REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

GROUP HEIGHT - SAFETY AND REGULATING ROD GROUPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONS

3.1.3.1 All control (safety and regulating) rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within \pm 6.5% (indicated position) of their group average height.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more control rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within one lour and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one control rod inoperable or misaligned from its group average height by more than + 6.5% (indicated position), be in at last HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one control rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above, or misaligned from its group average height by more than + 6.5% (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within one hour either:
 - The control rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or
 - The control rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:
 - An analysis of the potential ejected rod worth is performed within 72 hours and the rod worth is determined to be < 1.0% Ak at zero power and < 0.65% Ak at RATED THERMAL POWER for the remainder of the fuel cycle, and
 - b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours, and

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.1 and 3.10.2.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

GROUP HEIGHT - SAFETY AND REGULATING ROD GROUPS

LIMITING CO DITION FOR OPERATIONS

ACTION: (Continued)

- A power distribution map is obtained from the incore detectors and FQ and Fau are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours and
- d) Either the THERMAL POWER level is reduced to < 60% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within one hour and within the next 4 hours the High Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to < 70% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination, or
- e) The remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within ± 6.5% of the inoperable rod within one hour while maintaining the position of the rods within the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.3.1.1 The position of each control rod shall be determined to be within the group average height limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the asymmetric rod monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod position(s) of the rod(s), with the inoperable asymmetric rod monitor at least once per 4 hours.
- 4.1.3.1.2 Each control rod not fully inserted shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 2% in any one direction at least once ever 31 days.



REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.3 All safety, regulating and axial power shaping control rod absolute position indicator channels and relative position indicator channels shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod group average positions within \pm 1.5%.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With a maximum of one absolute position indicator channel per control rod group or one relative position indicator channel per control rod group inoperable either:
 - 1. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 60% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination and reduce the High Flux Trip Setpoint to < 70% of the THERMAL POWER allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within 8 hours. or

2. (Operation may continue provided:

The position of the control rod with the inoperable position indicator is verified within 8 hours by actuating its 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or, 100% position reference indicator, and

b) The control rod group(s) containing the inoperable position indicator channel is subsequently maintained at the 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or, 100% withdrawn position are verified at this position at least once per 12 hours thereafter, and

Operation is within the limits of Stacification 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.66 or 3.1.3.9, as applicable.

With more than one relative position indicator channel imperable, operation in MODES I and 2 may continue for up to 24 hours provided all of the absolute position indicator channels are OPERABLE.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.



New 3.1.3.3 Action

b. With more than one relative position indicator channel per control rod group inoperable, STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may continue provided that the requirements of either Action a.1 or a.2 above have been complied with and the absolute position indicator channels are OPERABLE for the affected control rod issemblies.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

INFORMATION ONLY

POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS (Continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.3 Each absolute and relative position indicator channel shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the islative position indicator channels and the absolute position indicator channels agree within 3.46% at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the asymmetric rod monitor is inoperable, then compare the relative position indicator and absolute position indicator channel(s) of the rod(s) with the inoperable asymmetric rod monitor at least once per 4 hours.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

NFORMATION ONLY

SAFETY ROD INSERTION LIMIT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.5 All safety rods shall be fully withdrawn.

APPLICABILITY: 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one safety rod not fully withdrawn, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within one hour either:

- a. Fully withdraw the rod or
- Declars the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.3.5 Each safety rod shall be determined to be fully withdrawn:
 - Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any regulating rod a. during an approach to reactor criticality.
 - At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

^{*}See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 and 3.10.2. #With K = 1.0.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

NFORMATION ONLY

REGULATING ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 The regulating rod groups shall be positioned within the acceptable operating limits for regulating rod position provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

With the regulating rod groups inserted beyond the operating limits (in a region other than acceptable operation), or with any group sequence or overlap outside the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, either:

- a. Restore the regulating groups to within the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT within 2 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the rod group position limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT within 2 hours or
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

NOTE: If in unacceptable region, also see Section 3/4.1.1.1.

^{*}See Special Test Exception 3.10.1 and 3.10.2. #With $K_{\mbox{eff}} \geq$ 1.0.

REGULATING ROD INSERTION LIMITS

INFORMATION ONLY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.1.3.6 The position of each regulating group shall be determined to be within the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at least once every 12 hours except when:
 - a. The regulating rod insertion limit alarm is inoperable, then verify the groups to be within the insertion limits at least once per 4 hours;
 - to. The control rod drive sequence alarm is inoperable, then verify the groups to be within the sequence and overlap limits at least once per 4 hours.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

INFORMATION ONLY

XIAL POWER SHAPING ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.9 The axial power shaping rod group shall be within the acceptable operating limits for axial power shaping rod position specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2*.

ACTION:

With the axial power shaping rod group outside the above insertion limits. either:

- Restore the axial power shaping rod group to within the limits within 2 hours, or
- Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of b. RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the rod group position using the acceptable operating limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT within 2 hours, or
- Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.9 The position of the axial power shaping rod group shall be determined to be within the limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at least once every 12 hours except when the axial power shaping rod insertion limit alarm is inoperable, then verify the group to be within the limit provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT at least once every 4 hours.

*With $k_{eff} \ge 1.0$.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

NEGRMATION ONLY

BASES

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boren capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SEUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 70°F. This condition requires either 600 gallons of 7875 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage system or 3,000 gallens of 1800 ppm borated vater from the borated vater storage tank.

The bottom 4 inches of the borated water storage tank are not available. and the instrumentation is calibrated to reflect the available volume. All boric acid tank volume is available. The limits on water volume, and boron concentration ensure a pr value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the solution recirculated within containment after a design basis accident. The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section (1) ensure that acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) ensure that the minimum SEUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of a rod ejection accident. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that he original riteria are set. For example, misalignment of a safety or regulating rod requires a restriction in TERRAL POWER. The reactivity worth of a misslighed rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used in the safety analysis.

The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment should not be included in computing the average group position for determining the CPERABILITY of rods with lesser sizalignments.

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INFORMATION ONLY

BASES

3/4.1.3. MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

The maximum rod drop time permitted is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T $_{2}>525^{\circ}\mathrm{F}$ and with reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied. A 1.5% group average position uncertainty is applied to the rod index curves. Therefore, the position indicators must be capable of supporting this accuracy. The Surveillance Requirement ensures this accuracy by keeping the RPI calibrated to a "known" position as indicated by the API. Using the API as a "known" position is valid provided two consecutive reed switches are not inoperable. Having one entire string (i.e., every other reed switch) inoperable is acceptable

A specific surveillance of the reed switches is not required because:

- 1) When one or more reed switch fails closed, a large API indication of asymmetry occurs.
- 2) Two failed open reed switches in series result in a large indication of asymmetry.
- 3) Failed open reed switches not in series (up to every other switch) are bounded by the analysis.

Therefore, a reed switch condition not bounded by the analysis will be indicated by API system asymmetry indications.

Technical Specification 3.1.3.8 provides the ability to prevent excessive powr peaking by transient xenon at RATED THERMAL POWER. Operating restrictions resulting from transient xenon power peaking, including xenon-free startup, are inherently included in the limits of Sections 3.1.3 Rod Inser On Limits), 3.1.3.9 (Axial Power Shaping Rod Insertion Limits), and 3.2.1 (Axia'l Power Imbalance) for transient peating behavior bounded by the following factors. For the period of cycle operation where regulating rod groups 6 and 7 are allowed to be inserted at RATED THERMAL POWER, an 8% peaking increase is applied at or above 92% FP. An 18% increase is applied below 92% FP. For operation where only regulating rod group 7 is allowed to be inserted at RATED THERMAL POWER, a 5% peaking increase is applied at or above 92% FP and a 13% increase is applied below 92% FP.

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NFCRMATION ONLY

BASES

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

If these values, checked every cycle, conservatively bound the peaking effects of all transient xenon, then the need for any hold at a power level cutoff below KATED THERMAL POWER is precluded. If not, either the power level at which the requirements of Section 3.1.3.8 must be satisfied or the above-listed factors will be suitably adjusted to preserve the LOCA linear heat rate limits.

The limitation on axial power shaping rod insertion is necessary to ensure that power peaking limits are not exceeded.