UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

Docket File

August 27, 1984

Docket No.: STN 50-454

Mr. Dennis L. Farrar
Director of Licensing
Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. Farrar:

Subject: Byron Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications

Enclosed are the Byron 1 Technical Specifications in final draft form. These Technical Specifications were developed utilizing the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (W-STS) Revision 4, as a basis. They reflect plant-specific design requirements, new regulatory requirements issued since the development of the W-STS Revision 4, and operating experience from other recently licensed Westinghouse plants.

The draft Technical Specifications were provided by letter dated December 16, 1983 to you and to the NRC staff for review and comment during the formal Proof and Review phase. The NRC staff and your comments were reviewed and applicable comments were incorporated. Your comments on the Proof and Review version were transmitted by letters of March 26, April 2, April 9, June 20, July 16, July 19, August 15, and August 21, 1984. Our review resulted in the transmittal, on July 19, 1984, of 13 technical specification questions. After reviewing your response dated July 26, 1984, a clarification of one question was sent by letter of August 22, 1984. To provide additional assurance that the final draft accurately reflects the results of the several review iterations since Proof and Review, we met with representatives of Commonwealth Edison in a series of meetings started on August 13 and continued through on August 21, 1984.

In most areas, the Technical Specifications to be issued as Appendix A to the Byron Station license are expected to be essentially identical to the enclosed final draft. Any changes you wish to make other than those required to correct editorial and/or typographical errors, must be docketed with justification for the requested changes. However, we understand that your continuing review may result in FSAR and SER changes that could necessitate corresponding changes in the Technical Specifications. Areas with a potential for such changes include (1) the Unit 2 2A diesel for powering an auxiliary feedwater pump, (2) the ultimate heat sinks (3) surveillance of diesel fuel oil, (4) the turbine overspeed protection reliability program, and (5) the reactor coolant system.

AUG 27 1984

Please review the enclosed draft and submit under oath or affirmation and as amendment to your application confirmation that the enclosed draft, or a revised draft incorporating any futher changes you believe are necessary, accurately reflect the plant, the FSAR, and the SER analyses.

If you have any questions, or if we can be of further assistance, please contact L. Olshan the Licensing Project Manager, at 301-492-7070.

Sincerely,

/s/

B. J. Youngblood, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: See next page

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Docket File	LB#1 Rdg
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If you have any questions, or if we can be of further assistance, please contact L. Olshan the Licensing Project Manager, at 301-492-7070.

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FINAL DRAFT

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FOR

BYRON STATION

UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. STN 50-454

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SECTION 1.0

DEFINITIONS

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1.0 DEFINITIONS

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

ACTION

1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Technical Specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

ACTUATION LOGIC TEST

1.2 An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the application of various simulated input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and verification of the required logic output. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of output devices.

ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

1.3 An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or Trip Setpoints such that the Setpoints are within the required range and accuracy.

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

1.4 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.5 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel such that it responds within the required range and accuracy to known values of input. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensors and alarm, interlock and/or trip functions and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.6 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

   1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

   2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATION

1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using diagnostic programs and injecting simulated process data into the channel to verify OPERABILITY of alarm and/or trip functions.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microCurie/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

$\bar{E}$ - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.12 $\bar{E}$ shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the sample) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV/d) for the radionuclides in the sample.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME

1.13 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF Actuation Setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

FREQUENCY NOTATION

1.14 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.15 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Leakage (except CONTROLLED LEAKAGE) into closed systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or

b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of Leakage Detection Systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or

c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the Secondary Coolant System.

MASTER RELAY TEST

1.16 A MASTER RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each master relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.

MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC

1.17 MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC shall include all persons who are not occupationally associated with the plant. This category does not include employees of the licensee, its contractors or vendors and persons who enter the site to service equipment or to make deliveries. This category does include persons who use portions of the site for recreational, occupational, or other purposes not associated with the plant.

OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL

1.18 The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) shall contain the methodology and parameters used in the calculation of offsite doses due to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring Alarm/Trip Setpoints and in the conduct of the Environmental Radiological Monitoring Program.

OPERABLE - OPERABILITY

1.19 A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s), and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE

1.20 An OPERATIONAL MODE (i.e., MODE) shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, and average reactor coolant temperature specified in Table 1.2.

PHYSICS TESTS

1.21 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the core and related instrumentation: (1) described in Chapter 14.0 of the FSAR, (2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or (3) otherwise approved by the Commission.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

1.22 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage (except steam generator tube leakage) through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM

1.23 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the current formulas, sampling, analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, 71 and Federal and State regulations, burial ground requirements, and other requirements governing the disposal of radioactive wastes.

PURGE - PURGING

1.24 PURGE or PURGING shall be any controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

1.25 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater. With one excore detector inoperable, the remaining three detectors shall be used for computing the average.

RATED THERMAL POWER

1.26 RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 3411 MWt.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

1.27 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its Trip Setpoint at the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage.

REPORTABLE EVENT

1.28 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 of 10 CFR Part 50.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN

1.29 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all full-length rod cluster assemblies (shutdown and control) are fully inserted except for the single rod cluster assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

SITE BOUNDARY

1.30 The SITE BOUNDARY shall be that line beyond which the land is neither owned, nor leased, nor otherwise controlled by the licensee.

SLAVE RELAY TEST

1.31 A SLAVE RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each slave relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The SLAVE RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of associated testable actuation devices.

SOLIDIFICATION

1.32 SOLIDIFICATION shall be the conversion of wet wastes into a form that meets shipping and burial ground requirements.

SOURCE CHECK

1.33 A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response when the channel sensor is exposed to a source of increased radioactivity.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS

1.34 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:

a. A test schedule for systems, subsystems, trains, or other designated components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals, and

b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train, or other designated component at the beginning of each subinterval.

THERMAL POWER

1.35 THERMAL POWER shall be the total core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST

1.36 A TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of operating the Trip Actuating Device and verifying OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the Trip Actuating Device such that it actuates at the required Setpoint within the required accuracy.

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.37 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE or CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.

UNRESTRICTED AREA

1.38 An UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY access to which is not controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.

VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM

1.39 A VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce gaseous radioiodine or radioactive material in particulate form in effluents by passing ventilation or vent exhaust gases through charcoal adsorbers and/or HEPA filters for the purpose of removing iodines or particulates from the gaseous exhaust stream prior to the release to the environment. Such a system is not considered to have any effect on noble gas effluents. Engineered Safety Features Atmospheric Cleanup Systems are not considered to be VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM components.

VENTING

1.40 VENTING shall be any controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not provided or required during VENTING. Vent, used in system names, does not imply a VENTING process.

WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM

1.41 A WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting Reactor Coolant System off-gases from the Reactor Coolant System and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

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TABLE 1.1

FREQUENCY NOTATION

NOTATION	FREQUENCY
S	At least once per 12 hours.
D	At least once per 24 hours.
W	At least once per 7 days.
M	At least once per 31 days.
Q	At least once per 92 days.
SA	At least once per 184 days.
R	At least once per 18 months.
S/U	Prior to each reactor startup.
N.A.	Not applicable.
P	Completed prior to each release.

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TABLE 1.2

OPERATIONAL MODES

MODE	REACTIVITY CONDITION, K_{eff}	% RATED THERMAL POWER*	AVERAGE COOLANT TEMPERATURE
1. POWER OPERATION	$\geq$ 0.99	> 5%	$\geq$ 350°F
2. STARTUP	$\geq$ 0.99	$\leq$ 5%	$\geq$ 350°F
3. HOT STANDBY	< 0.99	0	$\geq$ 350°F
4. HOT SHUTDOWN	< 0.99	0	350°F > T_{avg} > 200°F
5. COLD SHUTDOWN	< 0.99	0	$\leq$ 200°F
6. REFUELING**	$\leq$ 0.95	0	$\leq$ 140°F

*Excluding decay heat.
**Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

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SECTION 2.0

SAFETY LIMITS

AND

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

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2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

REACTOR CORE

2.1.1 The combination of THERMAL POWER, pressurizer pressure, and the highest operating loop coolant temperature (T_{avg}) shall not exceed the limits shown in Figure 2.1-1 for four loop operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

Whenever the point defined by the combination of the highest operating loop average temperature and THERMAL POWER has exceeded the appropriate pressurizer pressure line, be in HOT STANDBY within 1 hour, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.5.1.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

2.1.2 The Reactor Coolant System pressure shall not exceed 2735 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

MODES 1 and 2:

Whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure has exceeded 2735 psig, be in HOT STANDBY with the Reactor Coolant System pressure within this limit within 1 hour, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.5.1.

MODES 3, 4 and 5:

Whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure has exceeded 2735 psig, reduce the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within this limit within 5 minutes, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.5.1.

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

FIGURE 2.1-1

REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMIT - FOUR LOOPS IN OPERATION

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

2.2.1 The Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Interlock Setpoints shall be set consistent within the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

a. With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 2.2-1, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2-1, either:

   1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 2.2-1 and determine within 12 hours that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or

   2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3.3-1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

Equation 2.2-1 $$Z + RE + SE \leq TA$$

Where:

Z = The value for Column Z of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel,

RE = The "as measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel,

SE = Either the "as measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value for Column SE (Sensor Error) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel, and

TA = The value for Column TA (Total Allowance) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel.

TABLE 2.2-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux					
a. High Setpoint	7.5	4.56	0	≤109% of RTP*	≤111.1% of RTP*
b. Low Setpoint	8.3	4.56	0	≤25% of RTP*	≤27.1% of RTP*
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	1.6	0.5	0	≤5% of RTP* with a time constant ≥2 seconds	≤6.3% of RTP* with a time constant ≥2 seconds
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	1.6	0.5	0	≤5% of RTP* with a time constant ≥2 seconds	≤6.3% of RTP* with a time constant ≥2 seconds
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	17.0	8.4	0	≤25% of RTP*	≤30.9% of RTP*
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	17.0	10.0	0	≤10^5 cps	≤1.4×10^5 cps
7. Overtemperature ΔT	8.7	5.15	See Note 5	See Note 1	See Note 2
8. Overpower ΔT	4.3	1.3	1.2	See Note 3	See Note 4
9. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	5.0	2.21	1.5	≥1885 psig	≥1871 psig
10. Pressurizer Pressure-High	3.1	0.71	1.5	≤2385 psig	≤2396 psig
11. Pressurizer Water Level-High	5.0	2.18	1.5	≤92% of instrument span	≤93.8% of instrument span

*RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
12. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low	2.5	1.77	0.6	≥90% of loop design flow*	≥89.2% of loop design flow*
13. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low	27.1	18.28	1.5	≥40.8% of narrow range instrument span	≥39.1% of narrow range instrument span
14. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps	12.0	0.7	0	≥5268 volts - each bus	≥4728 volts - each bus
15. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps	14.4	13.3	0	≥57.0 Hz	≥56.5 Hz
16. Turbine Trip					
a. Emergency Trip Header Pressure	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥540 psig	≥520 psig
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥1% open	≥1% open
17. Safety Injection Input from ESF	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
18. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

*Loop design flow = 97,600 gpm

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks					
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$\geq 1 \times 10^{-10}$ amp	$\geq 6 \times 10^{-11}$ amp
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7					
1) P-10 input	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≤10% of RTP*	≥7.9% to ≤12.1% of RTP*
2) P-13 input	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≤10% RTP* Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent	≤12.1% RTP* Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≤30% of RTP*	≤32.1% of RTP*
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	≤10% of RTP*	≥7.9% to ≤12.1% of RTP*
e. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≤10% RTP* Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent	≤12.1% RTP* Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	N.A.	N.A.
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

*RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

NOTE 1: OVERTEMPERATURE ΔT

$$\Delta T \frac{(1 + \tau_1 S)}{(1 + \tau_2 S)} \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}\right) \leq \Delta T_o \left\{K_1 - K_2 \frac{(1 + \tau_4 S)}{(1 + \tau_5 S)} \left[T \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}\right) - T'\right] + K_3(P - P') - f_1(\Delta I)\right\}$$

Where:

ΔT	=	Measured ΔT by RTD Manifold Instrumentation,
$\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}$	=	Lead-lag compensator on measured ΔT,
τ_1, τ_2	=	Time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for ΔT, τ_1 = 8 s, τ_2 = 3 s,
$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}$	=	Lag compensator on measured ΔT,
τ_3	=	Time constants utilized in the lag compensator for ΔT, τ_3 = 0 s,
ΔT_o	=	Indicated ΔT at RATED THERMAL POWER,
K_1	=	1.48,
K_2	=	0.0265/°F,
$\frac{1 + \tau_4 S}{1 + \tau_5 S}$	=	The function generated by the lead-lag compensator for T_{avg} dynamic compensation,
τ_4, τ_5	=	Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T_{avg}, τ_4 = 33 s, τ_5 = 4 s,
T	=	Average temperature, °F,
$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}$	=	Lag compensator on measured T_{avg},

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

NOTE 1: (Continued)

τ_6	=	Time constant utilized in the measured T_{avg} lag compensator, τ_6 = 0 s,
T'	$\leq$	588.4°F (Nominal T_{avg} at RATED THERMAL POWER),
K_3	=	0.00134,
P	=	Pressurizer pressure, psig,
P'	=	2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure),
S	=	Laplace transform operator, s^{-1},

and $f_1(\Delta I)$ is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant STARTUP tests such that:

(i) for $q_t - q_b$ between -42% and -6%, $f_1(\Delta I) = 0$, where q_t and q_b are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and $q_t + q_b$ is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER;

(ii) for each percent that the magnitude of $q_t - q_b$ exceeds -42%, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 2.86% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER; and

(iii) for each percent that the magnitude of $q_t - q_b$ exceeds -6%, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by 1.86% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER.

NOTE 2: The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than 3.3% of ΔT span.

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

NOTE 3: OVERPOWER ΔT

$$\Delta T \frac{(1 + \tau_1 S)}{(1 + \tau_2 S)} \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}\right) \leq \Delta T_o \left\{K_4 - K_5 \left(\frac{\tau_7 S}{1 + \tau_7 S}\right) \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}\right) T - K_6 \left[T \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}\right) - T''\right] - f_2(\Delta I)\right\}$$

Where:

ΔT = As defined in Note 1,

$\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}$ = As defined in Note 1,

τ_1, τ_2 = As defined in Note 1,

$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}$ = As defined in Note 1,

τ_3 = As defined in Note 1,

ΔT_o = As defined in Note 1,

K_4 = 1.072,

K_5 = 0.02/°F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature,

$\frac{\tau_7 S}{1 + \tau_7 S}$ = The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for T_{avg} dynamic compensation,

τ_7 = Time constants utilized in the rate-lag compensator for T_{avg}, τ_7 = 10 s,

$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}$ = As defined in Note 1,

τ_6 = As defined in Note 1,

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

NOTE 3: (Continued)

K_6	=	0.00170/°F for $T > T''$ and $K_6 = 0$ for $T \leq T''$,
T	=	As defined in Note 1,
T''	=	Indicated T_{avg} at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for ΔT instrumentation, $\leq$ 588.4°F),
S	=	As defined in Note 1, and
$f_2(\Delta I)$	=	0 for all ΔI.

NOTE 4: The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than 2.6% of ΔT instrument span.

NOTE 5: The sensor error for temperature is 1.2 and for pressure is 1.0.

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BASES

FOR

SECTION 2.0

SAFETY LIMITS

AND

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

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NOTE

The BASES contained in succeeding pages summarize the reasons for the Specifications in Section 2.0, but in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36 are not part of these Technical Specifications.

2.1.1 REACTOR CORE

The restrictions of this Safety Limit prevent overheating of the fuel and possible cladding perforation which would result in the release of fission products to the reactor coolant. Overheating of the fuel cladding is prevented by restricting fuel operation to within the nucleate boiling regime where the heat transfer coefficient is large and the cladding surface temperature is slightly above the coolant saturation temperature.

Operation above the upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding temperatures because of the onset of departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) and the resultant sharp reduction in heat transfer coefficient. DNB is not a directly measurable parameter during operation and therefore THERMAL POWER and Reactor Coolant Temperature and Pressure have been related to DNB through the WRB-1 correlation. The WRB-1 DNB correlation has been developed to predict the DNB flux and the location of DNB for axially uniform and nonuniform heat flux distributions. The local DNB heat flux ratio (DNBR) is defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the local heat flux, and is indicative of the margin to DNB.

The DNB design basis is as follows: there must be at least a 95 percent probability that the minimum DNBR of the limiting rod during Condition I and II events is greater than or equal to the DNBR limit of the DNB correlation being used (the WRB-1 correlation in this application). The correlation DNBR limit is established based on the entire applicable experimental data set such that there is a 95 percent probability with 95 percent confidence that DNB will not occur when the minimum DNBR is at the DNBR limit.

In meeting this design basis, uncertainties in plant operating parameters, nuclear and thermal parameters, and fuel fabrication parameters are considered statistically such that there is at least a 95 confidence that the minimum DNBR for the limiting rods is greater than or equal to the DNBR limit. The uncertainties in the above plant parameters are used to determine the plant DNBR uncertainty. This DNBR uncertainty, combined with the correlation DNBR limit, establishes a design DNBR value which must be met in plant safety analysis using values of input parameters without uncertainties.

The curves of Figure 2.1-1 show the loci of points of THERMAL POWER, Reactor Coolant System pressure and average temperature for which the minimum DNBR is no less than 1.34 for a typical cell and 1.32 for a thimble cell, or the average enthalpy at the vessel exit is equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid.

These curves are based on an enthalpy hot channel factor, $F^N_{\Delta H}$, of 1.55. An allowance is included for an increase in $F^N_{\Delta H}$ at reduced power based on the expression:

REACTOR CORE (Continued)

$$F^N_{\Delta H} = 1.55\ [1+ 0.3\ (1-P)]$$

Where P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER.

These limiting heat flux conditions are higher than those calculated for the range of all control rods fully withdrawn to the maximum allowable control rod insertion assuming the axial power imbalance is within the limits of the f_1 (ΔI) function of the Overtemperature trip. When the axial power imbalance is not within the tolerance, the axial power imbalance effect on the Overtemperature ΔT trips will reduce the Setpoints to provide protection consistent with core Safety Limits.

2.1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

The restriction of this Safety Limit protects the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from overpressurization and thereby prevents the release of radionuclides contained in the reactor coolant from reaching the containment atmosphere.

The reactor vessel, pressurizer, and the RCS piping, valves, and fittings are designed to Section III of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plants which permits a maximum transient pressure of 110% (2735 psig) of design pressure. The Safety Limit of 2735 psig is therefore consistent with the design criteria and associated Code requirements.

The entire RCS is hydrotested at 3110 psig, 125% of design pressure, to demonstrate integrity prior to initial operation.

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2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

The Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified in Table 2.2-1 are the nominal values at which the Reactor trips are set for each functional unit. The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the core and Reactor Coolant System are prevented from exceeding their Safety Limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System in mitigating the consequences of accidents. The Setpoint for a Reactor Trip System or interlock function is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Reactor Trip Setpoints have been specified in Table 2.2-1. Operation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1, $Z + RE + SE < TA$, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, between the Trip Setpoint and the value used in the analysis for Reactor trip. RE or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. SE or Sensor Error is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensors and other instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued)

The various Reactor trip circuits automatically open the Reactor trip breakers whenever a condition monitored by the Reactor Trip System reaches a preset or calculated level. In addition to redundant channels and trains, the design approach provides a Reactor Trip System which monitors numerous system variables, therefore, providing Trip System functional diversity. The functional capability at the specified trip setting is required for those anticipatory or diverse Reactor trips for which no direct credit was assumed in the accident analysis to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System. The Reactor Trip System initiates a Turbine trip signal whenever Reactor trip is initiated. This prevents the reactivity addition that would otherwise result from excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown and thus avoids unnecessary actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.

Manual Reactor Trip

The Reactor Trip System includes manual Reactor trip capability.

Power Range, Neutron Flux

In each of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting used for a High and Low Range trip setting. The Low Setpoint trip provides protection during subcritical and low power operations to mitigate the consequences of a power excursion beginning from low power, and the High Setpoint trip provides protection during power operations to mitigate the consequences of a reactivity excursion from all power levels.

The Low Setpoint trip may be manually blocked above P-10 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is automatically reinstated below the P-10 Setpoint.

Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Rates

The Power Range Positive Rate trip provides protection against rapid flux increases which are characteristic of a rupture of a control rod drive housing. Specifically, this trip complements the Power Range Neutron Flux High and Low trips to ensure that the criteria are met for rod ejection from mid-power.

Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Rates (Continued)

The Power Range Negative Rate trip provides protection for control rod drop accidents. At high power a single or multiple rod drop accident could cause local flux peaking which could cause an unconservative local DNBR to exist. The Power Range Negative Rate trip will prevent this from occurring by tripping the reactor. No credit is taken for operation of the Power Range Negative Rate trip for those control rod drop accidents for which DNBRs will be greater than the limit value.

Intermediate and Source Range, Nuclear Flux

The Intermediate and Source Range, Nuclear Flux trips provide core protection during reactor STARTUP to mitigate the consequences of an uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical condition. These trips provide redundant protection to the Low Setpoint trip of the Power Range, Neutron Flux channels. The Source Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at about 10^5 counts per second unless manually blocked when P-6 becomes active. The Intermediate Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at a current level equivalent to approximately 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless manually blocked when P-10 becomes active.

Overtemperature ΔT

The Overtemperature ΔT trip provides core protection to prevent DNB for all combinations of pressure, power, coolant temperature, and axial power distribution, provided that the transient is slow with respect to piping transit delays from the core to the temperature detectors (about 4 seconds), and pressure is within the range between the Pressurizer High and Low Pressure trips. The Setpoint is automatically varied with: (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat capacity of water and includes dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, (2) pressurizer pressure, and (3) axial power distribution. With normal axial power distribution, this Reactor trip limit is always below the core Safety Limit as shown in Figure 2.1-1. If axial peaks are greater than design, as indicated by the difference between top and bottom power range nuclear detectors, the Reactor trip is automatically reduced according to the notations in Table 2.2-1.

Overpower ΔT

The Overpower ΔT Reactor trip provides assurance of fuel integrity (e.g., no fuel pellet melting and less than 1% cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions, limits the required range for Overtemperature ΔT trip, and provides a backup to the High Neutron Flux trip. The Setpoint is automatically varied with: (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat capacity of water, and (2) rate of change of temperature for dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, to ensure that the allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) is not exceeded. The Overpower ΔT trip provides protection to mitigate the consequences of various size steam breaks as reported in WCAP-9226, "Reactor Core Response to Excessive Secondary Steam Releases."

Pressurizer Pressure

In each of the pressure channels, there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting to provide for a High and Low Pressure trip thus limiting the pressure range in which reactor operation is permitted. The Low Setpoint trip protects against low pressure which could lead to DNB by tripping the reactor in the event of a loss of reactor coolant pressure.

On decreasing power the Low Setpoint trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7.

The High Setpoint trip functions in conjunction with the pressurizer relief and safety valves to protect the Reactor Coolant System against system overpressure.

Pressurizer Water Level

The Pressurizer High Water Level trip is provided to prevent water relief through the pressurizer safety valves. On decreasing power the Pressurizer High Water Level trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7.

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Reactor Coolant Flow

The Low Reactor Coolant Flow trips provide core protection to prevent DNB by mitigating the consequences of a loss of flow resulting from the loss of one or more reactor coolant pumps.

On increasing power above P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER or a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent), an automatic Reactor trip will occur if the flow in more than one loop drops below 90% of nominal full loop flow. Above P-8 (a power level of approximately 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER) an automatic Reactor trip will occur if the flow in any single loop drops below 90% of nominal full loop flow. Conversely on decreasing power between P-8 and the P-7 an automatic Reactor trip will occur on low reactor coolant flow in more than one loop and below P-7 the trip function is automatically blocked.

Steam Generator Water Level

The Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip protects the reactor from loss of heat sink in the event of a sustained steam/feedwater flow mismatch resulting from loss of normal feedwater. The specified Setpoint provides allowances for starting delays of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump Busses

The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Bus trips provide core protection against DNB as a result of complete loss of forced coolant flow. The specified Setpoints assure a Reactor trip signal is generated before the Low Flow Trip Setpoint is reached. Time delays are incorporated in the Underfrequency and Undervoltage trips to prevent spurious Reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients. For undervoltage, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to trip the Reactor trip breakers after the Undervoltage Trip Setpoint is reached shall not exceed 1.5 seconds. For underfrequency, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to trip the Reactor trip breakers after the Underfrequency Trip Setpoint is reached shall not exceed 0.6 second. On decreasing power the Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Bus trips are automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, reinstated automatically by P-7.

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Turbine Trip

A Turbine trip initiates a Reactor trip. On decreasing power the Turbine trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, reinstated automatically by P-7.

Safety Injection Input from ESF

If a Reactor trip has not already been generated by the Reactor Trip System instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a Reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a Safety Injection. The ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a Safety Injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.

Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip

The Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position trips are anticipatory trips which provide core protection against DNB. The Open/Close Position trips assure a Reactor trip signal is generated before the Low Flow Trip Setpoint is reached. No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips. Their functional capability at the open/close position settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System. Above P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER or a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent) an automatic Reactor trip will occur if more than one reactor coolant pump breaker is opened. Below P-7 the trip function is automatically blocked.

Reactor Trip System Interlocks

The Reactor Trip System Interlocks perform the following functions:

P-6 On increasing power, P-6 allows the manual block of the Source Range Reactor trip (i.e., prevents premature block of Source Range trip), provides a backup block for Source Range Neutron Flux doubling, and de-energizes the high voltage to the detectors. On decreasing power, Source Range Level trips are automatically reactivated and high voltage restored.

P-7 On increasing power, P-7 automatically enables Reactor trips on low flow in more than one reactor coolant loop, more than one reactor coolant pump breaker open, reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage and underfrequency, Turbine trip, pressurizer low pressure and pressurizer high level. On decreasing power, the above listed trips are automatically blocked.

P-8 On increasing power, P-8 automatically enables Reactor trips on low flow in one or more reactor coolant loops. On decreasing power, the P-8 automatically blocks the single loop low flow trip.

P-10 On increasing power, P-10 allows the manual block of the Intermediate Range Reactor trip and the Low Setpoint Power Range Reactor trip; and automatically blocks the Source Range Reactor trip and de-energizes the Source Range high voltage power. On decreasing power, the Intermediate Range Reactor trip and the Low Setpoint Power Range Reactor trip are automatically reactivated. Provides input to P-7.

P-13 Provides input to P-7.

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SECTIONS 3.0 AND 4.0

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

AND

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met.

3.0.2 Noncompliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirements are not met within the specified time intervals. If the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time intervals, completion of the ACTION requirements is not required.

3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

a. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
b. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
c. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the action may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

This specification is not applicable in MODE 5 or 6.

3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the conditions for the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the ACTION requirements. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.

4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified time interval with:

a. A maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the surveillance interval, but

b. The combined time interval for any three consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25 times the specified surveillance interval.

4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the specified time interval shall constitute a failure to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.

4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified.

4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:

a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i);

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Surveillance intervals specified in Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for the inservice inspection and testing activities shall be applicable as follows in these Technical Specifications:

ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE AND APPLICABLE ADDENDA TERMINOLOGY FOR INSERVICE INSPECTION AND TESTING ACTIVITIES	REQUIRED FREQUENCIES FOR PERFORMING INSERVICE INSPECTION AND TESTING ACTIVITIES
Weekly	At least once per 7 days
Monthly	At least once per 31 days
Quarterly or every 3 months	At least once per 92 days
Semiannually or every 6 months	At least once per 184 days
Every 9 months	At least once per 276 days
Yearly or annually	At least once per 366 days

c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities;

d. Performance of the above inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements; and

e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T_{avg} >200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.3% Δk/k for four loop operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.3% Δk/k, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.3% Δk/k:

a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod(s) is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s);

b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1 at least once per 12 hours by verifying that control bank insertion is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

c. When in MODE 2 with K_{eff} less than 1, within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Specification 4.1.1.1.1e. below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6; and

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. When in MODE 3 or 4, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:

1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2) Control rod position,

3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5) Xenon concentration, and

6) Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within ± 1% Δk/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1e. above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - $T_{avg} \leq 200°F$

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1% $\Delta k/k$.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1% $\Delta k/k$, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1% $\Delta k/k$:

a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod(s) is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s); and

b. At least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:

   1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

   2) Control rod position,

   3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,

   4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

   5) Xenon concentration, and

   6) Samarium concentration.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

a. Less positive than 0 $\Delta k/k/^{o}F$ for the all rods withdrawn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), hot zero THERMAL POWER condition, or

b. Less negative than -4.1×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/^{o}F$ for the all rods withdrawn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERMAL POWER condition.

APPLICABILITY: Specification 3.1.1.3a. - MODES 1 and 2* only#.
Specification 3.1.1.3b. - MODES 1, 2, and 3 only#.

ACTION:

a. With the MTC more positive than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3a. above, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:

1. Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to less positive than 0 $\Delta k/k/^{o}F$ within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

2. The control rods are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition; and

3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 10 days, describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim control rod withdrawal limits, and the predicted average core burnup necessary for restoring the positive MTC to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.

b. With the MTC more negative than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3b. above, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

*With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.3 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

a. The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3a., above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading, and

b. The MTC shall be measured at any THERMAL POWER and compared to -3.2×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/^{o}F$ (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POWER condition) within 7 EFPD after reaching an equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm. In the event this comparison indicates the MTC is more negative than -3.2×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/^{o}F$, the MTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the EOL MTC limit of Specification 3.1.1.3b., at least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the fuel cycle.

FINAL DRAFT

MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) shall be greater than or equal to 550°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2#*.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) less than 550°F, restore T_{avg} to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 550°F:

a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} is less than 557°F with the T_{avg}-T_{ref} Deviation Alarm not reset.

#With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

FINAL DRAFT

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

FLOW PATH - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:

a. A flow path from the Boric Acid Storage System via a boric acid transfer pump and a centrifugal charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the Boric Acid Storage System is OPERABLE as given in Specification 3.1.2.5a. for MODES 5 and 6 or as given in Specification 3.1.2.6a. for MODE 4; or

b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a centrifugal charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank is OPERABLE as given in Specification 3.1.2.5b. for MODES 5 and 7 or as given in Specification 3.1.2.6b. for MODE 4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4*, 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path is greater than or equal to 65°F when a flow path from the Boric Acid Storage System is used, and

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

*A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be operable whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 330°F.

FINAL DRAFT

FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a. The flow path from the Boric Acid Storage System via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System, and

b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path from the boric acid tanks is greater than or equal to 65°F when it is a required water source;

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal; and

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2a. delivers at least 30 gpm to the Reactor Coolant System.

FINAL DRAFT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4*, 5, and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across the pump of greater than or equal to 2416 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 Whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 330°F, all charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position.

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*A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be operable whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 330°F.

FINAL DRAFT

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.4. At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow, that a differential pressure across each pump of greater than or equal to 2416 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

FINAL DRAFT

BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:

1) A minimum contained borated water level of 7.0%,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1) A minimum contained borated water level of 9.0%,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 2000 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 35°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2) Verifying the contained borated water volume, and

3) Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 35°F.

FINAL DRAFT

BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2 for MODES 1, 2 and 3 and one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.1 for MODE 4:

a. A Boric Acid Storage System with:

1) A minimum contained borated water level of 40%,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and

3) A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1) A minimum contained borated water level of 89%,

2) A minimum boron concentration of 2000 ppm,

3) A minimum solution temperature of 35°F, and

4) A maximum solution temperature of 100°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources in MODE 1, 2, or 3, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F; restore the Boric Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

b. With the RWST inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With no borated water source OPERABLE in MODE 4, restore one borated water source to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

FINAL DRAFT

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

   1) Verifying the boron concentration in the water,

   2) Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and

   3) Verifying the Boric Acid Storage System solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is either less than 35°F or greater than 100°F.

c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST vent path temperature to be greater than or equal to 35°F when the outside air temperature is less than 35°F.

FINAL DRAFT

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

GROUP HEIGHT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All full-length shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within ± 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

a. With one or more full-length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

b. With more than one full-length rod inoperable or misaligned from the group step counter demand position by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

c. With one full-length rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a. above, or misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within 1 hour:

   1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or

   2. The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within ± 12 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-1. The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or

   3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

      a) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours the High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

      b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours;

---

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

FINAL DRAFT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detectors and $F_Q(Z)$ and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours; and

d) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length rod shall be determined to be within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod position deviation alarm is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

FINAL DRAFT

TABLE 3.1-1

ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL-LENGTH ROD

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics.

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment.

Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or from Cracks in Large Pipes Which Actuates the Emergency Core Cooling System.

Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power.

Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss of Coolant Accident).

Major Secondary Coolant System Pipe Rupture.

Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection).

FINAL DRAFT

POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.2 The Digital Rod Position Indication System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod positions within ± 12 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With a maximum of one digital rod position indicator per bank inoperable either:

   1. Determine the position of the nonindicating rod(s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least once per 8 hours and immediately after any motion of the non-indicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or

   2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.

b. With a maximum of one bank demand position indicator inoperable either:

   1. Verify that all digital rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours, or

   2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.2 Each digital rod position indicator shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying that the Bank Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree within 12 steps at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod position deviation alarm is inoperable, then compare the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System at least once per 4 hours.

FINAL DRAFT

POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.3 One digital rod position indicator (excluding bank demand position indication) shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod position within ± 12 steps for each shutdown or control rod not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3*#, 4*# and 5*#.

ACTION:

With less than the above required position indicator(s) OPERABLE, immediately open the Reactor Trip System breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.3 Each of the above required digital rod position indicator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying that the digital rod position indicator agrees with the demand position indicator within 12 steps when exercised over the full-range of rod travel at least once per 18 months.

*With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

FINAL DRAFT

ROD DROP TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.4 The individual full-length shutdown and control rod drop time from the fully withdrawn position shall be less than or equal to 2.2 seconds from beginning of decay of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry with:

a. T_{avg} greater than or equal to 550°F, and

b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY. MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With the rod drop time of any full-length rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.

b. With the rod drop time within limits but determined with three reactor coolant pumps operating, operation may proceed provided THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 66% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.4 The rod drop time of full-length rods shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head,

b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the Control Rod Drive System which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and

c. At least once per 18 months.

FINAL DRAFT

SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.5 All shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown rod not fully withdrawn, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

a. Fully withdraw the rod, or

b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined fully withdrawn:

a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in Control Bank A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

#With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

FINAL DRAFT

CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figure 3.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or

b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the above figures, or

c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the Rod Insertion Limit Alarm is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

#With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

FINAL DRAFT



FIGURE 3.1-1

ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER
FOUR LOOP OPERATION

FINAL DRAFT

3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) shall be maintained within the following target band (flux difference units) about the target flux difference:

a. ± 5% for core average accumulated burnup of less than or equal to 5000 MWD/MTU, and

b. + 3%, -9% for the initial cycle and + 3%, -12% for each subsequent cycle for core average accumulated burnup of greater than 5000 MWD/MTU.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than or equal to 50% but less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the indicated AFD is within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than 15% but less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER*.

ACTION:

a. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band and with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 15 minutes, either:

   1. Restore the indicated AFD to within the above required target band limits, or

   2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

b. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours or outside the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and with THERMAL POWER less than 90% but equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, reduce:

   1. THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 30 minutes, and

   2. The Power Range Neutron Flux - High# Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

#Surveillance testing of the Power Range Neutron Flux channel may be performed pursuant to Specification 4.3.1.1 provided the indicated AFD is maintained within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1. A total of 16 hours operation may be accumulated with the AFD outside of the above required target band during testing without penalty deviation.

ACTION (Continued)

c. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours and with THERMAL POWER less than 50% but greater than 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER shall not be increased equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER until the indicated AFD is within the above required target band.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1.1 The indicated AFD shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

a. Monitoring the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel:

   1) At least once per 7 days when the AFD Monitor Alarm is OPERABLE, and

   2) At least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD Monitor Alarm to OPERABLE status.

b. Monitoring and logging the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable. The logged values of the indicated AFD shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

4.2.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its target band when two or more OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. Penalty deviation outside of the above required target band shall be accumulated on a time basis of:

a. One minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

4.2.1.3 The target flux difference of each OPERABLE excore channel shall be determined by measurement at least once per 92 Effective Full Power Days. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.4 The target flux difference shall be updated at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days by either determining the target flux difference pursuant to Specification 4.2.1.3 above or by linear interpolation between the most recently measured value and 0% at the end of the cycle life. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

FINAL DRAFT

FIGURE 3.2-1

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER



FINAL DRAFT

3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_Q(Z)$

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2 $F_Q(Z)$ shall be limited by the following relationships:

$F_Q(Z) \leq [\frac{2.32}{P}] [K(Z)]$ for $P > 0.5$, and

$F_Q(Z) \leq [4.64] [K(Z)]$ for $P \leq 0.5$.

Where:

$$P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}},$$

and K(Z) is the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for a given core height location.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With $F_Q(Z)$ exceeding its limit:

a. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower ΔT Trip Setpoints have been reduced at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit; and

b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided $F_Q(Z)$ is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

FINAL DRAFT



FIGURE 3.2-2

K(Z) - NORMALIZED $F_Q(Z)$ AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 F_{xy} shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limit by:

a. Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER;

b. Increasing the measured F_{xy} component of the power distribution map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties;

c. Comparing the F_{xy} computed (F_{xy}^C) obtained in Specification 4.2.2.2b., above, to:

1) The F_{xy} limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) for the appropriate measured core planes given in Specifications 4.2.2.2e. and f., below, and

2) The relationship:

$$F_{xy}^L = F_{xy}^{RTP} [1+0.2(1-P)]$$

Where F_{xy}^L is the limit for fractional THERMAL POWER operation expressed as a function of F_{xy}^{RTP} and P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy} was measured.

d. Remeasuring F_{xy} according to the following schedule:

1. When F_{xy}^C is greater than the F_{xy}^{RTP} limit for the appropriate measured core plane but less than the F_{xy}^L relationship, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^C compared to F_{xy}^{RTP} and F_{xy}^L:

a) Within 24 hours after exceeding by 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER or greater, the THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy}^C was last determined, or

b) At least once per 31 EFPD, whichever occurs first.

2) When the F_{xy}^{C} is less than or equal to the F_{xy}^{RTP} limit for the appropriate measured core plane, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^{C} compared to F_{xy}^{RTP} and F_{xy}^{L} at least once per 31 EFPD.

e. The F_{xy} limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) shall be 1.71 for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and 1.55 for all unrodded core planes;

f. The F_{xy} limits of Specification 4.2.2.2e., above, are not applicable in the following core planes regions as measured in percent of core height from the bottom of the fuel:

1) Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive,

2) Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive,

3) Grid plane regions at 17.5 ± 2%, 31.8 ± 2%, 46.0 ± 2%, 60.3 ± 2% and 74.6 ± 2%, inclusive, and

4) Core plane regions within ± 2% of core height (± 2.88 inches) about the bank demand position of the Bank "D" control rods.

g. With F_{xy}^{C} exceeding F_{xy}^{L}, the effects of F_{xy} on $F_Q(Z)$ shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limits.

4.2.2.3 When $F_Q(Z)$ is measured for other than F_{xy} determinations, an overall measured $F_Q(Z)$ shall be obtained from a power distribution map and increased by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by 5% to account for measurement uncertainty.

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3/4.2.3 RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3 Indicated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) total flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ shall be maintained as follows for four loop operation.

a. RCS Total Flowrate $\geq$ 399,000 gpm, and

b. $F^N_{\Delta H} \leq 1.55 [1.0 + 0.3 (1.0-P)]$

where:

Measured values of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ are obtained by using the movable incore detectors. An appropriate uncertainty of 4% (nominal) or greater shall then be applied to the measured value of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ before it is compared to the requirements, and

$$P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$$

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With RCS total flow rate or $F^N_{\Delta H}$ outside the region of acceptable operation:

a. Within 2 hours either:

1. Restore RCS total flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ to within the above limits, or

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

b. Within 24 hours of initially being outside the above limits, verify through incore flux mapping and RCS total flow rate comparison that the combination of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ and RCS total flow rate are restored to within the above limits, or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours; and

c. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced THERMAL POWER limit required by ACTION a.2. and/or b. above; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that the combination of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ and indicated RCS total flow rate are demonstrated, through incore flux mapping and RCS total flow rate comparison, to be within the region of acceptable operation defined by Specification 3.2.3 prior to exceeding the following THERMAL POWER levels:

   1. A nominal 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
   2. A nominal 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
   3. Within 24 hours of attaining greater than or equal to 95% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2 The combination of indicated RCS total flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ shall be determined to be within the region of acceptable operation of Specification 3.2.3:

a. Prior to operation above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, and

b. At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days.

4.2.3.3 The indicated RCS total flow rate shall be verified to be within the region of acceptable operation of Specification 3.2.3 at least once per 12 hours when the most recently obtained value of $F^N_{\Delta H}$, obtained per Specification 4.2.3.2, is assumed to exist.

4.2.3.4 The RCS total flow rate indicators shall be subjected to a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

4.2.3.5 The RCS total flow rate shall be determined by precision heat balance measurement at least once per 18 months. The measurement instrumentation shall be calibrated within seven days prior to the performance of the calorimetric flow measurement.

3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall not exceed 1.02 above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1*.

ACTION:

a. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.02 but less than or equal to 1.09:

   1. Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour until either:

      a) The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within its limit, or

      b) THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

   2. Within 2 hours either:

      a) Reduce the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO to within its limit, or

      b) Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of 1 and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours.

   3. Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is within its limit within 24 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours, and

   4. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL power may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

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ACTION (Continued)

b. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.09 due to misalignment of either a shutdown or control rod:

1. Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour until either:

   a) The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within its limit, or

   b) THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of 1, within 30 minutes;

3. Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is within its limit within 2 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours; and

4. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

c. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.09 due to causes other than the misalignment of either a shutdown or control rod:

1. Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour until either:

   a) The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within its limit, or

   b) THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION (Continued)

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours; and

3. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.4.1 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

a. Calculating the ratio at least once per 7 days when the alarm is OPERABLE, and

b. Calculating the ratio at least once per 12 hours during steady-state operation when the alarm is inoperable.

4.2.4.2 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit when above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER with one Power Range channel inoperable by using the movable incore detectors to confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution, obtained from two sets of four symmetric thimble locations or a full-core flux map, is consistent with the indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per 12 hours.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.5 The following DNB related parameters shall be maintained within the limits shown on Table 3.2-1:

a. Reactor Coolant System T_{avg}, and

b. Pressurizer Pressure.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.5 Each of the parameters of Table 3.2-1 shall be verified to be within their limits at least once per 12 hours.

TABLE 3.2-1

DNB PARAMETERS

PARAMETER	LIMITS
Indicated Reactor Coolant System T_{avg}	$\leq$ 592°F (592.5)
Indicated Pressurizer Pressure	$\geq$ 2205 psig* (2220 psig)

*Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp in excess of 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER per minute or a THERMAL POWER step in excess of 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

FINAL DRAFT

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.2 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one train such that both trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific Reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

TABLE 3.3-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
1. Manual Reactor Trip	2	1	2	1, 2	1
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	10
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux					
a. High Setpoint	4	2	3	1, 2	2#
b. Low Setpoint	4	2	3	1###, 2	2#
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux High Positive Rate	4	2	3	1, 2	2#
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	4	2	3	1, 2	2#
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	2	1	2	1###, 2	3
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux					
a. Startup	2	1	2	2##	4
b. Shutdown	2	1	2	3, 4, 5	5
7. Overtemperature ΔT	4	2	3	1, 2	6#
8. Overpower ΔT	4	2	3	1, 2	6#
9. Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-7)	4	2	3	1	6#

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
10. Pressurizer Pressure-High	4	2	3	1, 2	6#
11. Pressurizer Water Level-High (Above P-7)	3	2	2	1	7#
12. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low					
a. Single Loop (Above P-8)	3/loop	2/loop in any operating loop	2/loop in each operating loop	1	7#
b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8)	3/loop	2/loop in two operating loops	2/loop in each operating loop	1	7#
13. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. each operating stm. gen.	1, 2	6#
14. Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7)	4-1/bus	2	3	1	6#
15. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7)	4-1/bus	2	3	1	6#
16. Turbine Trip (Above P-7)					
a. Emergency Trip Header Pressure	3/Train	2/Train	2/Train	1	11#
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	4	4	1	1	11#

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
17. Safety Injection Input from ESF	2	1	2	1, 2	9
18. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip Above P-7	1/breaker	2	1/breaker per operating loop	1	11#
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks					
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	2	1	2	2##	8
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7					
P-10 Input	4	2	3	1	8
or					
P-13 Input	2	1	2	1	8
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	4	2	3	1	8
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	4	2	3	1, 2	8
e. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	2	1	2	1	8
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	2	1	2	1, 2	9
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	10
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	2	1	2	1, 2	9
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	10

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TABLE NOTATIONS

*With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.
#The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
##Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
###Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour;

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1; and

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.2.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint; and

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or within the next hour open the reactor trip breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes, and verify valves 1CV111B, 1CV8428, 1CV-8439, 1CV-8441 and 1C-8435 are closed and secured in position.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour; and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 7 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the Reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

TABLE 3.3-2

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES

FUNCTIONAL UNIT		RESPONSE TIME
1.	Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.
2.	Power Range, Neutron Flux	$\leq$0.5 second*
3.	Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	N.A.
4.	Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	$\leq$0.5 second*
5.	Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	N.A.
6.	Source Range, Neutron Flux	N.A.
7.	Overtemperature ΔT	$\leq$4.0 seconds*#
8.	Overpower ΔT	N.A.
9.	Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-7)	$\leq$2.0 seconds
10.	Pressurizer Pressure-High	$\leq$2.0 seconds
11.	Pressurizer Water Level-High (Above P-7)	N.A.

*Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.

#Thermal lag and RTD bypass manifold delay times are not included.

TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	RESPONSE TIME
12. Low Reactor Coolant Flow - Low	
a. Single Loop (Above P-8)	$\leq$1.0 second
b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8)	$\leq$1.0 second
13. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low	$\leq$2.0 seconds
14. Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7)	$\leq$1.5 seconds
15. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7)	$\leq$0.6 second
16. Turbine Trip (Above P-7)	
a. Emergency Trip Header Pressure	N.A.
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	N.A.
17. Safety Injection Input from ESF	N.A.
18. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip (Above P-7)	N.A.
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks	N.A.
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	N.A.
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.

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TABLE 4.3-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux						
a. High Setpoint	S	D(2, 4), M(3, 4), Q(4, 6), R(4, 5)	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
b. Low Setpoint	S	R(4)	M	N.A.	N.A.	1###, 2
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	N.A.	R(4)	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	N.A.	R(4)	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 5)	S/U(1),M	N.A.	N.A.	1###, 2
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 5, 12)	S/U(1),M(9)	N.A.	N.A.	2##, 3, 4, 5
7. Overtemperature ΔT	S	R(13)	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
8. Overpower ΔT	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
9. Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-7)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	1
10. Pressurizer Pressure-High	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
11. Pressurizer Water Level-High (Above P-7)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	1

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
12. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	1
13. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
14. Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7)	N.A.	R	N.A.	M	N.A.	1
15. Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Pumps (Above P-7)	N.A.	R	N.A.	M	N.A.	1
16. Turbine Trip (Above P-7)						
a. Emergency Trip Header Pressure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 10)	N.A.	1
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 10)	N.A.	1
17. Safety Injection Input from ESF	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	1, 2
18. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip (Above P-7)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	1
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks						
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	N.A.	R(4)	M	N.A.	N.A.	2##
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7	N.A.	R(4)	M (8)	N.A.	N.A.	1
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	N.A.	R(4)	M (8)	N.A.	N.A.	1

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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks (Continued)						
d. Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	N.A.	R(4)	M (8)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
e. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	N.A.	R	M (8)	N.A.	N.A.	1
20. Reactor Trip Breaker	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M (7, 11)	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M (7)	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*

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TABLE NOTATIONS

*With the Reactor Trip System breakers closed and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.

##Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

###Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1) If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2) Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(3) Single point comparison of incore to excore AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(5) Initial plateau curves shall be measured for each detector. Subsequent plateau curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial curves. For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(6) Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(8) With power greater than or equal to the interlock Setpoint the required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of verifying that the interlock is in the required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.

(9) Monthly surveillance in MODES 3*, 4*, and 5* shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator window. Monthly surveillance shall include verification of the Boron Dilution Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to an increase of twice the count rate within a 10-minute period.

(10) Setpoint verification is not applicable.

(11) At least once per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment of the Reactor trip breakers, the TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall include independent verification of the Undervoltage and Shunt trips.

(12) At least once per 18 months during shutdown verify that on a simulated Boron Dilution Doubling test signal CVCS valves 112D and E open and 112B and C close within 30 seconds.

(13) CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the RTD bypass loops flow rate.

3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4 adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, either:

   1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-4 and determine within 12 hours that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or

   2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirements of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

   Equation 2.2-1 $Z + RE + SE \leq TA$

   Where:

   Z = The value from Column Z of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel,

   RE = The "as measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel,

   SE = Either the "as measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value for Column SE (Sensor Error) of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel, and

   TA = The value from Column TA (Total Allowance) of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel.

c. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one train such that both trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.

TABLE 3.3-3

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Start Diesel Generators, Containment Cooling Fans, Control Room Isolation, Phase "A" Isolation, Turbine Trip, Auxiliary Feedwater, Containment Vent Isolation, and Essential Service Water).					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	18
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
c. Containment Pressure-High-1	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	15*
d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-7)	4	2	3	1, 2, 3#	19*
e. Steam Line Pressure-Low (Above P-11)	3/steam line	2/steam line any steam line	2/steam line	1, 2, 3#	15*
2. Containment Spray					
a. Manual Initiation	2 pair	1 pair	2 pair	1, 2, 3, 4	18
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
c. Containment Pressure-High-3	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	16

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
3. Containment Isolation					
a. Phase "A" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	18
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
b. Phase "B" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	2 pair	1 pair	2 pair	1, 2, 3, 4	18
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
3) Containment Pressure-High-3	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	16
c. Containment Vent Isolation					
1) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	17
2) Manual Phase "A" Isolation	See Item 3.a.1 for all manual Phase "A" Isolation initiating functions and requirements.				
3) Manual Phase "B" Isolation	See Item 3.b.1 for all manual Phase "B" Isolation initiating functions and requirements.				
4) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all automatic Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
4. Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation					
1) Individual	1/steam line	1/steam line	1/operating steam line	1, 2, 3	23
2) System	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	22
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	21
c. Containment Pressure-High-2	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	15*
d. Steam Line Pressure-Low (above P-11)	3/steam line	2/steam line any steam line	2/steam line	1, 2, 3#	15*
e. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate-High (below P-11)	3/steam line	2/steam line any steam line	2/steam line	3##	15*
5. Turbine Trip & Feedwater Isolation					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2	24
b. Steam Generator Water Level-High-High (P-14)	4/stm. gen	2/stm. gen. in any oper ating stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. in each oper-ating stm. gen.	1, 2	19*
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
6. Auxiliary Feedwater					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	22
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	21
c. Stm. Gen. Water Level-Low-Low					
1) Start Motor-Driven Pump	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm gen.	3/stm. gen. in each operating stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	19*
2) Start Diesel-Driven Pump	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. in each operating stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	19*
d. Undervoltage - RCP Bus-Start Motor-Driven Pump and Diesel-Driven Pump	4-1/bus	2	3	1, 2	19*
e. Safety Injection - Start Motor-Driven Pump and Diesel-Driven Pump	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
f. Division 11 ESF Bus Undervoltage-Start Motor-Driven Pump (Start as part of DG sequencing)	2	2	2	1, 2, 3	18

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)					
g. Auxiliary Feed-water Pump Suction Pressure-Low (Transfer to Essential Service Water)	2	2	2	1, 2, 3	15*
7. Automatic Opening of Containment Sump Suction Isolation Valves					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
b. RWST Level - Low-Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	16
Coincident With Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
8. Loss of Power					
a. ESF Bus Undervoltage	2/Bus	2/Bus	1/Bus	1, 2, 3, 4	19*
b. Grid Degraded Voltage	2/Bus	2/Bus	1/Bus	1, 2, 3, 4	19*

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
9. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks					
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	20
b. Reactor Trip, P-4	4-2/Train	2/Train	2/Train	1, 2, 3	22
c. Low-Low T_{avg}, P-12	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	20
d. Steam Generator Water Level, P-14 (High-High)	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in each operating stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	20

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

#Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) Setpoint.

##Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.

*The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge supply and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 20 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

TABLE 3.3-4

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Start Diesel Generators, Containment Cooling Fans, Control Room Isolation, Phase "A" Isolation, Turbine Trip, Auxiliary Feedwater, Containment Vent Isolation and Essential Service Water)					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure-High-1	6.8	0.71	1.5	≤ 2.7 psig	≤ 5.8 psig
d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-11)	16.1	14.41	1.5	≥ 1829 psig	≥ 1823 psig
e. Steam Line Pressure-Low (Above P-11)	21.2	14.81	1.5	≥ 640 psig*	≥ 617 psig*
2. Containment Spray					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure-High-3	8.0	0.71	1.5	≤ 20.0 psig	≤ 21.0 psig

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
3. Containment Isolation					
a. Phase "A" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
b. Phase "B" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Containment Pressure-High-3	8.0	0.71	1.5	$\leq$ 20.0 psig	$\leq$ 21.0 psig
c. Containment Vent Isolation					
1) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Manual Phase "A" Isolation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Manual Phase "B" Isolation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
4) Safety Injection	See Item 1 above for all automatic Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
4. Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure-High-2	7.7	0.71	1.5	≤8.2 psig	≤9.2 psig
d. Steam Line Pressure-Low (Above P-11)	21.2	14.81	1.5	≥640 psig*	≥617 psig*
e. Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate-High (Below P-11)	8.0	0.5	0	≤100 psi**	≤111.5 psi**
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Steam Generator Water Level-High-High (P-14)	6.0	4.28	1.5	≤81.4% of narrow range instrument span	≤82.7% of narrow range instrument span
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
6. Auxiliary Feedwater					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low-Start Motor-Driven Pump and Diesel-Driven Pump	27.1	18.28	1.5	$\geq$40.8% of narrow range instrument span	$\geq$39.1% of narrow range instrument span
d. Undervoltage-RCP Bus-Start Motor Driven Pump and Diesel-Driven Pump	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	$\geq$5268 volts	$\geq$4728 volts
e. Safety Injection-Start Motor-Driven Pump and Diesel-Driven Pump	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)					
f. Division 11 ESF Bus Undervoltage-Start Motor-Driven Pump	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	2870 volts	2730 volts
g. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure-Low (Transfer to Essential Service Water)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1.22" Hg vac	2" Hg vac
7. Automatic Opening of Containment Sump Suction Isolation Valves					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. RWST Level-Low-Low	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	46.7%	44.7%
Coincident with Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (SE)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
8. Loss of Power					
a. ESF Bus Undervoltage	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	2870 volts w/1.8s delay	≥2730 volts w/≤1.9s delay
b. Grid Degraded Voltage	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3804 volts w/310s delay	≥3728 volts w/310 ± 30s delay
9. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks					
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≤1930 psig	≤1936 psig
b. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Low-Low T_{avg}, P-12	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	550°F	≥547.6°F
d. Steam Generator Water Level, P-14 (High-High)	See Item 5.b. above for all Steam Generator Water Level Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

*Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure-Low are $\tau_1 \geq 50$ seconds and $\tau_2 \leq 5$ seconds. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that these time constants are adjusted to these values.

**The time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High is greater than or equal to 50 seconds. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that this time constant is adjusted to this value.

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TABLE 3.3-5

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
1. Manual Initiation	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	N.A.
b. Containment Spray	N.A.
c. Phase "A" Isolation	N.A.
d. Phase "B" Isolation	N.A.
e. Containment Vent Isolation	N.A.
f. Steam Line Isolation	N.A.
f. Feedwater Isolation	N.A.
h. Auxiliary Feedwater	N.A.
i. Essential Service Water	N.A.
j Containment Cooling Fans	N.A.
k. Start Diesel Generator	N.A.
l. Control Room Isolation	N.A.
m. Turbine Trip	N.A.
2. Containment Pressure-High-1	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 27^{(1)}/12^{(2)}$
1) Reactor Trip	≤ 2
2) Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 7^{(3)}$
3) Phase "A" Isolation	$\leq 2(6)$
4) Containment Vent Isolation	≤ 7
5) Auxiliary Feedwater	≤ 60
6) Essential Service Water	$\leq 42^{(1)}$
7) Containment Cooling Fans	$\leq 40(1)$
8) Start Diesel Generator	≤ 12
9) Control Room Isolation	N.A.
10) Turbine Trip.	N.A.
3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 27^{(1)}/12^{(2)}$
1) Reactor Trip	≤ 2
2) Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 7^{(3)}$
3) Phase "A" Isolation	$\leq 2^{(6)}$
4) Containment Vent Isolation	≤ 7
5) Auxiliary Feedwater	≤ 60
6) Essential Service Water	$\leq 42^{(1)}$
7) Containment Cooling Fans	$\leq 40^{(1)}$
8) Start Diesel Generator	≤ 12
9) Control Room Isolation	N.A.
10) Turbine Trip	N.A.

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
4. Steam Line Pressure-Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	$\leq 22^{(4)}/12^{(5)}$
1) Reactor Trip	≤ 2
2) Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 7^{(3)}$
3) Phase "A" Isolation	$\leq 2^{(6)}$
4) Containment Vent Isolation	≤ 7
5) Auxiliary Feedwater	≤ 60
6) Essential Service Water	$\leq 42^{(1)}$
7) Containment Cooling Fans	$\leq 40^{(1)}$
8) Start Diesel Generator	≤ 12
9) Control Room Isolation	N.A.
10) Turbine Trip	N.A.
b. Steam Line Isolation	≤ 7
5. Containment Pressure-High-3	
a. Containment Spray	$\leq 45^{(1)}$
b. Phase "B" Isolation	$\leq 22^{(1)}/12^{(2)}$
6. Steam Generator Water Level-High-High	
a. Turbine Trip	≤ 2.5
b. Feedwater Isolation	$\leq 7^{(3)}$
7. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low	
a. Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump	≤ 60
b. Diesel-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	≤ 60
8. Containment Pressure-High-2	
Steam Line Isolation	≤ 7
9. RWST Level-Low-Low Coincident with Safety Injection	
Automatic Opening of Containment Sump Suction Isolation Valves	≤ 100

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
10. Undervoltage RCP Bus	
a. Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump	$\leq$60
b. Diesel-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump	$\leq$60
11. Division 11 ESF Bus Undervoltage	
Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump	$\leq$60
12. Loss of Power	
a. ESF Bus Undervoltage	$\leq$1.9
b. Grid Degraded Voltage	$\leq$310 ± 30 delay
13. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate-High (Below P-11)	
Steam Line Isolation	$\leq$7
14. Phase "A" Isolation	
Containment Vent Isolation	$\leq$7
15. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure-Low-Low	
Automatic Switchover to ESW	N.A.

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

(2) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delay not included. Offsite power available.

(3) Hydraulic operated valves.

(4) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delay included. Only centrifugal charging pumps included.

(5) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available. Only centrifugal charging pumps included.

(6) Does not include valve closure time.

TABLE 4.3-2

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Start Diesel Generators, Containment Cooling Fans, Control Room Isolation, Phase "A" Isolation, Turbine Trip, Auxiliary Feedwater, Containment Vent Isolation and Essential Service Water)								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Containment Pressure-High-1	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low (Above P-11)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. Steam Line Pressure-Low (Above P-11)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
2. Containment Spray								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Containment Pressure-High-3	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
3. Containment Isolation								
a. Phase "A" Isolation								
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
b. Phase "B" Isolation								
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Containment Pressure-High-3	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Vent Isolation								
1) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
3.c. Containment Vent Isolation (Continued)								
2) Manual Phase "A" Isolation	See Item 3.a.1 above for all manual Phase "A" Isolation Surveillance Requirements.							
3) Manual Phase "B" Isolation	See Item 3.b.1 above for all manual Phase "B" Isolation Surveillance Requirements.							
4) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all automatic Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
4. Steam Line Isolation								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A	N.A	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Pressure-High-2	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Steam Line Pressure-Low (Above P-11)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High (Below P-11)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relay	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater (Continued)								
b. Steam Generator Water Level-High-High (P-14)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
6. Auxiliary Feedwater								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relay	N.A.	N.A	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3
c. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Undervoltage-RCP Bus	N.A.	R	N.A.	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
e. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
f. Division 11 ESF Bus Undervoltage	N.A.	R	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	1, 2, 3
g. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Pressure-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
7. Automatic Opening of Containment Sump Suction Isolation Valves								

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
7. Automatic Opening (Continued)								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
b. RWST Level-Low-Low Coincident With	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	M	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements							
8. Loss of Power								
a. ESF Bus Undervoltage	N.A.	R	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Grid Degraded Voltage	N.A.	R	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
9. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks								
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Low-Low T_{avg}, P-12	N.A.	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Steam Generator Water Level, P-14 (High-High)	S	R	M	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3

TABLE NOTATION

(1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

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3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels for plant operations shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints within the specified limits.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-6.

ACTION:

a. With a radiation monitoring channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint for plant operations exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-6, adjust the Setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours or declare the channel inoperable.

b. With one or more radiation monitoring channels for plant operations inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for plant operations shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.

TABLE 3.3-6

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNELS TO TRIP/ALARM	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ALARM/TRIP SETPOINT	ACTION
1. Fuel Building Isolation-Radioactivity-High and Criticality (ORE-AR055/56)	1	2	*	≤5 mR/h	29
2. Containment Isolation-Containment Radioactivity-High (1RE-AR011/12)	1	2	All	**	26
3. Gaseous Radioactivity-RCS Leakage Detection (1RE-PR011B)	N.A.	1	1, 2, 3, 4	N.A.	28
4. Particulate Radioactivity-RCS Leakage Detection (1RE-PR011A)	N.A.	1	1, 2, 3, 4	N.A.	28
5. Main Control Room Isolation-Outside Air Intake-Gaseous Radioactivity-High (ORE-PR031B/32B and ORE-PR033B/34B)	1	2 per intake	All	≤1.0 E-5 μCi/cc	27

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TABLE NOTATIONS

*With new fuel or irradiated fuel in the fuel storage areas or fuel building.

**Trip Setpoint is to be established such that the actual submersion dose rate would not exceed 10 mR/hr in the containment building. For containment purge or vent the Setpoint value may be increased up to twice the maximum concentration activity in the containment determined by the sample analysis performed prior to each release in accordance with Table 4.11-2 provided the value does not exceed 10% of the equivalent limits of Specification 3.11.2.1.a in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 26 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge valves are maintained closed.

ACTION 27 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour isolate the Control Room Ventilation System and initiate operation of the Control Room Make-up System.

ACTION 28 - Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1.

ACTION 29 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, ACTION a. of Specification 3.9.12 must be satisfied. With both channels inoperable, provide an appropriate portable continuous monitor with the same Alarm Setpoint in the fuel pool area and satisfy ACTION b. of Specification 3.9.12 with one Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenum in operation.

TABLE 4.3-3

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Fuel Building Isolation-Radioactivity-High and Criticality (ORE-AR055/56)	S	R	M	*
2. Containment Isolation-Containment Radioactivity-High (1RE-AR011/12)	S	R	M	All
3. Gaseous Radioactivity-RCS Leakage Detection (1RE-PR011B)	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
4. Particulate Radioactivity-RCS Leakage Detection (1RE-PR011A)	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
5. Main Control Room Isolation-Outside Air Intake-Gaseous Radioactivity-High (ORE-PR031B/32B and ORE-PR033B/34B)	S	R	M	All

*With new fuel or irradiated fuel in the fuel storage areas or fuel building.

MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. At least 75% of the detector thimbles,

b. A minimum of two detector thimbles per core quadrant, and

c. Sufficient movable detectors, drive, and readout equipment to map these thimbles.

APPLICABILITY: When the Movable Incore Detection System is used for:

a. Recalibration of the excore neutron flux detection system, or

b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or

c. Measurement of $F^N_{\Delta H}$, $F_Q(Z)$ and F_{xy}.

ACTION:

With the Movable Incore Detection System inoperable, do not use the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by normalizing each detector output when required for:

a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or

b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or

c. Measurement of $F^N_{\Delta H}$, $F_Q(Z)$, and F_{xy}.

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SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.3 The seismic monitoring instrumentation shown in Table 3.3-7 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required seismic monitoring instruments inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the instrument(s) to OPERABLE status.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.3.1 The seismic monitoring instrumentation shall be determined operable:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying operable status indications of the seismic monitoring instrumentation.

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that:

   1) The active seismic sensors, the time-history recorder and the playback unit properly processes the equipments internal test signals.

   2) The response spectrum analyzer properly executes its diagnostic routine.

c. At least once per 184 days by verifying that the active seismic sensors, the time-history recorder and the playback unit properly record the equipments internal test signals.

d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

   1) Verifying the electronic calibration of the time-history recorder and the playback unit.

   2) Installing fresh magnetic recording plates in the peak recording acclerometers.

4.3.3.3.2 Upon actuation of the seismic monitoring instruments, the equipment listed in Table 3.3-7 shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours following the seismic event. Data shall be retrieved from actuated instruments and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the vibratory ground motion. A Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days describing the magnitude, frequency spectrum and resultant effect upon facility features important to safety.

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TABLE 3.3-7

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS	MEASUREMENT RANGE	MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE
1. Time - History Accelerographs		
a. Aux. Elect. Rm, OPA02J	N.A.	1
b. Byron River Screen House	N.A.	1
2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs		
a. Cont./Reactor Eq. Accumulators	-2 g to +2 g	1
b. Cont./Reactor piping	-2 g to +2 g	1
c. Aux. Bldg./Cat. I piping	-2 g to +2 g	1
3. Response-Spectrum Analyzer		
Aux Elect Rm, OPA02J	None	1
4. Triaxial Acceleration Sensors		
a. Cont./10W - 377'	-2 g to +2 g	1
b. Cont/10W - 502'	-2 g to +2 g	1
c. Cont./10X - 426'	-2 g to +2 g	1
d. Free Field/41 + 00E, 27 + 00N	-2 g to +2 g	1
e. Aux. Bldg./18N - 426'	-2 g to +2 g	1
f. Byron River Screen House	-2 g to +2 g	1

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TABLE 4.3-4

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS	CHANNEL CHECK	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST
1. Time History Accelerographs			
a. Aux Elect Rm, OPA02J	SA	R	R
b. RSH	SA	R	R
2. Triaxial Peak Accelerographs			
a. Cont./Reactor Eq. Accumulators	N.A.	R	R
b. Cont./Reactor piping	N.A.	R	R
c. Aux. Bldg./Cat. I piping	N.A.	R	R
3. Response-Spectrum Analyzer			
Aux Elect Rm, OPA02J	Q	N.A.	Q
4. Triaxial Acceleration Sensors			
a. Cont./10W - 377'	Q	SA	N.A.
b. Cont./10W - 502'	Q	SA	N.A.
c. Cont./10X - 426'	Q	SA	N.A.
d. Free Field/41 + 00E, 27 + 00N	Q	SA	N.A.
e. Aux. Bldg./18N -426'	Q	SA	N.A.
f. Byron River Screen House	Q	SA	N.A.

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METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.4 The meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels given in Table 3.3-8 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one or more required meteorological monitoring channels inoperable for more than 7 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.4 Each of the above meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies given in Table 4.3-5.

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TABLE 3.3-8

METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	LOCATION	MINIMUM OPERABLE
1. Wind Speed	Nominal Elev. 30 ft	1
	Nominal Elev. 250 ft	1
2. Wind Direction	Nominal Elev. 30 ft	1
	Nominal Elev. 250 ft	1
3. Air Temperature - ΔT	Nominal Elev. 30 ft/250 ft	1

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TABLE 4.3-5

METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1. Wind Speed		
a. Nominal Elev. 30 ft	D	SA
b. Nominal Elev. 250 ft	D	SA
2. Wind Direction		
a. Nominal Elev. 30 ft	D	SA
b. Nominal Elev. 250 ft	D	SA
3. Air Temperature - ΔT		
Nominal Elev. 30 ft/250 ft	D	SA

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REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channels given in Table 3.3-9 shall be OPERABLE with readouts displayed external to the control room.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE as required by Table 3.3-9, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.5 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies given in Table 4.3-6.

TABLE 3.3-9

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	READOUT LOCATION	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE
1. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux	1PL06J	2	1
2. Source Range Neutron Flux	1PL06J	2	1
3. Reactor Coolant Temperature - Wide Range			
a. Hot Leg	1PL05J	1/loop	1/loop
b. Cold Leg	1PL05J	1/loop	1/loop
4. Pressurizer Pressure	1PL06J	1	1
5. Pressurizer Level	1PL06J	2	1
6. Steam Generator Pressure	1PL04J/1PL05J	1/stm gen	1/stm gen
7. Steam Generator Level	1PL04J	1/stm gen	1/stm gen
8. RHR Flow Rate	LOCAL	2	1
9. RHR Temperature	LOCAL	2	1
10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	1PL04J/1PL05J	1/stm gen	1/stm gen

TABLE 4.3-6

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux	M	R
2. Source Range Neutron Flux	M*	R
3. Reactor Coolant Temperature - Wide Range	M	R
4. Pressurizer Pressure	M	R
5. Pressurizer Level	M	R
6. Steam Generator Pressure	M	R
7. Steam Generator Level	M	R
8. RHR Flow Rate	M	R
9. RHR Temperature	M	R
10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	M	R

*When below P-6.

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ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels, except the containment high range area radiation monitor, main steam line radiation monitor, and the auxiliary building vent stack wide range noble gas monitor, less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

c. With the number of OPERABLE channels for the containment high range area radiation monitor, or main steam line radiation monitor, or the auxiliary building vent stack wide range noble gas monitor less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, initiate an alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s) within 72 hours and either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days that provides actions taken, cause of the inoperability and plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.6 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

TABLE 3.3-10

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE
1. Containment Pressure	2	1
2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - T_{HOT} (Wide Range)	2	1
3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - T_{COLD} (Wide Range)	2	1
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range	2	1
5. Pressurizer Water Level	2	1
6. Steam Line Pressure	2/steam generator	1/steam generator
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range	1/steam generator	1/steam generator
8. Steam Generator Water Level - Wide Range	1/steam generator	1/steam generator
9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level	2	1
10. Auxiliary Feedater Flow Rate	2/steam generator	1/steam generator
11. PORV Position Indicator (Open/Closed)	1/Valve	1/Valve
12. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator (Open/Closed)	1/Valve	1/Valve
13. Safety Valve Position Indicator (Open/Closed)	1/Valve	1/Valve
14. Containment Floor Drain Sump Water Level (Narrow Range)	2	1
15. Containment Water Level (Wide Range)	2	1
16. In Core Thermocouples	4/core quadrant	2/core quadrant
17. Containment High-Range Area Radiation	N.A.	1
18. Containment Hydrogen Concentration	2	1
19. Neutron Flux (Power Range)	4	2
20. Auxiliary Building Vent Stack - Wide Range Noble Gas	N.A.	1/stack
21. Main Steam Line Radiation	N.A.	1/stm line
22. Reactor Vessel Water Level	2	1

TABLE 4.3-7

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1. Containment Pressure	M	R
2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - T_{HOT} (Wide Range)	M	R
3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - T_{COLD} (Wide Range)	M	R
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range	M	R
5. Pressurizer Water Level	M	R
6. Steam Line Pressure	M	R
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range	M	R
8. Steam Generator Water Level - Wide Range	M	R
9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level	M	R
10. Auxiliary Feedater Flow Rate	M	R
11. PORV Position Indicator (Open/Closed)	M	R
12. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator (Open/Closed)	M	R
13. Safety Valve Position Indicator (Open/Closed)	M	R
14. Containment Floor Drain Sump Water Level (Narrow Range)	M	R
15. Containment Water Level (Wide Range)	M	R
16. In Core Thermocouples	M	R
17. Containment High Range Area Radiation	M	R*
18. Containment Hydrogen Concentration	S	Q
19. Neutron Flux (Power Range)	M	R
20. Auxiliary Building Vent Stack - Wide Range Noble Gas	M	R
21. Main Steam Line Radiation	M	R
22. Reactor Vessel Water Level	M	R

*CHANNEL CALIBRATION may consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10R/h and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10R/h with an installed or portable gamma source.

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.7 As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With any, but not more than one-half the total in any fire zone, fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, restore the inoperable instrument(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or within the next 1 hour establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per hour, unless the instrument(s) is located inside the containment, then inspect that containment zone at least once per 8 hours or monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations listed in Specification 4.6.1.5.

b. With more than one-half of the fire detection instruments in any fire zone shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable or with any fire suppression instruments shown in Table 3.3-11, inoperable, or with any two or more adjacent fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, within 1 hour establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per hour, unless the instrument(s) is located inside the containment, then inspect that containment zone at least once per 8 hours or monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations listed in Specification 4.6.1.5.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.7.1 Each of the above required fire detection instruments which are accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 6 months by performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST. Fire detectors which are not accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours unless performed in the previous 6 months.

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4.3.3.7.2 The NFPA Standard 72D supervised circuits supervision associated with the detector alarms of each of the above required fire detection instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 6 months.

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TABLE 3.3-11

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENT LOCATION	INSTRUMENT TYPE*	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS		
		Heat	Flame	Smoke
1. Containment ***				
Zone 11 Elev 426	Suppression	1 **		
Zone 12 Elev 426	Suppression	1 **		
Zone 2 Elev 401	Detection			2
Zone 3 Elev 401	Detection			2
Zone 4 Elev 401	Detection			2
Zone 5 Elev 401	Detection			2
Zone 6 Elev 426	Detection			6
Zone 76 Elev 426	Detection			13
Zone 7 Elev 414	Detection			7
Zone 24 Elev 414	Detection			16
2. Control Room				
Zone 68 Elev 451	Detection			3
Zone 69 Elev 451	Detection			12
Zone 75 Elev 451	Detection			20
3. Switchgear Rooms				
Zone 77 Elev 426	Detection			21
Zone 78 Elev 426	Detection			19
4. Upper Cable Spreading Room				
Zone 41 Elev 463	Detection			4
Zone 42 Elev 463	Detection			4
Zone 43 Elev 463	Detection			8
Zone 44 Elev 463	Detection			8
Zone 45 Elev 463	Detection			10
Zone 46 Elev 463	Detection			10
Zone 47 Elev 463	Detection			5
Zone 48 Elev 463	Detection			5
Lower Cable Spreading Room				
Zone 49 Elev 439	Detection			23
Zone 50 Elev 439	Detection			23
Zone 51 Elev 439	Detection			13
Zone 52 Elev 439	Detection			13
Zone 53 Elev 439	Detection			9
Zone 54 Elev 439	Detection			9
Zone 55 Elev 439	Detection			6
Zone 56 Elev 439	Detection			6
5. Remote Shutdown Panel				
Zone 13 Elev 383	Detection			7

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TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

INSTRUMENT LOCATION	INSTRUMENT TYPE*	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS		
		Heat	Flame	Smoke
6. Station Battery Room				
Zone 67 Elev 451	Detection			13
7. Diesel Generator Room				
Zone 37 Elev 401	Suppression	4		
Zone 38 Elev 401	Suppression	4		
Zone 71 Elev 401	Detection		1	
Zone 72 Elev 401	Detection		1	
8. Diesel Fuel Storage				
Zone 39 Elev 401	Suppression	1		
Zone 40 Elev 401	Suppression	1		
Zone 27 Elev 383	Suppression	3		
Zone 28 Elev 383	Suppression	3		
Zone 10 Elev 383	Detection			6
9. Safety Related Pumps				
Zone 41 Elev 383	Suppression	2		
Zone 42 Elev 383	Suppression	1		
Zone 16 Elev 364	Detection			2
Zone 18 Elev 364	Detection			3
Zone 19 Elev 364	Detection			2
Zone 20 Elev 346	Detection			3
Zone 21 Elev 346	Detection			3
Zone 52 RSH	Suppression	8		
10. Fuel Storage				
Zone 39 Elev 401	Detection			29
Zone 38 Elev 426	Detection		3	

TABLE NOTATIONS

*A single detector in a zone marked "Detection" will alarm in the Main Control Room. A single detector in a zone marked "Suppression" will initiate suppression and alarm in the Main Control Room.

**These are Containment Ventilation temperature switches. Upon receipt of a Hi-Hi temperature, suppression must be manually initiated. These switches are not 720 supervised.

***The fire detection instruments located within the containment are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests.

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LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.8 The Loose-Part Detection System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With one or more Loose-Part Detection System channels inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.8 Each channel of the Loose-Part Detection Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

a. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24 hours,

b. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST except for verification of setpoint at least once per 31 days, and

c. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

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RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.9 The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-12 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1 are not exceeded. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints of these channels shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM).

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With a radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint less conservative than required by the above specification, immediately suspend the release of radioactive liquid effluents monitored by the affected channel, or declare the channel inoperable.

b. With less than the minimum number of radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-12. Restore the inoperable instrumentation to OPERABLE status within the time specified in the ACTION, or explain in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.7 why this inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.9 Each radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and DIGITAL and ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-8.

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TABLE 3.3-12 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 31 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 14 days provided that prior to initiating a release:

a. At least two independent samples are analyzed in accordance with Specification 4.11.1.1.1, and

b. At least two technically qualified members of the facility staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge line valving.

Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTION 32 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided that, at least once per 12 hours, grab samples are collected and analyzed for radioactivity at a lower limit of detection of no more than 10^{-7} microCurie/ml.

ACTION 33 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours during actual releases. Pump performance curves generated in place may be used to estimate flow.

TABLE 3.3-12

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	ACTION
1. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release		
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (ORE-PR001)	1	31
2. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm But Not Providing Automatic Termination of Release		
a. Essential Service Water RCFC 1A and 1B Outlet (1RE-PR002)	1	32
b. Essential Service Water RCFC 1B and 1D Outlet (1RE-PR003)	1	32
c. Station Blowdown Line (ORE-PR010)	1	32
3. Flow Rate Measurement Devices		
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (Loop-WX001)	1	33
b. Station Blowdown Line (Loop-CW032)	1	33

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TABLE 4.3-8

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST
1. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release					
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (ORE-PR001)	D	P	R(3)	Q(1)	N.A.
2. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm But Not Providing Automatic Termination of Release					
a. Essential Service Water RCFC 1A and IC Outlet Line (1RE-PR002)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	N.A.
b. Essential Service Water RCFC 1B and ID Outlet (1RE-PR003)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	N.A.
c. Station Blowdown Line (ORE-PR010)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	N.A.
3. Flow Rate Measurement Devices					
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (Loop-WX001)	D(4)	N.A.	R	N.A.	Q
b. Station Blowdown Line (Loop-CW032)	D(4)	N.A.	R	N.A.	Q

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TABLE 4.3-8 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists:

   a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint, or

   b. Circuit failure, or

   c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or

   d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.

(2) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

   a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or

   b. Circuit failure, or

   c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or

   d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.

(3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once per 24 hours on days on which continuous, periodic, or batch releases are made.

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RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.10 The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-13 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.5 are not exceeded. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints of these channels meeting Specification 3.11.2.1 shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-13

ACTION:

a. With a radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint less conservative than required by the above specification, immediately suspend the release of radioactive gaseous effluents monitored by the affected channel, or declare the channel inoperable.

b. With less than the minimum number of radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-13. Restore the inoperable instrumentation to OPERABLE status within the time specified in the ACTION, or explain in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.7 why this inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3, and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.10 Each radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-9.

TABLE 3.3-13

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABILITY	ACTION
1. Plant Vent Monitoring System - Unit 1			
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor-Providing Alarm			
1) High Range (1RE-PR028D)	1	*	39
2) Low Range (1RE-PR028B)	1	*	39
b. Iodine Sampler (1RE-PR028C)	1	*	40
c. Particulate Sampler (1RE-PR028A)	1	*	40
d. Effluent System Flow Rate Measuring Device (LOOP-VA019)	1	*	36
e. Sampler Flow Rate Measuring Device (1FT-PR165)	1	*	36
2. Plant Vent Monitoring System - Unit 2			
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor-Providing Alarm			
1) High Range (2RE-PR028D)	1	*	39
2) Low Range (2RE-PR028B)	1	*	39
b. Iodine Sampler (2RE-PR028C)	1	*	40
c. Particulate Sampler (2RE-PR028A)	1	*	40
d. Effluent System Flow Rate Measuring Device (LOOP-VA020)	1	*	36
e. Sampler Flow Rate Measuring Device (2FT-PR165)	1	*	36

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TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABILITY	ACTION
3. Gaseous Waste Management System			
a. Hydrogen Analyzer (OAT-GW8000)	1	**	38
b. Oxygen Analyzer (OAT-GW004 and OAT-GW8003)	2	**	41
4. Gas Decay Tank System			
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor - Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release (ORE-PR002A and 2B)	2	*	35
5. Containment Purge System			
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor - Providing Alarm (1RE-PR001B)	1	*	37
b. Iodine Sampler (1RE-PR001C)	1	*	40
c. Particulate Sampler (1RE-PR001A)	1	*	40
6. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Closure of Surge Tank Vent-Component Cooling Water Line (ORE-PR009 and 1RE-PR009)	2	*	42

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TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

* At all times.

** During WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM operation.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 35 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the contents of the tank(s) may be released to the environment for up to 14 days provided that prior to initiating the release:

a. At least two independent samples of the tank's contents are analyzed, and

b. At least two technically qualified members of the facility staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge valve lineup.

Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTION 36 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours.

ACTION 37 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend PURGING of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTION 38 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation of the Gaseous Waste Management System may continue for up to 14 days provided grab samples are taken and analyzed at least once per 8 hours (once per 4 hours during degassing operations).

ACTION 39 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours and these samples are analyzed for radioactivity within 24 hours.

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TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 40 With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via the affected pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment as required in Table 4.11-2.

ACTION 41 With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation of the Gaseous Waste Management System may continue provided that the system is sampled by either the remaining monitor or by a grab sample once per 4 hours and the oxygen concentration remains less than 2%. Such operation may continue for up to 14 days. If there are no monitors OPERABLE, Gaseous Waste Management System operation may continue provided a grab sample is taken and analyzed from the onservice gas decay tank once per 4 hours and the oxygen concentration remains less than 1%. With oxygen concentration exceeding 1%, reduce the oxygen concentration to less than 1% within 48 hours, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

ACTION 42 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided that, at least once per 12 hours, grab samples are collected and analyzed for radioactivity at a lower limit of detection of no more than 10^{-7} microCurie/ml.

TABLE 4.3-9

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Plant Vent Monitoring System - Unit 1					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor - Providing Alarm					
1) High Range (1RE-PR028D)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
2) Low Range (1RE-PR028B)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Iodine Sampler (1RE-PR028C)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
c. Particulate Sampler (1RE-PR028A)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
d. Effluent System Flow Rate Measuring Device (LOOP-VA019)	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Measuring Device (1FT-PR165)	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
2. Plant Vent Monitoring System - Unit Two					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor-Providing Alarm					
1) High Range (2RE-PR028D)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
2) Low Range (2RE-PR028B)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Iodine Sampler (2RE-PR028C)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
c. Particulate Sampler (2RE-PR028A)	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*

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TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
2. Plant Vent Monitoring System - Unit Two (continued)					
d. Effluent System Flow Rate Measuring Device (LOOP-VA020)	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Measuring Device (2FT-PR165)	D	N.A.	R	Q	*
3. Gaseous Waste Management System					
a. Hydrogen Analyzer (OAT-GW8000)	D	N.A.	Q(4)	M	**
b. Oxygen Analyzer (OAT-GW004 and OAT-GW8003)	D	N.A.	Q(5)	M	**
4. Gas Decay Tank System					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor - Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release (ORE-PR002A and 2B)	P	P	R(3)	Q(1)	*
5. Containment Purge System					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor - Providing Alarm (1RE-PR001B)	D	P	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Iodine Sampler (1RE-PR001C)	P	P	R(3)	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler (1RE-PR001A)	P	P	R(3)	N.A.	*

TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
6. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Closure of Surge Tank Vent Component Cooling Water Line (0RE-PR009 and 1RE-PR009)	D	M	R(3)	Q(1)	*

TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

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* At all times.

** During WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM operation.

(1) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists:

   a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint, or

   b. Circuit failure, or

   c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or.

   d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.

(2) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

   a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or

   b. Circuit failure, or

   c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure, or

   d. Instrument controls not set in operate mode.

(3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing hydrogen and nitrogen.

(5) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing oxygen and nitrogen.

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3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4 At least one Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one throttle valve or one governor valve per high pressure turbine steam line inoperable and/or with one reheat stop valve or one reheat intercept valve per low pressure turbine steam line inoperable, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or close at least one valve in the affected steam line(s) or isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next 6 hours.

b. With the above required Turbine Overspeed Protection System otherwise inoperable, within 6 hours isolate the turbine from the steam supply.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.3.4.2 The above required Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by cycling each of the following valves through at least one complete cycle from the running position:
   1) Four high pressure turbine throttle valves,
   2) Four high pressure turbine governor valves,
   3) Six turbine reheat stop valves,
   4) Six turbine reheat intercept valves, and

b. Within 7 days prior to entering MODE 3 from MODE 4, each of the 12 extraction steam nonreturn check valves shall be cycled from the closed position.

c. At least once per 31 days by direct observation of the movement of each of the above valves through one complete cycle from the running position,

d. At least once per 31 days by direct observation, verify freedom of movement of the 12 extraction steam nonreturn check valve weight arms.

e. At least once per 18 months by performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems, and

f. At least once per 40 months by disassembling at least one of each of the valves given in Specifications 4.3.4.2a. and b. above, and performing a visual and surface inspection of valve seats, disks and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or corrosion.

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3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONS

3.4.1.1 All reactor coolant loops shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.*

ACTION:

With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.1 The above required reactor coolant loops shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

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HOT STANDBY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 At least three of the reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least two of these reactor coolant loops shall be in operation:*

a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump, and

d. Reactor Coolant Loop D and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3.**

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With only one reactor coolant loop in operation, restore at least two loops to operation within 72 hours or open reactor trip breakers within 1 hour.

c. With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required reactor coolant loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required reactor coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 The required steam generators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side narrow range water level to be greater than or equal to 41% at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.2.3 At least two reactor coolant loops shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

---

*All Reactor Coolant pumps may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.3 At least two of the loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least one of these loops shall be in operation:*

a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

d. Reactor Coolant Loop D and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

e. RHR Loop A, and

f. RHR Loop B.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required reactor coolant and/or RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; if the remaining OPERABLE loop is an RHR loop, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours.

b. With no reactor coolant or RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.

*All reactor coolant pumps and RHR pumps may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

**A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 350°F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.3.1 The required reactor coolant pump(s) and/or RHR pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.3.2 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side narrow range water level to be greater than or equal to 41% at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.3.3 At least one reactor coolant or RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

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COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS FILLED

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.4.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation*, and either:

a. One additional RHR loop shall be OPERABLE#, or

b. The secondary side narrow range water level of at least two steam generators shall be greater than 41%.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled##.

ACTION:

a. With one of the RHR loops inoperable and with less than the required steam generator level, immediately initiate corrective action to return the inoperable RHR loop to OPERABLE status or restore the required steam generator level as soon as possible.

b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.4.1.1 The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators when required shall be determined to be within limits at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.4.1.2 At least one RHR loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

#One RHR loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

##A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 350°F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

FINAL DRAFT

COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS NOT FILLED

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.4.2 Two residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE* and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.**

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.4.2 At least one RHR loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*One RHR loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

**The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

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LOOP ISOLATION VALVES

OPERATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.5.1 All RCS loop isolation valves (hot leg and cold leg stop valves) shall be open and power removed from the isolation valve operators.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION: With any RCS loop isolation valve closed, suspend startup of the isolated loop and be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.5.1 All RCS loop isolation valves shall be verified open and power removed from the isolation valve operators at least once per 31 days.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.5.2 If an RCS loop is isolated, maintain the hot leg and cold leg stop valves closed until:

a. The boron concentration of the isolated loop is greater than the boron concentration of the operating loops.

b. The temperature of the cold leg of the isolated loop is within 20°F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, do not open either the hot leg or cold leg stop valves.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.5.2.1 The isolated loop cold leg temperature shall be determined to be within 20°F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops within 30 minutes prior to opening the cold leg stop valve.

4.4.1.5.2.2 The boron concentration of an isolated loop shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the boron concentration of the operating loops within 2 hours prior to opening either the hot leg or cold leg stop valves of an isolated loop.

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3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2.1 A minimum of one pressurizer Code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig ± 1%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer Code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2.2 All pressurizer Code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig ± 1%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer Code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.2 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

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3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with at least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 150 kW and a water level of less than or equal to 92%.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With less than two groups of pressurizer heaters operable, restore at least two groups of pressurizer heaters to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the Reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water level shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit current at least once per 92 days.

4.4.3.3 The cross-tie for the pressurizer heaters to the ESF power supply shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by energizing the heaters.

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3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 All power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s); otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With both PORV(s) inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore each of the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close their associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s) and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

d. With one or more blocks valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour: 1) restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s), or close the PORV and remove power from its associated solenoid valve; and 2) apply the ACTION of b. or c. above, as appropriate for the isolated PORV(s).

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and

b. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.

4.4.4.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed with power removed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b. or c. of Specification 3.4.4.

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3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.5 Each steam generator shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more steam generators inoperable, restore the inoperable steam generator(s) to OPERABLE status prior to increasing T_{avg} above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.5.0 Each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.5.1 Steam Generator Sample Selection and Inspection - Each steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE during shutdown by selecting and inspecting at least the minimum number of steam generators specified in Table 4.4-1.

4.4.5.2 Steam Generator Tube Sample Selection and Inspection - The steam generator tube minimum sample size, inspection result classification, and the corresponding action required shall be as specified in Table 4.4-2. The inservice inspection of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.4.5.3 and the inspected tubes shall be verified acceptable per the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.4.5.4. The tubes selected for each inservice inspection shall include at least 3% of the total number of tubes in all steam generators; the tubes selected for these inspections shall be selected on a random basis except:

a. Where experience in similar plants with similar water chemistry indicates critical areas to be inspected, then at least 50% of the tubes inspected shall be from these critical areas;

b. The first sample of tubes selected for each inservice inspection (subsequent to the preservice inspection) of each steam generator shall include:

1) All nonplugged tubes that previously had detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20% of wall thickness),

2) Tubes in those areas where experience has indicated potential problems, and

3) A tube inspection (pursuant to Specification 4.4.5.4a.8) shall be performed on each selected tube. If any selected tube does not permit the passage of the eddy current probe for a tube inspection, this shall be recorded and an adjacent tube shall be selected and subjected to a tube inspection.

c. The tubes selected as the second and third samples (if required by Table 4.4-2) during each inservice inspection may be subjected to a partial tube inspection provided:

1) The tubes selected for these samples include the tubes from those areas of the tube sheet array where tubes with imperfections were previously found, and

2) The inspections include those portions of the tubes where imperfections were previously found.

The results of each sample inspection shall be classified into one of the following three categories:

Category	Inspection Results
C-1	Less than 5% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes and none of the inspected tubes are defective.
C-2	One or more tubes, but not more than 1% of the total tubes inspected are defective, or between 5% and 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes.
C-3	More than 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes or more than 1% of the inspected tubes are defective.

Note: In all inspections, previously degraded tubes must exhibit significant (greater than 10% of wall thickness) further wall penetrations to be included in the above percentage calculations.

4.4.5.3 Inspection Frequencies - The above required inservice inspections of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the following frequencies:

a. The first inservice inspection shall be performed after 6 Effective Full Power Months but within 24 calendar months of initial criticality. Subsequent inservice inspections shall be performed at intervals of not less than 12 nor more than 24 calendar months after the previous inspection. If two consecutive inspections, not including the preservice inspection, result in all inspection results falling into the C-1 category or if two consecutive inspections demonstrate that previously observed degradation has not continued and no additional degradation has occurred, the inspection interval may be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months;

b. If the results of the inservice inspection of a steam generator conducted in accordance with Table 4.4-2 at 40-month intervals fall in Category C-3, the inspection frequency shall be increased to at least once per 20 months. The increase in inspection frequency shall apply until the subsequent inspections satisfy the criteria of Specification 4.4.5.3a.; the interval may then be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months; and

c. Additional, unscheduled inservice inspections shall be performed on each steam generator in accordance with the first sample inspection specified in Table 4.4-2 during the shutdown subsequent to any of the following conditions:

   1) Reactor-to-secondary tube leaks (not including leaks originating from tube-to-tube sheet welds) in excess of the limits of Specification 3.4.6.2c., or

   2) A seismic occurrence greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake, or

   3) A Condition IV loss-of-coolant accident requiring actuation of the Engineered Safety Features, or

   4) A Condition IV main steam line or feedwater line break.

4.4.5.4 Acceptance Criteria

a. As used in this specification:

1) Imperfection means an exception to the dimensions, finish or contour of a tube from that required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy-current testing indications below 20% of the nominal tube wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections;

2) Degradation means a service-induced cracking, wastage, wear or general corrosion occurring on either inside or outside of a tube;

3) Degraded Tube means a tube containing imperfections greater than or equal to 20% of the nominal wall thickness caused by degradation;

4) % Degradation means the percentage of the tube wall thickness affected or removed by degradation;

5) Defect means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the plugging limit. A tube containing a defect is defective;

6) Plugging Limit means the imperfection depth at or beyond which the tube shall be removed from service and is equal to 40% of the nominal tube wall thickness;

7) Unserviceable describes the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line or feedwater line break as specified in 4.4.5.3c., above;

8) Tube Inspection means an inspection of the steam generator tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely around the U-bend to the top support of the cold leg; and

9) Preservice Inspection means an inspection of the full length of each tube in each steam generator performed by eddy current techniques prior to service to establish a baseline condition of the tubing. This inspection shall be performed prior to initial POWER OPERATION using the equipment and techniques expected to be used during subsequent inservice inspections.

b. The steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE after completing the corresponding actions (plug all tubes exceeding the plugging limit and all tubes containing through-wall cracks) required by Table 4.4-2.

4.4.5.5 Reports

a. Within 15 days following the completion of each inservice inspection of steam generator tubes, the number of tubes plugged in each steam generator shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2;

b. The complete results of the steam generator tube inservice inspection shall be submitted to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 12 months following the completion of the inspection. This Special Report shall include:

1) Number and extent of tubes inspected,

2) Location and percent of wall-thickness penetration for each indication of an imperfection, and

3) Identification of tubes plugged.

c. Results of steam generator tube inspections which fall into Category C-3 shall be reported in a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. This report shall provide a description of investigations conducted to determine cause of the tube degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence.

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TABLE 4.4-1

MINIMUM NUMBER OF STEAM GENERATORS TO BE INSPECTED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION

Preservice Inspection	Yes
No. of Steam Generators per Unit	Four
First Inservice Inspection	Two
Second & Subsequent Inservice Inspections	One1

TABLE NOTATION

1. The inservice inspection may be limited to one steam generator on a rotating schedule encompassing 3 N % of the tubes (where N is the number of steam generators in the plant) if the results of the first or previous inspections indicate that all steam generators are performing in a like manner. Note that under some circumstances, the operating conditions in one or more steam generators may be found to be more severe than those in other steam generators. Under such circumstances the sample sequence shall be modified to inspect the most severe conditions. Each of the other two steam generators not inspected during the first inservice inspections shall be inspected during the second and third inspections. The fourth and subsequent inspections shall follow the instructions described above.

TABLE 4.4–2

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION

1ST SAMPLE INSPECTION			2ND SAMPLE INSPECTION		3RD SAMPLE INSPECTION	
Sample Size	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required
A minimum of S Tubes per S. G.	C–1	None	N. A.	N. A.	N. A.	N. A.
	C–2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 2S tubes in this S. G.	C–1	None	N. A.	N. A.
			C–2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 4S tubes in this S. G.	C–1	None
					C–2	Plug defective tubes
					C–3	Perform action for C–3 result of first sample
			C–3	Perform action for C–3 result of first sample	N. A.	N. A.
	C–3	Inspect all tubes in this S. G., plug defective tubes and inspect 2S tubes in each other S. G. Notification to NRC pursuant to §50.72 (b)(2) of 10 CFR Part 50	All other S. G.s are C–1	None	N. A.	N. A.
			Some S. G.s C–2 but no additional S. G. are C–3	Perform action for C–2 result of second sample	N. A.	N. A.
			Additional S. G. is C–3	Inspect all tubes in each S. G. and plug defective tubes. Notification to NRC pursuant to §50.72 (b)(2) of 10 CFR Part 50	N. A.	N. A.

$S = 3 \frac{N}{n} \%$ Where N is the number of steam generators in the unit, and n is the number of steam generators inspected during an inspection

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3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.6.1 The following Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. The Containment Atmosphere Particulate and Gaseous Radioactivity Monitoring System,

b. The Containment Floor Drain and Reactor Cavity Flow Monitoring System, and

c. The containment air pressure instrumentation and reactor containment fan cooler outlets and inlets Dewcell and dry bulb temperature instrumentation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only two of the above required Leakage Detection Systems OPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed for gaseous and particulate radioacitivity at least once per 24 hours when the required Gaseous or Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.6.1 The Leakage Detection Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Containment Atmosphere Gaseous and Particulate Monitoring System-performance of CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies specified in Table 4.3-3,

b. Containment Floor Drain and Reactor Cavity Flow Monitoring System-performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months, and

c. Verify the oil separator portion of the containment floor drain collection sump has been filled to the level of the overflow to the containment floor drain unidentified leakage collection weir box once per 18 months, following refueling, and prior to initial startup.

d. Containment air pressure and reactor containment fan cooler outlet and inlet temperatures-performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. 1 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 1 gpm total reactor-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators not isolated from the Reactor Coolant System and 500 gallons per day through any one steam generator,

d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE frc :he Reactor Coolant System,

e. 40 gpm CONTROLLED LEAKAGE at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2235 ± 20 psig, and

f. 1 gpm leakage at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2235 ± 20 psig from any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve leakage greater than the above limit, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.6.2.1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere gaseous and particulate radioactivity monitor at least once per 12 hours;

b. Monitoring the reactor cavity sump discharge, and the containment floor drain sump discharge and inventory at least once per 12 hours;

c. Measurement of the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE to the reactor coolant pump seals when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is 2235 ± 20 psig at least once per 31 days with the modulating valve fully open. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4;

d. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours; and

e. Monitoring the Reactor Head Flange Leakoff System at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.6.2.2 Each Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit:

a. At least once per 18 months,

b. Prior to entering MODE 2 whenever the plant has been in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours or more and if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months,

c. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve, and

d. Within 24 hours following valve actuation due to automatic or manual action or flow through the valve.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4.

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TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION
1SI8900A,B,C,D	CHG/SI Check Valve
1SI8815	CHG/SI Backup Check Valve
1SI8948A,B,C,D	Accumulator Check Valve
1SI8956A,B,C,D	Accumulator Backup Check Valve
1SI8818A,B,C,D	RHR Cold Leg Check Valve
1SI8819A,B,C,D	SI Cold Leg Check Valve
1SI8949A,B,C,D	SI Hot Leg Check Valve
1SI8905A,B,C,D	SI Hot Leg Backup Check Valve
1SI8841A,B	RHR Hot Leg Check Valve

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3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be maintained within the limits specified in Table 3.4-2.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4:

a. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Steady-State Limit but within its Transient Limit, restore the parameter to within its Steady-State Limit within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

b. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Transient Limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

At All Other Times:

With the concentration of either chloride or fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System in excess of its Steady-State Limit for more than 24 hours or in excess of its Transient Limit, reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than or equal to 500 psig, if applicable, and perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 500 psig or prior to proceeding to MODE 4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be determined to be within the limits by analysis of those parameters at the frequencies specified in Table 4.4-3.

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TABLE 3.4-2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

CHEMISTRY LIMITS

PARAMETER	STEADY-STATE LIMIT	TRANSIENT LIMIT
Dissolved Oxygen*	$\leq$ 0.10 ppm	$\leq$ 1.00 ppm
Chloride	$\leq$ 0.15 ppm	$\leq$ 1.50 ppm
Fluoride	$\leq$ 0.15 ppm	$\leq$ 1.50 ppm

*Limit not applicable with T_{avg} less than or equal to 250°F.

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TABLE 4.4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

CHEMISTRY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

PARAMETER	SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY
Dissolved Oxygen*	At least once per 72 hours
Chloride	At least once per 72 hours
Fluoride	At least once per 72 hours

*Not required with T_{avg} less than or equal to 250°F

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3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.8 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to:

a. Less than or equal to 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and

b. Less than or equal to $100/\bar{E}$ microCuries per gram of gross radioactivity.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2 and 3*:

a. With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 but within the allowable limit (below and to the left of the line) shown on Figure 3.4-1, operation may continue for up to 48 hours provided that the cumulative operating time under these circumstances does not exceed 800 hours in any consecutive 12-month period. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable;

b. With the total cumulative operating time at a reactor coolant specific activity greater than 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 exceeding 500 hours in any consecutive 6-month period, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, indicating the number of hours above this limit. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable;

c. With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 for more than 48 hours during one continuous time interval or exceeding the limit line shown on Figure 3.4-1, be in at least HOT STANDBY with T_{avg} less than 500°F within 6 hours; and

d. With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than $100/\bar{E}$ microCuries per gram of gross radioactivity, be in at least HOT STANDBY with T_{avg} less than 500°F within 6 hours.

* With T_{avg} greater than or equal to 500°F.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5:

With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 or greater than 100/Ē microCuries per gram of gross radioactivity, perform the sampling and analysis requirements of Item 4.a) of Table 4.4-4 until the specific activity of the reactor coolant is restored to within its limits. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days with a copy to the Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Attention: Chief, Core Performance Branch, and Chief, Accident Evaluation Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 20555. This report shall contain the results of the specific activity analyses together with the following information:

a. Reactor power history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded;

b. Results of: (1) the last isotopic analysis for radioiodine performed prior to exceeding the limit, (2) analysis while limit was exceeded, and (3) one analysis after the radioiodine was reduced to less than the limit, including for each isotopic analysis, the date and time of sampling and the radioiodine concentration;

c. Clean-up flow history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded,

d. History of degassing operations, if any, starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded, and

e. The time duration when the specific activity of the primary coolant exceeded 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.8 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be determined to be within the limits by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.4-4.

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

FIGURE 3.4-1

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY > 1μCi/GRAM DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

TABLE 4.4-4

REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS	SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY	MODES IN WHICH SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS REQUIRED
1. Gross Radioactivity Determination**	At least once per 72 hours	1, 2, 3, 4
2. Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	Once per 14 days	1
3. Radiochemical for $\bar{E}$ Determination***	Once per 6 months*	1
4. Isotopic Analysis for Iodine Including I-131, I-133, and I-135	a) Once per 4 hours, whenever the specific activity exceeds 1 μCi/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 or 100/$\bar{E}$ μCi/gram of gross radioactivity, and	1#, 2#, 3#, 4#, 5#
	b) One sample between 2 and 6 hours following a THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of the RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1-hour period.	1, 2, 3

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TABLE 4.4-4 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

#Until the specific activity of the Reactor Coolant System is restored within its limits.

*Sample to be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of POWER OPERATION have elapsed since reactor was last subcritical for 48 hours or longer.

**A gross radioactivity analysis shall consist of the quantitative measurement of the total specific activity of the reactor coolant except for radionuclides with half-lives less than 10 minutes and all radioiodines. The total specific activity shall be the sum of the degassed beta-gamma activity and the total of all identified gaseous activities in the sample within 2 hours after the sample is taken and extrapolated back to when the sample was taken. Determination of the contributors to the gross specific activity shall be based upon those energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidence level. The latest available isotopic decay data may be used for pure beta-emitting radio-nuclides.

***A radiochemical analysis for $\overline{E}$ shall consist of the quantitative measurement of the specific activity for each radionuclide, except for radionuclides with half-lives less than 10 minutes and all radio-iodines, which is identified in the reactor coolant. The specific activities for these individual radionuclides shall be used in the determination of $\overline{E}$ for the reactor coolant sample. Determination of the contributors to $\overline{E}$ shall be based upon these energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidence level.

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3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,

b. A maximum cooldown of 100°F in any 1-hour period, and

c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to 10°F in any 1-hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS T_{avg} and pressure to less than 200°F and 500 psig, respectively, within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.9.1.2 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figures 3.4-2, 3.4-3, and 3.4-4.

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

FIGURE 3.4-2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS
APPLICABLE UP TO 32 EPPY



FIGURE 3.4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLDOWN LIMITATIONS
APPLICABLE UP TO 32 EPPY

TABLE 4.4-5

REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM - WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE

CAPSULE NUMBER	VESSEL LOCATION	LEAD FACTOR	WITHDRAWAL TIME (EFPY)*
U	58.5°	4.00	1st Refueling
X	238.5°	3.69	6
V	61°	3.69	10
Y	241°	4.00	15
W	121.5°	4.00	Standby
Z	301.5°	4.00	Standby

*Withdrawal time may be modified to coincide with those refueling outages or reactor shutdowns most closely approaching the withdrawal schedule.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,

b. A maximum cooldown of 200°F in any 1-hour period, and

c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of 320°F.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours during auxiliary spray operation.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 At least one of the following Overpressure Protection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a Setpoint of 450 psig ± 1%, or

b. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift Setpoints that vary with RCS temperature which do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4, or

c. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

ACTION:

a. With one PORV and one RHR suction relief valve inoperable, either restore two PORVs or two RHR suction relief valves to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.

b. With both PORVs and both RHR suction relief valves inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2 square inch vent within 8 hours.

c. In the event the PORVs, or the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, or the RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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

FIGURE 3.4-4

NOMINAL PORV PRESSURE RELIEF SETPOINT VERSUS
RCS TEMPERATURE FOR THE COLD OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM

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4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE;

b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and

c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.2 Each RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when the RHR suction relief valves are being used for cold overpressure protection as follows:

a. For RHR suction relief valve 8708B:

   1) By verifying at least once per 31 days that RHR RCS Suction Isolation Valve 1RH8702A is open with power to the valve operator removed, and

   2) By verifying at least once per 12 hours that 1RH8702B is open.

b. For RHR suction relief valve 8708A:

   1) By verifying at least once per 31 days that 1RH8701B is open with power to the valve operator removed, and

   2) By verifying at least once per 12 hours that 1RH8701A is open.

c. Testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.3 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

*Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

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3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.10 The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be maintained in accordance with Specification 4.4.10.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

ACTION:

a. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 1 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

b. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 2 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

c. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 3 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) from service.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.10 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each reactor coolant pump flywheel shall be inspected as follows:

a. Volumetric examination of the areas of higher stress concentration at the bore and keyways will be performed each 40 month period during refueling or maintenance shutdowns coinciding with the service inspection schedule as required by Section XI of the ASME Code.

b. Visual examination of all exposed surfaces will be performed and a surface examination of the bore and keyway surfaces will be performed whenever the flywheels are removed for maintenance purposes, but not more frequently than once each 10 year interval.

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3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.11 At least two reactor vessel head vent paths, each consisting of two valves in series powered from emergency buses, shall be OPERABLE and closed.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one of the above reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable vent path is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuator of all the valves in the inoperable vent path; restore the inoperable vent path to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With both of the above reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable; maintain the inoperable vent paths closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the valves in the inoperable vent paths, and restore at least one of the vent paths to OPERABLE status within 72 days or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.11 Each reactor vessel head vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position.

b. Cycling each valve in the vent path through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room during COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING.

c. Verifying flow through the reactor vessel head vent paths during venting operations at COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open,

b. A contained borated water level of between 34% and 66%,

c. A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2100 ppm, and

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 617 and 662 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by:

1) Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and

2) Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 70 gallons by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution,

c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected from the circuit by removing the control fuses.

4.5.1.2 Each accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

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3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - $T_{avg} \geq 350°F$

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,

b. One OPERABLE Safety Injection pump,

c. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,

d. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and

e. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and automatic opening of the containment sump suction valves.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

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4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

Valve Number	Valve Function	Valve Position
MOV SI8806	Suction to the SI Pumps	Open
MOV SI8835	SI Pump Discharge To RCS Cold Legs	Open
MOV SI8813	SI Pump Recirculation To The RWST	Open
MOV SI8809A	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs	Open
MOV SI8809B	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs	Open
MOV SI8840	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	Closed
MOV SI8802A	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	Closed
MOV SI8802B	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	Closed

b. At least once per 31 days by:

1) Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points, and

2) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

1) For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and

2) Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR System from the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that:

a) With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 360 psig the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, and

b) With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 662 psig the interlocks will cause the valves to automatically close.

2) A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal and on a RWST Level-Low-Low test signal, and

2) Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection actuation test signal:

a) Centrifugal charging pump,

b) Safety Injection pump, and

c) RHR pump.

f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated discharge pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1) Centrifugal charging pump $\geq$ 2476 psig,

2) Safety Injection pump $\geq$ 1472 psig, and

3) RHR pump $\geq$ 182 psig.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

g. By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:

   1) Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and

   2) At least once per 18 months.

High Head SI System Valve Number	SI System Valve Number
1SI8810 A,B,C,D	1SI8822 A,B,C,D 1SI8816 A,B,C,D

h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

   1) For centrifugal charging pump lines, with a single pump running:

      a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 330 gpm, and

      b) The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 535 gpm, including a simulated seal injection flow of 80 gpm.

   2) For Safety Injection pump lines, with a single pump running:

      a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 460 gpm, and

      b) The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 650 gpm.

   3) For RHR pump lines, with a single pump running, the sum of the injection line flow rates is greater than or equal to 3800 gpm.

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3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_{avg} < 350°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,*

b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,

c. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and

d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.

b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the RHR heat exchanger or RHR pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} less than 350°F by use of alternate heat removal methods.

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission within 90 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

* A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 330°F.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable requirements of Specification 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 All charging pumps and Safety Injection pumps, except the above required OPERABLE pumps, shall be demonstrated inoperable* by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position at least once per 12 hours whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 330°F.

*An inoperable pump may be energized for testing or for filling accumulators provided the discharge of the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed from the valve operator, or by a manual isolation valve secured in the closed position.

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3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the heat traced portions of the associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water level of 89%,

b. A minimum boron concentration of 2000 ppm,

c. A minimum water temperature of 35°F, and

d. A maximum water temperature of 100°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1) Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and

2) Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is either less than 35°F or greater than 100°F.

c. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST vent path temperature to be greater than or equal to 35°F when the outside air temperature is less than 35°F.

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3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3;

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and

c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at a pressure not less than P_a, 43.6 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than 0.60 L_a.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:

1) Less than or equal to L_a, 0.10% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, 43.6 psig, or

2) Less than or equal to L_t, 0.07% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_t, 21.8 psig.

b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L_a for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P_a.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, as applicable, or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L_a, restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than 0.75 L_a or less than 0.75 L_t, as applicable, and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L_a prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972:

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 ± 10 month intervals during shutdown at a pressure not less than P_a, 43.6 psig, or P_t, 21.8 psig, during each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection;

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b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet either 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L_a, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L_a, at which time the above test schedule may be resumed;

c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:

   1) Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the containment leakage rate calculated in accordance with ANSI N45.4-1972 Appendix C, is within 25% of the containment leakage rate measured prior to the introduction of the superimposed leak;

   2) Has a duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test; and

   3) Requires that the rate at which gas is injected into the containment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test is between 0.75 L_a and 1.25 L_a.

d. Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at a pressure not less than P_a, 43.6 psig, at intervals no greater than 24 months except for tests involving:

   1) Air locks, and

   2) Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals.

e. Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.3;

f. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.7.3 or 4.6.1.7.4, as applicable; and

g. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exits through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and

b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 L_a at P_a, 43.6 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:

1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed;

2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days;

3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying seal leakage is less than 0.01 L_a standard cubic feet per hour when the volume between the door seals is pressurized to greater than or equal to 10 psig, for at least 15 minutes;

b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests at not less than P_a, 43.6 psig, and verifying the overall air lock leakage rate is within its limit:

   1) At least once per 6 months,* and

   2) Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sealing capability.**

c. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

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*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

**This represents an exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph III D.2(b)(ii).

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INTERNAL PRESSURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.4 Primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between -0.1 and +0.3 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.4 The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 12 hours.

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AIR TEMPERATURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment average air temperature greater than 120°F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shall be the arithmetical average of the temperatures of the running fans at the following locations and shall be determined at least once per 24 hours:

Location

1A. RCFC Dry Bulb Inlet Temperature

1B. RCFC Dry Bulb Inlet Temperature

1C. RCFC Dry Bulb Inlet Temperature

1D. RCFC Dry Bulb Inlet Temperature.

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CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment vessel shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With more than one tendon with an observed lift-off force between the predicted lower limit and 90% of the predicted lower limit or with one tendon below 90% of the predicted lower limit, restore the tendon(s) to the required level of integrity within 15 days and perform an engineering evaluation of the containment and provide a Special Report to the Commission within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With any abnormal degradation of the structural integrity other than ACTION a. at a level below the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.6.1.6, restore the containment vessel to the required level of integrity within 72 hours and perform an engineering evaluation of the containment and provide a Special Report to the Commission within 15 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2 or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.6.1 Containment Vessel Tendons. The containment vessel tendons' structural integrity shall be demonstrated at the end of 1, 3, and 5 years following the initial containment vessel structural integrity test and at 5-year intervals thereafter. The tendons' structural integrity shall be demonstrated by:

a. Determining that a random but representative sample of at least 19 tendons (5 dome, 6 vertical, and 8 hoop) each have an observed lift-off force within predicted limits for each. For each subsequent inspection one tendon from each group may be kept unchanged to develop a history and to correlate the observed data. If the observed lift-off force of any one tendon in the original sample population lies between the predicted lower limit and 90% of the predicted lower limit, two tendons, one on each side of this tendon should be checked for their lift-off forces. If both of these adjacent tendons are found to be within their predicted limits, all three tendons should be restored to the required level of integrity. This single deficiency may be considered unique and acceptable. Unless there is abnormal degradation of the containment vessel during the first three inspections, the sample population for subsequent inspections shall include at least 10 tendons (3 dome, 3 vertical, and 4 hoop);

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b. Performing tendon detensioning, inspections, and material tests on a previously stressed tendon from each group (dome, vertical, and hoop). A randomly selected tendon from each group shall be completely detensioned in order to identify broken or damaged wires and determining that over the entire length of the removed wire or strand that:

   1) The tendon wires or strands are free of corrosion, cracks, and damage,

   2) There are no changes in the presence or physical appearance of the sheathing filler-grease, and

   3) A minimum tensile strength of 240,000 psi (guaranteed ultimate strength of the tendon material) for at least three wire or strand samples (one from each end and one at mid-length) cut from each removed wire or strand. Failure of any one of the wire or strand samples to meet the minimum tensile strength test is evidence of abnormal degradation of the containment vessel structure.

c. Performing tendon retensioning of those tendons detensioned for inspection to their observed lift-off force with a tolerance limit of +6%. During retensioning of these tendons, the changes in load and elongation should be measured simultaneously at a minimum of three approximately equally spaced levels of force between zero and the seating force. If the elongation corresponding to a specific load differs by more than 5% from that recorded during installation, an investigation should be made to ensure that the difference is not related to wire failures or slip of wires in anchorages;

d. Assuring the observed lift-off stresses adjusted to account for elastic losses exceed the average minimum design value given below:

Dome	143 ksi
Vertical	144 ksi
Hoop	140 ksi

e. Verifying the OPERABILITY of the sheathing filler grease by assuring:

   1) No voids in excess of 5% of the net duct volume,

   2) Minimum grease coverage exists for the different parts of the anchorage system, and

   3) The chemical properties of the filler material are within the tolerance limits as specified by the manufacturer.

4.6.1.6.2 End Anchorages and Adjacent Concrete Surfaces. The structural integrity of the end anchorages of all tendons inspected pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.6.1 and the adjacent concrete surfaces shall be demonstrated by determining through inspection that no apparent changes have occurred in the visual appearance of the end anchorage or the concrete crack patterns adjacent to the end anchorages. Inspections of the concrete shall be performed during the containment vessel tandon tests (reference Specification 4.6.1.6.1).

4.6.1.6.3 Containment Vessel Surfaces. The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel, including the liner plate, shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of these surfaces. This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 Each containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be OPERABLE and:

a. Each 48-inch containment shutdown purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be closed and power removed, and

b. The 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve(s) may be open for up to 1000 hours during a calendar year provided no more than one line is open at one time.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With a 48-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve open and/or powered, close and remove power to isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With the 8-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) open for more than 1000 hours during a calendar year, close the open 8-inch valve(s) or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With a containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) having a measured leakage rate in excess of the limits of Specifications 4.6.1.7.3 and/or 4.6.1.7.4, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 Each 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve(s) shall be verified closed and power removed at least once per 31 days.

4.6.1.7.2 The cumulative time that all 8-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valves have been open during a calendar year shall be determined at least once per 7 days.

4.6.1.7.3 At least once per 6 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, the inboard and outboard valves with resilient material seals in each closed 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust penetration shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than 0.05 L_a when pressurized to at least P_a, 43.6 psig.

4.6.1.7.4 At least once per 3 months, each 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than 0.01 L_a when pressurized to at least P_a, 43.6 psig.

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3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Two independent Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE with each Spray System capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.1 Each Containment Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 265 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

   1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Spray Actuation test signal, and

   2) Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a Containment Spray Actuation test signal.

d. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

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SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A spray additive tank containing a level of between 78.6% and 90.3% of between 30 and 36% by weight NaOH solution, and

b. Two spray additive eductors each capable of adding NaOH solution from the spray additive tank to a Containment Spray System pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the Spray Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

b. At least once per 6 months by:

1) Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and

2) Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Containment Spray Actuation test signal; and

d. At least once per 5 years by verifying each water flow rate equivalent to 55(+5,-0) gallons per minute for 30% NaOH from the Educator test connections in the Spray Additive System:

1) CS26A $68\ {}^{+6}_{-0}$ gpm (Train A), and

2) CS26B $68\ {}^{+6}_{-0}$ gpm (Train B).

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.3 Two electrically independent systems of containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE with two fans to each system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one system of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable system of cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With two systems of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore at least one system of cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore both above required systems of cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With one system of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable and one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore the inoperable system of containment cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.3 Each system of containment cooling fans shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1) Starting each fan system in slow speed from the control room, and verifying that each fan system operates for at least 15 minutes, and

2) Verifying an essential service water flow rate of greater than or equal to 2660 gpm to each cooler.

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each fan system starts automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

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3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position;

b. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; and

c. Verifying that on a Containment Vent Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

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TABLE 3.6-1

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (sec)	TYPE OF OPERATOR
1. Phase "A" Isolation			
1CV8100	Chemical and Volume Control	10	Motor
1CV8112	Chemical and Volume Control	10	Motor
1CV8152	Chemical and Volume Control	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1CV8160	Chemical and Volume Control	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1W0056A	Chilled Water	50	Motor
1W0056B	Chilled Water	50	Motor
1W0020A	Chilled Water	50	Motor
1W0006A	Chilled Water	50	Motor
1W0020B	Chilled Water	50	Motor
1W0006B	Chilled Water	50	Motor
1CC9437B	Component Cooling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1CC9437A	Component Cooling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FP010	Fire Protection	12	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FP011	Fire Protection	12	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1IA065	Instrument Air	15	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1IA066	Instrument Air	15	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1OG079	Off-gas	60	Motor
1OG080	Off-gas	60	Motor
1OG081	Off-gas	60	Motor
1OG057A	Off-gas	60	Motor
1OG082	Off-gas	60	Motor
1OG083	Off-gas	60	Motor
1OG084	Off-gas	60	Motor
1OG085	Off-gas	60	Motor
1PR001A	Process Radiation	4.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PR001B	Process Radiation	4.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PR066	Process Radiation	5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory

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TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (sec)	TYPE OF OPERATOR
1. Phase "A" Isolation (Continued)			
1PS228A	Process Sampling	N.A.*	Solenoid
1PS229A	Process Sampling	N.A.*	Solenoid
1PS230A	Process Sampling	N.A.*	Solenoid
1PS228B	Process Sampling	N.A.*	Solenoid
1PS229B	Process Sampling	N.A.*	Solenoid
1PS230B	Process Sampling	N.A.*	Solenoid
1PS9354A	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PS9354B	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PS9355A	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PS9355B	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PS9356A	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PS9356B	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PS9357A	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1PS9357B	Process Sampling	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RE9157	Reactor and Containment Drains to Radiowaste	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RE9159A	Reactor and Containment Drains to Radiowaste	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RE9159B	Reactor and Containment Drains to Radiowaste	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RE9160A	Reactor and Containment Drains to Radiowaste	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RE9160B	Reactor and Containment Drains to Radiowaste	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RE1003	Reactor and Containment Drains to Radiowaste	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RE9170	Reactor and Containment Drains to Radiowaste	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RY8025	Reactor Coolant Pressurizer	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RY8026	Reactor Coolant Pressurizer	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory

*Proper valve operation will be demonstrated by verifying that the valve strokes to its required position.

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TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (sec)	TYPE OF OPERATOR
1. Phase "A" Isolation (Continued)			
1RY8033	Reactor Coolant Pressurizer	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RY8028	Reactor Coolant Pressurizer	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SI8880	Safety Injection	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SI8964	Safety Injection	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SI8871	Safety Injection	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SI8888	Safety Injection	10	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SA032	Service Air	4.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SA033	Service Air	4.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002C	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD005B	Steam Generator Blowdown	3	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002D	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002A	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD005A	Steam Generator Blowdown	3	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002B	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002E	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD005C	Steam Generator Blowdown	3	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002F	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002G	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD005D	Steam Generator Blowdown	3	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1SD002H	Steam Generator Blowdown	7.5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RF026	Waste Disposal	15	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1RF027	Waste Disposal	15	Air Operator with solenoid accessory

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TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (sec)	TYPE OF OPERATOR
2. Feedwater Isolation			
1FW009A	S/G Feedwater	5	Hydraulic Operator
1FW009B	S/G Feedwater	5	Hydraulic Operator
1FW009C	S/G Feedwater	5	Hydraulic Operator
1FW009D	S/G Feedwater	5	Hydraulic Operator
1FW035A	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW035B	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW035C	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW035D	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW039A	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW039B	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW039C	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW039D	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW043A	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW043B	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW043C	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1FW043D	S/G Feedwater	6	Air Operator with solenoid accessory

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TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NO.	FUNCTION	ISOLATION TIME (sec)	TYPE OF OPERATOR
3. Containment Ventilation Isolation			
1VQ005A	Containment Purge	5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1VQ005B	Containment Purge	5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1VQ005C	Containment Purge	5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1VQ003	Containment Purge	5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1VQ002A	Containment Purge	5	Hydraulic Operator
1VQ002B	Containment Purge	5	Hydraulic Operator
1VQ004A	Containment Purge	5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1VQ004B	Containment Purge	5	Air Operator with solenoid accessory
1VQ001A	Containment Purge	5	Hydraulic Operator
1VQ001B	Containment Purge	5	Hydraulic Operator
4. Phase "B"/Components Isolation			
1CC9414	Component Cooling	10	Motor
1CC9416	Component Cooling	10	Motor
1CC685	Component Cooling	10	Motor
1CC9438	Component Cooling	10	Motor
1CC9413A	Component Cooling	10	Motor
1CC9413B	Component Cooling	10	Motor
5. Safety Injection/Main Steam Isolation			
1MS001D	Main Steam	5	Hydraulic
1MS101D	Main Steam	10	Air Operator with Solenoid Accessory
1MS001B	Main Steam	5	Hydraulic
1MS101B	Main Steam	10	Air Operator with Solenoid Accessory
1MS001A	Main Steam	5	Hydraulic
1MS101A	Main Steam	10	Air Operator with Solenoid Accessory
1MS001C	Main Steam	5	Hydraulic
1MS101C	Main Steam	10	Air Operator with Solenoid Accessory

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3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

HYDROGEN MONITORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With one hydrogen monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

b. With both hydrogen monitors inoperable, restore at least one monitor to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK and a check that the monitor is in standby mode at least once per 12 hours, an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using sample gas containing:

a. Nominal one volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and

b. Nominal four volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

*The monitors must be in standby mode to meet the requirement in NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1.6.

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ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.2 Two independent Hydrogen Recombiner Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2

ACTION:

With one Hydrogen Recombiner System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.2 Each Hydrogen Recombiner System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 6 months by verifying, during a Recombiner System functional test that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to greater than or equal to 1200°F within 90 minutes. Upon reaching 1200°F, increase the temperature controller to maximum setting for 2 minutes and verify that the power meter reads greater than or equal to 38 kW, and

b. At least once per 18 months by:

   1) Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombiner instrumentation and control circuits,

   2) Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiners enclosure (i.e., loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.), and

   3) Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a resistance to ground test following the above required functional test. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be greater than or equal to 10,000 ohms.

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3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2, and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

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TABLE 3.7-1

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING FOUR LOOP OPERATION

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE SAFETY VALVES ON ANY OPERATING STEAM GENERATOR	MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT (PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER)
1	87
2	65
3	43

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TABLE 3.7-2

STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP

VALVE NUMBER	LIFT SETTING (±1%)*	ORIFICE SIZE
1MS013(A-D)	1235 psig	16 in^2
1MS014(A-D)	1220 psig	16 in^2
1MS015(A-D)	1205 psig	16 in^2
1MS016(A-D)	1190 psig	16 in^2
1MS017(A-D)	1175 psig	16 in^2

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.2 At least two independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

a. One motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an ESF Bus, and

b. One direct-driven diesel auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from a direct-drive diesel engine and an OPERABLE Diesel Fuel Supply System consisting of a day tank containing a minimum level of 71% (420 gallons) of fuel.

c. With the "A" diesel generator in Unit 2 inoperable for seven days, immediately restore it to an operable condition or place Unit 1 in hot shutdown within 6 hours and in cold shutdown within an additional 6 hours.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With both auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

c. With the "A" diesel generator in Unit 2 inoperable for seven days, immediately restore it to an operable condition or place Unit 1 in hot shutdown within 6 hours ana in cold shutdown within an additional 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1) Verifying that the pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 1825 psid at a flow of greater than or equal to 85 gpm on the recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2) Verifying by flow or position check that each non-automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

3) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path is in the fully open position whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is placed in automatic control or when above 10% RATED THERMAL POWER.

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal, and

2) Verifying that the motor-driven pump and the direct-driven diesel pump start automatically upon receipt of each of the following test signals:

a) ESF, or

b) Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low from one steam generator, or

c) Undervoltage on Reactor Coolant Pump 6.9 kV Buses (2/4), or

d) ESF Bus 141 Undervoltage (motor-driven pump only).

4.7.1.2.2 An auxiliary feedwater flow path to each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying normal flow to each steam generator.

4.7.1.2.3 The auxiliary feedwater pump diesel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying the fuel level in its day tank;

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from its day tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D270-1975 is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM-D975-1977 when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment; and

c. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of service.

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CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with a contained water level of at least 40%.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With the CST inoperable, within 4 hours either:

a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, or

b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the Essential Service Water System as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

4.7.1.3.2 The Essential Service Water System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by performing the surveillance specified in Specification 4.7.4a. whenever the Essential Service Water System is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

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SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be less than or equal to 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System greater than 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be determined to be within the limit by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.7-1.

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TABLE 4.7-1

SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS	SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY
1. Gross Radioactivity Determination*	At least once per 72 hours.
2. Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	a) Once per 31 days, whenever the gross radioactivity determination indicates concentrations greater than 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines. b) Once per 6 months, whenever the gross radioactivity determination indicates concentrations less than or equal to 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines.

*A gross radioactivity analysis shall consist of the quantitative measurement of the total specific activity of the secondary coolant except for radionuclides with half-lives less than 10 minutes. Determination of the contributors to the gross specific activity shall be based upon those energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidence level.

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MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

MODE 1:

With one MSIV inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

MODES 2 and 3:

With one MSIV inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is maintained closed. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

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3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.2 The temperatures of both the reactor and secondary coolants in the steam generator shall be greater than 70°F when the pressure of either coolant in the steam generator is greater than 200 psig.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied:

a. Reduce the steam generator pressure of the applicable side to less than or equal to 200 psig within 30 minutes, and

b. Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effect of the overpressurization on the structural integrity of the steam generator. Determine that the steam generator remains acceptable for continued operation prior to increasing its temperatures above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.2 The pressure in each side of the steam generator shall be determined to be less than 200 psig at least once per hour when the temperature of either the reactor or secondary coolant is less than 70°F.

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3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.3 The Component Cooling Water System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two safety loops serving the RH pumps and RH heat exchangers.

b. Two component cooling water pumps powered from 4 KV buses 141 and 142.

c. Two component coding heat exchangers.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With only one safety loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With only one component cooling water pump OPERABLE, restore at least two pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With only one heat exchanger OPERABLE, restore at least two heat exchangers to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.3.1 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

4.7.3.2 At least two component cooling water pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performing the following:

a. The component cooling pumps shall be operated each month. Performance will be acceptable if the pump starts upon actuation, operates for at least 4 hours, and satisfies the cooling requirements for the routine operation of the component cooling system.

b. By verifying at least once per 18 months during shutdown that each component cooling pump starts automatically on a SI test signal. This will include a test of the common component cooling pump while powered from 4 KV buses 141 and 142.

4.2.3.3 At least two component cooling heat exchangers shall be verified OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by:

a. Verifying that each component cooling heat exchanger inlet and outlet value is OPERABLE.

b. Verifying the Essential Service Water is available to each component cooling heat exchanger.

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3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.4 At least two independent Essential Service Water Systems, which includes a loop and a cooling tower, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With only one Essential Service Water System OPERABLE, restore at least two Essential Service Water Systems to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.4 At least two Essential Service Water Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

   1) Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection test signal, and

   2) Each Essential Service Water System pump starts automatically on a Safety Injection test signal.

c. At least once per 31 days, by verifying that each cooling tower fan operates for at least 15 minutes and at least once per 18 months by visually inspecting and verifying no abnormal breakage or degradation of the fill materials in the cooling tower.

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3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink (UHS) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. An essential service water pump discharge water temperature of less than or equal to 98°F, and

b. A minimum Rock River water level at or above 671 feet Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, at the Byron Screenhouse, with two essential service water make-up pumps OPERABLE, and

c. Two deep wells OPERABLE with the Rock River water level at or above 702 feet Mean Sea Level USGS datum, at the Byron Screenhouse.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the essential service water pump discharge water temperature not meeting the above requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With the minimum Rock River water level not meeting the above requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With only essential service water make-up pump OPERABLE restore two essential service water make-up pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

d. With one deep well inoperable, restore both deep wells to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.5.1 The UHS shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by verifying the essential service water pump discharge water temperature and the Rock River water level to be within their limits.

4.7.5.2 The deep wells shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by starting each pump and operating it for at least 15 minutes and verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position, and

b. At least once per 18 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.7.5.3 The essential service water make-up pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:

1) The fuel storage tank level is at least 16%,

2) The diesel starts from ambient conditions on a simulated low basin level test signal and operates for at least 30 minutes, and

3) Each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position.

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D270-1975, is within the acceptable limits specific in Table 1 of ASTM-D975-1977 when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment; and

c. At least once per 18 months by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service and by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

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3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.6 Two independent Control Room Ventilation Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

With one Control Room Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

MODES 5 and 6:

a. With one Control Room Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Room Ventilation System in the make-up mode.

b. With both Control Room Ventilation Systems inoperable, or with the OPERABLE Control Room Ventilation System, required to be in the make-up mode by ACTION a. not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.6 Each Control Room Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 90°F;

b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the duct heaters operating;

c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the make-up system filter plenum by:

1) Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 6000 cfm ± 10% for the Make-up System.

2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.2%; and

3) Verifying a system flow rate of 6000 cfm ± 10% for the Make-up System when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

d. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodine penetration of less than 0.2%;

e. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6.0 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 6000 cfm ± 10% for the Make-up System,

2) Verifying that on a Safety Injection signal or High Radiation-Control Room Outside Air Intake test signal, the system automatically switches into a make-up mode of control room ventilation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks,

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3) Verifying that the make-up system maintains the control room at a positive nominal pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water Gauge relative to ambient pressure in areas adjacent to this Control Room Area and

4) Verifying that the heaters dissipate 27.2 ± 2.7 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 6000 cfm ± 10% for the Make-up System; and

g. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 6000 cfm ± 10% for the Make-up System.

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3/4.7.7 NON-ACCESSIBLE AREA EXHAUST FILTER PLENUM VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.7 Three independent non-accessible area exhaust filters plenums (50% capacity each) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one non-accessible area exhaust filters plenum Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.7 Each non-accessible area exhaust filters plenum Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that operation occurs for at least 15 minutes;

b. At least once per 18 months, or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the exhaust filters plenum by:

   1) Verifying that the exhaust filters plenum satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% when using the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the flow rate is 66,900 cfm ± 10%;

   2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample from each filter obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, when the average of the methyl iodide penetration for the three samples is less than 7.1%;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3) Verifying a system flow rate of 66,900 cfm ± 10% through the exhaust filters plenum during operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, when the average of the methyl iodide penetration for the three samples is less than 7.1%;

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks of less than 6.0 inches Water Gauge while operating the exhaust filters plenum at a flow rate of 66,900 cfm ± 10%, and

2) Verifying that the exaust filters plenum starts on manual initiation or Safety Injection test signal.

3) Verifying that the system maintains the ECCS equipment rooms at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/4 in. water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the exhaust filters plenum satisfies the in-place penetration testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating at a flow rate of 66,900 cfm ± 10%; and

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the exhaust filters plenum satisfies the in-place penetration testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% remove greater than in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 66,900 cfm ± 10%.

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3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.8 All hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable on any system, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.8g. on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.8 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Inspection Types

As used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b. Visual Inspections

Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these groups (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule below. The first inservice visual inspection of each type of snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers. If all snubbers of each type on any system are found OPERABLE during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection of that system shall be performed at the first refueling outage. Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections of a given system shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

No. of Inoperable Snubbers of Each Type on Any System per Inspection Period	Subsequent Visual Inspection Period*#
0	18 months ± 25%
1	12 months ± 25%
2	6 months ± 25%
3,4	124 days ± 25%
5,6,7	62 days ± 25%
8 or more	31 days ± 25%

*The inspection interval of each type of snubber on a given system shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a generic problem has been identified and corrected; in that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first time and two steps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found on that system.

#The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

c. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) there are no visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are secure. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that: (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type on that system that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.8f. All snubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservior shall be counted as inoperable snubbers. For those snubbers common to more than one system, the OPERABILITY of such snubbers shall be considered in assessing the surveillance schedule for each of the related systems.

d. Transient Event Inspection

An inspection shall be performed of all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

e. Functional Tests

During the first refueling shutdown and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers of each type shall be tested using one of the following sample plans. The sample plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected for each snubber type prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:

1) At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.8f., an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or

2) A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested in accordance with Figure 4.7-1. "C" is the

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e. Functional Tests (Continued)

total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.7.8f. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on Figure 4.7-1. If at any time the point plotted falls in the "Reject" region, all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested. If at any time the point plotted falls in the "Accept" region, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the "Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the "Accept" region or the "Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested. Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow the day's testing to resume anew at a later time provided all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested; or

3) An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers shall be functionally tested. For each snubber type which does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor, $1 + C/2$, where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance criteria. The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using an "Accept" line which follows the equation $N = 55(1 + C/2)$. Each snubber point should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested. If the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated. If the point plotted falls above the "Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls in the "Accept" region or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.

The representative sample selected for the functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure, as far as practicable, that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, range of size, and capacity of snubbers of each type. Snubbers placed in the same location as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan. If during the functional testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional test results shall be reviewed at that time to determine if additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing.

f. Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The snubber functional test shall verify that:

1) Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression;

2) Snubber bleed, or release rate where required, is present in both tension and compression, within the specified range;

3) Where required, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both directions of travel; and

4) For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

g. Functional Test Failure Analysis

An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the OPERABILITY of other snubbers irrespective of type which may be subject to the same failure mode.

For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached. The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable for meeting the designed service.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lock up or fails to move, i.e., frozen-in-place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated in Specification 4.7.8e. for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

h. Functional Testing of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers

Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. Mechanical snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the freedom-of-motion test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

i. Snubber Service Life Program

The service life of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections. The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be determined and established based on engineering information and shall be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history. Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE. The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.8.2.

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

FIGURE 4.7-1

SAMPLE PLAN 2) FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST

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3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9 Each sealed source containing radioactive material either in excess of 100 microCuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 5 microCuries of alpha emitting material shall be free of greater than or equal to 0.005 microCurie of removable contamination.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With a sealed source having removable contamination in excess of the above limits, immediately withdraw the sealed source from use and either:

   1. Decontaminate and repair the sealed source, or

   2. Dispose of the sealed source in accordance with Commission Regulations.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9.1 Test Requirements - Each sealed source shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination by:

a. The licensee, or

b. Other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State.

The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005 microCurie per test sample.

4.7.9.2 Test Frequencies - Each category of sealed sources (excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux) shall be tested at the frequency described below.

a. Sources in use - At least once per 6 months for all sealed sources containing radioactive materials:

   1) With a half-life greater than 30 days (excluding Hydrogen 3), and

   2) In any form other than gas.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Stored sources not in use - Each sealed source and fission detector shall be tested prior to use or transfer to another licensee unless tested within the previous 6 months. Sealed sources and fission detectors transferred without a certificate indicating the last test date shall be tested prior to being placed into use; and

c. Startup sources and fission detectors - Each sealed startup source and fission detector shall be tested within 31 days prior to being subjected to core flux or installed in the core and following repair or maintenance to the source.

4.7.9.3 Reports - A report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission on an annual basis if sealed source or fission detector leakage tests reveal the presence of greater than or equal to 0.005 microCurie of removable contamination.

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3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.1 The Fire Suppression Water Supply System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two fire suppression pumps with their discharge aligned to the fire suppression header, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the flume and transferring the water through distribution piping with OPERABLE sectionalizing control or isolation valves to:

   1) the yard hydrant isolation valves (for hydrants near buildings containing safety-related equipment),

   2) the last valve ahead of each hose standpipe as required by Specification 3.7.10.5,

   3) the last valve ahead of the deluge valve (on the diesel generator fuel oil storage room foam system and manual containment charcoal filter deluge systems), or

   4) flow alarm valves (on sprinkler systems) as required by Specification 3.7.10.2.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one pump and/or one water supply inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status within 7 days or provide an alternate backup pump or supply. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With the Fire Suppression Water Supply System otherwise inoperable establish a backup Fire Suppression Water Supply System within 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.1.1 The Fire Suppression Water Supply System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying the contained water supply volume,

b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by starting the electric motor-driven pump and operating it for at least 15 minutes on recirculation flow,

c. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position,

d. At least once per 6 months by performance of a system ring header flush,

e. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel,

f. At least once per 18 months by performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its operating sequence, and:

   1) Verifying that each fire pump develops a discharge of 150% of rated capacity at 65% of rated pressure (3750 gpm ± 10% gpm at 107 ± 10% psig), and recording measured performance at minimum and rated loads.

   2) Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and

   3) Verifying that each fire suppression pump starts (sequentially) to maintain the fire suppression water system pressure greater than or equal to 125 psig.

g. At least once per 3 years by performing a flow test of the system in accordance with Chapter 8, Section 16 of the Fire Protection Handbook, 15th Edition, published by the National Fire Protection Association.

4.7.10.1.2 The fire pump diesel engine shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying:

   1) The fuel storage tank contains at least 325 gallons of fuel, and

   2) The diesel starts from ambient conditions and operates for at least 30 minutes on recirculation flow.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel oil day tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D270-1975, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-1977 when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment; and

c. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service.

4.7.10.1.3 The fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery bank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:

   1) The electrolyte level of each battery is above the plates, and

   2) The overall battery voltage is greater than or equal to 24 volts.

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that the specific gravity is appropriate for continued service of the battery, and

c. At least once per 18 months, by verifying that:

   1) The batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and

   2) The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anticorrosion material.

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WATER SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.2 The Water Systems including the Foam Systems in the diesel generator fuel oil storage tank room, the sprinkler systems in the Auxiliary Building, and the containment charcoal filter manual deluge system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the above systems is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required systems inoperable, within 1 hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.2.1 The above required Foam System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days, by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 12 months, by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel,

c. At least once per 18 months:

   1) By performing a system functional test which includes simulated actuation of the system, and:

      a) Verifying a "Fire Trouble" alarm is received when the isolation valve is closed, and

      b) Verifying a "Fire" alarm is received on actuation of the alarm switch.

   2) By a visual inspection of the dry pipe deluge headers to verify their integrity, and

   3) By a visual inspection of each nozzle's spray area to verify the spray pattern is not obstructed.

d. At least once per 3 years by performing an air flow test through each open deluge nozzle and verifying each nozzle is unobstructed.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.7.10.2.2 The required sprinkler system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 92 days:

   1) By discharging water out of the inspectors test connections and verifying a "Fire" alarm.

b. At least once per 12 months:

   1) By a visual inspection of the sprinkler header to verify integrity and that the head spray pattern is not obstructed.

   2) By verifying water flow through the 2-inch test drain at the riser.

4.7.10.2.3 The required manual deluge system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

   1) By cycling the isolation valve and verifying the "Fire Trouble" alarm.

   2) By cycling the deluge valve.

   3) By a visual inspection of the deluge header to verify integrity and that the spray heads are not obstructed.

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CO_2 SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.3 The following CO_2 Systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Diesel generator rooms and day tank rooms,

b. Lower cable spreading room,

c. Auxiliary feedwater diesel room and day tank room, and

d. Diesel-driven Essential Service Water (ESW) make-up pumps and day tank rooms.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the CO_2 systems is required to be OPERABLE:

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required CO_2 systems inoperable, within 1 hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas (Lower Cable Spreading Room) in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.3.1 Each of the above required CO_2 Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position.

4.7.10.3.2 Each of the above required CO_2 Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying the plant CO_2 storage tank level to be greater than 75% (75 tons) and river screen house CO_2 storage tank level to be greater than 50% (1 ton), and pressure of both to be greater than 275 and less than 375 psig, and

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying:

1) The system, including associated ventilation system fire dampers, actuates both automatically upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal, and manually, and

2) Flow from each nozzle during a "Puff Test."

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HALON SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.4 The Halon Systems in the upper cable spreading room shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the Halon System is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required Halon systems inoperable, within 1 hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.4 Each of the above required Halon Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days, by verifying that each solenoid valve in the flow path is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 6 months by verifying Halon storage cylinder weight to be at least 95% of full charge weight and pressure to be at least 90% of full charge pressure, and

c. At least once per 18 months by:

   1) Verifying the system, including associated ventilation dampers, actuates automatically, upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal, and

   2) Performance of a flow test through headers and nozzles to assure no blockage.

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FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.5 The fire hose stations given in Table 3.7-5 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the fire hose stations given in Table 3.7-5 inoperable, provide gated wye (s) on the nearest OPERABLE hose station(s). One outlet of the wye shall be connected to the standard length of hose provided for the hose station. The second outlet of the wye shall be connected to a length of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the area left unprotected by the inoperable hose station. Where it can be demonstrated that the physical routing of the fire hose would result in a recognizable hazard to operating personnel, plant equipment, or the hose itself, the fire hose shall be stored in a roll at the outlet of the operable hose station. Signs shall be mounted above the gated wye(s) to identify the proper hose to use. The above ACTION shall be accomplished within 1 hour if the inoperable fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise route the additional hose within 24 hours.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.5 Each of the fire hose stations given in Table 3.7-5 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days, by a visual inspection of the fire hose stations accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station,

b. At least once per 18 months, by:

   1) Visual inspection of the stations not accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station,

   2) Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and

   3) Inspecting all gaskets and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings.

c. At least once per 3 years, by:

   1) Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve OPERABILITY and no flow blockage, and

   2) Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.

TABLE 3.7-5

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION		ELEVATION	HOSE RACK REEL	ANGLE VALVE
Aux. Roof				
L-10:	South wall U-1 of safety valve penthouse	481	1	OFP331
L-26:	North wall U-2 of safety valve penthouse	481	2	OFP338
Aux. Bldg.				
S-18:	By dumb waiter	480	233	OFP458
S-15:	By U-1 prefilters (near stairs)	471	176	OFP329
S-21:	By U-2 prefilters (near stairs)	471	177	OFP334
Q-17:	Wall by elevator in upper cable room	469	244*	OFP469
Q-19:	Wall by stairs in upper cable room	469	252*	OFP477
L-11:	Outside Southeast corner of upper cable spreading room A-1	467	240	OFP465
L-14:	By the southeast door of UCSR C-1	467	241*	OFP466
M-1[illegible]:	By the northwest corner of UCSR A-1	467	242*	OFP467
Q-13:	In the northwest corner of UCSR B-1	467	243*	OFP468
P-18:	Northwest corner of UCSR C-1	467	245*	OFP470
M-18:	North wall of UCSR C-1	467	246*	OFP471
M-18:	South wall of UCSR C-2	467	247*	OFP472
L-25:	Outside northeast corner of UCSR A-2	467	248	OFP473
L-22:	In the northeast corner of UCSR C-2	467	249*	OFP474
M-23:	In the southwest corner of UCSR A-2	467	250*	OFP475
P-20:	West wall of UCSR C-2	467	251*	OFP476
Q-23:	In the southwest corner of UCSR B-2	467	253*	OFP478
S-21:	By U-2 VA Filters (U-2 side)	464	232	OFP457
S-15:	By U-1 VA Filters (U-1 side)	464	234	OFP459
S-21:	By VA Filters (U-2 side)	456	231	OFP456
S-15:	By VA Filters (U-1 side)	456	235	OFP460
L-10:	By Control room refrig. units	387	106	OFP385
L-12:	By blowdown after filters	387	107	OFP384

*Fire hoses that do not supply the primary means of fire suppression.

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TABLE 3.7-5 (Continued)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION		ELEVATION	HOSE RACK REEL	ANGLE VALVE
Aux. Bldg. (Continued)				
M-18:	By Aux. Feedwater motor driven pump 1A	387	108	0FP383
N-23:	By remote shutdown panel U-1	387	111	0FP376
Q-15:	By 480V MCC 132X3	387	113	0FP382
V-18:	By letdown heat exchanger	387	114	0FP379
P-7:	West Wall 6.9 kV switchgear room	455	20	0FP324
L-11:	In UC HVAC Rm 0A of LCSR C-1	455	22	0FP332
M-8:	South wall of battery room	451	279	0FP638
M-26:	South wall of battery room	451	280	0FP639
M-18:	North wall U-1 AB by door	444	238*	0FP463
L-7:	East wall LCSR A-1	443	207*	0FP330
M-10:	In the southeast corner of LCSR B-1	443	208*	0FP327
P-10:	In the southwest corner of LCSR B-1	443	209*	0FP325
M-13:	South wall of LCSR C-1	443	210*	0FP326
P-15:	West wall of LCSR D-1	443	211*	0FP328
S-21:	By cabinet 2RY01EC (elec. pen. area)	431	229	0FP455
S-24:	By U-2 cont. shield wall (elec pen. area)	431	230	0FP456
S-12:	By U-1 cont. shield wall (elec pen. area)	431	237	0FP462
P-11:	Outside Laundry Room	430	52	0FP313
Q-19:	By U-2 VCT valve aisle	430	54	0FP342
P-24:	By radwaste evaporator	430	55	0FP343
V-17:	By east door to decon/change area	430	58	0FP319
V-17:	By west door to decon/change area	430	61	0FP320
L-11:	By waste oil tank room	405	90	0FP315
P-18:	By elevator	405	91	0FP318
P-23:	By spent resin pumps	405	92	0FP349
Q-11:	By laundry tanks	405	93	0FP314
S-21:	East of U-2 hydrogen recombiner	405	94	0FP348
V-21:	West of U-2 hydrogen recombiner	405	95	0FP345
V-15:	West of U-1 hydrogen recombiner control panel	405	96	0FP316

*Fire hoses that do not supply the primary means of fire suppression.

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TABLE 3.7-5 (Continued)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION	ELEVATION	HOSE RACK REEL	ANGLE VALVE
Aux. Bldg. (Continued)			
S-15: East of U-1 hydrogen recombiner	405	97	0FP317
N-11: By the recycle holdup tanks	368	130	0FP373
M-14: By the U-1 stairs	368	131	0FP374
P-14: By panel 1PL84JB	368	132	0FP369
L-20: By the U-2 stairs	368	133	0FP355
P-21: By the blowdown condenser	368	134	0FP356
L-25: By the PW M/MA pumps	368	135	0FP361
N-25: By chemical drain tank	368	136	0FP357
S-18: By panel 1PL86J	368	138	0FP362
Q-11: By Aux. Bldg. floor drain tanks	368	139	0FP368
U-15: By U-1 spray add tank	368	140	0FP372
P-11: By recycle evaporator feed pumps	350	151	0FP381
M-13: By U-1 stairs	350	152	0FP370
N-23: By gas decay tanks	350	154	0FP352
Q-19: By "B" Aux. Bldg. Equip. drain tank	350	155	0FP365
Q-17: By "A" Aux. Bldg. Equip. drain tank	350	156	0FP371
Q-13: By collection sump pumps	350	157	0FP380
S-18: Between moderating heat exchangers	350	158	0FP354
V-18: Between BR chiller units	350	161	0FP353
W-15: By CS pump 1A	350	163	0FP367
M-13: By leak detection sump	334	165	0FP448
P-18: By elevator pit	334	166	0FP449
Fuel Hand. Bldg.			
Z-15: South of decon. area	430	170	0FP389
X-21: North of spent fuel pool	430	171	0FP386
Z-15: By 480V MCC 134X6	405	172	0FP388
AA-19: Outside FC pump room	405	173	0FP387
Cont. #1			
R-17: By reactor head assembly area	430	62	1FP163
R-2: By accumulator tank 1C	430	63	1FP154

TABLE 3.7-5 (Continued)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION		ELEVATION	HOSE RACK REEL	ANGLE VALVE
Cont. #1 (Continued)				
R-7:	By equipment hatch	430	64	1FP160
R-12:	By charcoal filter 1A	430	65	1FP157
R-17:	By south stairs	403	98	1FP164
R-2:	By RCFC 1C	403	99	1FP155
R-7:	By pressurizer (outside missile shield)	403	100	1FP161
R-12:	By panel 1PL69J	403	101	1FP158
R-12:	By PRT	381	143	1FP159
R-17:	By south stairs	381	144	1FP162
R-2:	By RCFC 1C	381	145	1FP156
R-7:	By panel 1PL52J	381	146	1FP165

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3/4.7.11 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.11 All fire rated assemblies (walls, floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable, piping and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices inoperable, within 1 hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.11.1 At least once per 18 months the above required fire barrier penetrations and penetration sealing devices shall be verified OPERABLE by:

a. performing a visual inspection of:

1. The exposed surfaces of each fire rated assembly,
2. Each fire window/fire damper and associated hardware,
3. At least 10% of each type of sealed penetration. If apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradations are found, a visual inspection of an additional 10% of each type of sealed penetration shall be made. This inspection process shall continue until a 10% sample with no apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradation is found. Samples shall be selected such that each penetration seal will be inspected every 15 years.

b. Performing a functional test of at least 10% of the fire dampers. If any nonconforming dampers are found, an additional 10% will be functionally tested. This process will continue until an acceptable sample is found.

4.7.11.2 Each of the above required fire doors shall be verified OPERABLE by inspecting the release and closing mechanism and latches at least once per 6 months, and by verifying:

a. The OPERABILITY of the Fire Door Supervision System for each electrically supervised fire door by performing a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days,

b. That each locked closed fire door is closed at least once per 7 days, and

c. That each unlocked fire door without electrical supervision is closed at least once per 24 hours.

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3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.12 The temperature of each area shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be maintained within the limits indicated in Table 3.7-6.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-6 for more than 8 hours, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.7.2, a Special Report that provides a record of the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature in the affected area(s) exceeded the limit(s) and an analysis to demonstrate the continued OPERABILITY of the affected equipment.

b. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-6 by more than 30°F, prepare and submit a Special Report as required by ACTION a. above, and within 4 hours either return the area(s) to within the temperature limit(s) or declare the equipment in the affected area(s) inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.12 The temperature in each of the areas shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

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TABLE 3.7-6

AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

	AREA	TEMPERATURE LIMIT (°F)
1.	Misc. Elec. Equip. and Battery Rooms, ESF Switchgear Rms., Div. 12 Cable Spreading	108
2.	Upper and Lower Cable Spreading Rooms	90
3.	Diesel-Generator Rooms, Diesel Oil Storage Rooms	132
4.	Aux. Bldg. Drain Tank Cubicles, Recycle Holdup Tank Cubicles, Gas Decay Tank Cubicle, Gas Decay Pipe Tunnel, Recycle Evap. Pipe Tunnel, Floor Drain Tank Cubicle, Recycle Holdup Pipe Tunnel, Filter Pipe Tunnels, Demineralizer Cubicles, Positive Displacement Pump Rooms, Spent Fuel Pit Pump Room, Aux. Bldg. Vent Exhaust Filter Cubicle Process Filter Cubicles, Centrifugal Charging Pump Rooms	122
5.	Containment Spray Pump Rooms, RHR Pump Rooms, Safety Injection Pump Rooms, Pentration Areas El. 346, 364	130
6.	Control Room	90
7.	Radwaste aporator Cubicles	118
8.	Boric Acid Tank Cubicles	127

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3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Each Class 1E 4160 volt bus capable of being powered from:

   1) Either transformer of a given units normal System Auxiliary Transformer bank, and

   2) Either transformer of the other units System Auxiliary Transformers bank, with

   Each units System Auxiliary Transformer bank energized from an independent transmission circuit.

b. Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

   1) A separate day tank containing a minimum volume of 450 gallons of fuel,

   2) A separate Fuel Oil Storage System containing a minimum volume of 42,000 gallons of fuel, and

   3) A separate fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With either an offsite circuit or diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.1a or Specifications 4.8.1.1.2a.4) and 6) within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Specifications 4.8.1.1.1a and 4.8.1.1.2a.4) within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

c. With one diesel generator inoperable in addition to ACTION a. or b. above, verify that:

   1. All required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and

   2. When in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the Division 21 diesel generator is OPERABLE, if the inoperable diesel generator is the emergency power supply for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

   If these conditions are not satisfied within 2 hours be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

d. With two of the above required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two diesel generators by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.4) within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, unless the diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. With only one offsite source restored, restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

e. With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing Specification 4.8.1.1.1a. within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore at least two diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class 1E Distribution System shall be:

a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability, and

b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring manually unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.

4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1) Verifying the fuel level in the day tank,

2) Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank,

3) Verifying the fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day tank,

4) Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to at least 600 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds.* The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 $\pm$ 420 volts and 60 $\pm$ 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds* after the start signal. The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals:

a) Manual, or

b) Simulated loss of ESF bus voltage by itself, or

c) Simulated loss of ESF bus voltage in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal, or

d) An ESF actuation test signal by itself.

5) Verifying the generator is synchronized, loaded to greater than or equal to 5500 kW in less than or equal to 60 seconds, operates with a load greater than or equal to 5500 kW for at least 60 minutes, and

6) Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated ESF busses.

b. At least once per 31 days and after each operation of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or equal to 1 hour by checking for and removing accumulated water from the day tanks;

c. At least once per 92 days by checking for and removing accumulated water from the fuel oil storage tanks;

d. At least once per 92 days and from new fuel oil prior to its addition to the storage tanks by verifying that a sample obtained in accordance with ASTM-D270-1975 meets the following minimum requirements in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM-D975-1977:

1) A water and sediment content of less than or equal to 0.05 volume percent;

2) A kinematic viscosity of 40°C of greater than or equal to 1.3 centistokes, but less than or equal to 4.1 centistokes;

*The diesel generator start (10 sec) from ambient conditions shall be performed at least once per 184 days in these surveillance tests. All other engine starts for the purpose of this surveillance testing may be preceded by an engine prelube period and/or other warmup procedures recommended by the manufacturer so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.

3) A specific gravity as specified by the manufacturer at 60/60°F of greater than or equal to 0.83 but less than or equal to 0.89 or an API gravity at 60°F of greater than or equal to 27 degrees but less than or equal to 39 degrees;

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1) Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service,

2) Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 1034 kW while maintaining voltage at 4160 ± 420 volts and frequency at 60 ± 4.5 Hz, (transient state), 60 ± 1.2 Hz (steady state).

3) Verifying the diesel generator capability to reject a load of 5500 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 4784 volts during and following the load rejection,

4) Simulating a loss of ESF bus voltage by itself, and:

a) Verifying de-energization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses, and

b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the ESF busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected safe shutdown loads through the load sequencing timer and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz during this test.

5) Verifying that on an ESF Actuation test signal without loss of ESF bus voltages, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the generator steady state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test;

6) Simulating a loss of ESF bus voltage in conjunction with an ESF Actuation test signal, and

   a) Verifying deenergization of the ESF busses and load shedding from the ESF busses;

   b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the ESF busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through the LOCA sequencer and operators for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with emergency loads. After energization, the steady-state voltage and frequency of the ESF busses shall be maintained at 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz during this test; and

   c) Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss-of-voltage on the emergency bus concurrent with a Safety Injection Actuation signal.

7) Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours. During the first 2 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 6050 kW and during the remaining 22 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 5500 kW. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 ± 420 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal; the steady-state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform Specification 4.8.1.1.2f.6)b);*

8) Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 5935 kW;

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*If Specification 4.8.1.1.2f.6)b) is not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test. Instead, the diesel generator may be operated at 5500 kW for 1 hour or until operating temperature has stabilized.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

9) Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:

   a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power,

   b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and

   c) Be restored to its standby status.

10) Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test mode, connected to its bus, a simulated Safety Injection signal overrides the test mode by: (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation and (2) automatically energizing the emergency loads with offsite power;

11) Verifying that the fuel transfer pump transfers fuel from each fuel storage tank to the day tank of each diesel via the installed cross-connection lines;

12) Verifying that the automatic LOCA and Shutdown sequence timer is OPERABLE with the interval between each load block within ± 10% of its design interval; and

13) Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel generator starting only when required:

   a) Turning gear engaged, and

   b) Emergency stop.

f. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting both diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that both diesel generators accelerate to at least 600 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds; and

g. At least once per 10 years by:

1) Draining each fuel oil storage tank, removing the accumulated sediment and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypochlorite solution, and

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2) Performing a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel oil system designed to Section III, subsection ND of the ASME Code at a test pressure equal to 110 percent of the system design pressure.

4.8.1.1.3 Reports - All diesel generator failures, valid or non-valid, shall be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.7.1. Reports of diesel generator failures shall include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977. If the number of failures in the last 100 valid tests (on a per nuclear unit basis) is greater than or equal to 7, the report shall be supplemented to include the additional information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

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Table 4.8-1

DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE

NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 100 VALID TESTS*	TEST FREQUENCY
≤ 1	At least once per 31 days
2	At least once per 14 days
3	At least once per 7 days
≥ 4	At least once per 3 days

*Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, where the last 100 tests are determined on a per nuclear unit basis. For the purposes of this schedule, only valid tests conducted after the completion of the preoperational test requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev 1, Aug 1977, shall be included in the computation of the "last 100 valid tests."

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One class 1E 4160 volt bus capable of being powered from:

1) Either transformer of the associated units System Auxiliary Transformer bank, or

2) Either transformer of the other units System Auxiliary Transformer bank, with

The System Auxiliary Transformer bank supplying the 4160 volt bus energized from an off-site transmission circuit.

b. One diesel generator with:

1) A day tank containing a minimum volume of 450 gallons of fuel,

2) A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 42,000 gallons of fuel, and

3) A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through at least a 2 square inch vent. In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required sources to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 (except for Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.5), and 4.8.1.1.3.

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3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.1 As a minimum the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. 125-Volt D.C. Bus 111 fed from Battery 111, and its associated full capacity charger, and

b. 125-Volt D.C. Bus 112 fed from Battery 112, and its associated full capacity charger.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one of the required battery banks and/or chargers inoperable, restore the inoperable battery bank and/or battery bus to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With the normal full capacity charger inoperable: 1) restore the affected battery and/or battery bus to operable status with the opposite units full capacity charger within 2 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours, and 2) restore the normal full capacity charger to operable status within 24 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.1.1 Each D.C. bus shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from its battery at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment.

4.8.2.1.2 Each 125-volt battery bank and its associated charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:

1) The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and

2) The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 125-volts on float charge.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 105 volts, or battery overcharge with battery terminal voltage above 145 volts, by verifying that:

   1) The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category B limits,

   2) There is no visible corrosion at either terminals or connectors, or the connection resistance of these items is less than 150×10^{-6} ohm*, and

   3) The average electrolyte temperature of all connected cells is above 60°F.

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

   1) The cells, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration,

   2) The cell-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, and coated with anticorrosion material,

   3) The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection is less than or equal to 150×10^{-6} ohm*, and

   4) The battery charger will supply a load equal to the manufacturer's rating for at least 8 hours.

d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual emergency loads for 240 minutes when the battery is subject to a battery service test;

e. At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. This performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test required by Specification 4.8.2.1.2d.;

f. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by giving performance discharge tests of battery capacity to any battery that shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the application. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops more than 10% of rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the manufacturer's rating.

*Obtained by subtracting the normal resistance of: 1) the cross room rack connector (400×10^{-6} ohm, typical) and 2) the bi-level rack connector (50×10^{-6} ohm, typical); from the measured cell-to-cell connection resistance.

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TABLE 4.8-2

BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

PARAMETER	CATEGORY A(1)	CATEGORY B(2)	
	LIMITS FOR EACH DESIGNATED PILOT CELL	LIMITS FOR EACH CONNECTED CELL	ALLOWABLE(3) VALUE FOR EACH CONNECTED CELL
Electrolyte Level	>Minimum level indication mark, and $\leq$ ¼" above maximum level indication mark	>Minimum level indication mark, and $\leq$ ¼" above maximum level indication mark	Above top of plates, and not overflowing
Float Voltage	$\geq$ 2.13 volts	$\geq$ 2.13 volts(6)	> 2.07 volts
Specific Gravity(4)	$\geq$ 1.200(5)	$\geq$ 1.195	Not more than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells
		Average of all connected cells > 1.205	Average of all connected cells $\geq$ 1.195(5)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) For any Category A parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that within 24 hours all the Category B measurements are taken and found to be within their allowable values, and provided all Category A and B parameter(s) are restored to within limits within the next 6 days.

(2) For any Category B parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that the Category B parameters are within their allowable values and provided the Category B parameter(s) are restored to within limits within 7 days.

(3) Any Category B parameter not within its allowable value indicates an inoperable battery.

(4) Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level.

(5) Or battery charging current is less than 2 amps when on charge.

(6) Corrected for average electrolyte temperature.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.2 As a minimum, one 125-volt D.C. bus fed from its battery and its associated full-capacity charger shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

a. With the required battery bank inoperable, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes or movement of irradiated fuel; initiate corrective action to restore the required battery to OPERABLE status as soon as possible, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through at least a 2 square inch vent.

b. With the required full-capacity charger inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of its associated battery bank by performing Specification 4.8.2.1.2a.1) within 1 hour, and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in Table 4.8-2 is not met, declare the battery inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.2 The above required 125-volt D.C. bus fed from its battery and its associated charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Specifications 4.8.2.1.1 and 4.8.2.1.2.

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3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.1 The following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner:

a. Division 11 A.C. ESF Busses consisting of:

1) 4160-Volt Bus 141,
2) 480-Volt Bus 131X, and
3) 480-Volt Bus 131Z.

b. Division 12 A.C. ESF Busses consisting of:

1) 4160-Volt Bus 142
2) 480-Volt Bus 132X,and
3) 480-Volt Bus 132Z.

c. 120-Volt A.C. Instrument Bus 111 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 111,

d. 120-Volt A.C. Instrument Bus 113 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 111,

e. 120-Volt A.C. Instrument Bus 112 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 112, and

f. 120-Volt A.C. Instrument Bus 114 energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus 112.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one of the required divisions of A.C. ESF busses not fully energized, reenergize the division within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one A.C. instrument bus either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. bus: 1) reenergize the A.C. instrument bus within 2 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours, and 2) reenergize the A.C. instrument bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. bus within 24 hours or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the ESF busses.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical busses shall be operable and energized in the specified manner:

a. One 4160-Volt ESF Bus (141 or 142),

b. One 480-Volt ESF Bus (131X or 132X),

c. One 480-Volt ESF Bus (131Z or 132Z), and

d. Two of the 120-Volt A.C. instrument busses powered from their associated inverter with the inverter connected to its D.C. power supply.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With any of the above required A.C. busses inoperable or not energized, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool, and within 8 hours depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2 square inch vent. In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled or in MODE 6 with less than 23 feet of borated water covering the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required A.C. busses to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

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3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the above required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) inoperable:

a. Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out, or removed, at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their circuit breakers tripped, their inoperable circuit breakers racked out, or removed, or

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

   1) By verifying that the 6.9 kV circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers, and performing the following:

      a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays,

      b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system to demonstrate that the overall penetration protection design remains within operable limits.

c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

2) By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of 480-volt circuit breaker. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. Testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current in excess of the breakers nominal setpoint and measuring the response time. The measured response time will be compared to the manufacturers data to ensure that it is less than or equal to a value specified by the manufacturer. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested; and

3) By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of each type of fuse on a rotating basis. Each representative sample of fuses shall include at least 10% of all fuses of that type. The functional test shall consist of a nondestructive resistance measurement test which demonstrates that the fuse meets its manufacturer's design criteria. Fuses found inoperable during these functional tests shall be replaced with OPERABLE fuses prior to resuming operation. For each fuse found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally tested.

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each 6.9 kV circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

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TABLE 3.8-1

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
1. 6.9 kV Switchgear	
1RC01PA-RCPA Bus 157 Cub 1	Primary
Bus 157 Norm. Feed ACB 1571	Backup
Bus 157 Emerg. Feed ACB 1572	Backup
1RC01PB-RCPB Bus 156 Cub 2	Primary
Bus 156 Norm. Feed ACB 1561	Backup
Bus 156 Emerg. Feed ACB 1562	Backup
1RC01PC RCPC Bus 158 Cub 5	Primary
Bus 158 Norm. Feed ACB 1582	Backup
Bus 158 Emerg. Feed ACB 1581	Backup
1RC01PD - RCPD Bus 159 Cub 5	Primary
Bus 159 Norm. Feed ACB 1591	Backup
Bus 159 Emerg. Feed ACB 1592	Backup
2. 480V Switchgear	
1RY03EA - Pzr. Htr. Backup Group A	Primary
Compt. A1-A6, B1	Backup
1RY03EB - Pzr. Htr. Backup Group B	Primary
Compt. B1-B6, A1	Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
2. 480V Switchgear (Continued)	
1RY03EC - Pzr.	Primary
Htr. Backup Group C	
Compt. A1-A6, B1	Backup
1RY03ED - Pzr.	Primary
Htr. Backup Group D	
Compt. B1-B6, A1	Backup
3. 480V A.C. Ckt. Bkrs.	
1VP01CA - RCFC Fan 1A Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub 4C	Primary
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub 5C	Primary
1VP01CC - RCFC Fan 1C Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub 4C	Primary
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 131X Cub 5C	Primary
Bus 131X Norm. Feed 141 Swgr., Cub 14, ACB 1415	Backup
1VP01CB - RCFC Fan 1B Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 4C	Primary
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 5C	Primary
1VP01CD - RCFC Fan 1D Low Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 2C	Primary

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
3. 480V A.C. Ckt. Bkrs. (Continued)	
Hi Speed Feed Bkr Swgr 132X Cub 3C	Primary
Bus 132X Norm. Feed 142 Swgr., Cub 14, ACB 1423	Backup
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB)	
	MCC 133x4
1RC01PA-A Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RC01PA-B Cub B2	Primary Backup
1HC22G Cub B3	Primary Backup
1FH036 Cub B4	Primary Backup
1VP05CA Cub C1	Primary Backup
1RF03P Cub C2	Primary Backup
1RC01PD-A Cub D1	Primary Backup
1RC01PD-B Cub D2	Primary Backup
1RF02PB Cub D4	Primary Backup
1RF01P Cub D5	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 133x4
1RE01PA Cub D6	Primary Backup
1VP02CA Cub E1	Primary Backup
1VP04CA Cub E2	Primary Backup
1VP04CC Cub F1	Primary Backup
1EW11EA Cub F3	Primary Backup
1EW11EB Cub F3	Primary Backup
1EW11EC Cub F3	Primary Backup
1IC02EA Cub F5	Primary Backup
1IC02EB Cub G1	Primary Backup
1IC02EC Cub G2	Primary Backup
1IC02EF Cub A1	Primary Backup
1IC02EE Cub A2	Primary Backup
1IC02ED Cub A3	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 133x4
IFH02J Cub G1	Primary Backup
IFH03J Cub G2	Primary Backup
1RC01PB-B Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RE01PB Cub B3	Primary Backup
	MCC 134x5
1RC01PC-A Cub C1	Primary Backup
1RC01PC-B Cub C2	Primary Backup
1VP05CB Cub J1	Primary Backup
1RC01PB-A Cub C3	Primary Backup
1HC656-A Cub D3	Primary Backup
1VP02CB Cub F1	Primary Backup
1RC01R-A Cub F2	Primary Backup
1RF02PA Cub G3	Primary Backup
1EW12EA Cub F3	Primary Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 134x5
1EW12EB Cub F3	Primary Backup
1EW12EC Cub F3	Primary Backup
1VP04CB Cub F4	Primary Backup
1VP04CD Cub F5	Primary Backup
1SI8808C Cub A2	Primary Backup
1SI8808B Cub A3	Primary Backup
1RH8702B Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RH8701B Cub B3	Primary Backup
	MCC 132x2
1CV8112 Cub B4	Primary Backup
1OG079 Cub C1	Primary Backup
1WO056A Cub C2	Primary Backup
1OG080 Cub C3	Primary Backup

FINAL DRAFT

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 132x2
1RY8000B Cub C4	Primary Backup
1RY8003C Cub C5	Primary Backup
1IP06E Cub E1	Primary
1RC8003B Cub D4	Primary Backup
1LL43J Cub E2	Primary Backup
1RC8002A Cub G1	Primary Backup
1RC8002B Cub G2	Primary Backup
1RC8002C Cub G3	Primary Backup
1RC8002D Cub G4	Primary Backup
	MCC 131x2A
1SI8808D Cub A2	Primary
1SI8808A Cub A3 Cub B2 (MCC 131 x 2)	Primary Backup
	MCC 131x2
1RC8001A Cub G1	Primary Backup

FINAL DRAFT

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 132x2A
1RC8001B Cub G2	Primary Backup
1RC8001C Cub G3	Primary Backup
1RC8001D Cub G4	Primary Backup
1RH8701A Cub B1	Primary Backup
1RH8702A Cub B4	Primary Backup
1LL42J Cub C1	Primary Backup
1VQ001A Cub C3	Primary Backup
1VQ002A Cub F1	Primary Backup
1RC8003D Cub C4	Primary Backup
1RC8003A Cub C5	Primary Backup
1OG057A Cub D1	Primary Backup
1CC9416 Cub D3	Primary Backup
1CC9438 Cub D4	Primary Backup
1OG081 Cub E2	Primary Backup

FINAL DRAFT

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
4. 480V Molded Case Ckt. Bkts. (MCCB) (Continued)	
	MCC 133x6
1HC016 - Cub B2	Primary
Cub B1	Backup
1LL04E - Cub C3	Primary
Cub C1	Backup
1VP03CA	Primary
Cub A3	Backup
1VP03CD	Primary
Cub C4	Backup
	MCC 132x5
1CC9414	Primary
Cub B4	Backup
	MCC 134x7
1LL05E	Primary
Cub B1, B2	Backup
1VP03CB	Primary
Cub A3	Backup
1VP03CC	Primary
Cub B4	Backup
	MCC 131x2B
1W0056B	Primary
Cub A1	Backup
1RY8000A	Primary
Cub A5	Backup

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TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR

OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

PROTECTIVE DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	DEVICE
5. 260 VAC RCD Power (53 rods, 5 panels)	
Stationary Gripper Coils (all panels)	Primary Backup
Lift Coils (all panels)	Primary Backup
Movable Gripper Coils (all panels)	Primary Backup

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MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection devices, integral with the motor starter of each valve listed in Table 3.8-2, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor-operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more of the thermal overload protection devices inoperable, declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION statement(s) for the affected valve(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.2 The above required thermal overload protection devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of a representative sample of at least 25% of:

a. All thermal overload devices, such that each device is calibrated at least once per 6 years. and

b. All thermal overload devices such that each thermal overload is calibrated and each valve is cycled through at least one complete cycle of full travel with the motor-operator when the thermal overload is OPERABLE, at least once per 6 years.

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TABLE 3.8-2

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD

PROTECTION DEVICES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION
1RC8001A	RC Loop 1A Hot Leg Stop Valve
1RC8001B	RC Loop 1B Hot Leg Stop Valve
1RC8001C	RC Loop 1C Hot Leg Stop Valve
1RC8001D	RC Loop 1D Hot Leg Stop Valve
1OG081	H2 Recomb Suction Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1CC9438	CC Wtr from RC Pumps Thermal Bar Isol. Valve
1CC9416	CC Wtr from RCPS Isol. Valve
1OG057A	H2 Recomb Cnmt. Isol. Valve Disch. "H"
1RC8003A	RC Loop 1A Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RC8003D	RC Loop 1D Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RH8701A	RC Loop 1A to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1RH8702A	RC Loop 1C to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1SI8808A	Accum. 1A Disch. Isol. Valve
1SI8808D	Accum. 1D Disch. Isol. Valve
1RY8000A	Pzr. Relief Isol. Valve 1A
1WO056B	Chilled Water Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1RC8002A	RC Loop 1A Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8002B	RC Loop 1B Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8002C	RC Loop 1C Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8002D	RC Loop 1D Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8003B	RC Loop 1B Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RC8003C	RC Loop 1C Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RY8000B	Pzr. Relief Valve 1B
1OG080	H2 Recomb Suct. Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1WO056A	Chilled Water Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1OG079	H2 Recomb. Disch. Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1CV8112	RC Pump Seal Water Return Isol. Valve
1RH8701B	RC Loop 1A to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1RH8702B	RC Loop 1C to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1SI8808B	Accum. 1B Disch. Isol. Valve
1SI8808C	Accum. 1C Disch. Isol. Valve
1CC9414	CC Water from React. Chg. Pumps Isol. Valve 1B
0OG059	Unit 1 Suct Isol Vlv H_2 Recomb
0OG060	Unit 1 Discharge Isol Vlv H_2 Recombiner
0OG061	Unit Discharge Xtie for H_2 Recombiner
0OG062	Unit Xtie on Discharge of H_2 Recombiner
0OG063	Unit Suction Xtie for H_2 Recombiner
0OG064	Unit Suction Xtie for H_2 Recombiners
0OG065	OB H_2 Analyzer Inlet Isol Vlv

TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD

PROTECTION DEVICES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION
0OG066	OB H_2 Recomb Disch Isol Vlv
1OG057A	H_2 Recomb Cnmt. Isol. Valve Disch. "H"
1OG079	H_2 Recomb Disch. Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1OG080	H_2 Recomb Suct. Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1OG081	H_2 Recomb Suction Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1OG082	OA H_2 Recomb Disch Cnmt Isol Vlv
1OG083	OA H_2 Recomb Disch Cnmt Isol Vlv
1OG084	OA H_2 Recomb Cnmt Outlet Isol Vlv
1OG085	H_2 Recomb Cnmt Outlet Isol Vlv
1AF013A	AF Mtr Drv Pmp Disch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1AF013B	AF Mtr Drv Pmp Dsch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1AF013C	AF Mtr Drv Pp Disch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1AF013D	AF Mtr Drv Pp Disch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1AF013E	AF Dsl Drv Pm Dsch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1AF013F	AF Dsl Drv Pp Dsch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1AF013G	AF Dsl Drv Pp Dsch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1AF013H	AF Dsl Drv Pp Dsch Hdr Dwst Isol Vlv
1CC685	RCP Thermal Barrier Outlet Hdr Cnmt Isol Vlv
1CC9413A	RCP CC Supply Dwst CNMT Isol
1CC9413B	RCPs CC Supply Upst CNMT Isol
1CC9414	CC Water from React. Chg. Pumps Isol. Valve 1B
1CC9416	CC Wtr from RCPS Isol. Valve
1CC9438	CC Wtr from RC Pumps Thermal Bar Isol. Valve
1CS001A	1A CS Pp Suct from RWST 364'
1CS001B	1B CS Pp Suction from RWST 364'
1CS007A	CC Pp 1A Disch Line Dwst Isol Vlv
1CS007B	CS Pp 1B Disch Line Downstream Isol Vlv
1CS009A	1A Pump Suction from 1A Recirc Sump
1CS009B	1B CS Cont Recirc Sump B Suct Isol Vlv to CS
1CS019A	CS Eductor 1A Suction Conn Isol Vlv
1CS019B	CS Eductor 1B Suction Conn Isol Vlv
1CV112D	MOV RWST to Chg Pp Suct Hdr
1CV112E	MOV RWST to Chg Pp Suct Hdr
1CV8100	MOV RCP Seal Leakoff Hdr Isol
1CV8105	MOV Chrg Pps Disch Hdr Isol Vlv
1CV8106	MOV Chrg Pps Disch Hdr Isol Vlv
1CV8109	MOV PD Chrg. Pp Miniflow Recirc. Vlv
1CV8110	MOV A & B Chg. pp Recirc Downstream Isol
1CV8111	MOV A & B Chg Pp Recirc Upstream Isol
1CV8112	RC Pump Seal Water Return Isol. Valve

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MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD

PROTECTION DEVICES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION
1CV8355A	MOV RCP 1A Seal Inj Inlet to containment Isol
1CV8355B	MOV RCP 1B Seal Inj Inlet Isol
1CV8355C	MOV RCP 1C Seal Inj Isol
1CV8355D	MOV RCP 1D Seal Inj Isol
1CV8804A	MOV RHR Sys X-Tie Vlv to Chrgng Pump Suction Hdr A.B.
1RC8001A	RC Loop 1A Hot Leg Stop Valve
1RC8001B	RC Loop 1B Hot Leg Stop Valve
1RC8001C	RC Loop 1C Hot Leg Stop Valve
1RC8001D	RC Loop 1D Hot Leg Stop Valve
1RC8002A	RC Loop 1A Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8002B	RC Loop 1B Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8002C	RC Loop 1C Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8002D	RC Loop 1D Cold Leg Stop Valve
1RC8003A	RC Loop 1A Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RC8003B	RC Loop 1B Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RC8003C	RC Loop 1C Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RC8003D	RC Loop 1D Bypass Leg Stop Valve
1RH610	RH PP 1RH01PB Recirc, Line Isol.
1RH611	RH PP 1RH01PB Recirc, Line Isol.
1RH8701A	RC Loop 1A to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1RH8702A	RC Loop 1C to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1RH8701B	RC Loop 1A to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1RH8702B	RC Loop 1C to RHR Pump Isol. Valve
1RH8716A	RH HX 1RH02AA Dwnstrm Isol Vlv
1RH8616B	RH HX 1RH02AB Dwnstrm Isol Valve
1RY8000A	Prz. Relief Isol. Valve 1A
1RY8000B	Prz. Relief Valve 1B
1SI8801A	SI Charging Pump Disch Isol Vlv
1SI8801B	SI Charging Pump Disch Isol Vlv
1SI8802A	SI PP 1A Disch Line Dwst Cont Isol Vlv
1SI8802B	SI PP 1B Disch Line Dwst Isol Vlv
1SI8304B	SI Pump 1B Suct X-tie from RHR HX
1SI8806	SI Pumps Upstream Suction Isol
1SI8807A	SI to Chg PP Suction Crosstie Isol Vlv
1SI8807B	SI to Chg PP Suction Crosstie Isol Vlv
1SI8808A	Accum. 1A Disch. Isol. Valve
1SI8808B	Accum. 1B Disch. Isol. Valve
1SI8808C	Accum. 1C Disch. Isol. Valve
1SI8808D	Accum. 1D Disch. Isol. Valve

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TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD

PROTECTION DEVICES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION
1SI8809A	SI RX HX 1A Dsch Line Dwst Isol Vlv
1SI8809B	SI RX HX 1B Dsch Line Dwst Isol Vlv
1SI8811A	SI Cnmt Sump A Outlet Isol Vlv
1SI8811B	SI Cnmt Sump B Outlet Isol Vlv
1SI8812A	SI Rwst to RH Pp 1B Outlet Isol Vlv
1SI8812B	SI Rwst to RH Pp 1B Outlet Isol Vlv
1SI8813	SI Pumps 1A-1B Recirc Line Dwst Isol
1SI8814	SI Pump 1A Recirc Line Isol Vlv
1SI8835	SI Pumps X-tie Disch Isol Vlv
1SI8840	SI RHR XH Disch Line Upstrm Cont Pen Isl Vlv
1ST8821A	SI PP 1A Disch Line X-tie Isol Vlv
1ST8821B	SI Pump 1B Disch Line X-tie Isol Vlv
1ST8920	SI Pump 1B Recirc Line Isol Vlv
1ST8923A	SI PP 1A Suction Isol Vlv
1ST8923B	SI Pump 1B Suct Isol Valve
1SI8924	SI Pump 1A Suction X-tie Dwnstrm Isol Vlv
1SX016B	RCFC B&D Sx Supply MOV
1SX016A	RCFC A&C SX Supply MOV
1SX027A	RCFC A&B Return
1SX027B	RCFC B&D SX Return MOV
1W0006A	Chilled Wtr Coils 1A & 1C Supply Isol Vlv
1W0006B	Chilled Wtr Coils 1B & 1D Supply Isol Vlv
1W0020A	Chilled Wtr Coils 1A & 1C Return Isol Vlv
1W0020B	Chilled Wtr Coils 1B & 1D Return Isol Vlv
1W0023A	Chiller 1W001CA Oil Cooler Return Vlv
1W0023B	Chiller 1W001CB Oil Cooler Return Vlv
1W0056A	Chilled Water Cnmt. Isol. Valve
1W0056B	Chilled Water Cnmt. Isol. Valve

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met:

a. A K_{eff} of 0.95 or less, or

b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2000 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6*.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K_{eff} is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2000 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

b. Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 57 steps (3 feet) from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours.

4.9.1.3 Valves 1CV111B, 1CV8428, 1CV8441, 1CV8435, and 1CV8439 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days.

*The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.2 As a minimum, two Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors shall be OPERABLE each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

a. With one of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

b. With both of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, determine the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.2 Each Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

a. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours,

b. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 8 hours prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and

c. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.

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3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.3 The reactor shall have been subcritic 1 for at least the last 100 hours.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the reactor subcritical for less than 100 hours, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 100 hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

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3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The personnel hatch should have a minimum of one door closed at any one time and the equipment hatch shall be in place and held by a minimum of four bolts,

b. A minimum of one door in the personnel emergency exit hatch is closed, and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1) Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or

2) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge isolation valve.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIC'S or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed/isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge isolation valve within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:

a. Verifying the penetrations are in their closed/isolated condition, or

b. Testing the containment purge isolation valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.2.

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3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.5 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the containment refueling station.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTION:

When direct communications between the control room and personnel at the containment refueling station cannot be maintained, suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.5 Direct communications between the control room and personnel at the containment refueling station shall be demonstrated within 1 hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATIONS.

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3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.6 The refueling machine shall be used for movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies having:

1) A capacity equal to or greater than 2850 pounds, and

2) An overload cutoff limit less than or equal to 2850 pounds.

b. The auxiliary hoist used for latching and unlatching drive rods having:

1) A capacity equal to or greater than 2000 pounds, and

2) A load indicator which shall be used to prevent lifting loads in excess of 1000 pounds.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the requirements for refueling machine and/or hoist OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend use of any inoperable refueling machine and/or auxiliary hoist from operations involving the movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.6.1 Each refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 3563 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cutoff when the crane load exceeds 2850 pounds.

4.9.6.2 Each auxiliary hoist and associated load indicator used for movement of drive rods within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 2500 pounds.

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3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2000 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage facility.

APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage facility.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.7 Crane interlocks and physical stops which prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2000 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation.*

*Physical stops are not required until June 1, 1985.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

HIGH WATER LEVEL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is greater than or equal to 23 feet.

ACTION:

With no RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, suspend all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective ACTION to return the required RHR loop to OPERABLE and operating status as soon as possible. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.8.1 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 2800 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

*The RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 8-hour period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot legs.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.8.2 Two independent residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is less than 23 feet.

ACTION:

a. With less than the required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status, or establish greater than or equal to 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange, as soon as possible.

b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.8.2 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 2800 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

*Prior to initial criticality, the RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 2 hour period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot legs.

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3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.9 The Containment Purge Isolation System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

a. With the Containment Purge Isolation System inoperable, close each of the purge valves providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.9 The Containment Purge Isolation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS by verifying that containment purge isolation occurs on an ESF test signal from each of the containment radiation monitoring instrumentation channels.

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3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.10 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the containment when either the fuel assemblies being moved or the fuel assemblies seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated while in MODE 6.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.10 The water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth within 2 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods.

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3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - STORAGE POOL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.11 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the storage pool.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all movement of fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads in the fuel storage areas and restore the water level to within its limit within 4 hours.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.11 The water level in the storage pool shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth at least once per 7 days when irradiated fuel assemblies are in the fuel storage pool.

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3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST FILTER PLENUMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.12 Two independent Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenums shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in the storage pool

ACTION:

a. With one Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenum inoperable, fuel movement within the storage pool, or crane operation with loads over the storage pool, may proceed provided the OPERABLE Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenum is capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source and is in operation and taking suction from at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

b. With no Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenums OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel within the storage pool, or crane operation with loads over the storage pool, until at least one Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenum is restored to OPERABLE status.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.12 The above required Fuel Handling Building Exhaust filter plenums shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes;

b. At least once per 18 months, or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system, by:

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

1) Verifying that the exhaust filter plenum satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0%, when using the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the flow rate is 21,000 cfm ± 10%;

2) Verifying, within 31 days afer removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and by showing a methyl iodine penetration of less than 4.3%;

3) Verifying a flow rate of 21,000 cfm ± 10% through the exhaust filter plenum during operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, by showing a methyl iodide penetration of less than 4.3%;

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches Water Gauge while operating the exhaust filter plenum at a flow rate of 21,000 cfm ± 10%.

2) Verifying that on a Safety Injection test signal and a High Radiation test signal, the system automatically starts (unless already operating) and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks; and

3) Verifying that the exhaust filter plenum maintains the fuel building at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 1/4 inch Water Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during operation.

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e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the exhaust filter plenum satisfies the in-place penetration testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 21,000 cfm ± 10%; and

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the exhaust filter plenum satisfies the in-place penetration testing acceptance criteria of less than 1.0% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 21,000 cfm ± 10%.

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and shutdown margin provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a. With any full-length control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all full-length control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.1.1 The position of each full-length control rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours.

4.10.1.2 Each full-length control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.2 The group height, insertion, and power distribution limits of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER is maintained less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. The limits of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are maintained and determined at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.10.2.2, below.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specifications 3.2.2 or 3.2.3 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 are suspended, either:

a. Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficient to satisfy the ACTION requirements of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, or

b. Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.2.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.2.2 The requirements of the below listed specfications shall be performed at least once per 12 hours during PHYSICS TESTS:

a. Specifications 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3, and

b. Specification 4.2.3.2.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.3 The limitations of Specifications 3.1.1.3, 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, and 3.1.3.6, may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,

b. The Reactor Trip Setpoints on the OPERABLE Intermediate and Power Range channels are set at less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

c. The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) is greater than or equal to 530°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a. With the THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

b. With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) less than 530°F, restore T_{avg} to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel shall be subjected to an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.3 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 530°F at least once per 30 minutes during PHYSICS TESTS.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.4 The limitations of Specification 3.4.1.1 may be suspended during the performance of startup and PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed the P-7 Interlock Setpoint, and

b. The Reactor Trip Setpoints on the OPERABLE Intermediate and Power Range channels are set less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: During operation below the P-7 Interlock Setpoint.

ACTION:

With the THERMAL POWER greater than the P-7 Interlock Setpoint, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.4.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than P-7 Interlock Setpoint at least once per hour during startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.4.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel, and P-7 Interlock shall be subjected to an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.5 The limitations of Specification 3.1.3.3 may be suspended during the performance of individual full-length shutdown and control rod drop time measurements provided only one shutdown or control bank is withdrawn from the fully inserted position at a time.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5 during performance of rod drop time measurements and during surveillance of digital rod position indicators for OPERABILITY.

ACTION:

With the Position Indication System inoperable or with more than one bank of rods withdrawn, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.5 The above required Position Indication Systems shall be determined to be OPERABLE within 24 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during rod drop time measurements by verifying the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree:

a. Within 12 steps when the rods are stationary, and

b. Within 24 steps during rod motion.

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3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS

CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.1 The concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-1) shall be limited to the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, for radionuclides other than dissolved or entrained noble gases. For dissolved or entrained noble gases, the concentration shall be limited to 2×10^{-4} microCurie/ml total activity.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the concentration to within the above limits.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.1.1 Radioactive liquid wastes shall be sampled and analyzed according to the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.11-1.

4.11.1.1.2 The results of the radioactivity analysis shall be used in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to assure that the concentrations at the point of release are maintained within the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1.

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TABLE 4.11-1

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

LIQUID RELEASE TYPE	SAMPLING FREQUENCY	MINIMUM ANALYSIS FREQUENCY	TYPE OF ACTIVITY ANALYSIS	LOWER LIMIT OF DETECTION (LLD)[1] (μCi/ml)
1. Batch Release Tanks[2]	P Each Batch	P Each Batch	Principal Gamma Emitters[3]	5×10^{-7}
			I-131	1×10^{-6}
	P One Batch/M	M	Dissolved and Entrained Gases (Gamma Emitters)	1×10^{-5}
	P Each Batch	M Composite[4]	H-3	1×10^{-5}
			Gross Alpha	1×10^{-7}
	P Each Batch	Q Composite[4]	Sr-89, Sr-90	5×10^{-8}
			Fe-55	1×10^{-6}
2. Continuous Releases[5] Circulating Water Blowdown	Continuous[6]	W Composite[6]	Principal Gamma Emitters[3]	5×10^{-7}
			I-131	1×10^{-6}
	M Grab Sample	M	Dissolved and Entrained Gases (Gamma Emitters)	1×10^{-5}
	Continuous[6]	M Composite[6]	H-3	1×10^{-5}
			Gross Alpha	1×10^{-7}
	Continuous[6]	Q Composite[6]	Sr-89, Sr-90	5×10^{-8}
			Fe-55	1×10^{-6}

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TABLE 4.11-1 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

LIQUID RELEASE TYPE	SAMPLING FREQUENCY	MINIMUM ANALYSIS FREQUENCY	TYPE OF ACTIVITY ANALYSIS	LOWER LIMIT OF DETECTION (LLD)(1) (μCi/ml)
3. Continuous Release(5) Essential Service Water Reactor Coolant Fan Cooler (RCFC) Outlet Line	W(7) Grab Sample	W(7)	Principal Gamma Emitters(3)	5×10^{-7}
			I-131	1×10^{-6}
			Dissolved and Entrained Gases (Gamma Emitters)	1×10^{-5}
			H-3	1×10^{-5}

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TABLE 4.11-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) The LLD is defined, for purposes of these specifications, as the smallest concentration of radioactive material in a sample that will yield a net count, above system background, that will be detected with 95% probability with only 5% probability of falsely concluding that a blank observation represents a "real" signal.

For a particular measurement system, which may include radiochemical separation:

$$LLD = \frac{4.66\ s_b}{E \cdot V \cdot 2.22 \times 10^6 \text{ " } Y \cdot \exp(-\lambda\Delta t)}$$

Where:

LLD = the "a priori" lower limit of detection (microCuries per unit mass or volume),

s_b = the standard deviation of the background counting rate or of the counting rate of a blank sample as appropriate (counts per minute),

E = the counting efficiency (counts per disintegration),

V = the sample size (units of mass or volume),

2.22×10^6 = the number of disintegrations per minute per microCurie,

Y = the fractional radiochemical yield, when applicable,

λ = the radioactive decay constant for the particular radionuclide (sec^{-1}), and

Δt = the elapsed time between the midpoint of sample collection and the time of counting (sec).

Typical values of E, V, Y, and Δt should be used in the calculation.

It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as a before the fact limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an after the fact limit for a particular measurement.

(2) A batch release is the discharge of liquid wastes of a discrete volume. Prior to sampling for analyses, each batch shall be isolated, and then thoroughly mixed by a method described in the ODCM to assure representative sampling.

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TABLE 4.11-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(3) The principal gamma emitters for which the LLD specification applies include the following radionuclides: Mn-54, Fe-59, Co-58, Co-60, Zn-65, Mo-99, Cs-134, Cs-137, Ce-141, and Ce-144. This list does not mean that only these nuclides are to be considered. Other gamma peaks that are identifiable, together with those of the above nuclides, shall also be analyzed and reported in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.7.1.7 in the format outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.21, Appendix B, Revision 1, June 1974.

(4) A composite sample is one in which the quantity of liquid sampled is proportional to the quantity of liquid waste discharged and in which the method of sampling employed results in a specimen that is representative of the liquids released.

(5) A continuous release is the discharge of liquid wastes of a nondiscrete volume, e.g., from a volume of a system that has an input flow during the continuous release.

(6) To be representative of the quantities and concentrations of radioactive materials in liquid effluents, samples shall be collected continuously in proportion to the rate of flow of the effluent stream. Prior to analyses, all samples taken for the composite shall be thoroughly mixed in order for the composite sample to be representative of the effluent release.

(7) Not required unless the Essential Service Water RCFC Outlet Radiation Monitor (1RE-PR002) and (1RE-PR003) indicates measured levels greater than 1×10^{-6} μCi/ml above background at any time during the week.

DOSE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.2 The dose or dose commitment to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from radioactive materials in liquid effluents released, from each unit, to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-1) shall be limited:

a. During any calendar quarter to less than or equal to 1.5 mrems to the whole body and to less than or equal to 5 mrems to any organ, and

b. During any calendar year to less than or equal to 3 mrems to the whole body and to less than or equal to 10 mrems to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the calculated dose from the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.2 Cumulative dose contributions from liquid effluents for the current calendar quarter and the current calendar year shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

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LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.3 The Liquid Radwaste Treatment System shall be OPERABLE and appropriate portions of the system shall be used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses due to the liquid effluent, from each unit, to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-1) would exceed 0.06 mrem to the whole body or 0.2 mrem to any organ in a 31-day period.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With radioactive liquid waste being discharged without treatment and in excess of the above limits and any portion of the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System not in operation, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that includes the following information:

   1. Explanation of why liquid radwaste was being discharged without treatment, identification of any inoperable equipment or subsystems, and the reason for the inoperability,

   2. Action(s) taken to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status, and

   3. Summary description of action(s) taken to prevent a recurrence.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.3.1 Doses due to liquid releases from each unit to UNRESTRICTED AREAS shall be projected at least once per 31 days in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

4.11.1.3.2 The installed Liquid Radwaste Treatment System shall be considered OPERABLE by meeting Specifications 3.11.1.1 and 3.11.1.2.

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LIQUID HOLDUP TANKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.4 The quantity of radioactive material, excluding tritium and dissolved or entrained noble gases contained in any outside tanks shall be limited to the following:

a. Primary Water Storage Tank $\leq$ 2000 Curies, and

b. Outside Temporary Tank $\leq$ 10 Curies.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the quantity of radioactive material in any of the above listed tanks exceeding the above limit, immediately suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank, within 48 hours reduce the tank contents to within the limit, and describe the events leading to this condition in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.7.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.4 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each of the above tanks shall be determined to be within the above limit by analyzing a representative sample of the tank's contents at least once per 7 days when radioactive materials are being added to the tank.

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3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS

DOSE RATE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.1 The dose rate due to radioactive materials released in gaseous effluents from the site to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-1) shall be limited to the following:

a. For noble gases: Less than or equal to 500 mrems/yr to the whole body and less than or equal to 3000 mrems/yr to the skin, and

b. For Iodine-131 and 133, for tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equal to 1500 mrems/yr to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the dose rate(s) exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the release rate to within the above limit(s).

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.1.1 The dose rate due to noble gases in gaseous effluents shall be determined to be within the above limits in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

4.11.2.1.2 The dose rate due to Iodine-131 and 133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in gaseous effluents shall be determined to be within the above limits in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM by obtaining representative samples and performing analyses in accordance with the sampling and analysis program specified in Table 4.11-2.

TABLE 4.11-2

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS WASTE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

GASEOUS RELEASE TYPE	SAMPLING FREQUENCY	MINIMUM ANALYSIS FREQUENCY	TYPE OF ACTIVITY ANALYSIS	LOWER LIMIT OF DETECTION (LLD)(1) (μCi/ml)
1. Waste Gas Decay Tank	P Each Tank Grab Sample	P Each Tank	Principal Gamma Emitters(2)	1×10^{-4}
2. Containment Purge	P Each PURGE(3) Grab Sample	P Each PURGE(3)	Principal Gamma Emitters(2)	1×10^{-4}
		M	H-3	1×10^{-6}
3. Auxiliary Bldg Vent Stack (Units 1 and 2)	M(4)(5) Grab Sample	M	Principal Gamma Emitters(2)	1×10^{-4}
			H-3	1×10^{-6}
4. All Release Types as listed in 2. and 3. above.	Continuous(6)	W(7) Charcoal Sample	I-131	1×10^{-12}
			I-133	1×10^{-10}
	Continuous(6)	W(7) Particulate Sample	Principal Gamma Emitters(2)	1×10^{-11}
	Continuous(6)	M Composite Particulate Sample	Gross Alpha	1×10^{-11}
	Continuous(6)	Q Composite Particulate Sample	Sr-89, Sr-90	1×10^{-11}
	Continuous	Noble Gas Monitor	Noble Gases Gross Beta or Gamma	1×10^{-6}

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TABLE 4.11-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) The LLD is defined, for purposes of these specifications, as the smallest concentration of radioactive material in a sample that will yield a net count, above system background, that will be detected with 95% probability with only 5% probability of falsely concluding that a blank observation represents a "real" signal.

For a particular measurement system, which may include radiochemical separation:

$$LLD = \frac{4.66\ s_b}{E \cdot V \cdot 2.22 \times 10^6 \cdot Y \cdot \exp(-\lambda\Delta t)}$$

Where:

LLD = the "a priori" lower limit of detection (microCuries per unit mass or volume),

s_b = the standard deviation of the background counting rate or of the counting rate of a blank sample as appropriate (counts per minute),

E = the counting efficiency (counts per disintegration),

V = the sample size (units of mass or volume),

2.22×10^6 = the number of disintegrations per minute per microCurie,

Y = the fractional radiochemical yield, when applicable,

λ = the radioactive decay constant for the particular radionuclide (sec^{-1}), and

Δt = the elapsed time between the midpoint of sample collection and the time of counting (sec).

Typical values of E, V, Y, and Δt should be used in the calculation.

It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as a before the fact limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an after the fact limit for a particular measurement.

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TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(2) The principal gamma emitters for which the LLD specification applies include the following radionuclides: Kr-87, Kr-88, Xe-133, Xe-133m, Xe-135, and Xe-138 in noble gas releases and Mn-54, Fe-59, Co-58, Co-60, Zn-65, Mo-99, I-131, Cs-134, Cs-137, Ce-141, and Ce-144 in iodine and particulate releases. This list does not mean that only these nuclides are to be considered. Other gamma peaks that are identifiable, together with those of the above nuclides, shall also be analyzed and reported in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.7, in the format outlined in Regulator Guide 1.21, Appendix B, Revision 1, June 1974.

(3) Sampling and analysis shall also be performed following shutdown, startup, or a THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1-hour period.

(4) Tritium grab samples shall be taken at least once per 24 hours when the refueling canal is flooded.

(5) Tritium grab samples shall be taken at least once per 7 days from the spent fuel pool area, whenever spent fuel is in the spent fuel pool.

(6) The ratio of the sample flow rate to the sampled stream flow rate shall be known for the time period covered by each dose or dose rate calculation made in accordance with Specifications 3.11.2.1, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.2.3.

(7) Samples shall be changed at least once per 7 days and analyses shall be completed within 48 hours after changing, or after removal from sampler. Sampling shall also be performed at least once per 24 hours for at least 7 days following each shutdown, startup or THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1-hour period and analyses shall be completed within 48 hours of changing. When samples collected for 24 hours are analyzed, the corresponding LLDs may be increased by a factor of 10. This requirement does not apply if: (1) analysis shows that the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration in the reactor coolant has not increased more than a factor of 3, and (2) the noble gas monitor shows that effluent activity has not increased more than a factor of 3.

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DOSE - NOBLE GASES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.2 The air dose due to noble gases released in gaseous effluents, from each unit, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-1) shall be limited to the following:

a. During any calendar quarter: Less than or equal to 5 mrads for gamma radiation and less than or equal to 10 mrads for beta radiation, and

b. During any calendar year: Less than or equal to 10 mrads for gamma radiation and less than or equal to 20 mrads for beta radiation.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the calculated air dose from radioactive noble gases in gaseous effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.2 Cumulative dose contributions for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year for noble gases shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

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DOSE - IODINE-131 AND 133, TRITIUM, AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PARTICULATE FORM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.3 The dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from Iodine-131 and 133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in gaseous effluents released, from each unit, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-1) shall be limited to the following:

a. During any calendar quarter: Less than or equal to 7.5 mrems to any organ, and

b. During any calendar year: Less than or equal to 15 mrems to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the calculated dose from the release of Iodine-131 and 133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days, in gaseous effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limits and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.3 Cumulative dose contributions for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year for Iodine-131 and 133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

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GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.4 The VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM and the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM shall be OPERABLE and appropriate portions of these systems shall be used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in 31 days due to gaseous effluent releases, from each unit, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-1) would exceed:

a. 0.2 mrad to air from gamma radiation, or

b. 0.4 mrad to air from beta radiation, or

c. 0.3 mrem to any organ of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With radioactive gaseous waste being discharged without treatment and in excess of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that includes the following information:

   1. Identification of any inoperable equipment or subsystems, and the reason for the inoperability,

   2. Action(s) taken to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status, and

   3. Summary description of action(s) taken to prevent a recurrence.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.4.1 Doses due to gaseous releases from each unit to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY shall be projected at least once per 31 days in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM when Gaseous Radwaste Treatment Systems are not being fully utilized.

4.11.2.4.2 The installed VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM and WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM shall be considered OPERABLE by meeting Specification 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2 or 3.11.2.3.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.5 The concentration of oxygen in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM shall be limited to less than or equal to 2% by volume whenever the hydrogen concentration exceeds 4% by volume.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the concentration of oxygen in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM greater than 2% by volume but less than or equal to 4% by volume, reduce the oxygen concentration to the above limits within 48 hours.

b. With the concentration of oxygen in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM greater than 4% by volume and the hydrogen concentration greater than 4% by volume, immediately suspend all additions of waste gases to the system and reduce the concentration of oxygen to less than or equal to 4% by volume, then take ACTION a. above.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.5 The concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM shall be determined to be within the above limits by continuously monitoring the waste gases in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM with the hydrogen and oxygen monitors required OPERABLE by Table 3.3-13 of Specification 3.3.3.10.

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GAS DECAY TANKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.6 The quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas decay tank shall be limited to less than or equal to 5×10^4 Curies of noble gases (considered as Xe-133 equivalent).

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the quantity of radioactive material in any gas decay tank exceeding the above limit, immediately suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank and, within 48 hours, reduce the tank contents to within the limit, and describe the events leading to this condition in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.7.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.6 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each gas decay tank shall be determined to be within the above limit at least once per 24 hours when radioactive materials are being added to the tank.

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3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.3 Radioactive wastes shall be solidified or dewatered in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM to meet shipping and transportation requirements during transit, and disposal site requirements when received at the disposal site.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering not meeting disposal site and shipping and transportation requirements, suspend shipment of the inadequately processed wastes and correct the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, the procedures and/or the solid waste system as necessary to prevent recurrence.

b. With SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering not performed in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, test the improperly processed waste in each container to ensure that it meets burial ground and shipping requirements and take appropriate administrative action to prevent recurrence.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.3 SOLIDIFICATION of at least one representative test specimen from at least every tenth batch of each type of wet radioactive wastes (e.g., filter sludges, spent resins, evaporator bottoms, boric acid solutions and sodium sulfate solutions) shall be verified in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM:

a. If any test specimen fails to verify SOLIDIFICATION, the SOLIDIFICATION of the batch under test shall be suspended until such time as additional test specimens can be obtained, alternative SOLIDIFICATION parameters can be determined in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, and a subsequent test verifies SOLIDIFICATION. SOLIDIFICATION of the batch may then be resumed using the alternative SOLIDIFICATION parameters determined by the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM;

b. If the initial test specimen from a batch of waste fails to verify SOLIDIFICATION, the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall provide for the collection and testing of representative test specimens from each consecutive batch of the same type of wet waste until at least 3 consecutive initial test specimens demonstrate SOLIDIFICATION. The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall be modified as required, as provided in Specification 6.11, to assure SOLIDIFICATION of subsequent batches of waste; and

c. With the installed equipment incapable of meeting Specification 3.11.3 or declared out-of-service, restore the equipment to operable status or provide for contract capability to process wastes as necessary to satisfy all applicable transportation and disposal requirements.

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3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.4 The annual (calendar year) dose or dose commitment to any MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources shall be limited to less than or equal to 25 mrems to the whole body or any organ, except the thyroid, which shall be limited to less than or equal to 75 mrems.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the calculated doses from the release of radioactive materials in liquid or gaseous effluents exceeding twice the limits of Specification 3.11.1.2a., 3.11.1.2b., 3.11.2.2a., 3.11.2.2b., 3.11.2.3a., or 3.11.2.3b., calculations should be made including direct radiation contributions from the units and from outside storage tanks to determine whether the above limits of Specification 3.11.4 have been exceeded. If such is the case, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.7.2, a Special Report that defines the corrective action to be taken to reduce subsequent releases to prevent recurrence of exceeding the above limits and includes the schedule for achieving conformance with the above limits. This Special Report, as defined in 10 CFR 20.405c, shall include an analysis that estimates the radiation exposure (dose) to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from uranium fuel cycle sources, including all effluent pathways and direct radiation, for the calendar year that includes the release(s) covered by this report. It shall also describe levels of radiation and concentrations of radioactive material involved, and the cause of the exposure levels or concentrations. If the estimated dose(s) exceeds the above limits, and if the release condition resulting in violation of 40 CFR Part 190 has not already been corrected, the Special Report shall include a request for a variance in accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR Part 190. Submittal of the report is considered a timely request, and a variance is granted until staff action on the request is complete.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.4.1 Cumulative dose contributions from liquid and gaseous effluents shall be determined in accordance with Specifications 4.11.1.2, 4.11.2.2, and 4.11.2.3, and in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

4.11.4.2 Cumulative dose contributions from direct radiation from the units and from radwaste storage tanks shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM. This requirement is applicable only under conditions set forth in ACTION a. of Specification 3.11.4.

3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

3/4.12.1 MONITORING PROGRAM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.1 The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program shall be conducted as specified in Table 3.12-1.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program not being conducted as specified in Table 3.12-1, prepare and submit to the Commission, in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report required by Specification 6.9.1.6, a description of the reasons for not conducting the program as required and the plans for preventing a recurrence.

b. With the level of radioactivity as the result of plant effluents in an environmental sampling medium at a specified location exceeding the reporting levels of Table 3.12-2 when averaged over any calendar quarter, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions to be taken to reduce radioactive effluents so that the potential annual dose* to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC is less than the calendar year limits of Specifications 3.11.1.2, 3.11.2.2, or 3.11.2.3. When more than one of the radionuclides in Table 3.12-2 are detected in the sampling medium, this report shall be submitted if:

$$\frac{\text{concentration (1)}}{\text{reporting level (1)}} + \frac{\text{concentration (2)}}{\text{reporting level (2)}} + \ldots \geq 1.0$$

When radionuclides other than those in Table 3.12-2 are detected and are the result of plant effluents, this report shall be submitted if the potential annual dose* to A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from all radionuclides is equal to or greater than the calendar year limits of Specifications 3.11.1.2, 3.11.2.2, or 3.11.2.3. This report is not required if the measured level of radioactivity was not the result of plant effluents; however, in such an event, the condition shall be reported and described in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report required by Specification 6.9.1.6.

*The methodology and parameters used to estimate the potential annual dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC shall be indicated in this report.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

c. With milk or fresh leafy vegetable samples unavailable from one or more of the sample locations required by Table 3.12-1, identify specific locations for obtaining replacement samples and add them within 30 days to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM. The specific locations from which samples were unavailable may then be deleted from the monitoring program. Submit controlled version of the ODCM within 180 days including a revised figure(s) and table reflecting the new location(s) with supporting information identifying the cause of the unavailability of samples and justifying the selection of the new location(s) for obtaining samples.

d. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.1 The radiological environmental monitoring samples shall be collected pursuant to Table 3.12-1 from the specific locations given in the table and figure(s) in the ODCM, and shall be analyzed pursuant to the requirements of Table 3.12-1 and the detection capabilities required by Table 4.12-1.

TABLE 3.12-1

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS(1)	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
1. Direct Radiation(2)	Forty routine monitoring stations either with two or more dosimeters or with one instrument for measuring and recording dose rate continuously, placed as follows: An inner ring of stations, one in each meteorological sector in the general area of the SITE BOUNDARY; An outer ring of stations, one in each meteorological sector in the 6- to 8-km range from the site; and The balance of the stations to be placed in special interest areas such as population centers, nearby residences, schools, and in one or two areas to serve as control stations.	Quarterly.	Gamma dose quarterly.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS[1]	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
2. Airborne			
Radioiodine and Particulates	Samples from five locations: Three samples from close to the three SITE BOUNDARY locations, in different sectors, of the highest calculated annual average ground level D/Q; One sample from the vicinity of a community having the highest calculated annual average ground-level D/Q; and One sample from a control location, as for example 10 to 30 km distant and in the least prevalent wind direction.	Continuous sampler operation with sample collection weekly, or more frequently if required by dust loading.	Radioiodine Cannister: I-131 analysis weekly. Particulate Sampler: Gross beta radioactivity analysis following filter change;[3] and gamma isotopic analysis[4] of composite (by location) quarterly.
3. Waterborne			
a. Surface[5]	One sample upstream. One sample downstream.	Composite sample over 1-month period.[6]	Gamma isotopic analysis[4] monthly. Composite for tritium analysis quarterly.
b. Ground	Samples from one or two sources only if likely to be affected[7].	Quarterly.	Gamma isotopic[4] and tritium analysis quarterly.
c. Drinking	One sample of each community drinking water supply downstream of the plant within 10 kilometers. One sample from a control location.	Composite sample over 2-week period[6] when I-131 analysis is performed, monthly composite otherwise.	I-131 analysis on each composite when the dose calculated for the consumption of the water is greater than 1 mrem per year.(8) Composite for gross beta and gamma isotopic analyses[4] monthly. Composite for tritium analysis quarterly.

TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS(1)	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
3. Waterborne (Continued)			
d. Sediment from shoreline	One sample from downstream area with existing or potential recreational value.	Semiannually.	Gamma isotopic analysis(4) semiannually.
4. Ingestion			
a. Milk	Samples from milking animals in three locations within 5 km distance having the highest dose potential. If there are none, then, one sample from milking animals in each of three areas between 5 to 8 km distant where doses are calculated to be greater than 1 mrem per yr(8).	Semimonthly when animals are on pasture, monthly at other times.	Gamma isotopic(4) and I-131 analysis semimonthly when animals are on pasture; monthly at other times.
	One sample from milking animals at a control location, 15 to 30 km distant and in the least prevalent wind direction.		
b. Fish and Invertebrates	Representative samples of commercially and recreationally important species in vicinity of plant discharge area.	Three times per year (spring, summer and fall).	Gamma isotopic analysis(4) on edible portions.
	Representative samples of commercially and recreationally important species in areas not influenced by plant discharge.		
c. Food Products	Representative samples of the principal classes of food products from any area within 10 miles of the plant that is irrigated by water in which liquid plant wastes have been discharged.	At time of harvest.(9)	Gamma isotopic analyses(4) on edible portion.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS[(1)]	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
4. Ingestion (Continued)			
c. Food Products (continued)	Samples of three different kinds of broad leaf vegetation grown nearest each of two different offsite locations of highest predicted annual average ground-level D/Q if milk sampling is not performed.	Monthly when available.	Gamma isotopic[(4)] and I-131 analysis.
	One sample of each of the similar broad leaf vegetation grown 15 to 30 km distant in the least prevalent wind direction if milk sampling is not performed.	Monthly when available.	Gamma isotopic[(4)] and I-131 analysis.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) Specific parameters of distance and direction sector from the centerline of one unit, and additional description where pertinent, shall be provided for each and every sample location in Table 3.12-1 in a table and figure(s) in the ODCM. Refer to NUREG-0133, "Preparation of Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plants," October 1978, and to Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, Revision 1, November 1979. Deviations are permitted from the required sampling schedule if specimens are unobtainable due to hazardous conditions, seasonal unavailability, malfunction of automatic sampling equipment and other legitimate reasons. If specimens are unobtainable due to sampling equipment malfunction, every effort shall be made to complete corrective action prior to the end of the next sampling period. All deviations from the sampling schedule shall be documented in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6. It is recognized that, at times, it may not be possible or practicable to continue to obtain samples of the media of choice at the most desired location or time. In these instances suitable specific alternative media and locations may be chosen for the particular pathway in question and appropriate substitutions made within 30 days in the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM. Submit controlled revisions of the ODCM within 180 days including a revised figure(s) and table reflecting the new location(s) with supporting information identifying the cause of the unavailability of samples for that pathway and justifying the selection of the new location(s) for obtaining samples.

(2) One or more instruments, such as a pressurized ion chamber, for measuring and recording dose rate continuously may be used in place of, or in addition to, integrating dosimeters. For the purposes of this table, a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) is considered to be one phosphor; two or more phosphors in a packet are considered as two or more dosimeters. Film badges shall not be used as dosimeters for measuring direct radiation. The 40 stations is not an absolute number. The number of direct radiation monitoring stations may be reduced according to geographical limitations; e.g., at an ocean site, some sectors will be over water so that the number of dosimeters may be reduced accordingly. The frequency of analysis or readout for TLD systems will depend upon the characteristics of the specific system used and should be selected to obtain optimum dose information with minimal fading.

(3) Airborne particulate sample filters shall be analyzed for gross beta radioactivity 24 hours or more after sampling to allow for radon and thoron daughter decay. If gross beta activity in air particulate samples is greater than 10 times the yearly mean of control samples, gamma isotopic analysis shall be performed on the individual samples.

(4) Gamma isotopic analysis means the identification and quantification of gamma-emitting radionuclides that may be attributable to the effluents from the facility.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(5) The "upstream sample" shall be taken at a distance beyond significant influence of the discharge. The "downstream" sample shall be taken in an area beyond but near the mixing zone.

(6) A composite sample is one in which the quantity (aliquot) of liquid sampled is proportional to the quantity of flowing liquid and in which the method of sampling employed results in a specimen that is representative of the liquid flow. In this program composite sample aliquots shall be collected at time intervals that are very short (e.g., hourly) relative to the compositing period (e.g., monthly) in order to assure obtaining a representative sample.

(7) Groundwater samples shall be taken when this source is tapped for drinking or irrigation purposes in areas where the hydraulic gradient or recharge properties are suitable for contamination.

(8) The dose shall be calculated for the maximum organ and age group, using the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

(9) If harvest occurs more than once a year, sampling shall be performed during each discrete harvest. If harvest occurs continuously, sampling shall be monthly. Attention shall be paid to including samples of tuberous and root food products.

TABLE 3.12-2

REPORTING LEVELS FOR RADIOACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES

REPORTING LEVELS

ANALYSIS	WATER (pCi/ℓ)	AIRBORNE PARTICULATE OR GASES (pCi/m³)	FISH (pCi/kg, wet)	MILK (pCi/ℓ)	FOOD PRODUCTS (pCi/kg, wet)
H-3	20,000*				
Mn-54	1,000		30,000		
Fe-59	400		10,000		
Co-58	1,000		30,000		
Co-60	300		10,000		
Zn-65	300		20,000		
Zr-Nb-95	400				
I-131	2	0.9		3	100
Cs-134	30	10	1,000	60	1,000
Cs-137	50	20	2,000	70	2,000
Ba-La-140	200			300	

*For drinking water samples. This is 40 CFR Part 141 value. If no drinking water pathway exists, a value of 30,000 pCi/ℓ may be used.

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TABLE 4.12-1

DETECTION CAPABILITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE ANALYSIS(1)

LOWER LIMIT OF DECTECTION (LLD)(2)(3)

ANALYSIS	WATER (pCi/ℓ)	AIRBORNE PARTICULATE OR GAS (pCi/m³)	FISH (pCi/kg, wet)	MILK (pCi/ℓ)	FOOD PRODUCTS (pCi/kg, wet)	SEDIMENT (pCi/kg, dry)
Gross Beta	4	0.01				
H-3	2000*					
Mn-54	15		130			
Fe-59	30		260			
Co-58,60	15		130			
Zn-65	30		260			
Zr-Nb-95	15					
I-131	1(4)	0.07		1	60	
Cs-134	15	0.05	130	15	60	150
Cs-137	18	0.06	150	18	80	180
Ba-La-140	15			15		

*If no drinking water pathway exists, a value of 3000 pCi/ℓ may be used.

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TABLE 4.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) This list does not mean that only these nuclides are to be considered. Other peaks that are identifiable, together with those of the above nuclides, shall also be analyzed and reported in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

(2) Required detection capabilities for thermoluminescent dosimeters used for environmental measurements shall be in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 4.13.

(3) The LLD is defined, for purposes of these specifications, as the smallest concentration of radioactive material in a sample that will yield a net count, above system background, that will be detected with 95% probability with only 5% probability of falsely concluding that a blank observation represents a "real" signal.

For a particular measurement system, which may include radiochemical separation:

$$LLD = \frac{4.66\ s_b}{E \cdot V \cdot 2.22 \cdot Y \cdot \exp(-\lambda \Delta t)}$$

Where:

LLD = the "a priori" lower limit of detection (picoCuries per unit mass or volume),

s_b = the standard deviation of the background counting rate or of the counting rate of a blank sample as appropriate (counts per minute),

E = the counting efficiency (counts per disintegration),

V = the sample size (units of mass or volume),

2.22 = the number of disintegrations per minute per picoCurie,

Y = the fractional radiochemical yield, when applicable,

λ = the radioactive decay constant for the particular radionuclide, (sec^{-1}), and

Δt = the elapsed time between sample collection, or end of the sample collection period, and time of counting (sec).

Typical values of E, V, Y, and Δt should be used in the calculation.

TABLE 4.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as a before the fact limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an after the fact limit for a particular measurement. Analyses shall be performed in such a manner that the stated LLDs will be achieved under routine conditions. Occasionally background fluctuations, unavoidable small sample sizes, the presence of interfering nuclides, or other uncontrollable circumstances may render these LLDs unachievable. In such cases, the contributing factors shall be identified and described in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

(4) LLD for drinking water samples. If no drinking water pathway exists, the LLD of gamma isotopic analysis may be used.

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3/4.12.2 LAND USE CENSUS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.2 A Land Use Census shall be conducted and shall identify within a distance of 8 km (5 miles) the location in each of the 16 meteorological sectors of the nearest milk animal, and the nearest residence. For dose calculation, a garden will be assumed at the nearest residence.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With a Land Use Census identifying a location(s) that yields a calculated dose or dose commitment greater than the values currently being calculated in Specification 4.11.2.3, identify the new location(s) in the next Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

b. With a Land Use Census identifying a location(s) that yields a calculated dose or dose commitment (via the same exposure pathway) 20% greater than at a location from which samples are currently being obtained in accordance with Specification 3.12.1, add the new location(s) within 30 days to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM. The sampling location(s), excluding the control station location, having the lowest calculated dose or dose commitment(s), via the same exposure pathway, may be deleted from this monitoring program after October 31 of the year in which this Land Use Census was conducted. Pursuant to Specification 6.14, submit in the next Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report documentation for a change in the ODCM including a revised figure(s) and table(s) for the ODCM reflecting the new location(s) with information supporting the change in sampling locations.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.2 The Land Use Census shall be conducted during the growing season at least once per 12 months using that information that will provide the best results, such as by a door-to-door survey, aerial survey, or by consulting local agriculture authorities. The results of the Land Use Census shall be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

3/4.12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.3 Analyses shall be performed on radioactive materials, suppled as part of an Interlaboratory Comparison Program that has been approved by the Commission, that correspond to samples required by Table 3.12-1.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With analyses not being performed as required above, report the corrective actions taken to prevent a recurrence to the Commission in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.3 The Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be described in the ODCM. A summary of the results obtained as part of the above required Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.6.

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BASES FOR

SECTIONS 3.0 AND 4.0

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

AND

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FINAL DRAFT

NOTE

The BASES contained in succeeding pages summarize the reasons for the Specifications in Sections 3.0 and 4.0, but in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36 are not part of these Technical Specifications.

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The specifications of this section provide the general requirements applicable to each of the Limiting Conditions for an Operation and Surveillance Requirements within Section 3/4. In the event of a disagreement between the requirements stated in these Technical Specifications and those stated in an applicable Federal Regulation or Act, the requirements stated in the applicable Federal Regulation or Act shall take precedence and shall be met.

3.0.1 This specification defines the applicability of each specification in terms of defined OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions and is provided to delineate specifically when each specification is applicable.

3.0.2 This specification defines those conditions necessary to constitute compliance with the terms of an individual Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirement.

3.0.3 The specification delineates the measures to be taken for those circumstances not directly provided for in the ACTION statements and whose occurrence would violate the intent of a specification. For example, Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent ECCS subsystems to be OPERABLE and provides explicit ACTION requirements if one ECCS subsystem is inoperable. Under the requirements of Specification 3.0.3, if both the required ECCS subsystems are inoperable, within 1 hour measures must be initiated to place the unit in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. As a further example, Specification 3.6.2.1 requires two Containment Spray Systems to be OPERABLE and provides explicit ACTION requirements if one Spray System is inoperable. Under the requirements of Specification 3.0.3 if both the required Containment Spray Systems are inoperable, within 1 hour measures must be initiated to place the unit in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. It is acceptable to initiate and complete a reduction in OPERATIONAL MODES in a shorter time interval than required in the ACTION statement and to add the unused portion of this allowable out-of-service time to that provided for operation in subsequent lower OPERATIONAL MODE(S). Stated allowable out-of-service times are applicable regardless of the OPERATIONAL MODE(S) in which the inoperability is discovered but the times provided for achieving a mode reduction are not applicable if the inoperability is discovered in a mode lower than the applicable mode. For example, if the Containment Spray System was discovered to be inoperable while in STARTUP, the ACTION Statement would allow up to 156 hours to achieve COLD SHUTDOWN. If HOT STANDBY is attained in 16 hours rather than the allowed 78 hours, 140 hours would still be available before the plant would be required to be in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, if this system was discovered to be inoperable while in HOT STANDBY, the 6 hours provided to achieve HOT STANDBY would not be additive to the time available to achieve COLD SHUTDOWN so that the total allowable time is reduced from 156 hours to 150 hours.

3.0.4 This specification provides that entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition must be made with: (1) the full complement of required systems, equipment, or components OPERABLE, and (2) all other parameters as specified in the Limiting Conditions for Operation being met without regard for allowable deviations and out-of-service provisions contained in the ACTION statements.

The intent of this provision is to ensure that facility operation is not initiated with either required equipment or systems inoperable or other specified limits being exceeded.

Exceptions to this provision have been provided for a limited number of specifications when STARTUP with inoperable equipment would not affect plant safety. These exceptions are stated in the ACTION statements of the appropriate specifications.

4.0.1 This specification provides that surveillance activities necessary to ensure the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met and will be performed during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions for which the Limiting Conditions for Operation are applicable. Provisions for additional surveillance activities to be performed without regard to the applicable OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions are provided in the individual Surveillance Requirements. Surveillance Requirements for Special Test Exceptions need only be performed when the Special Test Exception is being utilized as an exception to an individual specification.

4.0.2 The provisions of this specification provide allowable tolerances for performing surveillance activities beyond those specified in the nominal surveillance interval. These tolerances are necessary to provide operational flexibility because of scheduling and performance considerations. The phrase "at least" associated with a surveillance frequency does not negate this allowable tolerance value and permits the performance of more frequent surveillance activities.

The tolerance values, taken either individually or consecutively over three test intervals, are sufficiently restrictive to ensure that the reliability associated with the surveillance activity is not significantly degraded beyond that obtained from the nominal specified interval.

4.0.3 The provisions of this specification set forth the criteria for determination of compliance with the OPERABILITY requirements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation. Under these criteria, equipment, systems, or components are assumed to be OPERABLE if the associated surveillance activities have been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval. Nothing in this provision is to be construed as defining equipment, systems, or components OPERABLE, when such items are found or known to be inoperable although still meeting the Surveillance Requirements. Items may be determined inoperable during use, during surveillance tests, or in accordance with this specification. Therefore, ACTION statements are entered when the Surveillence Requirements should have been performed rather than at the time it is discovered that the tests were not performed.

4.0.4 This specification ensures that the surveillance activities associated with a Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the specified time interval prior to entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other applicable condition. The intent of this provision is to ensure that surveillance activities have been satisfactorily demonstrated on a current basis as required to meet the OPERABILITY requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation.

APPLICABILITY

BASES

Under the terms of this specification, for example, during initial plant STARTUP or following extended plant outages, the applicable surveillance activities must be performed within the stated surveillance interval prior to placing or returning the system or equipment into OPERABLE status.

4.0.5 This specification ensures that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 pumps and valves will be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a. Relief from any of the above requirements has been provided in writing by the Commission and is not a part of these Technical Specifications.

This specification includes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout these Technical Specifications and to remove any ambiguities relative to the frequencies for performing the required inservice inspection and testing activities.

Under the terms of this specification, the more restrictive requirements of the Technical Specifications take precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. For example, the requirements of Specification 4.0.4 to perform surveillance activities prior to entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows pumps to be tested up to 1 week after return to normal operation. And for example, the Technical Specification definition of OPERABLE does not grant a grace period before a device that is not capable of performing its specified function is declared inoperable and takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows a valve to be incapable of performing its specified function for up to 24 hours before being declared inoperable.

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BASES

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T_{avg}. The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T_{avg} at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.3% $\Delta k/k$ is required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T_{avg} less than 200°F, the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated steam line break cooldown are minimal and a 1% $\Delta k/k$ SHUTDOWN MARGIN provides adequate protection.

The OPERABILITY of the four charging pump suction valves ensures adequate capability for negative reactivity insertion to prevent a transient caused by the uncontrolled dilution of the RCS. The functioning of the valves precludes the necessity of operator action to prevent further dilution by terminating flow to the charging pumps from possible unborated water sources and initiating flow from the RWST. Actions taken by the microprocessor if the neutron count rate is doubled will prevent return to criticality in these MODES.

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated will require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison.

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The most negative MTC value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These corrections involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a core condition of all rods inserted (most positive MDC) to an all rods withdrawn condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions. This value of the MDC was then transformed into the limiting MTC value -4.1×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/°F$. The MTC value of -3.2×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/°F$ represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting MTC value of -4.1×10^{-4} $\Delta k/k/°F$.

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 550°F. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature, and (5) the plant is above the cooldown steam dump permissive, P-12.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each MODE of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 350°F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.3% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 15,780 gallons of 7000-ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 70,450 gallons of 2000-ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

A Boric Acid Storage System level of 40% ensures that there is a volume of greater than or equal to 15,780 gallons available. A RWST level of 89% ensures that there is a volume of greater than or equal to 395,000 gallons available.

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 330°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or an RHR Suction valve.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either 2,652 gallons of 7000-ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 11,840 gallons of 2000-ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). A Boric Acid Storage System level of 7% ensures there is a volume of greater than or equal to 2652 gallons available. An RWST level of 9% ensures there is a volume of greater than or equal to 38,740 gallons available.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. Verification that the Digital Rod Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within ±12 steps at 24, 48, 120, and 228 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and

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MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

18, 210, and 228 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurances that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication. Since the Digital Rod Position System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 210 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T_{avg} greater than or equal to 550°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum Design DNBR in the core greater than or equal to 1.34 for a typical cell and 1.32 for a thimble cell during normal operation and in short-term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature, and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria. In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200°F is not exceeded.

The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors as used in these specifications are as follows:

$F_Q(Z)$ Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing tolerances on fuel pellets and rods;

$F^N_{\Delta H}$ Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of the integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power to the average rod power; and

$F_{xy}(Z)$ Radial Peaking Factor, is defined as the ratio of peak power density to average power density in the horizontal plane at core elevation Z.

3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) assure that the $F_Q(Z)$ upper bound envelope of 2.32 times the normalized axial peaking factor is not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes.

Target flux difference is determined at equilibrium xenon conditions. The full-length rods may be positioned within the core in accordance with their respective insertion limits and should be inserted near their normal position for steady-state operation at high power levels. The value of the target flux difference obtained under these conditions divided by the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER is the target flux difference at RATED THERMAL POWER for the associated core burnup conditions. Target flux differences for other THERMAL POWER levels are obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value by the appropriate fractional THERMAL POWER level. The periodic updating of the target flux difference value is necessary to reflect core burnup considerations.

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AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (Continued)

Although it is intended that the plant will be operated with the AFD within the target band required by Specification 3.2.1 about the target flux difference, during rapid plant THERMAL POWER reductions, control rod motion will cause the AFD to deviate outside of the target band at reduced THERMAL POWER levels. This deviation will not affect the xenon redistribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which may be reached on a subsequent return to RATED THERMAL POWER (with the AFD within the target band) provided the time duration of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, a 1-hour penalty deviation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours is provided for operation outside of the target band but within the limits of Figure 3.2-1 while at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours actual time reflects this reduced significance.

Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer determines the 1-minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for two or more OPERABLE excore channels are outside the target band and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% and between 15% and 50% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond the limits of 1 hour and 2 hours, respectively.

Figure B 3/4 2-1 shows a typical monthly target band.

3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, and RCS FLOWRATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

The limits on heat flux hot channel factor, RCS flowrate, and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensure that: (1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded, and (2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200°F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.

Each of these is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to insure that the limits are maintained provided:

a. Control rods in a single group move together with no individual rod position differing by more than ± 12 steps, indicated, from the group demand position,

b. Control rod groups are sequenced with overlapping groups as described in Specification 3.1.3.6,



FIGURE B 3/4 2-1

TYPICAL INDICATED AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE VERSUS THERMAL POWER

HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

c. The control rod insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6 are maintained, and

d. The axial power distribution, expressed in terms of AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE, is maintained within the limits.

A rod bow penalty is not applied to the final value of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ for the following reason:

$F^N_{\Delta H}$ will be maintained within its limits provided the Conditions a. through d. above are maintained. The combination of the RCS flow requirement (399,000) and the requirement on $F^N_{\Delta H}$ guarantee that the DNBR used in the safety analysis will be met.

The RCS flow requirement is based on the loop flow rate of 97,600 gpm which is used in the Improved Thermal Design Procedure described in FSAR 4.4.1 and 15.0.3. This design value is then increased by 2.2% for measurement uncertainties. The measurement error for RCS total flow rate is based on performing a precision heat balance and using the results to calibrate the RCS flow rate indicators. Potential fouling of the feedwater venturi, which might not be detected, could bias the results from the precision heat balance in a non-conservative manner. Therefore, a penalty of 0.1% has been included in the 2.2% measurement uncertainty of the RCS flow rate. Any fouling which might bias the RCS flow rate measurement greater than 0.1% can be detected by monitoring and trending various plant performance parameters. If detected, action shall be taken, before performing subsequent precision heat balance measurements, i.e., either the effect of fouling shall be quantified and compensated for in the RCS flow rate measurement, or the venturi shall be cleaned to eliminate the fouling.

Surveillance Requirement 4.2.3.5 specifies that the measurement instrumentation shall be calibrated within seven days prior to the performance of the calorimetric flow measurement. This requirement is due to the fact that the drift effects of this instrumentation are not included in the flow measurement uncertainty analysis. This requirement does not apply for the instrumentation whose drift effects have been included in the uncertainty analysis.

The limit of 1.55 for $F^N_{\Delta H}$ does not assume any specific uncertainty on the measured value of $F^N_{\Delta H}$. An appropriate uncertainty of 4% (nominal) or greater is added to the measured value of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ before it is compared with the requirement.

When an F_Q measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be made. An allowance of 5% is appropriate for a full-core map taken with the Incore Detector Flux Mapping System, and a 3% allowance is appropriate for manufacturing tolerance.

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BASES

HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

The Radial Peaking Factor, $F_{xy}(Z)$ is measured periodically to provide assurance that the Hot Channel $F_Q(Z)$ remains within its limit. The F_{xy} limit for Rated Thermal Power (F_{xy}^{RTP}) as provided in Specification 3.2.2 was determined from expected power control maneuvers over the full range of burnup conditions in the core.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance of indicated RCS flow is sufficient to detect flow degradation which could lead to operation outside the acceptable limit.

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3-4 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. A Setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-4. Operation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 3.3-1, $Z + RE + SE \leq TA$, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, between the Trip Setpoint and the value used in the analysis for the actuation. RE or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. SE or Sensor Error is either

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 3.3-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statisitical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either: (1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents, events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition. As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss of coolant accident: (1) Safety Injection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position, (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) Turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) containment cooling fans start and automatic valves position, and (11) essential service water pumps start and automatic valves position.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater valves on T_{avg} below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.

Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.

P-11 On increasing pressure P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure and automatically blocks steamline isolation on negative steamline pressure rate. On decreasing pressure; P-11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure and allows steamline isolation on negative steamline pressure rate to become active upon manual block of low steamline pressure SI.

P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arming signal from the Steam Dump System.

P-14 An increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance. The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems. The radiation monitor Setpoints given in the requirements are assumed to be values established above normal background radiation levels for the particular area.

3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS

The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.

For the purpose of measuring $F_Q(Z)$ or $F^N_{\Delta H}$ a full incore flux map is used. Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range channel is inoperable.

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100.

The instrumentation consists of two time-history response spectrum analyzers, a playback unit, three peak recording accelerometers, and six triaxial accelerometers. One time-history recorder and one sensor are located down at the River Screen House. The rest of the equipment, excluding the sensors, is located in the Auxiliary Electrical Room. The remaining sensors are located as follows: three in containment, one in the Auxiliary Building, and one at the free field location 27 + 00N, 41 + 00E. The peak recording accelerometers are passive devices which have no interplay on the rest of the system and are located on reactor equipment, reactor piping, and outside containment on the Category I piping.

The triaxial accelerometer is based on three orthogonal force-balanced servo-accelerometers which generate a voltage signal upon stimulation. The voltage signals are transmitted to the time-history recorder in the Auxiliary Electrical Room, digitized, and recorded on magnetic tape.

The time-history recorder is the master control unit for all control timing signals and system data interface. It also contains the system triggers used to actuate the system. The master control unit continually monitors two of the sensor inputs, which are processed through the trigger circuits for comparison to the system actuation level. The time-history recorder also has the ability to record both pre- and post-seismic event data. The other key component in the system is the response spectrum analyzer. This unit determines the variation in the maximum response of a single-degree-of-freedom system system versus its natural frequency of vibration when either of two designated triaxial accelerometers is subjected to a time-history motion of the accelerometer.

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SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The response spectrum analyzer computes the response spectrum of the event for two sensor locations, compares it to the design response spectra of the plant, and indicates whether the event exceeded the operating basis earthquake criteria or the safe shutdown earthquake criteria.

This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquake," April 1974.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," May 1983 and NUREG 0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.3.7 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

OPERABILITY of the detection instrumentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires and that Fire Suppression Systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinguishing agents in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program. The zone designations given in Table 3.3-11 are from electrical schematic diagrams.

Fire detectors that are used to actuate Fire Suppression Systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. Consequently, the minimum number of operable fire detectors must be greater.

The loss of detection capability for Fire Suppression Systems, actuated by fire detectors represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.3.8 LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the Reactor Coolant System and avoid or mitigate damage to Reactor Coolant System components. The allowable out-of-service times and Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981.

3/4.3.3.9 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The purpose of tank level indicating devices is to assure the detection and control of leaks that if not controlled could potentially result in the transport of radioactive materials to UNRESTRICTED AREAS.

3/4.3.3.10 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.

The instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The sensitivity of any noble gas activity monitor used to show compliance with the gaseous effluent release requirements of Specification 3.11.2.2 shall be such that concentrations as low as 1×10^{-6} uCi/cc are measurable.

3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION

This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety-related components, equipment, or structures.

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3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above the applicable design bases DNBR during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure considerations require that three loops be OPERABLE.

In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a reactor coolant pump with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 350°F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

The requirement to maintain the boron concentration of an isolated loop greater than or equal to the boron concentration of the operating loops ensures that no reactivity addition to the core could occur during startup of an isolated loop. Verification of the boron concentration in an idle loop prior to opening the stop valves provides a reassurance of the adequacy of the boron concentration in the isolated loop.

Startup of an idle loop will inject cool water from the loop into the core. The reactivity transient resulting from this cool water injection is minimized by delaying isolated loop startup until its temperature is within 20°F of the operating loops.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve Setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume (1656 cubic feet) in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

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3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the Reactor Coolant System and the Secondary Coolant System (reactor-to-secondary leakage = 500 gallons per day per steam generator). Cracks having a reactor-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that reactor-to-secondary leakage of 500 gallons per day per steam generator can readily be detected by radiation monitors of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with proper chemistry treatment of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Plugging will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit of 40% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness.

Whenever the results of any steam generator tubing inservice inspection fall into Category C-3, these results will be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 prior to resumption of plant operation. Such cases will be considered by the Commission on a case-by-case basis and may result in a requirement for analysis, laboratory examinations, tests, additional eddy-current inspection, and revision of the Technical Specifications, if necessary.

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS Leakage Detection Systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These Detection Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Therefore, the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 gpm. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 gpm for all steam generators not isolated from the RCS ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 gpm limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents. The 500 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture or under LOCA conditions.

The 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the Leakage Detection Systems.

The CONTROLLED LEAKAGE limitation restricts operation when the total flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals exceeds 40 gpm with the modulating valve in the supply line fully open at a nominal RCS pressure of 2235 psig. This limitation ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the Safety Injection flow will not be less than assumed in the safety analyses.

The 1 gpm leakage from any RCS pressure isolation valve is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of possible in-series check valve failure. It is apparent that when pressure isolation is provided by two in-series check valves and when failure of one valve in the pair can go undetected for a substantial length of time, verification of valve integrity is required. Since these valves are important in preventing overpressurization and rupture of the ECCS low pressure piping which could result in a LOCA that bypasses containment, those valves should be tested periodically to ensure low-probability of gross failure.

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valves is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady-State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride, and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady-State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady-State Limits.

The Surveillance Requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the reactor coolant ensure that the resulting 2-hour doses at the SITE BOUNDARY will not exceed an appropriately small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values following a steam generator tube rupture accident in conjunction with an assumed steady-state reactor-to-secondary steam generator leakage rate of 1 gpm. The values for the limits on specific activity represent limits based upon a parametric evaluation by the NRC of typical site locations. These values are conservative in that specific site parameters of the Byron Station, such as SITE BOUNDARY location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the reactor coolant's specific activity greater than 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but within the allowable limit shown on Figure 3.4-1, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER. Operation with specific activity levels exceeding 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 but within the limits shown on Figure 3.4-1 must be restricted to no more than 800 hours per year (approximately 10% of the unit's yearly operating time) since the activity levels allowed by Figure 3.4-1 increase the 2-hour thyroid dose at the SITE BOUNDARY by a factor of up to 20 following a postulated steam generator tube

SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (Continued)

rupture. The reporting of cumulative operating time over 500 hours in any 6-month consecutive period with greater than 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 will allow sufficient time for Commission evaluation of the circumstances prior to reaching the 800-hour limit.

The sample analysis for determining the gross specific activity and $\bar{E}$ can exclude the radioiodines because of the low reactor coolant limit of 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and because, if the limit is exceeded, the radioiodine level is to be determined every 4 hours. If the gross specific activity level and radioiodine level in the reactor coolant were at their limits, the radioiodine contribution would be approximately 1%. In a release of reactor coolant with a typical mixture of radioactivity, the actual radioiodine contribution would be about 20%. The exclusion of radionuclides with half-lives less than 10 minutes from these determinations has been made for several reasons. The first consideration is the difficulty to identify short-lived radionuclides in a sample that requires a significant time to collect, transport, and analyze. The second consideration is the predictable delay time between the postulated release of radioactivity from the reactor coolant to its release to the environment and transport to the SITE BOUNDARY, which is relatable to at least 30 minutes decay time. The choice of 10 minutes for the half-life cutoff was made because of the nuclear characteristics of the typical reactor coolant radioactivity. The radionuclides in the typical reactor coolant have half-lives of less than 4 minutes or half-lives of greater than 14 minutes, which allows a distinct window for determination of the radionuclides above and below a half-life of 10 minutes. For these reasons the radionuclides that are excluded from consideration are expected to decay to very low levels before they could be transported from the reactor coolant to the SITE BOUNDARY under any accident condition.

Based upon the above considerations for excluding certain radionuclides from the sample analysis, the allowable time of 2 hours between sample taking and completing the initial analysis is based upon a typical time necessary to perform the sampling, transport the sample, and perform the analysis of about 90 minutes. After 90 minutes, the gross count should be made in a reproducible geometry of sample and counter having reproducible beta or gamma self-shielding properties. The counter should be reset to a reproducible efficiency versus energy. It is not necessary to identify specific nuclides. The radiochemical determination of nuclides should be based on multiple counting of the sample with typical counting basis following sampling of less than 1 hour, about 2 hours, about 1 day, about 1 week, and about 1 month.

Reducing T_{avg} to less than 500°F prevents the release of activity should a steam generator tube rupture since the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves. The Surveillance Requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the reactor coolant will be detected in sufficient time to

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SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (Continued)

take corrective ACTION. Information obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomenon. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

The temperature and pressure changes during heatup and cooldown are limited to be consistent with the requirements given in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G.

1. The reactor coolant temperature and pressure and system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 for the service period specified thereon:

   a. Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown. Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation; and

   b. Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 define limits to assure prevention of non-ductile failure only. For normal operation, other inherent plant characteristics, e.g., pump heat addition and pressurizer heater capacity, may limit the heatup and cooldown rates that can be achieved over certain pressure-temperature ranges.

2. These limit lines shall be calculated periodically using methods provided below,

3. The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator is below 70°F,

4. The pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates shall not exceed 100°F/hr and 200° F/hr respectively. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 320°F, and

5. System preservice hydrotests and in-service leak and hydrotests shall be performed at pressures in accordance with the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

The fracture toughness properties of the ferritic materials in the reactor vessel are determined in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan, ASTM E-185-73, and in accordance with additional reactor vessel requirements. These

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

properties are then evaluated in accordance with Appendix G of the 1976 Summer Addenda to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the calculation methods described in WCAP-7924-A, "Basis for Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves," April 1975.

Heatup and cooldown limit curves are calculated using the most limiting value of the nil-ductility reference temperature, RT_{NDT}, at the end of 32 effective full power years of service life. The 32 EFPY service life period is chosen such that the limiting RT_{NDT} at the 1/4T location in the core region is greater than the RT_{NDT} of the limiting unirradiated material. The selection of such a limiting RT_{NDT} assures that all components in the Reactor Coolant System will be operated conservatively in accordance with applicable Code requirements.

The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial RT_{NDT}; the results of these tests are shown in Table B 3/4.4-1. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron (E greater than 1 MeV) irradiation can cause an increase in the RT_{NDT}. Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature, based upon the fluence, copper content and phosphorus content of the material in question, can be predicted using Figure B 3/4.4-1 and the largest value of ΔRT_{NDT} computed by either Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1, "Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials" or the Westinghouse Copper Trend Curves shown in Figure B 3/4.4-2. The heatup and cooldown limit curves of Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 include predicted adjustments for this shift in RT_{NDT} at the end of 32 EFPY as well as adjustments for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments.

Values of ΔRT_{NDT} determined in this manner may be used until the results from the material surveillance program, evaluated according to ASTM E185, are available. Capsules will be removed in accordance with the requirements of ASTM E185-73 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. The surveillance specimen withdrawal schedule is shown in Table 4.4-5. The lead factor represents the relationship between the fast neutron flux density at the location of the capsule and the inner wall of the reactor vessel. Therefore, the results obtained from the surveillance specimens can be used to predict the future radiation damage to the reactor vessel material by using the lead factor and the withdrawal time of the capsule. The heatup and cooldown curves must be recalculated when the ΔRT_{NDT} determined from the surveillance capsule exceeds the calculated ΔRT_{NDT} for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

Allowable pressure-temperature relationships for various heatup and cooldown rates are calculated using methods derived from Appendix G in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, and these methods are discussed in detail in WCAP-7924-A.

The general method for calculating heatup and cooldown limit curves is based upon the principles of the linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) technology. In the calculation procedures a semi-elliptical surface defect with a depth of one-quarter of the wall thickness, T, and a length of 3/2T is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall as well as at the outside of the vessel wall. The dimensions of this postulated crack, referred to in Appendix G of ASME Section III as the reference flaw, amply exceed the current capabilities of inservice inspection techniques. Therefore, the reactor operation limit curves developed for this reference crack are conservative and provide sufficient safety margins for protection against non-ductile failure. To assure that the radiation embrittlement effects are accounted for in the calculation of the limit curves, the most limiting value of the nil-ductility reference temperature, RT_{NDT}, is used and this includes the radiation-induced shift, ΔRT_{NDT}, corresponding to the end of the period for which heatup and cooldown curves are generated.

The ASME approach for calculating the allowable limit curves for various heatup and cooldown rates specifies that the total stress intensity factor, K_I, for the combined thermal and pressure stresses at any time during heatup or cooldown cannot be greater than the reference stress intensity factor, K_{IR}, for the metal temperature at that time. K_{IR} is obtained from the reference fracture toughness curve, defined in Appendix G to the ASME Code. The K_{IR} curve is given by the equation:

$$K_{IR} = 26.78 + 1.223 \exp [0.0145(T-RT_{NDT} + 160)] \qquad (1)$$

Where: K_{IR} is the reference stress intensity factor as a function of the metal temperature T and the metal nil-ductility reference temperature RT_{NDT}. Thus, the governing equation for the heatup-cooldown analysis is defined in Appendix G of the ASME Code as follows:

$$C\ K_{IM} + K_{It} \leq K_{IR} \qquad (2)$$

Where: K_{IM} = the stress intensity factor caused by membrane (pressure) stress,

K_{It} = the stress intensity factor caused by the thermal gradients,

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

K_{IR} = constant provided by the code as a function of temperature relative to the RT_{NDT} of the material,

C = 2.0 for level A and B service limits, and

C = 1.5 for inservice hydrostatic and leak test operations.

At any time during the heatup or cooldown transient, K_{IR} is determined by the metal temperature at the tip of the postulated flaw, the appropriate value for RT_{NDT}, and the reference fracture toughness curve. The thermal stresses resulting from temperature gradients through the vessel wall are calculated and then the corresponding thermal stress intensity factor, K_{IT}, for the reference flaw is computed. From Equation (2) the pressure stress intensity factors are obtained and, from these, the allowable pressures are calculated.

COOLDOWN

For the calculation of the allowable pressure versus coolant temperature during cooldown, the Code reference flaw is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall. During cooldown, the controlling location of the flaw is always at the inside of the wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses at the inside, which increase with increasing cooldown rates. Allowable pressure-temperature relations are generated for both steady-state and finite cooldown rate situations. From these relations, composite limit curves are constructed for each cooldown rate of interest.

The use of the composite curve in the cooldown analysis is necessary because control of the cooldown procedure is based on measurement of reactor coolant temperature, whereas the limiting pressure is actually dependent on the material temperature at the tip of the assumed flaw. During cooldown, the 1/4T vessel location is at a higher temperature than the fluid adjacent to the vessel ID. This condition, of course, is not true for the steady-state situation. It follows that at any given reactor coolant temperature, the ΔT developed during cooldown results in a higher value of K_{IR} at the 1/4T location for finite cooldown rates than for steady-state operation. Furthermore, if conditions exist such that the increase in K_{IR} exceeds K_{It}, the calculated allowable pressure during cooldown will be greater than the steady-state value.

The above procedures are needed because there is no direct control on temperature at the 1/4T location; therefore, allowable pressures may unknowingly be violated if the rate of cooling is decreased at various intervals along a cooldown ramp. The use of the composite curve eliminates this problem and assures conservative operation of the system for the entire cooldown period.

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TABLE B 3/4.4-1

REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS

COMPONENT	Heat No.	Grade	Cu (%)	P (%)	T_{NDT} (°F)	50 ft-lb 35 mil Temp. (F°)	RT_{NDT} (°F)	Average Upper Shelf Energy: Normal to Principal Working Direction (ft-lb)	Average Upper Shelf Energy: Principal Working Direction (ft-lb)
Closure Head Dome	C3486-1	A533B CL1	.10	.016	-10	< 40	-10	151	---
Closure Head Ring	1V4566	A508 CL2	.11	.007	20	< 80	20	125	---
Closure Head Flange	124K358VA1	"	---	.011	60	<100	60	145	---
Vessel Flange	123J219VA1	"	---	.012	10	< 70	10	152	---
Inlet Nozzle	1V4684/3V1320	"	.12	.008	-10	< 40	-10	117	---
" "	1V4684/3V1320	"	.12	.008	-20	< 40	-20	116	---
" "	1V4695	"	.13	.007	-20	< 10	-20	116	---
" "	1V4695	"	.12	.006	-20	< 10	-20	119	---
Outlet Nozzle	1V4656	"	.11	.007	0	< 10	0	131	---
" "	1V4656	"	.11	.007	-20	< 10	-20	131	---
" "	2V2557	"	.11	.007	-20	< 10	-20	112	---
" "	2V2557	"	.11	.008	-10	50	-10	94	---
Nozzle Shell	123J218	"	.05	.010	20	< 70	20	138	184
Upper Shell	5P-5933	"	.05	.010	40	<100	40	139	156
Lower Shell	5P-5951	"	.04	.014	10	< 70	10	150	160
Bottom Head Ring	1V4672	"	---	.012	0	< 60	0	115	---
Bottom Head Dome	C2815-1	A533B CL1	.19	.009	-30	40	-20	118	---
Upper to Lower Shell Girth Weld	WF336	---	.024	.010	-30	30	-30	77*	---

*Normal to Principal Welding Direction

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

FIGURE B 3/4.4-1

FAST NEUTRON FLUENCE (E > 1 MeV) AS A FUNCTION OF FULL POWER SERVICE LIFE



EFFECT OF FLUENCE AND COPPER ON SHIFT OF RT_{NDT} FOR REACTOR VESSEL STEELS EXPOSED TO IRRADIATION AT 550°F

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

The notch in the cooldown curve of Figure 3.4-3 is due to the added constraint on the vessel closure flange given in Appendix G of 10 CFR 50. This constraint requires that, at pressures greater than 20% of the preservice system hydrostatic test pressure, the flange regions that are highly stressed by the bolt preload must exceed the RT_{NDT} of the material by at least 120°F. In the case of Byron 1, the flange RT_{NDT} + 120°F impinges on the cooldown curves and therefore the notch is required.

HEATUP

Three separate calculations are required to determine the limit curves for finite heatup rates. As is done in the cooldown analysis, allowable pressure-temperature relationships are developed for steady-state conditions as well as finite heatup rate conditions assuming the presence of a 1/4T defect at the inside of the vessel wall. The thermal gradients during heatup produce compressive stresses at the inside of the wall that alleviate the tensile stresses produced by internal pressure. The metal temperature at the crack tip lags the coolant temperature; therefore, the K_{IR} for the 1/4T crack during heatup is lower than the K_{IR} for the 1/4T crack during steady-state conditions at the same coolant temperature. During heatup, especially at the end of the transient, conditions may exist such that the effects of compressive thermal stresses and different K_{IR}'s for steady-state and finite heatup rates do not offset each other and the pressure-temperature curve based on steady-state conditions no longer represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the 1/4T flaw is considered. Therefore, both cases have to be analyzed in order to assure that at any coolant temperature the lower value of the allowable pressure calculated for steady-state and finite heatup rates is obtained.

The second portion of the heatup analysis concerns the calculation of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which a 1/4T deep outside surface flaw is assumed. Unlike the situation at the vessel inside surface, the thermal gradients established at the outside surface during heatup produce stresses which are tensile in nature and thus tend to reinforce any pressure stresses present. These thermal stresses, of course, are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time (or coolant temperature) along the heatup ramp. Furthermore, since the thermal stresses, at the outside are tensile and increase with increasing heatup rate, a lower bound curve cannot be defined. Rather, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis.

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration.

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves.

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs, or two RHR suction valves, or an RCS vent opening of at least 2 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350°F. Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50°F above the RCS cold leg temperatures, or (2) the start of a centrifugal charging pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.

These two scenarios are analyzed to determine the resulting overshoots assuming a single PORV actuation with a stroke time of 2.0 seconds from full closed to full open. Figure 3.4-4 is based upon this analysis and represents the maximum allowable PORV variable setpoint such that, for the two overpressurization transients noted, the resulting pressure will not exceed the nominal 10 effective full power years (EFPY) Appendix G reactor vessel NDT limits.

RHR RCS suction isolation valves 8701A and 8702A are interlocked with an "A" train wide range pressure transmitter and valves 8701B and 8702B are interlocked with a "B" train wide range pressure transmitter. Removing power from valves 8701B and 8702A, prevents a single failure from inadvertently isolating both RHR suction relief valves while maintaining RHR isolation capability for both RHR flow paths.

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition and Addenda through Summer 1975.

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3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. A contained borated water level between 34% and 66% ensures a volume of greater than or equal to 6995 gallons but less than or equal to 7217 gallons.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

The requirement to verify accumulator isolation valves shut with power removed from the valve operator when the pressurizer is solid ensures the accumlators will not inject water and cause a pressure transient when the Reactor Coolant System is on solid plant pressure control.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and Safety Injection pumps except the required OPERABLE charging pump to be inoperable below 330°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. The Surveillance Requirements for leakage testing of ECCS check valves ensures that a failure of one valve will not cause an intersystem LOCA.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. A minimum contained borated water level of 89% ensures a volume of greater than or equal to 395,000 gallons.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

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BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a. As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, as applicable, during performance of the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 0.1 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 50 psig during steam line break conditions.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a cold leg double-ended break event is 43.6 psig. The limit of 0.3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 43.9 psig, which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a steam line break accident. Measurements shall be made at all of the listed running fan locations, whether by fixed or portable instruments, to determine the average air temperature.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 43.9 psig in the event of a cold leg double-ended break accident. The measurement of containment tendon lift-off force, the tensile tests of the tendon wires or strands, the visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of proposed Rev. 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.35, "Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," April 1979 and proposed Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, "Determining Prestressing Forces for Inspection of Prestressed Concrete Containments," April 1979.

The required Special Reports from any engineering evaluation of containment abnormalties shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking, the results of the engineering evaluation and the corrective actions taken.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be sealed closed (power removed) during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves sealed closed during plant operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive material will not be released via the Containment Purge System. To provide assurance that the 48-inch containment valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevents power from being supplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 48-inch valves, the 8-inch valves are capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Therefore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 would not

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment purging operation. Operation with one line open will be limited to 1000 hours during a calendar year. The total time the containment purge (vent) system isolation valves may be open during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in a calendar year is a function of anticipated need and operating experience. Only safety related reasons; e.g., containment pressure control or the reduction of airborne radioactivity to facilitate personnel access for surveillance and maintenance activities, may be used to support the additional time requests.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust supply valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures could develop. The 0.60 L_a leakage limit of Specification 3.6.1.2.b. shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses. A spray additive tank level of between 78.6% and 90.3% ensures a volume of greater than or equal to 4000 gallons but less than or equal to 4540 gallons.

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3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray Systems during post-LOCA conditions.

The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Cooling System have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit (or the Purge System) is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These Hydrogen Control Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.

The Hydrogen Mixing Systems are provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA. This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable limit.

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary Coolant System pressure will be limited to within 110% (1320 psia) of its design pressure of 1200 psia during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a turbine trip from 102% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam dumps to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 17.958×10^6 lbs/h which is 119% of the total secondary steam flow of 15.135×10^6 lbs/h at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. A minimum of two OPERABLE safety valves per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in Secondary Coolant System steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced Reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels. The Reactor Trip Setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:

For four loop operation:

$$SP = \frac{(X) - (Y)(V)}{X} \times (109).$$

Where:

SP = Reduced Reactor Trip Setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER,

V = Maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line, SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

109 = Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for four loop operation,

X = Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hour, and

Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour.

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss-of-offsite power.

The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 740 gpm at a pressure of 1450 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. The diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 740 gpm at a pressure of 1450 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350°F when the RHR System may be placed into operation.

3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water level of 40% ensures that sufficient water (200,000 gallons) is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 9 hours with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss-of-offsite power. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

3/4.7.1.4 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of a steam line break. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gpm reactor to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT_{NDT} of 60°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Essential Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available either to: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (Continued)

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," March 1974.

3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Ventilation System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.7.7 NON-ACCESSIBLE AREA EXHAUST FILTER PLENUM VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Non-Accessible Area Exhaust Filter Plenum Ventilation System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the pump rooms following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip, and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the

3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS (Continued)

same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured Company "B" for the purposes of this specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of systems affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system. In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers. For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three functional testing methods are used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested for each functional testing failure, or

2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.7-1, or

SNUBBERS (Continued)

3. Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubber for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(a)(3) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from Byproduct, Source, and Special Nuclear Material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with Surveillance Requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located. The Fire Suppression System consists of the water system, spray, and/or sprinklers, CO_2, Halon, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the Fire Suppression Systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility Fire Protection Program.

In the event that portions of the Fire Suppression Systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire-fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service. When the inoperable fire-fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression. 3750 gpm pump capacity is based on NFPA 20, 1981 standards which call for 150% of rated capacity (2500 gpm) at 65% of discharge pressure.

The Surveillance Requirements provide assurance that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the Fire Suppression Systems are met. An allowance is made for ensuring a sufficient volume of Halon in the Halon storage tanks by verifying either the weight or the level of the tanks. Level measurements are made by either a U.L. or F.M. approved method.

In the event the Fire Suppression Water System becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.

3/4.7.11 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES

The functional integrity of the fire rated assemblies and barrier penetrations ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection of and the extinguishing of the fire. The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

Fire barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and dampers are considered functional when the observed condition is the same as the as-designed condition. For those fire barrier penetrations that are not in the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be performed to show that the modification has not degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier penetration.

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

During periods of time when a barrier is not functional, either: (1) a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier, or (2) the fire detectors on at least one side of the affected barrier must be verified OPERABLE and an hourly fire watch patrol established, until the barrier is restored to functional status.

3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY.

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3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for: (1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss-of-offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source. The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974. When one diesel generator is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE, and that the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss-of-offsite power event will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the diesel generators is inoperable. The term verify as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the Surveillance Requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that: (1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971, 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977, and 1.137, "Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1, October 1979.

The station chose its largest emergency load to be the SX pump. The maximum BHP of the SX pump is 1247 per FSAR Table 8.3-1. A BHP of 1247 corresponds to a load of 1034 kW.

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A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

The reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 do not apply during the first eight hours in the Action Statement. This requirement is necessary to complete the Pre-Operational test program on the Unit 2 plant. The Unit 2 Auxiliary Power test will require breaker interlocks to be checked and this will affect the Unit 2 Diesel Generator output breaker. Diesel Generator retesting may also be required. This exception to the normal reporting method will only remain in effect until fuel load on Unit 2.

The Surveillance Requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the station batteries is based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129, "Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-2 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7-day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.05 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

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3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protective circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

The OPERABILITY of the motor-operated valves thermal overload protective devices ensures that these devices will not prevent safety-related valves from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of these devices are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977.

FINAL DRAFT

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on Keff of no greater than 0.95 is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations and includes a 1% $\Delta k/k$ conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of 2000 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portions of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

The Byron Station is designed such that the containment opens into the fuel building through the personnel hatch. In the event of a fuel drop accident in the containment, any gaseous radioactivity escaping from the containment building will be filtered through the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Ventilation System.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that: (1) refueling machines will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) each refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool areas ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that: (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of RHR capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and at least 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

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3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM

The limitations on the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter Plenum ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

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BASES

3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

This special test exception provides that a minimum amount of control rod worth is immediately available for reactivity control when tests are performed for control rod worth measurement and shutdown margin determination. This special test exception is required to permit the periodic verification of the actual versus predicted core reactivity condition occurring as a result of fuel burnup or fuel cycling operations.

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

This special test exception permits individual control rods to be positioned outside of their normal group heights and insertion limits during the performance of such PHYSICS TESTS as those required to: (1) measure control rod worth, and (2) determine the reactor stability index and dampening factor under xenon oscillation conditions.

3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS

This special test exception permits PHYSICS TESTS to be performed at less than or equal to 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with the RCS T_{avg} slightly lower than normally allowed so that the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the core and related instrumentation can be verified. In order for various characteristics to be accurately measured, it is at times necessary to operate outside the normal restrictions of these Technical Specifications. For instance, to measure the moderator temperature coefficient at BOL, it is necessary to position the various control rods at heights which may not normally be allowed by Specification 3.1.3.6 which in turn may cause the RCS T_{avg} to fall slightly below the minimum temperature of Specification 3.1.1.4.

3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS

This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain STARTUP and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.

3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM-SHUTDOWN

This special test exception permits the Position Indication Systems to be inoperable during rod drop time measurements. The exception is required since the data necessary to determine the rod drop time is derived from the induced voltage in the position indicator coils as the rod is dropped. This induced voltage is small compared to the normal voltage and, therefore, cannot be observed if the Position Indication Systems remain OPERABLE.

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3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS

3/4.11.1.1 CONCENTRATION

This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of radioactive materials released in liquid waste effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be less than the concentration levels specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2. This limitation provides additional assurance that the levels of radioactive materials in bodies of water in UNRESTRICTED AREAS will result in exposures within: (1) the Section II.A design objectives of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC, and (2) the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.106(e) to the population. The concentration limit for dissolved or entrained noble gases is based upon the assumption that Xe-135 is the controlling radioisotope and its MPC in air (submersion) was converted to an equivalent concentration in water using the methods described in International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 2.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents from all units at the site.

The required detection capabilities for radioactive materials in liquid waste samples are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L. A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J. K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques," Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

3/4.11.1.2 DOSE

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.A, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Condition for Operation implements the guides set forth in Section II.A of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive material in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The dose calculation methodology and parameters in the ODCM implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides

DOSE (Continued)

of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data, such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The equations specified in the ODCM for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of radioactive materials in liquid effluents are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I" Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.113, "Estimating Aquatic Dispersion of Effluents from Accidental and Routine Reactor Releases for the Purpose of Implementing Appendix I," April 1977.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents from each reactor at the site. When shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are used by more than one unit on a site, the wastes from all units are mixed for shared treatment; by such mixing, the effluent releases cannot accurately be ascribed to a specific unit. An estimate should be made of the contributions from each unit based on input conditions, e.g., flow rates and radioactivity concentrations, or, if not practicable, the treated effluent releases may be allocated equally to each of the radioactive waste producing units sharing the Radwaste Treatment System. For determining conformance to LCOs, these allocations from shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are to be added to the releases specifically attributed to each unit to obtain the total releases per unit.

3/4.11.1.3 LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System ensures that this system will be available for use whenever liquid effluents require treatment prior to release to the environment. The requirement that the appropriate portions of this system be used when specified provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable". This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a, General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the design objective given in Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The specified limits governing the use of appropriate portions of the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System were specified as a suitable fraction of the dose design objectives set forth in Section II.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, for liquid effluents.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents from each unit at the site. When shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are used by more than one unit on a site, the wastes from all units are mixed for shared treatment; by such mixing, the effluent releases cannot accurately be ascribed to a specific unit. An estimate should be made of the contributions from each unit based on input conditions, e.g., flow rates and radioactivity concentrations, or, if not practicable, the treated effluent releases may be allocated equally to each of the radioactive waste producing

LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM (Continued)

units sharing the Radwaste Treatment System. For determining conformance to LCOs, these allocations from shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are to be added to the releases specifically attributed to each unit to obtain the total releases per unit.

3/4.11.1.4 LIQUID HOLDUP TANKS

The tanks listed in this specification include all those outdoor radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System.

Restricting the quantity of radioactive material contained in the specified tanks provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents, the resulting concentrations would be less than the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an UNRESTRICTED AREA.

3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS

3/4.11.2.1 DOSE RATE

This specification is provided to ensure that the dose at any time at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY from gaseous effluents from all units on the site will be within the annual dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 to UNRESTRICTED AREAS. The annual dose limits are the doses associated with the concentrations of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 1. These limits provide reasonable assurance that radioactive material discharged in gaseous effluents will not result in the exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in an UNRESTRICTED AREA, either within or outside the SITE BOUNDARY, to annual average concentrations exceeding the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of 10 CFR Part 20 (10 CFR 20.106(b)). For MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC who may at times be within the SITE BOUNDARY, the occupancy of that MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC will usually be sufficiently low to compensate for any increase in the atmospheric diffusion factor above that for the SITE BOUNDARY. Examples of calculations for such MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, with the appropriate occupancy factors, shall be given in the ODCM. The specified release rate limits restrict, at all times, the corresponding gamma and beta dose rates above background to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY to less than or equal to 500 mrems/year to the whole body or to less than or equal to 3000 mrems/year to the skin. These release rate limits also restrict, at all times the corresponding thyroid dose rate above background to a child via the inhalation pathway to less than or equal to 1500 mrems/year.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from all units at the site.

DOSE RATE (Continued)

The required detection capabilities for radioactive materials in liquid waste samples are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L. A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J. K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques," Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

3/4.11.2.2 DOSE - NOBLE GASES

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.B, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Condition for Operation implements the guides set forth in Section II.B of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive material in gaseous effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The Surveillance Requirements implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The dose calculation methodology and parameters established in the ODCM for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of radioactive materials in liquid effluents are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I" Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.111, "Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water Cooled Reactors," Revision 1," July 1977. The ODCM equations provided for determining the air doses at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are based upon the historical average atmospheric conditions.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from each unit at the site. When shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are used by more than one unit on a site, the wastes from all units are mixed for shared treatment; by such mixing, the effluent releases cannot accurately be ascribed to a specific unit. An estimate should be made of the contributions from each unit based on input conditions, e.g., flow rates and radioactivity concentrations, or, if not practicable, the treated effluent releases may be allocated equally to each of the radioactive waste producing units sharing the Radwaste Treatment System. For determining conformance to LCOs, these allocations from shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are to be added to the releases specifically attributed to each unit to obtain the total releases per unit.

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BASES

3/4.11.2.3 DOSE - IODINE-131 AND 133, TRITIUM, AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PARTICULATE FORM

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.C, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Section II.C of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The ODCM calculational methods specified in the Surveillance Requirements implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data, such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The ODCM calculational methodology and parameters for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of the subject materials are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I," Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.111, "Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," Revision 1, July 1977. These equations also provide for determining the actual doses based upon the historical average atmospheric conditions. The release rate specifications for Iodine-131 and 133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days are dependent upon the existing radionuclide pathways to man, in the areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY. The pathways that were examined in the development of these calculations were: (1) individual inhalation of airborne radionuclides, (2) deposition of radionuclides onto green leafy vegetation with subsequent consumption by man, (3) deposition onto grassy areas where milk animals and meat producing animals graze with consumption of the milk and meat by man, and (4) deposition on the ground with subsequent exposure to man.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from each unit at the site. When shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are used by more than one unit on a site, the wastes from all units are mixed for shared treatment; by such mixing, the effluent releases cannot accurately be ascribed to a specific unit. An estimate should be made of the contributions from each unit based on input conditions, e.g., flow rates and radioactivity concentrations, or, if not practicable, the treated effluent releases may be allocated equally to each of the radioactive waste producing units sharing the Radwaste Treatment System. For determining conformance to LCOs, these allocations from shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are to be added to the releases specifically attributed to each unit to obtain the total releases per unit.

3/4.11.2.4 GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM and the VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM ensures that the systems will be available for use whenever gaseous effluents require treatment prior to release to the environment. The requirement that the appropriate portions of this system be used when specified provides reasonable assurance that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable". This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a, General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the design objectives given in Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The specified limits governing the use of appropriate portions of the Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System were specified as a suitable fraction of the dose design objectives set forth in Section II.B and II.C of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, for gaseous effluents.

This specification applies to the release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents from each unit at the site. When shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are used by more than one unit on a site, the wastes from all units are mixed for shared treatment; by such mixing, the effluent releases cannot accurately be ascribed to a specific unit. An estimate should be made of the contributions from each unit based on input conditions, e.g., flow rates and radioactivity concentrations, or, if not practicable, the treated effluent releases may be allocated equally to each of the radioactive waste producing units sharing the Radwaste Treatment System. For determining conformance to LCOs, these allocations from shared Radwaste Treatment Systems are to be added to the releases specifically attributed to each unit to obtain the total releases per unit.

3/4.11.2.5 EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM is maintained below the flammability limits of hydrogen and oxygen. Automatic control features are included in the system to prevent the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations from reaching these flammability limits. These automatic control features include isolation of the source of hydrogen and/or oxygen, automatic diversion to recombiners, or injection of dilutants to reduce the concentration below the flammability limits. Maintaining the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen below their flammability limits provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.11.2.6 GAS DECAY TANKS

The tanks included in this specification are those tanks for which the quantity of radioactivity contained is not limited directly or indirectly by another Technical Specification to a quantity that is less than the quantity that provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents, the resulting whole body exposure to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at the nearest SITE BOUNDARY will not exceed 0.5 rem, the annual dose limit in 10 CFR Part 20.

GAS DECAY TANKS (Continued)

Restricting the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tank's contents, the resulting whole body exposure to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at the nearest SITE BOUNDARY will not exceed 0.5 rem. This is consistent with Standard Review Plan 11.3, Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure," in NUREG-0800, July 1981.

3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES

This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a and General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The process parameters included in establishing the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM may include, but are not limited to, waste type, waste pH, waste/liquid/SOLIDIFICATION agent/catalyst ratios, waste oil content, waste principal chemical constituents, and mixing and curing times.

3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE

This specification is provided to meet the dose limitations of 40 CFR Part 190 that have been incorporated into 10 CFR Part 20 by 46 FR 18525. The specification requires the preparation and submittal of a Special Report whenever the calculated doses due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources exceed 25 mrems to the whole body or any organ, except the thyroid, which shall be limited to less than or equal to 75 mrems. For sites containing up to four reactors, it is highly unlikely that the resultant dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC will exceed the dose limits of 40 CFR Part 190 if the individual reactors remain within twice the dose design objectives of Appendix I, and if direct radiation doses from the reactor units and outside storage tanks are kept small. The Special Report will describe a course of action that should result in the limitation of the annual dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC to within the 40 CFR Part 190 limits. For the purposes of the Special Report, it may be assumed that the dose commitment to the MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from other uranium fuel cycle sources is negligible, with the exception that dose contributions from other nuclear fuel cycle facilities at the same site or within a radius of 8 km must be considered. If the dose to any MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC is estimated to exceed the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190, the Special Report with a request for a variance (provided the release conditions resulting in violation of 40 CFR Part 190 have not already been corrected), in accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR 190.11 and 10 CFR 20.405c, is considered to be a timely request and fulfills the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190 until NRC staff action is completed. The variance only relates to the limits of 40 CFR Part 190, and does not apply in any way to the other requirements for dose limitation of 10 CFR Part 20, as addressed in Specifications 3.11.1.1 and 3.11.2.1. An individual is not considered a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC during any period in which he/she is engaged in carrying out any operation that is part of the nuclear fuel cycle.

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3/4.12.1 MONITORING PROGRAM

The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program required by this specification provides representative measurements of radiation and of radioactive materials in those exposure pathways and for those radionuclides that lead to the highest potential radiation exposures of MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC resulting from the station operation. This monitoring program implements Section IV.B.2 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and thereby supplements the radiological effluent monitoring program by verifying that the measurable concentrations of radioactive materials and levels of radiation are not higher than expected on the basis of the effluent measurements and the modeling of the environmental exposure pathways. Guidance for this monitoring program is provided by the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position on Environmental Monitoring. The initially specified monitoring program will be effective for at least the first 3 years of commercial operation. Following this period, program changes may be initiated based on operational experience.

The required detection capabilities for environmental sample analyses are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). The LLDs required by Table 4.12-1 are considered optimum for routine environmental measurements in industrial laboratories. It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as a before the fact limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an after the fact limit for a particular measurement.

Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits, can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L. A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J. K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques," Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

3/4.12.2 LAND USE CENSUS

This specification is provided to ensure that changes in the use of areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are identified and that modifications to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM are made if required by the results of this census. The best information from the door-to-door survey, from aerial survey, or from consulting with local agricultural authorities shall be used. This census satisfies the requirements of Section IV.B.3 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. An annual garden census will not be required since the licensee will assume that there is a garden at the nearest residence in each sector for dose calculations.

FINAL DRAFT

3/4.12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM

The requirement for participation in an approved Interlaboratory Comparison Program is provided to ensure that independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive material in environmental sample matrices are performed as part of the quality assurance program for environmental monitoring in order to demonstrate that the results are valid for the purposes of Section IV.B.2 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

FINAL DRAFT

SECTION 5.0

DESIGN FEATURES

5.0 DESIGN FEATURES

5.1 SITE

EXCLUSION AREA

5.1.1 The Exclusion Area shall be as shown in Figure 5.1-1.

LOW POPULATION ZONE

5.1.2 The Low Population Zone shall be as shown in Figure 5.1-2.

MAP DEFINING UNRESTRICTED AREAS AND SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS

5.1.3 Information regarding radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, which will allow identification of structures and release points as well as definition of UNRESTRICTED AREAS within the SITE BOUNDARY that are accessible to MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, shall be as shown in Figure 5.1-1. The definition of UNRESTRICTED AREA used in implementing these Technical Specifications has been expanded over that in 10 CFR 20.3 (a)(17). The UNRESTRICTED AREA boundary may coincide with the Exclusion (fenced) Area boundary, as defined in 10 CFR 100.3(a), but the UNRESTRICTED AREA does not include areas over water bodies. The concept of UNRESTRICTED AREAS, established at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY, is utilized in the LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION to keep levels of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents as low as is reasonably achievable, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36a. For the Byron Station, the Exclusion Area and UNRESTRICTED AREA boundaries are the same.

5.2 CONTAINMENT

CONFIGURATION

5.2.1 The containment building is a steel lined, reinforced concrete building of cylindrical shape, with a dome roof and having the following design features:

a. Nominal inside diameter = 140 feet,

b. Nominal inside height = 222 feet,

c. Nominal thickness of concrete walls = 3.5 feet,

d. Nominal thickness of concrete dome = 3 feet,

e. Nominal thickness of concrete base slab = 12 feet,

f. Nominal thickness of steel liner = 0.25 inch, and

g. Net free volume = 2.8×10^6 cubic feet.

DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.2.2 The containment building is designed and shall be maintained for a maximum internal pressure of 50 psig and a temperature of 250°F.

FINAL DRAFT



FIGURE 5.1-1

EXCLUSION AREA AND UNRESTRICTED AREA FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS

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

FIGURE 5.1-2

LOW POPULATION ZONE (L.P.Z.)
PUBLIC FACILITIES AND INSTITUTIONS WITHIN 3 MILES OF THE SITE

FINAL DRAFT

5.3 REACTOR CORE

FUEL ASSEMBLIES

5.3.1 The core shall contain 193 fuel assemblies with each fuel assembly containing 264 fuel rods clad with Zircaloy-4. Each fuel rod shall have a nominal active fuel length of 144 inches and contain a maximum total weight of 1619 grams uranium. The initial core loading shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.10 weight percent U-235. Reload fuel shall be similar in physical design to the initial core loading and shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.50 weight percent U-235.

CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES

5.3.2 The core shall contain 53 full-length and no part-length control rod assemblies. The full-length control rod assemblies shall contain a nominal 142 inches of absorber material. All control rods shall be hafnium, clad with stainless steel tubing.

5.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.4.1 The Reactor Coolant System is designed and shall be maintained:

a. In accordance with the Code requirements specified in Section 5.2 of the FSAR, with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements,

b. For a pressure of 2485 psig, and

c. For a temperature of 650°F, except for the pressurizer which is 680°F.

VOLUME

5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the Reactor Coolant System is 12,257 cubic feet at a nominal T_{avg} of 588.4°F.

5.5 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION

5.5.1 The meteorological tower shall be located as shown on Figure 5.1-1.

5.6 FUEL STORAGE

CRITICALITY

5.6.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. A k_{eff} equivalent to less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated water, which includes a conservative allowance of 3.31% $\Delta k/k$ for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the FSAR; and

b. A nominal 14 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.

5.6.1.2 The k_{eff} for new fuel for the first core loading stored dry in the spent fuel storage racks shall not exceed 0.98 when aqueous foam moderation is assumed.

DRAINAGE

5.6.2 The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 423 feet 2 inches.

CAPACITY

5.6.3 The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 1050 fuel assemblies.

5.7 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT

5.7.1 The components identified in Table 5.7-1 are designed and shall be maintained within the cyclic or transient limits of Table 5.7-1.

TABLE 5.7-1

COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMITS

COMPONENT	CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT	DESIGN CYCLE OR TRANSIENT
Reactor Coolant System	200 heatup cycles at $\leq$ 100°F/h and 200 cooldown cycles at $\leq$ 100°F/h.	Heatup cycle - T_{avg} from $\leq$ 200°F to $\geq$ 550°F. Cooldown cycle - T_{avg} from $\geq$ 550°F to $\leq$ 200°F.
	200 pressurizer cooldown cycles at $\leq$ 100°F/h.	Pressurizer cooldown cycle temperatures from $\geq$ 650°F to $\leq$ 100°F.
	80 loss of load cycles, without immediate Turbine or Reactor trip.	$\geq$ 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER to 0% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
	40 cycles of loss-of-offsite A.C. electrical power.	Loss-of-offsite A.C. electrical ESF Electrical System.
	80 cycles of loss of flow in one reactor coolant loop.	Loss of only one reactor coolant pump.
	400 Reactor trip cycles.	100% to 0% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
	10 auxiliary spray actuation cycles.	Spray water temperature differential > 320°F.
	50 leak tests.	Pressurized to $\geq$ 2485 psig.
	5 hydrostatic pressure tests.	Pressurized to $\geq$ 3100 psig.
Secondary Coolant System	1 large steam line break.	Break in a > 6-inch steam line.
	5 hydrostatic pressure tests.	Pressurized to $\geq$ 1350 psig.

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SECTION 6.0

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.1 RESPONSIBILITY

6.1.1 The Superintendent, Byron Station, shall be responsible for overall unit operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility during his absence.

6.1.2 The Shift Engineer (or during his absence from the control room, a designated individual) shall be responsible for the control room command function. A management directive to this effect, signed by the Division Vice President and General Manager-Nuclear Stations shall be reissued to all station personnel on an annual basis.

6.2 ORGANIZATION

OFFSITE

6.2.1 The offsite organization for unit management and technical support shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-1.

UNIT STAFF

6.2.2 The unit organization shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-2 and:

a. Each on duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1; and

b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, at least one licensed Senior Operator shall be in the control room;

c. A Radiation Chemistry Technician,* qualified in radiation protection procedures, shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor;

d. ALL CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation;

e. A site Fire Brigade of at least five members* shall be maintained onsite at all times. The Fire Brigade shall not include the Shift Engineer, and the two other members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit and any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency; and

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*The Radiation Chemistry Technician and Fire Brigade composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions.

UNIT STAFF (Continued)

f. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions; e.g., licensed Senior Operators, licensed Operators, health physics personnel, equipment operators, and key maintenance personnel.

The amount of overtime worked by Unit staff members performing safety-related functions shall be limited in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement on working hours (Generic Letter No. 82-12).

6.2.3 INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP (ISEG)

FUNCTION

6.2.3.1 The ISEG shall function to examine plant operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, REPORTABLE EVENTS and other sources of plant design and operating experience information, including plants of similar design, which may indicate areas for improving plant safety. The ISEG shall make detailed recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications, maintenance activities, operations activities or other means of improving plant safety to the Manager of Nuclear Safety, and the Superintendent, Byron Station.

COMPOSITION

6.2.3.2 The ISEG shall be composed of at least four, dedicated, full-time engineers located on site.

RESPONSIBILITIES

6.2.3.3 The ISEG shall be responsible for maintaining surveillance of plant activities to provide independent verification* that these activities are performed correctly and that human errors are reduced as much as practical.

RECORDS

6.2.3.4 Records of activities performed by the ISEG shall be prepared, maintained, and forwarded each calendar month to the Manager of Nuclear Safety, and the Superintendent, Byron Station.

6.2.4 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

The Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE) may serve as the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) during abnormal operating or accident conditions. During these conditions the SCRE or other on duty STA shall provide technical support to the Shift Supervisor in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit.

*Not responsible for sign-off function.

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

Administrative
Functional

FIGURE 6.2-1

OFFSITE ORGANIZATION

FINAL DRAFT



O - Reactor Operators License
SO - Senior Reactor Operator's License
* - The Fuel Handling Foreman shall have a limited Senior Reactor Operator's License
** - May be filled by a SCRE

——— Administrative
------- Functional

FIGURE 6.2-2

UNIT ORGANIZATION

FINAL DRAFT

TABLE 6.2-1

MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION

POSITION	NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS REQUIRED TO FILL POSITION	
	MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4	MODES 5 & 6
SE	1	1
SF	1	None
RO	2	1
AO	2	1
SCRE	1	None

or, whenever a SCRE (SRO/STA) is not included in the shift crew composition, the minimum shift crew shall be as follows:

POSITION	NUMBER CF INDIVIDUALS REQUIRED TO FILL POSITION	
	MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4	MODES 5 & 6
SE	1	1
SF	1	None
RO	2	1
AO	2	1
STA	1	None

SE - Shift Supervisor (Shift Engineer) with a Senior Operator license on Unit 1
SRO - Shift Foreman with a Senior Operator license on Unit 1
RO - Individual with a Reactor Operator license on Unit 1
AO - Auxiliary Operator
SCRE - Station Control Room Engineer with a Senior Reactor Operator's License on Unit 1
STA - Shift Technical Advisor

The Shift Crew Composition may be one less than the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the Shift Crew Composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1. This provision does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent.

During any absence of the Shift Supervisor from the control room while the Unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4, an individual with a valid Senior Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. During any absence of the Shift Supervisor from the control room while the Unit is in MODE 5 or 6, an individual with a valid Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function.

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6.2.4 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR (Continued)

To assure capability for performance of all STA functions:

(1) The shift foreman (SRO) shall participate in the SCRE shift relief turnover.

(2) During the shift, the shift engineer and the shift foreman (SRO) shall be made aware of any significant changes in plant status in a timely manner by the SCRE.

(3) During the shift, the shift engineer and the shift foreman (SRO) shall remain abreast of the current plant status. The shift foreman (SRO) shall return to the control room two or three times per shift, where practicable, to confer with the SCRE regarding plant status. Where not practicable to return to the control room, the shift foreman (SRO) shall periodically check with the SCRE for a plant status update. The shift foreman (SRO) shall not abandon duties original to reactor operation, unless specifically ordered by the shift engineer.

6.3 UNIT STAFF QUALIFICATIONS

6.3.1 Each member of the unit staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971. The Rad/Chem Supervisor or Lead Health Physicist, who shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975, for a Radiation Protection Manager. The licensed Operators and Senior Operators shall also meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of the supplemental requirements specified in Sections A and C of Enclosure 1 of the March 28, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees.

6.4 TRAINING

6.4.1 A retraining and replacement training program for the unit staff shall be maintained under the direction of the Production Training Department and shall meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5 of ANSI/ANS 3.1-1978 and Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55 and the supplemental requirements specified in Sections A and C of Enclosure 1 of the March 28, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees, and shall include familiarization with relevant industry operational experience identified by the ISEG.

6.5 REVIEW INVESTIGATION AND AUDIT

The Review and Investigative Function and the Audit Function of activities affecting quality during facility operations shall be constituted and have the responsibilities and authorities outlined below.

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6.5 REVIEW INVESTIGATION AND AUDIT (Continued)

OFFSITE

6.5.1 The Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function shall be appointed by the Executive Vice President responsible for nuclear activities. The audit function shall be the responsibility of the Manager of Quality Assurance and shall be independent of operations.

a. Offsite Review and Investigative Function

The Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function shall: (1) provide directions for the review and investigative function and appoint a senior participant to provide appropriate direction, (2) select each participant for this function, (3) select a complement of more than one participant who collectively possess background and qualifications in the subject matter under review to provide comprehensive interdisciplinary review coverage under this function, (4) independently review and approve the findings and recommendations developed by personnel performing the review and investigative function, (5) approve and report in a timely manner all findings of non-compliance with NRC requirements to the Station Superintendent, Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations, Manager of Quality Assurance, and the Vice President - Nuclear Operations. During periods when the Supervisor of Offsite Review and Investigative Function is unavailable, he shall designate this responsibility to an established alternate, who satisfies the formal training and experience for the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigate Function. The responsibilities of the personnel performing this function are stated below. The Offsite Review and Investigative Function shall review:

1) The safety evaluations for: (1) changes to procedures, equipment, or systems as described in the safety analysis report, and (2) tests or experiments completed under the provision of 10 CFR 50.59 to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety question. Proposed changes to the Quality Assurance Program description shall be reviewed and approved by the Manager of Quality Assurance;

2) Proposed changes to procedures, equipment or systems which involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59;

3) Proposed tests or experiments which involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59;

4) Proposed changes in Technical Specifications or this Operating License;

OFFSITE (Continued)

5) Noncompliance with Codes, regulations, orders, Technical Specifications, license requirements, or of internal procedures, or instructions having nuclear safety significance;

6) Significant operating abnormalities or deviation from normal and expected performance of plant equipment that affect nuclear safety as referred to it by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function;

7) All REPORTABLE EVENTS;

8) All recognized indications of an unanticipated deficiency in some aspect of design or operation of safety-related structures, systems, or components;

9) Review and report findings and recommendations regarding all changes to the Generating Stations Emergency Plan prior to implementation of such change; and

10) Review and report findings and recommendations regarding all items referred by the Technical Staff Supervisor, Station Superintendent, Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations, and Manager of Quality Assurance.

b. Audit Function

The audit function shall be the responsibility of the Manager of Quality Assurance independent of the Production Department. Such responsibility is delegated to the Director of Quality Assurance for Operating and the Staff Assistant to the manager of Quality Assurance for maintenance quality assurance activities.

Either shall approve the audit agenda and checklists, the findings and the report of each audit. Audits shall be performed in accordance with the Company Quality Assurance Program and Procedures. Audits shall be performed to assure that safety-related functions are covered within the period designated below:

1) The conformance of facility operation to provisions contained within the Technical Specifications and applicable license conditions at least once per 12 months;

2) The adherence to procedure, training, and qualification of the station staff at least once per 12 months;

3) The results of actions taken to correct deficiencies occurring in facility equipment, structures, systems, or methods of operation that affect nuclear safety at least once per 6 months;

4) The performance of activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Program to meet the criteria of Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 50, at least once per 24 months;

OFFSITE (Continued)

5) The Facility Emergency Plan and implementing procedures at least once per 12 months;

6) The Facility Security Plan and implementing procedures at least once per 12 months;

7) Onsite and offsite reviews;

8) The Facility Fire Protection programmatic controls including the implementing procedures at least once per 24 months by qualified QA personnel;

9) The fire protection equipment and program implementation at least once per 12 months utilizing either a qualified offsite licensee fire protection engineer or an outside independent fire protection consultant. An outside independent fire protection consultant shall be used at least every third year;

10) The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and the results thereof at least once per 12 months;

11) The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL and implementing procedures at least once per 24 months;

12) The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM and implementing procedures for solification of radioactive wastes at least once per 24 months; and

13) The performance of activities required by the Company Quality Assurance Program for effluent and environmental monitoring at least once per 12 months.

Report all findings of noncompliance with NRC requirements and recommendations and results of each audit to the Station Superintendent, Director of Nuclear Safety, the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations, Manager of Quality Assurance, the Vice Chairman, and the Vice President - Nuclear Operations.

c. Authority

The Manager of Quality Assurance reports to the Vice-Chairman and the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function reports to the Director, Nuclear Safety. Either the Manager of Quality Assurance or the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigation Function has the authority to order unit shutdown or request any other action which he deems necessary to avoid unsafe plant conditions.

OFFSITE (Continued)

d. Records

1) Reviews, audits, and recommendations shall be documented and distributed as covered in Specification 6.5.1a. and 6.5.1b.; and

2) Copies oт documentation, reports, and correspondence shall be kept on file at the station.

e. Procedures

Written administrative procedures shall be prepared and maintained for the offsite reviews and investigative functions descrited in Specification 6.5.1a. and for the audit functions described in Specification 6.5.1b. Those procedures shall cover the following:

1) Content and method of submission of presentations to the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function,

2) Use of committees and consultants,

3) Review and approval,

4) Detailed listing of items to be reviewed,

5) Method of: (1) appointing personnel, (2) performing reviews, investigations, (3) reporting findings and recommendations of reviews and investigations, (4) approving reports, and (5) distributing reports, and

6) Determining satisfactory completion of action required basd on approved findings and recommendations reported by personnel performing the review and investigative function.

f. Personnel

1) The persons, including consultants, performing the review and investigative function, in addition to the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function shall have expertise in one or more of the following disciplines as appropriate for the subject or subjects being reviewed and investigated:

a) nuclear power plant technology,
b) reactor operations,
c) utility operations,
d) power plant design,
e) reactor engineering,
f) radiological safety,
g) reactor safety analysis,

OFFSITE (Continued)

h) instrumentation and control,
i) metallurgy, and
j) any other appropriate disciplines required by unique characteristics of the facility.

2) Individuals performing the Review and Investigative Function shall possess a minimum formal training and experience as listed below for each discipline.

a) Nuclear Power Plant Technology

Engineering graduate or equivalent with 5 years experience in the nuclear power field design and/or operation.

b) Reactor Operations

Engineering graduate or equivalent with 5 years experience in nuclear power plant operations.

c) Utility Operations

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in utility operation and/or engineering.

d) Power Plant Design

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in power plant design and/or operation.

e) Reactor Engineering

Engineering graduate or equivalent. In addition, at least 5 years of experience in nuclear plant engineering, operation, and/or graduate work in nuclear engineering or equivalent in reactor physics is required.

f) Radiological Safety

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in radiation control and safety.

g) Reactor Safety Analysis

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in nuclear engineering.

OFFSITE (Continued)

h) Instrumentation and Control

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in instrumentation and control design and/or operation.

i) Metallurgy

Engineering graduate or equivalent with at least 5 years of experience in the metallurgical field.

3) The Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function shall have experience and training which satisfy ANSI N18.1-1971 requirements for plant managers.

ONSITE

6.5.2 The Onsite Review and Investigative Function shall be supervised by the Station Superintendent.

a. Onsite Review and Investigative Function

The Station Superintendent shall: (1) provide directions for the Review and Investigative Function and appoint the Technical Staff Supervisor, or other comparably qualified individual as the senior participant to provide appropriate directions; (2) approve participants for this function; (3) assure that at least two participants who collectively possess background and qualifications in the subject matter under review are selected to provide comprehensive interdisciplinary review coverage under this function; (4) independently review and approve the findings and recommendations developed by personnel performing the Review and Investigative Function; (5) report all findings of noncompliance with NRC requirements, and provide recommendations to the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations and the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function; and (6) submit to the Offsite Review and Investigative Function for concurrence in a timely manner, those items described in Specification 6.5.1a which have been approved by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

b. Responsibility

The responsibilities of the personnel performing this function are:

1) Review of: (1) procedures required by Specification 6.8.1 and changes thereto, (2) all programs required by Specification 6.8.4 and changes thereto, and (3) any other proposed procedures or changes thereto as determined by the Plant Superintendent to affect nuclear safety;

2) Review of all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety;

ONSITE (Continued)

3) Review of all proposed changes to the Technical Specifications;

4) Review of all proposed changes or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety;

5) Investigation of all violations of the Technical Specifications including the preparation and forwarding of reports covering evaluation and recommendations to prevent recurrence to the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations and to the Supervisor of the Offsite Nuclear and Investigative Function;

6) Review of all REPORTABLE EVENTS;

7) Performance of special reviews and investigations and reports thereon as requested by the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function;

8) Review of the Station Security Plan and implementing procedures and submittal of recommended changes to the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations;

9) Review of the Emergency Plan and station implementing procedures and shall submit recommended changes to the Division Vice President - Nuclear Stations;

10) Review of Unit operations to detect potential hazards to nuclear safety;

11) Review of any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release including the preparation of reports covering evaluation, recommendations and disposition of the corrective action to prevent recurrence and the forwarding of these reports to the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations and the Supervisor of the Offsite Nuclear Review and Investigative Function; and

12) Review of changes to the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL, and the Radwaste Treatment Systems.

c. Authority

The Technical Staff Supervisor is responsible to the Station Superintendent and shall make recommendations in a timely manner in all areas of review, investigation, and quality control phases of plant maintenance, operation, and administrative procedures relating to facility operations and shall have the authority to request the action necessary to ensure compliance with rules, regulations, and procedures when in his opinion such action is necessary. The Station Superintendent shall follow such recommendations or select a course

ONSITE (Continued)

of action that is more conservative regarding safe operation of the facility. All such disagreements shall be reported immediately to the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations and the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function.

d. Records

1) Reports, reviews, investigations, and recommendations shall be documented with copies to the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations, the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function, the Station Superintendent, and the Manager of Quality Assurance.

2) Copies of all records and documentation shall be kept on file at the station.

e. Procedures

Written administrative procedures shall be prepared and maintained for conduct of the Onsite Review and Investigative Function. These procedures shall include the following:

1) Content and method of submission and presentation to the Station Superintendent, Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations, and the Supervisor of the Offsite Review and Investigative Function,

2) Use of committees,

3) Review and approval,

4) Detailed listing of items to be reviewed,

5) Procedures for administration of the quality control activities, and

6) Assignment of responsibilities.

f. Personnel

1) The personnel performing the Onsite Review and Investigative Function, in addition to the Station Superintendent, shall consist of persons having expertise in:

a) Nuclear power plant technology,
b) Reactor operations,
c) Reactor engineering,
d) Chemistry
e) Radiological controls,
f) Instrumentation and control, and
g) Mechanical and electrical systems.

ONSITE (Continued)

2) Personnel performing the Onsite Review and Investigative Function shall meet minimum acceptable levels as described in ANSI N18.1-1971, Sections 4.2 and 4.4.

6.6 REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION

6.6.1 The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

a. The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and

b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function and the results of this review shall be submitted to the Offsite Review and Investigative Function and the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations.

6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION

6.7.1 The following actions shall be taken in the event a Safety Limit is violated:

a. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within 1 hour. The Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations and the Offsite Review and Investigative Function shall be notified within 24 hours;

b. A Safety Limit Violation Report shall be prepared. The report shall be reviewed by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function. This report shall describe: (1) applicable circumstances preceding the violation, (2) effects of the violation upon facility components, systems or structures, and (3) corrective action taken to prevent recurrence;

c. The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted to the Commission, the Offsite Review and Investigative Function and the Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Stations within 14 days of the violation; and

d. Critical operation of the Unit shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission.

6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS

6.8.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced below:

a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A, of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

b. The emergency operating procedures required to implement the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 as stated in Section 7.1 of Generic Letter No. 82-33;

c. Plant Security Plan implementation,

d. Radiological Emergency Response Plan implementation,

e. PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM implementation,

f. OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL implementation, and

g. Quality Assurance Program implementation for effluent and environmental monitoring.

6.8.2 Each procedure of Specification 6.8.1 above, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed prior to implementation as set forth in Specification 6.5 above.

6.8.3 Temporary changes to procedures of Specification 6.8.1 above, may be made provided:

a. The intent of the original procedure is not altered;

b. The change is approved by two members of the plant management staff, at least one of whom holds a Senior Operator license on the Unit affected; and

c. The change is documented, reviewed by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function, and approved by the Station Superintendent within 14 days of implementation.

6.8.4 The following programs shall be established, implemented, and maintained:

a. Reactor Coolant Sources Outside Containment

A program to reduce leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to as low as practical levels. The systems include the recirculation portion of the Containment Spray System, Safety Injection System, Chemical and Volume Control System, and RHR System. The program shall include the following:

1) Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements, and

2) Integrated leak test requirements for each system at refueling cycle intervals or less.

PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

b. In-Plant Radiation Monitoring

A program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions. This program shall include the following:

1) Training of personnel,

2) Procedures for monitoring, and

3) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

c. Secondary Water Chemistry

A program for monitoring of secondary water chemistry to inhibit steam generator tube degradation. This program shall include:

1) Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control points for these variables,

2) Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables,

3) Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in-leakage,

4) Procedures for the recording and management of data,

5) Procedures defining corrective action for all off-control point chemistry conditions, and

6) A procedure identifying: (a) the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data, and (b) the sequence and timing of administrative events required to initiate corrective action.

d. Post-accident Sampling

A program which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include the following:

1) Training of personnel,

2) Procedures for sampling and analysis, and

3) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

ROUTINE REPORTS

6.9.1 In addition to the applicable reporting requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the NRC Regional Office unless otherwise noted.

STARTUP REPORT

6.9.1.1 A summary report of plant startup and power escalation testing shall be submitted following: (1) receipt of an Operating License, (2) amendment to the license involving a planned increase in power level, (3) installation of fuel that has a different design or has been manufactured by a different fuel supplier, and (4) modifications that may have significantly altered the nuclear, thermal, or hydraulic performance of the plant.

6.9.1.2 The Startup Report shall address each of the tests identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report FSAR and shall include a description of the measured values of the operating conditions or characteristics obtained during the test program and a comparison of these values with design predictions and specifications. Any corrective actions that were required to obtain satisfactory operation shall also be described. Any additional specific details required in license conditions based on other commitments shall be included in this report.

6.9.1.3 Startup Reports shall be submitted within: (1) 90 days following completion of the Startup Test Program, (2) 90 days following resumption or commencement of commercial power operation, or (3) 9 months following initial criticality, whichever is earliest. If the Startup Report does not cover all three events (i.e., initial criticality, completion of Startup Test Program, and resumption or commencement of commercial operation) supplementary reports shall be submitted at least every 3 months until all three events have been completed.

ANNUAL REPORTS

6.9.1.4 Annual Reports covering the activities of the unit as described below for the previous calendar year shall be submitted prior to March 1 of each year. The initial report shall be submitted prior to March 1 of the year following initial criticality.

6.9.1.5 Reports required on an annual basis shall include tabulation on an annual basis of the number of station, utility, and other personnel (including contractors) receiving exposures greater than 100 mrems/yr and their associated man-rem exposure according to work and job functions,* e.g., reactor operations and surveillance, inservice inspection, routine maintenance, special maintenance (describe maintenance), waste processing, and refueling. The dose assignments to various duty functions may be estimated based on pocket dosimeter, TLD, or film badge measurements. Small exposures totalling less than 20% of the individual total dose need not be accounted for. In the aggregate, at least 80% of the total whole body dose received from external sources should be assigned to specific major work functions.

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*This tabulation supplements the requirements of §20.407 of 10 CFR Part 20.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING REPORT*

6.9.1.6 Routine Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports covering the operation of the Unit during the previous calendar year shall be submitted prior to May 1 of each year. The initial report shall be submitted prior to May 1 of the year following initial criticality.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include summaries, interpretations, and an analysis of trends of the results of the radiological environmental surveillance activites for the report period, including a comparison with preoperational studies, with operational controls as appropriate, and with previous environmental surveillance reports, and an assessment of the observed impacts of the plant operation on the environment. The reports shall also include the results of the Land Use Census required by Specification 3.12.2.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include the results of analysis of all radiological environmental samples and of all environmental radiation measurements taken during the period pursuant to the locations specified in the tables and figures in the ODCM, as well as summarized and tabulated results of these analyses and measurements in the format of the table in the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, Revision 1, November 1979. In the event that some individual results are not available for inclusion with the report, the report shall be submitted noting and explaining the reasons for the missing results. The missing data shall be submitted as soon as possible in a supplementary report.

The reports shall also include the following: a summary description of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program; at least two legible maps** covering all sampling locations keyed to a table giving distances and directions from the centerline of one reactor; the results of licensee participation in the Interlaboratory Comparison Program and the corrective actions being taken if the specified program is not being performed as required by Specification 3.12.3; reasons for not conducting the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program as required by Specification 3.12.1, and discussion of all deviations from the sampling schedule of Table 3.12-1; discussion of environmental sample measurements that exceed the reporting levels of Table 3.12-2 but are not the result of plant effluents, pursuant to Specification 3.12.1; and discussion of all analyses in which the LLD required by Table 4.12-1 was not achievable.

*A single submittal may be made for a multiple unit station.

**One map shall cover stations near the SITE BOUNDARY; a second shall include the more distant stations.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report shall also include an annual summary of hourly meteorological data collected over the previous year. This annual summary may be either in the form of an hour-by-hour listing on magnetic tape of wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability, and precipitation (if measured), or in the form of joint frequency distributions of wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability.* This same report shall include an assessment of the radiation doses due to the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents released from the Unit or Station during the previous calendar year. This same report shall also include an assessment of the radiation doses from radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents to MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC due to their activities inside the SITE BOUNDARY (Figure 5.1-1) during the report period. All assumptions used in making these assessments, i.e., specific activity, exposure time and location, shall be included in these reports. The meteorological conditions concurrent with the time of release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents, as determined by sampling frequency and measurement, shall be used for determining the gaseous pathway doses. The assessment of radiation doses shall be performed in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report to be submitted prior to May 1 of each year shall also include an assessment of radiation doses to the most likely exposed MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from reactor releases and other nearby uranium fuel cycle sources, including doses from primary effluent pathways and direct radiation, for the previous calendar year to show conformance with 40 CFR Part 190, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operation." Acceptable methods for calculating the dose contribution from liquid and gaseous effluents are given in Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev. 1, October 1977.

SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT**

6.9.1.7 Routine Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports covering the operation of the unit during the previous 6 months of operation shall be submitted within 60 days after January 1 and July 1 of each year. The period of the first report shall begin with the date of initial criticality.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include a summary of the quantities of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents and solid waste released from the unit as outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.21,

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*In lieu of submission with the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, the licensee has the option of retaining this summary of required meteorological data on site in a file that shall be provided to the NRC upon request.

**A single submittal may be made for a multiple unit station. The submittal should combine those sections that are common to all units at the station; however, for units with separate radwaste systems, the submittal shall specify the releases of radioactive material from each unit.

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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

"Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, June 1974, with data summarized on a quarterly basis following the format of Appendix B thereof. For solid wastes, the format for Table 3 in Appendix B shall be supplemented with three additional categories: class of solid wastes (as defined by 10 CFR Part 61), type of container (e.g., LSA, Type A, Type B, Large Quantity), and SOLIDIFICATION agent or absorbent (e.g., cement, urea formaldehyde).

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include a list and description of unplanned releases from the site to UNRESTRICTED AREAS of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents made during the reporting period.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include any changes made during the reporting period to the PCP and to the ODCM, pursuant to Specifications 6.13 and 6.14 respectively, as well as any major changes to Liquid, Gaseous or Solid Radwaste Treatment Systems, pursuant to Specification 6.15. It shall also include a listing of new locations for dose calculations and/or environmental monitoring identified by the land use census pursuant to Specification 3.12.2.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall also include the following: an explanation as to why the inoperability of liquid or gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation was not corrected within the time specified in Specifications 3.3.3.10 or 3.3.3.11, respectively; and description of the events leading to liquid holdup tanks or gas storage tanks exceeding the limits of Specification 3.11.1.4 or 3.11.2.6, respectively.

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT

6.9.1.8 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the PORVs or RCS safety valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Resource Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the NRC Regional Office, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT

6.9.1.9 Changes to the F_{xy} limits for Rated Thermal Power (F_{xy}^{RTP}) shall be provided to the NRC Regional Administrator with a copy to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Attention: Chief, Core Performance Branch, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555 for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes and the plot of predicted ($F_q^T \cdot P_{Rel}$) vs Axial Core Height with the limit envelope at least 60 days prior to cycle initial criticality unless otherwise approved by the Commission by letter. In addition, in the event that the limit should change requiring a new

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RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT (Continued)

submittal or an amended submittal to the Peaking Factor Limit Report, it shall be submitted 60 days prior to the date the limit would become effective unless otherwise approved by the Commission by letter. Any information needed to support F_{xy}^{RTP} will be by request from the NRC and need not be included in this report.

SPECIAL REPORTS

6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the NRC Regional Office within the time period specified for each report.

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

In addition to the applicable record retention requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following records shall be retained for at least the minimum period indicated.

6.10.1 The following records shall be retained for at least 5 years:

a. Records and logs of unit operation covering time interval at each power level;

b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety;

c. All REPORTABLE EVENTS;

d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections, and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications;

e. Records of changes made to the procedures required by Specification 6.8.1;

f. Records of radioactive shipments;

g. Records of sealed source and fission detector leak tests and results; and

h. Records of annual physical inventory of all sealed source material of record.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the unit Operating License:

a. Records and drawing changes reflecting unit design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report;

b. Records of new and irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers and assembly burnup histories;

RECORD RETENTION (Continued)

c. Records of radiation exposure for all individuals entering radiation control areas;

d. Records of gaseous and liquid radioactive material released to the environs;

e. Records of transient or operational cycles for those unit components identified in Table 5.7-1;

f. Records of reactor tests and experiments;

g. Records of training and qualification for current members of the unit staff;

h. Records of in-service inspections performed pursuant to these Technical Specifications;

i. Records of Quality Assurance activities required by the QA Program;

j. Records of reviews performed for changes made to procedures or equipment or reviews of tests and experiments pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59;

k. Records of meetings and results of reviews and audits performed by the Offsite Review and Investigative Function and the Onsite Review and Investigative Function;

l. Records of the service lives of all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers required by Specification 3.7.8 including the date at which the service life commences and associated installation and maintenance records;

m. Records of secondary water sampling and water quality; and

n. Records of analysis required by the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program that would permit evaluation of the accuracy of the analysis at a later date. This should include procedures effective at specified times and QA records showing that these procedures were followed.

6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

6.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA

6.12.1 Pursuant to Paragraph 20.203(c)(5) of 10 CFR Part 20, in lieu of the "control device" or "alarm signal" required by paragraph 20.203(c), each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, in which the intensity of radiation is equal to or less than 1000 mR/hr at 45 cm (18 in.) from the radiation

HIGH RADIATION AREA (Continued)

source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). Individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures (e.g., Rad/Chem Technician) or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals may be exempt from the RWP issuance requirement during the performance of their assigned duties in high radiation areas with exposure rates equal to or less than 1000 mR/h, provided they are otherwise following plant radiation protection procedures for entry into such high radiation areas. Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following:

a. A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area; or

b. A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them; or

c. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures with a radiation dose rate monitoring device, who is responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified in the Radiation Work Permit.

6.12.2 In addition to the requirements of Specification 6.12.1, areas accessible to personnel with radiation levels greater than 1000 mR/h at 45 cm (18 in.) from the radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates shall be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry, and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Shift Foreman on duty and/or health physics supervision. Doors shall remain locked except during periods of access by personnel under an approved RWP which shall specify the dose rate levels in the immediate work areas and the maximum allowable stay time for individuals in that area. In lieu of the stay time specification of the RWP, direct or remote (such as closed circuit TV cameras) continuous surveillance may be made by personnel qualified in radiation protection procedures to provide positive exposure control over the activities being performed within the area.

For individual high radiation areas accessible to personnel with radiation levels of greater than 1000 mR/h that are located within large areas, such as PWR containment, where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking, and where no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the individual area, that individual area shall be barricaded, conspicuously posted, and a flashing light shall be activated as a warning device.

6.13 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP)

6.13.1 The PCP shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.13.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the PCP:

a. Shall be submitted to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the change(s) was made. This submittal shall contain:

1) Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change wthout benefit of additional or supplemental information;

2) A determination that the change did not reduce the overall conformance of the solidified waste product to existing criteria for solid wastes; and

3) Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function in accordance with Specification 6.5.2.

6.14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM)

6.14.1 The ODCM shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.14.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the ODCM:

a. Shall be submitted to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which change(s) was made effective. This submittal shall contain:

1) Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information. Information submitted should consist of a package of those pages of the ODCM to be changed with each page numbered, dated and containing the revision number, together with appropriate analyses or evaluations justifying the change(s);

2) A determination that the change will not reduce the accuracy or reliability of dose calculations or Setpoint determinations; and

3) Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function in accordance with Specification 6.5.2.

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6.15 MAJOR CHANGES TO LIQUID, GASEOUS, AND SOLID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS*

6.15.1 Licensee-initiated major changes to the Radwaste Treatment Systems (liquid, gaseous, and solid):

a. Shall be reported to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the evaluation was reviewed by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function. The discussion of each change shall contain:

   1) A summary of the evaluation that led to the determination that the change could be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59;

   2) Sufficient detailed information to totally support the reason for the change without benefit of additional and supplemental information;

   3) A detailed description of the equipment, components, and processes involved and the interfaces with other plant systems.

   4) An evaluation of the change which shows the predicted releases of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents and/or quantity of solid waste that differ from those previously predicted in the License application and amendments thereto;

   5) An evaluation of the change, which shows the expected maximum exposures to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in the UNRESTRICTED AREA and to the general population that differ from those previously estimated in the License application and amendments thereto;

   6) A comparison of the predicted releases of radioactive materials, in liquid and gaseous effluents and in solid waste, to the actual releases for the period prior to when the changes are to be made;

   7) An estimate of the exposure to plant operating personnel as a result of the change; and

   8) Documentation of the fact that the change was reviewed and found acceptable by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the Onsite Review and Investigative Function in accordance with Specification 6.5.2.

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*Licensees may choose to submit the information called for in this specification as part of the annual FSAR update.