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C. K. McCoy
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Georgia Power
the southern electric system

January 8, 1996

LCV-0724

Docket No. 50-424

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-95-7
HYDROGEN RECOMBINER INADEQUATE
POST-MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONAL TEST

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed report associated with an event discovered on December 13, 1995.

Sincerely,

C. K. McCoy

CKM/TEW
Enclosure: LER 1-95-07

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator
Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. C. R. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

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NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2): 05000424

PAGE (3): 1 OF 3

TITLE (4): HYDROGEN RECOMBINER INADEQUATE POST-MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONAL TEST

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
12	13	95	95	007	00	01	08	96		05000
									FACILITY NAME	05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2033(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2033(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	*Specify in Abstract below*
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	*or in NRC Form 366A*

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Mehdi Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance	AREA CODE 706 826-3209

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-space typewritten lines) (16)

In September 1994, during a refueling outage, personnel replaced power cables in panels of both trains of the hydrogen recombiner system without performing adequate functional testing to prove operability. Operability was not demonstrated prior to unit operation which resulted in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specification (TS) when the unit was returned to power. Hydrogen recombiner surveillance tests which later proved the recombiners operability were sucsessfully completed for train B on October 18, 1994, and train A on February 16, 1995. However, on December 13, 1995, after a review of activities associated with this system, it was concluded that the unit had operated in a condition prohibited by the TS due to an inadequate post-maintenance functional test.

The cause of this event was cognitive personnel errors on the part of a work planner who identified on the work orders that no functional test was required, and a support shift supervisor (SSS) who concurred that no functional testing was needed. The personnel involved will be counseled regarding the importance of adequate testing following component maintenance and the lessons learned from this event will be reviewed during licensed operator requalification training and technical staff continuing training.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS) when the hydrogen recombiner was returned to operability following maintenance without performing proper functional testing.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of the discovery of this event, Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 (power operation) at 100 percent of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

In September 1994, during a refueling outage, personnel replaced power cables in panels of both trains of the hydrogen recombiner system. Prior to the unit's return to power operation, 18-month surveillance tests per TS 4.6.4.2.b. were performed which meggered the cabling and provided for visual inspection of the recombiner. On October 15, 1994, the unit entered Mode 2 (startup) and subsequently resumed full power operation.

On November 30, 1995, during an audit of activities associated with the hydrogen recombiner system, it was identified that a proper functional test may not have been performed following cable replacement. On December 13, 1995, a review of the 18-month surveillance tests conducted per TS 4.6.4.2.b, revealed no conclusive evidence to ensure continuity of the replaced cables' circuits. Although 6-month surveillance testing, following the mode 2 entry, proved the adequacy of the cable replacement and the cabling circuits' continuity, the entering of Mode 2 on October 15, 1994, represented unit operation in a condition prohibited by the TS.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was cognitive personnel errors on the part of a work planner who identified on the work orders that no functional test was required, and a support shift supervisor (SSS) who concurred that no functional testing was needed. Due to the length of time from the event in 1994 to its discovery in 1995, personnel were unable to recall the underlying reasons for their actions or

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)

other contributing factors. There were no unusual characteristics of the work locations that contributed to the occurrence of these errors by the Georgia Power Company personnel involved.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The regularly scheduled 6-month surveillance testing was completed successfully for train B of the hydrogen recombiners on October 18, 1994, and for train A on February 16, 1995. This testing proved the adequacy of the cable replacement work and the electrical continuity of the cable circuits. Furthermore, no event occurred during the period involved that required the operation of the hydrogen recombiner system. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse affect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1) The personnel involved will be counseled by January 31, 1996, regarding the importance of adequate testing following component maintenance.

2) The lessons learned from this event will be reviewed by February 29, 1996, during the next regularly scheduled sessions of licensed operator requalification training.

3) The lessons learned from this event will be reviewed during the next regularly scheduled sessions for technical staff continuing training, which will be completed by December 31, 1996.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1) Failed Components:
None

2) Previous Similar Events:
None

3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:
Hydrogen Recombiner System - BB