ENCLOSURE 1

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

GPU Nuclear Corporation Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16

During an NRC inspection conducted February 23, 1992, - March 28, 1992, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, (1990), the violation is listed below:

Section 50.47(b)(8) of 10 CFR Part 50, requires the licensee to have adequate emergency response facilities and equipment to support the emergency response provided and maintained. A June 12, 1984, Confirmatory Order requires the licensee to comply with the commitments as stated in the April 15 and July 19, 1983, and the March 9, and April 9, 1984, correspondence in response to commitments on emergency response capability schedules. The habitability of the technical support center (TSC) was described as meeting the requirements of Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.4, "Control Room Habitability System," as they pertain to control rooms, with the exception of automatic actuation, seismic and redundancy criteria. SRP 6.4, section 6.4-II.3, specifies that the ventilation shall be tested on an 18 month frequency. Specifically, the TSC ventilation system was to be tested to verify that system makeup was ± 10% of the design value, and that the TSC can be pressurized to at least ½ inch water gage while making up at the designed rate.

Contrary to the above requirements to maintain and test the TSC ventilation system, adequate maintenance and testing was not conducted since completion of construction of the TSC in 1985 until December 1991. This was evident by the degraded condition of the TSC ventilation system discovered during testing in November and December 1991.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VIII).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, GPU Nuclear Corporation is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of your receipt of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Dated at: King of Prussia, PA this 8th day of May 1992

ENCLOSURE 2

GPUN's Enforcement Conference Presentation of April 30, 1992

Attendance

GPU Nuclear Corporation

John Barton Bill Behrle Thomas F. Quintenz Chris Lefler George Busch

Brenda DeMerchant

Vice President and Director Director, Site Tech Functions Manager, Maintenance Assessment Manager, Site Tech Functions Manager, Site Licensing Licensing Engineer

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Susan F. Shankman

Edward C. Wenzinger A. Randolph Blough William H. Ruland

Craig Gordon

Timothy Frye Maitri Banerice Lonny Eckert John H. Lusher F. Jeff Laughlin David J. Vito John A. Nakoski Alexander Dromerick

Ted Easlick

Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects

(DRP)

Branch Chief, DRP Branch Chief, DRP Section Chief, DRP

Senior EP Specialist, Division of Reactor Safety and

Safeguards (DRSS) Reactor Engineer, DRP

Resident Inspector/Acting RSLO

EP Specialist, DRSS EP Specialist, DRSS EP Specialist, DRP


Senior Resident Inspector

Resident Inspector NRR Project Manager Enforcement Specialist

NEW JERSEY BNE

David Vann

NJ BNE



GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE APRIL 30, 1992

AGENDA

INTRODUCTION

J. BARTON (VICE PRESIDENT & DIRECTOR)

VIOLATION

B. BEHRLE (TECH FUNCTIONS SITE DIRECTOR)

- ° DESCRIPTION
- MAINTENANCE HISTORY
- IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION
- ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION
- LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
- SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- MITIGATING FACTORS

NUREG 0737 SUP. 1 CONFIRMATORY ASTION LETTER COMPLIANCE G. BUSCH (MANAGER LICENSING)

DESCRIPTION

THE LACK OF MAINTENANCE AND TESTING OF THE OYSTER CREEK TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS IDENTIFIED AS AN APPARENT VIOLATION OF NRC REQUIREMENTS IN NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-219/92-04, SPECIFICALLY:

- THE LACK OF SYSTEM MAINTENANCE UNTIL DECEMBER 1991, AS REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 50.47(B)(8)
- * FAILURE TO PERFORM THE PERIODIC TESTING SPECIFIED BY SRP 6.4

 AS REQUIRED BY THE JUNE 12, 1984 CONFIRMATORY ORDER.

MAINTENANCE HISTORY

- A CONTINUING SERVICES CONTRACT HAS BEEN IN-PLACE TO INSPECT AND MAINTAIN THE HEATING, VENTILATING AND AIR - CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT IN THE SITE EMERGENCY BUILDING (INCLUDING THE TSC) ON A BIMONTHLY SCHEDULE SINCE 1986.
- TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING WAS DONE THREE TIMES SINCE THE BUILDING WENT INTO OPERATION.
 - ° JANUARY 1984 THROUGH JANUARY 1985 (INITIAL TESTING)
 - O DECEMBER 1987 (SU&T PERFORMED THE TESTING)
 - NOVEMBER 1991 THROUGH MARCH 1992

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- ASSESS EXISTING CONDITIONS AND DETERMINED THE TSC REMAINED
 OPERABLE RELATIVE TO DBA CRITERIA.
- DETERMINED NECESSARY TEST REQUIREMENTS.
- · COMPLETED REQUIRED TESTING OF THE TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM.
- · INSTALLED A CONTINUOUS AIR MONITOR IN THE TSC.
- REVIEWED OTHER NUREG 0737 ACTIVITIES TO ASSURE SIMILAR
 COMPLIANCE ISSUES DO NOT EXIST.
- * REVIEWED ALL OUTSTANDING INCOMPLETE WORK LIST ITEMS (IWL'S) TO ASSURE SIMILAR ITEMS DO NOT EXIST.
- PERFORMED ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION

ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION

THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS THAT APPLIED TO THE TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM WERE NOT CLEARLY DEFINED IN THE PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROJECT.

A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF SURVEILLANCE TESTS NECESSARY TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT IDENTIFIED AND DOCUMENTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROJECT.

ROOT CAUSE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- THE INCOMPLETE WORK LIST OVERDUE COMMITMENT DATES DID NOT RECEIVE APPROPRIATE ATTENTION, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE REVIEWED ON A MONTHLY BASIS.
- THE SITE EMERGENCY BUILDING WAS A MAJOR PROJECT WITH LOW VISIBILITY RELATIVE TO PLANT ACTIVITIES SINCE IT HAD A MINIMAL INTERFACE WITH PLANT SYSTEMS.
- THE TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS OVERSHADOWED BY THE LARGE AMOUNT OF SEB CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES UNRELATED TO THE TSC.
- " AN SDD DIVISION 2 WAS NOT DEVELOPED FOR THIS PROJECT.

LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- ESTABLISH THE COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF TEST REQUIREMENTS,
 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND FREQUENCIES OF PERFORMANCE
- PUT INTO PLACE THE PROCESS TO PERFORM TESTING TO ASSURE THE TSC REMAINS FUNCTIONAL.
- THE MODIFICATION TURNOVER PROCEDURE (124) IS BEING REVISED TO PLACE GREATER RESTRICTIONS ON INCOMPLETE WORK LIST ITEMS

PROGRAMMATIC DESIGN PROCESS CHANGES (POST TSC DESIGN)

- THE ESTABLISHED MODIFICATION PROCESS NOW REQUIRES IN DEPTH SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION DIVISIONS 1&2 WHICH DEFINE IN DETAIL THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.
- THE REQUIREMENT FOR PROJECT REVIEWS, IN THE FORM OF PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING DESIGN REVIEW MEETINGS AND OPERABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, CONSTRUCTABILITY REVIEW MEETINGS REINFORCES THE ESTABLISHMENT AND UNDERSTANDING OF MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

- VENTILATION SYSTEM WAS DEGRADED, HOWEVER FACILITY
 REMAINED FUNCTIONAL.
- CALCULATIONS DEMONSTRATED DOSES WITHIN ACCEPTABLE BOUNDS.
- FACILITY WAS FUNCTIONAL FOR ALL DESIT" BASIS EVENTS.
- SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE IS MINIMAL AS RECOGNIZED IN THE INSPECTION REPORT.

MITIGATING FACTORS

- SELF IDENTIFIED
- IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS INITIATED TO PROVIDE
 FOR THE DEGRADED CONDITION EVEN THOUGH FACILITY WAS
 FUNCTIONAL.
- · CURRENT PRACTICES PRECLUDE SUCH EVENTS IN THE FUTURE.

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER COMPLIANCE

STATUS

ISSUES COVERED

ORDER DATED

ASS) INSTALLATION COMPLETED DURING 10R.	MODIFICATION OF ORDER 4/29/85 TO	ADDRESS OPERABILITY CONCERNS.	COMPLETED FOR LARGE CONTAINMENT VENT	AND PURGF "ALVES DURING 11R. NOT	NEEDED ! UK SMALL VALVES (2 INCH).	ACCEPTED BY NRC PER CORRESPONDENCE	DATED 3/5/87.		CLOSED (IR 90-16)	
S.S. ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM (PASS)			ISOLATE PURGE AND VENT VALVES OR	HIGH PADIATION SIGNAL				SPDS	GRANTED EXTENSION FOR COMPLETION	DATE OF SPDS
(717.33								6/12/84	10/6/86	

0	R	D	F	R		D	A	T	F
×	22	-	-	-	-	*	-	2	
E		15	2	11	O.	A			

(CONT'D)

ISSUES COVERED

- 6/12/84 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW
 - REG GUIDE 1.97 APPLICATION
 TO EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES
 - UPGRADE EMERGENCY OPERATING
 PROCEDURES (EOPS)
 - EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES
 - TSC
 - 0SC
 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

7/15/86 • CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY

STATUS

COMPLETE PER NRC LETTER DATED 6/28/90.

IR 91-23 DATED 9/26/91 IDENTIFIED ONE DEVIATION NOT RELATED TO ERF'S.

INSPECTIONS PERFORMED 9/88, 4/91, AND 1/92. URI IDENTIFIED CONCERNING SUPPORT PROGRAM.

COMPLETE PER NRC LETTER DATED 3/3/86 (HOWEVER NO ERF APPRAISAL WAS DONE).

COMPLETE EXCEPT FOR OPEN ISSUE ON THYROID DOSE.