



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY  
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August 30, 1984

2CAN088414

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
ATTN: Mr. James R. Miller, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Licensing  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-368  
License No. NPF-6  
International Atomic Energy Agency  
(IAEA) Safeguards Implementation at ANO-2

Gentlemen:

Your July 27, 1984 letter (2CNA078402), concerning IAEA safeguards implemented at ANO-2, transmitted for our review a draft of the Facility Attachment intended to be implemented at ANO through issuance of a license amendment pursuant to the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement defined by 10CFR75. We are currently reviewing that document and expect to provide our comments by September 30, 1984.

Your letter also requested additional information to be submitted within 30 days of our receipt of the letter. Our responses are provided as follows:

Request: Review the Facility Attachment and inspection summaries and indicate to us if you wish to request the withholding of any of the information from public disclosure under 10CFR2.790.

Response: The Facility Attachment and inspection summaries do not contain information subject to the withholding provision of 10CFR2.790.

Request: We would like to have your comments concerning the lighting failure and change in the camera viewing angle noted in footnote no. 2 of the summary statement on Page 2 of the March 9, 1984 letter.

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August 30, 1984

Response: ANO-2 operating records were reviewed in order to determine the causes of the lighting failure and the change in the viewing angle of the camera in the containment building as indicated in the subject report. No information about the cause, or occurrence, of either incident could be found.


It is our understanding that a lighting failure is suspected because the film from the containment camera contained a segment of underexposed film. If a lighting "failure" did occur, it may have been the result of breaker testing which took place during that time period. In order to guard against such a reoccurrence, plant maintenance and operations managers have been advised of the need for continuous lighting in areas where surveillance cameras are located.

The change in the camera viewing angle, which resulted in the loss of the core viewing area for about six days, may have been due to inadvertent bumping by personnel in the area. In order to help prevent this in the future, ANO supervisors have been advised of camera locations and have been asked to instruct their personnel to exercise caution while near the cameras.

We have reviewed the inspection summary statements included with your subject letter and have the following comment concerning footnote 1 on Page 1 of the March 21, 1984 letter. The footnote indicates a difference of 145 gm Pu due to decay was noted. The reason for this difference is that isotopic reports received represent monthly totals as of the end of the month. However, the IAEA Physical Inventory Verification was done as of the 19th of the month (November). This apparent difference will be made up during the next Physical Inventory Listing. This has been discussed with members of the IAEA.

Additionally, in order to maintain agreement between the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) submitted by us on August 22, 1983, and the Facility Attachment which we are currently reviewing, we request that item 37 on Page 8 of the DIQ be changed to reflect a feed batch size of 50-75 assemblies per refueling. A corrected sheet is attached for your use.

Very truly yours,



John R. Marshall  
Manager, Licensing

JRM/VP/ac