NRC For (9-83)	m 366				LIC	ENSE	E EVE	NT RE	PORT	(LER)		PERPERENTAL PROVINCE SERVICE SERVICES B/31/85	O. 3150-0104				
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Browns Ferry - Units 1, 2, and 3												0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6					
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			20.408(a)(1)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)	(A)	below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
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All eight diesel generators started during the performance of the core spray logic functional test surveillance instruction on unit 3, loop I, core spray. Units 1 and 2 were in normal operation while unit 3 was in its cycle 5 refueling outage. The diesels started due to the improper interpretation and use of the procedure instructions.

The basic cause for the misinterpretation was procedural deficiency. The procedure makes no mention of how the diesel generator logic was disabled nor did it state that the diesel generator and core spray logic had common initiating relays. All eight diesel generators were manually tripped and placed back into standby readiness.

Changes to this procedure as well as similar surveillance instructions will be revised to prevent recurrence.

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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 speces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spece typewritten lines) (16)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)						LER NUMBER (6)							PAGE (3)		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power, unit 2 was operating at 69 percent power, and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. All three units were affected by this event.

On July 27, 1984 during the performance of surveillance instruction 4.2.B.39.A--core spray (BM) logic functional test--on unit 3, all eight diesel generators (DG) started when performing the surveillance instruction steps in reverse order. The B1 and D1 residual heat removal service water (BD) pumps (P) failed to start contrary to the test instruction. In order to diagnose the problem, personnel attempted to return the core spray system to normal by backing out of the surveillance instruction by performing the steps in reverse order. The diesel generators were given an automatic start signal when the emergency core cooling system switch was unplugged. This is prevented during normal performance of the surveillance instruction by depressing the core spray system I initiation signal reset button on panel 9-3 before removing the emergency core cooling system test switch.

The diesels were manually tripped by the operator performing the surveillance and placed back into standby readiness. There was no safety concern as the diesel generators were available to perform their intended function.

The procedure was deficient in that it made no mention of how the diesel-generator logic was disabled nor that the diesel generator and core spray logic had common initiating relays.

The procedure will be revised to explain how the diesel-generator logic is disabled and a caution statement concerning unplugging the test switch will be added to prevent recurrence.

Responsible Section - EN

Previous Similar Event - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

P. O. Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 21, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 - DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFR0-50-296/84008

The enclosed report provides details concerning all eight diesel generators starting during surveillance testing. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

G. T. Jones Plant Manager

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30303

INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN