Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 402/636-2000

May 8, 1992 LIC-92-133L

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

Subject: Licensee Event Report 92-013 for the Fort Calhoun Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 92-013 dated May 8, 1992. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

u. IL Tata

W. G. Gates Division Manager Nuclear Operations

WGG/lah

Attachment

c: R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV D. L. Wigginton, NRC Senior Project Manager S. D. Bloom, NRC Project Engineer R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector INPO Records Center

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Scott A. Lindquist, Shift Technical Advisor	REPORT (18)	L. L. L. W. L. Kn. L.	5[3]	31 -	1618	1219
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YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBABSSION DATE) X NO.		DATE (15)		1		1
On April 8, 1992 at 1538, a containment purge in progress we actuation of Engineered Safety Feature (EST) components occisolation valves (HCV-746A, PCV-742E and PCV-742G) closed valves PCV-742E and PCV-742G resulted in the isolation of coradiation monitors for particulate and noble gas (RM-050/C in progress and Technical Specification 2.9.1(2)g(v) require operable and in service during a containment purge. The event occurred when leads were inadvertently lifted durpanel. The root cause of this event was identified as the wire lugs installed during original construction to inadver connection. The incident did not present a significant hazard to the her as three ventilation stack process radiation menitors were isolating the release if their setpoints were exceeded.	was secu curred w unexpec containm 051). A res thes ring wor suscept rtent lo ealth or operabl requirem	red after hen inree tedly. T ent atmos containn e monitor k in a co ibility o osening a safety o e and cap ents for	an up vent The cl sphere ment p rs to ontrol of the pable termi	inpla ila losur be be roo be pur of of	anned tion re of ocess e was om ade of blic	
wires and providing a discussion of this event and the asso required reading to Maintenance Electricians and Instrument	ociated t and Co	Root Caus ntrol per	se Ana rsonne	alys al.	is as	

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION		ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST, BG3 HRB, FORWARD ODMMENTE REGARDING BURDEN ERTMARTE TO THE RECERDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PASS), U.S. NUCLEAR REQUILATORY COLMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20055, AND TO THE PARENWORK REDUCTION PROJECT DISO (10), OF RCE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20053.
	DOCKET NUMBER (8)	SECUENTIAL REVISION
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Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5	9 2 - 0113 - 01010101
per di more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A(a)(17)		the second second
The Ventilation Isolation Actuation Sirvelease of significant radioiodine or atmosphere. One possible source of su the range that would be detected by contraining the follow (SIAS), 2) Containment Spray Actuation Radiation High Signal (CRHS).	gnal (VIAS) is inter radioactive gas from uch nuclides could b polant or containmen wing signals: 1) Saf n Signal (CSAS) or 3	nded, in part, of the m the containment to the e reactor coolant leaks below t pressure instrumentation. The ety Injection Actuation Signal a Containment Atmosphere
wins initiates the following actions:		
the interest pressure relief	f valves HCV-746A/B,	
 Closes containment presservatives P(2) Closes containment purge valves P(3) Stops the containment purge fans, Closes containment air sample val Closes containment air sample val 	CV-742A/B/C/D, ves PCV-742E/F/G/H f he safety injection	for radiation monitors RM-050/051, pump rooms and the spent
6) Places control room ventilation in 7) Isolates the waste gas decay tank	in the filtered air 1 <s.< th=""><td>makeup mode,</td></s.<>	makeup mode,
The Containment Isolation Actuation radioactivity from the containment, containment building piping penetra radioactivity and are therefore, eo by either of the following signals: Pressurizer Pressure Low Signal (PF	Signal (CIAS) is in especially in the e tions are considered uipped with isolatio (1) Containment Pre PLS).	event of an accident. All event of an accident. All d potential paths for the escape of on valves. The CIAS is initiated ssure High Signal (CPHS) or 2)
The CIAS initiates the following a	ctions:	his have not required to
1) Closes the containment isolatio	n valves for flow pa	aths which are not required an
control or mitigate the accident	ough containment co	oling coils to reduce the magnet
and duration of the pressure th	r flow through unnec	essary heat loads.
3) Secures component cooring materials On April 8, 1992 while in Mode 5 personnel were in the process of detector well cooling unit pressu AI-44-3. While attempting to rem tracing out power leads by hand i and AL-F36 were inadvertently life resulted in loss of the 125 VDC i RM-050/051 isolation valves PCV- isolation valve HCV-746A, gas de compressor room supply damper HC	for Cycle 14 refueli removing power and ine indicating contro- nove the power supply in adjacent panel AI fted (the wires had power supply to cont 742E and PCV-742G, co cay tank room supply V-794A, and shutdown ed closed.	ing, Instrument and Control (I&C) lifting wires to replace nuclear oller PIC-705 in control room panel y to PIC-705, the I&C personnel wer- -44-2 when wires at terminals AL-F3 spade wire lug terminations). This ainment atmosphere radiation monito containment pressure relief inboard y damper HCV-792A, waste gas h cooling heat exchanger room supply

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ILE NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMUNICATION		APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/90/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50,0 HRB. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BIRANCH (P.538), U.S. NICZLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (P.59-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 2000.								
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1		YEAR SECUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER								
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TEXT (if more space is required, use addit) nal NRC Form 366R #((17)										
Upon lifting the leads the 1&C person investigation of plant status. At 15 progress was secured due to the disco the investigation it was also discove computer had failed to alarm and prin HCV-746A. It is estimated that PCV-7 minutes prior to securing the contain	nel informed the conti 38 on April 8, 1992, very that PCV-742E and red that the Emergency t the time of closure 42E and PCV-742G were ment purge.	rol room the con d PCV-7 y Respon of PCV- closed	m Op tain 42G nse -742 no	erati ment had Faci E, Pi long	ors pu clo lit CV- er	who rge i sed. y (ER 742G than	began Dur Dur and fifte	ing een		
PCV-742E, PCV-742G and HCV-746A receit this event was determined to constitut components and the NRC was notified o $50.72(b)(2)(ii)$.	ve both VIAS and CIAS te an actuation of En n April 8, 1992 at 174	closure gineere 44 CST,	e si d Sa pur	gnal fety suan	Fe t	Ther ature o 10	efore (ESF CFR	5		
The unplanned isolation of process rareasons. The first is that while the containment purge was in progress. If these monitors to be operable and in constituted a violation of TS 2.9.1(250.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The two valves wh PCV-742G) and the containment pressur operated by CIAS or VIAS relays. For reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)	diation monitors RM-0 monitors were isolate echnical Specification service during a cont)g(v) and is reportab ich closed to isolate e reduction valve that this reason this even)(2)(iv) as an actuat	50/051 ed, and n (TS) a ainment le purse RM-050, t closed nt is a ion of l	is r the 2.9. pur uant /051 d (K lso ESF	epor refo 1(2) ge. to (PC CV-7 cons comp	tab re g(v Th 10 V-7 46A ide	le fo inope) req is ev CFR 42E a 42E a nts.	n two rable uires ent nd	9, 8 5		
This incident did not present a signi The three process radiation monitors operable and in service with the capa were exceeded. Also, it is estimated minutes prior to securing the contain	ficant hazard to the l on the ventilation sta bility to isolate the that RM-050/051 were ment purge.	health (ark (RM release isolate	or s -060 e if ed n	afet (061) the o mo	y o /06 ir re	f thc 2) we setpo tnan	pub re ints fi/te	lic.		
The root cause of this event was iden installed during original constructio The following three contributing caus	tified as the suscept n to inadvertent loose es were also identifie	ibility ening an ed for	of nd 1 this	the oss even	spa of nt:	de wi conne	re lu ction	igs 1.		
 Original construction at Fort Calh currently specified in Engineering Inadequate sensitivity of I&C pers inadvertent loosening and loss of Condition of panel wiring not cond difficult due to wiring congestion cleanliness. The potential for sp wiring complicates performance of 	oun did not specify th Standard Specification onnel to the suscepting connection, ucive to panel mainten , and less than ideal ade wire lugs to loose maintenance in the pan	he use o on ESS-8 bility o nance. wire la en durin nels.)	of r B, of s (Wi abel ng m	ng n pade re ic ing a ianip	wir wi den and ula	e lug ce lu tific pane tion	s as gs to ation l of	i is		

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NPC Form 3uG/Le)(17)

An investigation was performed to determine the reason ERF computer alarm, were not received when valves PCV-742E, PCV-742G and HCV-746A closed. The problem was traced to the "B" Qualified Safety Parameter Display System panel. This channel was reset and the system was found to provide correct valve position indication and the appropriate alarms were received. The problem is considered to have been caused by outage activities (possibly involving an electrical noise spike) and no further corrective action was found to be macesary.

The following corrective actions will be performed:

- Maintenance procedures will be revised by September 1, 1992 to incorporate requirements for terminating wires in accordance with appropriate engineering standards.
- 2. A requirement for a close-out inspection of control room panel maintenance activities, to ensure that the condition of panel wiring (i.e., craftsmanship, cleanliness, etc.) complies with procedural requirements, will be implemented by September 1, 1992.
- 3. A discussion of this event and the associated Root Cause Analysis will be provided to Maintenance Electricians and I&C personnel as required reading by May 31, 1992 to increase sensitivity to the possibility of inadvertently lifting spade wire lugs.

LFRs 89-004, 90-002, 90-008, 90-011, 91-002, 91-009, 91-021, 91-024 and 92-007 document other recent events involving inadvertent VIAS or CIAS actuations.