting Levels for Radioactivity Concentrations in Environmental Samples
4.12-1	Steam Generator Tube Inspection
4.17-1	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements
4.17-2	Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring instrumentation Surveillance Requirements
4.17-3	Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis Program
4.17-4	Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program
5.5-1	Anticipated Annual Release of Radioactive Material in Liquid Effluents From Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (Per Unit)
5.5-2	Anticipated Annual Release of Radioactive Nuclides in Gaseous Effluent From Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (Per Unit)
6.1-1	Minimum Shift Crew Composition

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

1. Penetrations required to be isolated during accident conditions are either:
 - a. Capable of being closed by an OPB containment automatic isolation valve system, or
 - b. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Specifications 3.6.C and 3.6.D.
2. The equipment hatch is closed and sealed.
3. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.M.
4. The containment leakage rates are within their required limits.

COLD SHUTDOWN

A reactor is in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition when the reactor is subcritical by at least 1% $\Delta k/k$ and the reactor coolant average temperature is less than 200° F.

CORE ALTERATION

CORE ALTERATION is the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel, which may affect core reactivity. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.7.A.6. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

- 3.4.B.1.d. A minimum of 100,000 gallons of water is available in the condensate storage tanks and a backup supply of river water is available through the cooling water system.
 - e. Motor operated valves MV-32242 and MV-32243 (Unit 2 valves MV-32248 and MV-32249) shall have valve position monitor lights OPERABLE and shall be locked in the open position by having the motor control center supply breakers physically locked in the off position.
 - f. Manual valves in the above systems that could (if one is improperly positioned) reduce flow below that assumed for accident analysis shall be locked in the proper position for emergency use. During POWER OPERATION, changes in valve position will be under direct administrative control.
 - g. The condensate supply cross connect valve C-41-2, to the auxiliary feedwater pumps shall be blocked and tagged open. Any changes in position of this valve shall be under direct administrative control.
2. During STARTUP OPERATION or POWER OPERATION, any one of the following conditions of inoperability may exist for each unit provided STARTUP OPERATION is discontinued until OPERABILITY is restored. If OPERABILITY is not restored within the time specified, place the affected unit (or either unit in the case of a motor driven AFW pump inoperability) in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours and reduce reactor coolant system average temperature below 350°F within the following 6 hours.
 - a. A turbine driven AFW pump, system valves and piping may be inoperable for 72 hours.
 - b. A motor driven AFW pump, system valves and piping may be inoperable for 72 hours.
 - c. The condensate storage tanks may be inoperable for 48 hours provided the cooling water system is available as a backup supply of water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
 - d. The backup supply of river water provided by the cooling water system may be inoperable for 48 hours provided a minimum of 100,000 gallons of water is available in the condensate storage tanks.
 - e. The valve position monitor lights for motor operated valves MV-32242 and MV-32243 (Unit 2 valves MV-32248 and MV-32249) may be inoperable for 72 hours provided the associated valves' positions are verified to be open once each shift.

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to the integrity of the containment system.

Objective

To define the operating status of the containment system for plant operation.

Specification

A. Containment Integrity

1. A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall reactor coolant system average temperature exceed 200°F unless CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is maintained.
2. If these conditions cannot be satisfied, within one hour initiate the action necessary to place the unit in HOT SHUTDOWN, and be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

B. Vacuum Breaker System

1. Both valves in each of two vacuum breaker systems, including actuating and power circuits, shall be OPERABLE when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required (except as specified in 3.5.B.2 and 3.6.B.3 below).
2. With one vacuum breaker inoperable with respect to its containment isolation function, apply the requirements of Specification 3.6.C.3, to the isolation valves associated with the inoperable vacuum breaker.
3. One vacuum breaker may be inoperable with respect to its vacuum relief function for 7 days.

C. Containment Isolation Valves

1. Non-automatic containment isolation valves shall be locked closed or shall be under direct administrative control and capable of being closed within one minute following an accident when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required (except as specified in 3.6.C.3 below).
2. Automatic containment isolation valves, including actuation circuits, shall be OPERABLE when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required (except as specified in 3.6.C.3 below).
3. With one or more of the containment isolation valve(s) inoperable, within four hours:
 - (a) restore the inoperable valve(s) to operable status or,
 - (b) deactivate the operable valve in the closed position or,
 - (c) lock closed at least one valve in each penetration having one inoperable valve.

2. Initial and periodic type B (except airlocks) and type C tests of penetrations shall be performed at a pressure of 46 psig (P_a) in accordance with the provisions of Appendix J, Section III.B and Section III.C, and Specification 4.4.A.5. The airlocks shall be tested initially and at six-month intervals at 46 psig by pressurizing the inner volume. In addition, when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required, each airlock shall be tested every 3 days if it is in use by pressurizing the intergasket space to 10 psig. Type B or C testing is not required for the following penetrations and valves:
 - a. Instrumentation penetrations.
 - b. Feedwater, steam generator blowdown and auxiliary feedwater penetrations.
 - c. Safety injection, RHR, cooling water, and component cooling water system valves which are not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.
3. Type A tests will be considered to be satisfactory if the acceptance criteria delineated in Appendix J, Section III.A are met.
4. Type B and C tests will be considered to be satisfactory if the combined leakage rate of all components subjected to Type B and C tests does not exceed 60% of the L_a and if the following conditions are met.
 - a. For pipes connected to systems that are in the auxiliary building special ventilation zone, the total leakage past isolation valves shall be less than 0.1 weight percent per 24 hours at pressure P_a .
 - b. For pipes connected to systems that are exterior to both the shield building and the auxiliary building special ventilation zone, the total leakage past isolation valves shall be less than 0.02 weight percent per 24 hours at pressure P_a .
 - c. For airlocks, the leakage shall be less than 1% of the L_a at 10 psig for door intergasket tests and 5% of the L_a at 46 psig for overall airlock tests.
5. The retest schedules for Type A, B, and C tests will be in accordance with Section III.D of Appendix J. Each shield building shall be retested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for its containment. The auxiliary building special ventilation zone shall be retested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for Unit 1 containment.
6. Type A, B and C tests will be in accordance with Section V of Appendix J. Inspection and reporting requirements of each shield building test shall be the same for Type A tests. The auxiliary building special ventilation zone shall have the same inspection and reporting requirements as for the Type A tests of Unit 1.