James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York (3093) 315-342-3840



Harn, P. Salmon, Jr. Resig int Manager

May 7, 1992 JAFP-92-0373

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT:

92-019-00 - Hourly Roving Fire Watch Not Posted Within One Hour Due to Personnel Errors

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. W. Verne Childs at (315) 349-6071.

Very truly yours,

HARRY P. SALMON, JR.

HPS:WVC:lar

Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I

USNRC Resident Inspector

INPO Records Center

(27) 542971.

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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECT ON REQUEST SUD HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P 500), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. On 4/7/92 at 2316 hours, fire barrier penetration seal deficiencies were found which required posting of an hourly fire watch patrol to meet Technical Specification 3.12.F.2. Due to a personnel error, the required hourly fire watch patrol was not posted until approximately 8 hours later when the error was discovered by other personnel.

Operating personnel responsible for implementing the Technical Specification requirements did not discuss the requirements with fire watch supervision. As a result, the personnel most likely to be aware of the need to post an additional fire watch (or revise existing fire watch post instructions) was unaware of the necessary changes. Shift supervisors and assistant shift supervisors have been instructed to discuss each deficiency discovery with fire watch supervision to improve communications and coordination of the operating and fire protection groups. In addition, information has been provided to operating personnel for their use to accurately assess the need for additional or revised fire watch postings. LERs 92-001, 92-006, and 92-010 describe similar fire watchposting and/or fire watchstanding deficiencies.

NRC FORM 366A

U.S. NUCLEAR REGI

DRY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3180-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20565, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

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Description

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel.

On April 7, 1992 at 2316 hours, two (2) fire parrier penetration seals in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) [BN] 3-hour fire rated enclosure were found with deficiencies which resulted in the penetration seals being declared non-functional. Technical Specification 3.12.F.2 requires posting of an hourly fire watch patrol (with fire detection equipment verified operable on at least one side of the fire barrier) for the non-functional fire barrier penetration seals.

At the time that the RCIC enclosure fire barrier penetration seal deficiencies were found a number of other continuous and roving hourly fire watches were posted due to other penetration seal deficiencies discovered as part of a baseline inspection of all fire barrier penetration seals in the plant. See LER-91-024.

The shift supervisor was informed, and he recognized that Technical Specification 3.12.F.2 required posting of an hourly fire watch patrol. Due to the existence of other penetration seal deficiencies (and existing fire watches as a result of those deficiencies), the shift supervisor considered the need to post an additional fire watch for the deficient RCIC enclosure penetration seals. The shift supervisor concluded (in error) that an existing hourly fire watch patrol had post instructions that included an hourly patrol of areas adjacent to the RCIC enclosure thus making it unnecessary to post an additional fire watch or modify the post instructions for an existing fire watch.

At approximately 0800 hours on April 8, 1992 a different shift supervisor detected the error made the previous evening. An hourly fire watch patrol was posted immediately and existing hourly fire watch patrol instructions were modified to include the area adjacent to the RCIC enclosure. These actions resulted in compliance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.12.F.2.

Causes

The event was caused by a personnel error (Cause Code A). The error was cognitive in nature.

NRC FORM 366A (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-5301. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAREHWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (1)150-01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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Within the past four months several other failures to properly perform required fire watch duties have been noted and were reported in LERs 92-001, 92-006, and 92-010. As a result of these earlier fire watch posting and/or fire watchstanding deficiencies, fire watch supervisors were hired to supervise and coordinate fire watch activities until the number of deficiencies is reduced to the point where only a few fire watches are necessary. The shift supervisor on duty at the time the RCIC enclosure penetration seal deficiencies were found did not consult with the fire watch supervisor to request his assistance to determine what changes to fire watch postings (if any) would be necessary to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 4.12.F.2. As a result, the fire watch supervisor was not aware of the additional fire watch posting requirement. The shift supervisor did not take advantage of the fire watch supervisor's more intimate knowledge of the various existing fire watch postings. the shift supervisor had consulted with the fire watch supervisor, the errors probably would have been corrected soon enough to result in posting of the fire watch within the allowed 1-hour period.

Analysis

The failure to post an hourly fire watch patrol within one hour resulted in violation of the requirements of Technical Specification 3.12.F.2. As a result, the event requires a report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), that is, an operation prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

The event was not significant from a safety viewpoint because fire detection instrumentation in the area of the RCIC enclosure was operable, the plant was shutdown with all irradiated fuel in the fuel pool, and the time period during which an hourly fire watch patrol was not posted was relatively short (approximately 8 hours).

Under other plant conditions, such as during power operation, the event would also have been of minimal significance. The operable fire detection instrumentation would provide early warning of a fire and result in prompt response by the plant fire brigade.

Corrective Action

The required hourly fire watch patrol was posted immediately after the error was discovered. This action resulted in compliance with Technical Specification 3.12.F.2. NRC FORM 366A

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92

TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IF-530; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20656, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3:50-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)								LER NUMBER (6)										PAGE (3)			
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- 2. Shift supervisors and assistant shift supervisors have been instructed to discuss with the fire atch supervisor each discovery of a deficiency which may require posting of a fire watch. This action will improve communications between the involved individuals and improve the coordination between the operating and fire protection personnel.
- 3. Written information concerning each fire watch posting (for both continuous fire watches and hourly fire watch patrols) has been provided for use by the shift supervisor. This information is updated as the fire watch requirements change from day-to-day and provides the shift supervisor with accurate, easy-to-use information concerning the fire watch postings.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events: LERs 92-001, 92-006, and 92-010 describe additional events involving fire watch deficiencies.