



ENTERGY

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James J. Fisicaro
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January 11, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Mail Stop P1-37
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
License No. NPF-47
Licensee Event Report 50-458/95-011-00
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

RBG-42333
RBF1-96-0001

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is the subject report.

Sincerely,

James J. Fisicaro

JJF/tcb
enclosure

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cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
P. O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
700 Galleria Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C. R. Oberg
Public Utility Commission of Texas
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Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Radiation Protection Division
P.O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135
ATTN: Administrator

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) River Bend Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000-458	PAGE (3) 1 OF 2
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TITLE (4)
RCIC Division I Isolation Due to a Failed Transmitter

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	15	95	95	011	00	1	11	96	NA	NA
									NA	NA

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 87	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)						
	20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71						
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER						
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A						
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME David Lorfing-Supervisor, Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (504) 381-4157
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS
K	CEA	IXMITR	R369	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 1226 CST on December 15, 1995, with the plant at 87 percent power and the unit in Operational Condition 1, the Division I primary containment isolation instrument for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system high steam flow isolation function failed downscale. This failure resulted in isolation of the RCIC steam supply outboard isolation valve and closure of the RCIC trip and throttle valve. A faulty transmitter was found to be the source of the failure and was replaced. The RCIC system was restored to operability at 1010 CST on December 16, 1995. The high pressure core spray (HPCS) system was operable at the time of this event, therefore, this event was of little safety significance.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
RIVER BEND STATION	05000-458	95	-- 011	-- 00	2 OF 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION:

At 1227 CST on December 15, 1995, with the plant at 87 percent power and the unit in Operational Condition 1, the Division I primary containment isolation instrument for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system (*BN*) high steam flow isolation function pegged downscale. This condition caused the RCIC steam supply outboard isolation valve (*BN-ISV*) to isolate and the RCIC trip and throttle valve to close. This containment isolation constitutes an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation, and is being reported pursuant 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv).

INVESTIGATION:

On December 15, 1995, Division I of the RCIC system isolated. The reactor building operator was dispatched to the RCIC room. No abnormalities were found. However, one of the master RCIC steam line flow high trip units indicated downscale. The associated slave RCIC steam line flow high trip unit indicated downscale and was tripped. Troubleshooting indicated the RCIC steam line differential pressure transmitter (*BN-TI/P*) failed low which caused a false high reverse flow indication. Therefore, the Division I RCIC isolation was caused by an invalid signal produced by the failure of the outboard RCIC steam line differential pressure transmitter E31-PDTN083A.

The failure in 1986 of a similar model transmitter serving the same function and causing the same RCIC isolation was reported per LER 86-068, Revision 2. The 1986 failed transmitter had a broken seal and loose electronics head. An inspection of the 1995 failed transmitter showed no sign of a broken seal or a loose electronics head. No moisture, condensation, or corrosion was found in the electronics head.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

On December 16, 1995, the failed RCIC steam line differential pressure transmitter was replaced and a functional test and loop calibration were successfully completed. The system was resotred to operability at 1010 CST on December 16, 1995. The mechanism for the failure of the RCIC steam line differential pressure transmitter will be evaluated and corrective action to prevent future failures will be taken as appropriate.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Upon receipt of the invalid trip signal from the failed transmitter, the RCIC system isolated as designed. The HPCS system (*BG*) was operable at the time of the occurrence; therefore this isolation did not compromise the ability of the plant to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event was of little safety significance.

Note: Energy Industry Identification Codes are in text as (*XX*).