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August 28, 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Attention: Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch 2
Division of Licensing

Gentlemen:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

Pursuant to discussions with L. Ruth, Containment Systems Branch, on July 2 and 12, 1984, FSAR Sections 1.10 and 6.2, Tables 1.11-1, 6.2-16 and 6.2-25, Figures 5.4-8, 6.2-28 and 6.2-45, and Question 480.14 have been revised and are attached for your use. These changes will be incorporated into Amendment 8.

Very truly yours,

RL Mittl / DEC

JES:gs
Attachment

C D. H. Wagner
USNRC Licensing Program Manager

W. H. Bateman
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

The Energy People

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Response

Essential systems are those critical to the immediate mitigation of the consequences of a LOCA. Also identified as essential are those systems that could be useful, although not critical, in mitigating an accident that results in containment isolation. Essential systems are not automatically isolated by accident signals.

Nonessential systems are those that are not required or used in the mitigation of an accident that results in containment isolation. All nonessential systems are automatically isolated by the containment isolation signal, ~~and cannot be reopened by the operator while the accident signal is still present.~~ *Insert A*

Essential and nonessential systems are identified in Table 6.2-16.

Diverse parameters are sensed for the initiation of automatic isolation of nonessential systems penetrating primary containment. See Section 6.2.4 for a discussion of containment isolation signal sensed parameter diversity.

As required for post-accident situations, each nonessential penetration, except instrument lines, has two isolation barriers in series that meet the requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56, or 57, as clarified by SRP Section 6.2.4. Isolation is automatic with no credit taken for operator action. All manual valves are sealed closed so as to qualify as an isolation barrier. Each automatic isolation valve in a nonessential penetration receives independent isolation signals, derived from diverse parameters.

The design of the controls for automatic containment isolation are such that the resetting of the isolation signals will not result in the automatic reopening of containment isolation valves. Reopening of containment isolation valves will require deliberate operator action on a valve-by-valve basis. Ganged reopening of containment isolation valves is not used. Isolation valves in the RHR process sampling line, reactor water sample line, HPCI and RCIC suction and steam supply line, and the TIP system ball valve are being modified to reflect this criteria. These modifications will be incorporated into the HCGS design prior to fuel load

The primary containment isolation logic setpoint pressure is 2.0 psig. This pressure is far enough above the maximum expected pressure inside containment during normal operation that inadvertent containment isolation does not occur during normal operation from instrument drift fluctuations due to the accuracy of the pressure sensor.

with the exception of the systems discussed
below:

- a. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Return - Automatic isolation of Valve AE-V021 (AE-HV-F039) is not provided because there are two check valves at the containment boundary providing primary containment isolation for the feedwater system. These valves will provide immediate isolation without actuation of the motor-operated valve by an isolation signal. Valve AE-V021 is a motor-operated check valve that closes on backflow and is capable of being manually closed from the main control room.
- b. Bypass Lines Around the Testable Check Valves On the RHR and Core Spray Systems - The valves in the 1-inch bypass lines are not automatically isolated because they are normally closed, fail-closed valves, that are only operated to equalize pressures to permit testing of the check valves. The valves are opened by an operator holding a momentary pushbutton switch in the open position. Release of the

switch by the operator will return the valves to the closed position.

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c. Warmup Lines Around the Inboard HPCI and RCIK Steam Line Isolation Valves - Automatic isolation of these valves is not provided because they are in essential systems and are not required to perform a containment isolation function when the RCIK and HPCI systems are in operation.

Non-Condensable Gas Vent from the RHR Heat Exchangers - The valves on the vent line between the RHR heat exchangers and the suppression chamber (BC-HV-F104A,B and R-HV-F105A,B) are not automatically isolated because they are normally closed and are only opened during the RHR steam condensing mode of operation. The vent lines connect the RHR heat exchanger to the suppression pool. The RHR heat exchanger is part of an ECCS system and immediate isolation is not required if the valves were open at the time of requirement to isolate containment.

Reopening of primary containment isolation valves requires deliberate operator action on a valve-by-valve basis. Valves with manual override capabilities are identified in Table 6.2-16.

TABLE 1.11-1 (cont)

SRP Section	Specific SRP Acceptance Criteria	Summary Description of Differences	FSAR Section(s) Where Discussed
6.2.3 (Rev 2)	<p>II.3.e</p> <p>The external design pressure of the secondary containment structure should provide an adequate margin above the maximum expected external pressure.</p>	<p>The secondary containment for tornado depressurization is not designed with any margin above the maximum expected external pressure as stated in Regulatory Guide 1.76.</p>	6.2.3.6
6.2.4 (Rev 2)	<p>II.6.g</p> <p>Relief valves used as isolation valves should have a relief setpoint greater than 1.5 times the containment design pressure.</p>	<p>Relief valve setpoint is not greater than 1.5 times the containment design pressure.</p>	6.2.4.3
<p>Insert B →</p> <p>6.2.5 (Rev 2)</p>	<p>II.6.d</p> <p>Valve nearest the containment and piping between the containment and the first valve, when both valves are located outside primary containment, should be enclosed in a leak-tight or controlled leakage housing.</p>	<p>An enclosure or leak-tight housing has not been designed.</p>	6.2.4.5
6.2.5 (Rev 2)	<p>II.4</p> <p>Following a LOCA, repressurization of the containment should be limited to less than 50% of containment design pressure.</p>	<p>Pressure increase due to main steam isolation valve (MSIV) inleakage after a LOCA will result in repressurization of more than 50% of the containment design pressure.</p>	6.2.5.7
6.5.1 (Rev 2)	<p>II</p> <p>Design of instrumentation for ERF atmosphere cleanup systems to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52 and to the recommendations of ANSI N509 as summarized in SRP Table 6.5.1-1.</p>	<p>Compliance with the minimum instrumentation requirements for the CREF system are discussed in Table 6.5-4 and for the FRVS systems in Table 6.8-5</p>	6.5.1.2



II.6.b

All nonessential systems penetrating primary containment must be automatically isolated by the containment isolation signal.

There are valves in nonessential portions of systems where automatic isolation is not provided.

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water seal for at least 30 days. The ECCS and RCIC jockey pumps can be used to maintain pressure and to provide makeup or to fill up the feedwater system piping in the unlikely event that a line break occurs downstream of the check valves inside the primary containment, if it is necessary.

- b. Deleted
- c. High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine steam supply - The drain pot line is maintained full of water by condensation on the turbine steam supply line.
- d. Chilled water from and to drywell coolers - The lines in the reactor building are seismically analyzed with a vertical rise from the containment penetration of approximately 8 feet.
- e. RWCU supply - The lines in the primary containment are Seismic Category I and form a loop whose vertical leg is approximately 49 feet.
- f. RCIC turbine steam supply - This is similar to b. above.
- g. Main steam line drain - The line to the isolation valve is Seismic Category I. Steam would condense in the line and form a water seal during normal operation. Closure of the inboard and outboard isolation valves upon receipt of a containment isolation signal and the water seal provide a barrier to bypass leakage.
- h. Drywell floor drain and drywell equipment drain sump discharges - The lines to the isolation valves are Seismic Category I, and the sump water acts as an effective water seal.
- i. Reactor auxiliaries coolant system (RACS) supply and return - There are seismically analyzed lines in the auxiliary building, with a vertical leg approximately 6-feet long that forms a water seal.
- j. Deleted

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In addition to the third isolation valve, there are isolation valves on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) discharge lines, and on the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) return lines that connect to the feedwater lines between the outside containment isolation valves and the third isolation valves. Those isolation valves can be closed by operator action from the main control room.

See Section 5.4.9 for a further discussion of the design of the main steam lines and the feedwater lines.

6.2.4.3.1.3 Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Suction Line

The residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line penetrates primary containment and taps into one of the two recirculation loops. Isolation is provided by two normally closed motor-operated gate valves, which are maintained closed by a containment isolation signal. One containment isolation valve is located inside primary containment, and the second valve is located outside primary containment. ~~This design is conservative since it does not take credit for the RHR system being a closed system outside primary containment.~~

6.2.4.3.1.4 Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling Return Lines

The RHR shutdown cooling return lines ^{connect to} penetrate the primary containment and ~~discharge into~~ ^{are connected to} the discharge side of each recirculation loop, which ~~injects directly into~~ the RPV. Each line is isolated by a single, normally closed, motor-operated primary containment isolation valve ~~that receives a containment isolation signal outside primary containment~~ and by a testable check valve inside primary containment. ~~The motor-operated~~ Use of a single containment isolation valve is justified on the basis that the RHR system meets the requirements of a closed system outside primary containment. The RHR system is maintained in a leak-tight condition during normal operation by the use of a jockey pump system and by pump room flooding alarms and periodic visual inspection.

Valves are interlocked closed by a reactor high pressure signal during normal operation and are maintained closed during an accident by a low water level isolation signal.

Each testable check valve is ^{provided} ~~provided~~ with a bypass line for testing purposes. These lines are isolated by an air-operated ^{fail closed} globe valve.

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6.2.4.3.1.5 Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Core Spray Discharge Lines

The RHR low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) and the core spray discharge lines penetrate the primary containment and discharge directly into the RPV. Each line is isolated by a single, ^{outside primary} normally closed, motor-operated containment isolation valve that ~~does not receive a containment isolation signal~~ and a testable check valve inside primary containment.

~~Use of a single containment isolation valve is justified on the basis that both RHR and core spray meet the requirements of a closed system outside of primary containment. Automatic isolation is not provided because greater safety is ensured by initiating a cooling water supply to the reactor.~~

In addition, there is a HPCI line which discharges into the RPV by way of one of the two core spray lines downstream of the containment isolation valve on that core spray line. This line is isolated by a normally closed motor-operated gate valve. ^{Use primary containment} ~~of a single isolation valve is again justified on the basis that the HPCI system is a closed system outside primary containment. Automatic isolation is not provided because greater safety is ensured by initiating a cooling water supply to the reactor.~~

This motor-operated valve, in series with the testable check valve on the core spray line, provides the ~~second~~ redundant isolation barrier.

6.2.4.3.1.6 High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Supply Lines

The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam supply lines have two major containment isolation valves in series that are normally open, located inside and outside of the primary containment. The third containment isolation valve on these lines is a 2-inch, normally closed globe valve, on a 1-inch bypass line around the inside major containment isolation valve. These valves do not receive a containment isolation signal when a LOCA is detected. This permits these ESF systems to function during a LOCA. However, these valves automatically close when a break is detected in the portion of the steam supply line outside primary containment of the respective system.

6.2.4.3.1.7 Reactor Water Cleanup System Line

Reactor water processed through the RWCU system is taken out of containment from the reactor recirculation loops. The RWCU line

Each testable check valve is provided with a bypass line for testing purposes. These lines are isolated by an air-operated, fail-closed, globe valve.

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outside primary containment that closes on a containment isolation signal.

6.2.4.3.1.13 Post-Accident Liquid Sampling System

There are seven post-accident sampling lines that penetrate the primary containment. Only one of the seven forms part of the RCPB as well. See Section 6.2.4.3.2.16 for a discussion of the containment isolation provisions for these lines.

6.2.4.3.1.14 Instrument Lines

The instrument lines that penetrate the primary containment and form part of the RCPB are designed to optimize their monitoring function and to minimize uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the environment. These instrument lines have a flow restriction orifice inside the primary containment and an excess flow check valve outside the primary containment for automatic containment isolation in the event of an instrument line break. If an instrument line develops a leak of 1.5 to 2.5 gpm outside containment, the resultant differential pressure of 3 to 10 psi across the excess flow check valve will cause the check valve to close automatically. If an excess flow check valve fails to close when required, the restriction orifice and the main flow path through the valve have a resistance to flow at least equivalent to a sharp-edged orifice of 0.250 inches in diameter. Each valve is also provided with two limit switches that operate lights that indicate valve position and a solenoid valve for remote reset. The capability for remote operation has not been provided since there is no remote indication of failure of a specific line.

16 Insert D&E
6.2.4.3.1.15 Conclusion on GDC 55

To ensure protection against the consequences of accidents involving the release of radioactive material, piping systems that form the RCPB are shown to have adequate isolation capabilities on a case-by-case basis. In all cases, a minimum of two barriers are shown to protect against the release of radioactive materials.

In addition to meeting the isolation requirements stated in GDC 55, the pressure-retaining components that comprise the RCPB are designed to meet other requirements that minimize the

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be reliable boundaries against containment leakage, and that the system is maintained by visually checking for leaks during normal instrument calibrations.

The instrument lines that sense suppression pool water level have a remote manual valve for isolation. Their design is justified on the "other defined basis" because system reliability is greater with a single isolation valve and because these systems are closed systems outside containment that can accommodate a single failure without loss of system reliability as a boundary against containment leakage.

6.2.4.3.2.22 Conclusion on GDC 56

To ensure protection against the consequences of accidents involving release of significant amounts of radioactive materials, fluid lines that penetrate the primary containment have been demonstrated to provide isolation capabilities on a case-by-case basis in accordance with GDC 56.

In addition to meeting isolation requirements, the pressure-retaining components of these systems are designed to the same quality standards as the containment.

6.2.4.3.3 Evaluation Against GDC 57

6.2.4.3.3.1 Chilled Water System Lines and Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling System Lines

The chilled water and the reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RACS) lines are closed systems inside primary containment. However, greater safety is achieved by meeting the requirements of GDC 56. Therefore, two redundant motor-operated isolation valves that isolate on a containment isolation signal, one inside and one outside primary containment, are provided.

~~6.2.4.3.1.15~~ ~~6.2.4.3.3.1~~ Insert D
Control Rod Drive Lines

The CRD system has multiple, insert and withdraw lines, that penetrate the primary containment.

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The classification of these lines is quality group B, and they are designed in accordance with ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Class 2. The basis upon which the CRD insert and withdraw lines are designed is commensurate with the safety importance of maintaining the pressure integrity of these lines.

It has been an accepted practice not to provide automatic isolation valves for the CRD insert and withdraw lines in order to preclude any possible failure of the scram function. The lines can be isolated by the solenoid valves provided on the hydraulic control units (HCUs) that are located outside the primary containment. The lines that extend outside the primary containment are 1 inch or smaller and terminate in systems that are designed to prevent outleakage. The solenoid valves are normally closed, but they open upon rod movement and during reactor scram. In addition, a ball check valve located in the CRD flange housing automatically seals the insert line if there is a break. Finally, manual shutoff valves are provided outside the primary containment.

6.2.4.3.3.2 Deleted
6.2.4.3.4 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guides

6.2.4.3.4.1 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11)

Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.11 (Safety Guide 11) is discussed in Section 1.8.11.

6.2.4.3.4.2 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guide 1.141

Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.141 is discussed in Section 1.8.1.141.

Regulatory Guide 1.141 is not a requirement for HCGS. However, our assessment is that the other defined bases for complying with GDC 54, 55, 56, and 57 that were implemented on HCGS meet Regulatory Guide 1.141 requirements.

6.2.4.3.4.3 Failure Mode and Effects Analyses

A single failure can be defined as a failure of a component in any safety system that results in a loss or reduction of the

INSERT E

Because of the unique function and features of the CRD system, the previously described design constitutes an acceptable "other defined basis" for containment isolation as recognized by the NRC in the Federal Register (48 FR 23809).

system's capability to perform its safety function. Active mechanical components are defined in Regulatory Guide 1.48 as components that must perform a mechanical motion during the course of accomplishing a system safety function. Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 requires that electrical systems be designed against passive single failures as well as active single failures. Sections 3.1 and 15.9 describe the implementation of these requirements as well as the requirements of GDC 17, 21, 35, 41, 44, 54, 55, 56, and 57.

6.2.4.3.5 Evaluation of Other Defined Bases

When the reliability of an ESF system is increased by using only one containment isolation valve, a closed system outside primary containment is used as a second isolation barrier to accommodate a single active failure. In the case of a single failure, the closed system accommodates the failure by being an extension of the containment. Table 6.2-28 identifies those penetrations isolated with only a single isolation valve. Figures 6.2-45, 6.2-46, 6.2-47, and 6.2-48 show the limits of the extended containment boundary. All manual valves at the system boundary, vent valves, test valves, and drain valves, are under administrative control to assure the integrity of the extended containment boundary. Isolation provisions for the extended containment boundaries are identified in Table 6.2-27. Table 6.2-28 also evaluates the ability of check valves and safety/relief valves to maintain the extended containment boundary. All extended containment boundaries are Quality Group B (i.e. ASME B&PV Code Class 2 piping), Seismic Category I, and designed to temperature and pressure ratings at least equal to that of the containment as identified in Figures 6.2-45 through 6.2-48.

locked
closed
and

Missile protection for plant systems and structures is discussed in Section 3.5.

6.2.4.3.5.1 Conclusion on Other Defined Bases

When greater safety is ensured by using a single primary containment isolation valve, a dependable closed system outside primary containment is provided to act as a second barrier against the release of radioactive materials.

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setpoint is greater than 1.5 times the containment design pressure.

For relief valve PSV-F097, shown on Figure 5.4-13, the relief setpoint is less than 1.5 times the containment design pressure. Nevertheless, this is acceptable since valve F097 discharges into the suppression pool. Any increase in valve backpressure due to an increase in suppression chamber pressure resulting from an accident will tend to better seat the valve, thus enhancing its containment isolation capabilities.

Insert C

6.2.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL IN CONTAINMENT

Following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), hydrogen gas may be generated within the primary containment as a result of the following processes:

- a. Metal-water reaction involving the Zircaloy fuel cladding and the reactor coolant
- b. Radiolytic decomposition of water in the reactor vessel and the suppression pool (oxygen also evolves in this process)
- c. Corrosion of metals and paints in the primary containment.

To preclude the possibility of a combustible mixture of hydrogen and oxygen accumulating in the primary containment, the containment atmosphere is inerted with nitrogen gas before power operation of the reactor.

To ensure that the hydrogen and oxygen concentration in the primary containment is maintained below the lower flammability limit given in Regulatory Guide 1.7, the following features are provided:

- a. A containment hydrogen recombiner system
- b. A hydrogen/oxygen analyzer system (HOAS).

Insert C

6.2.4.5.3 Acceptance Criterion II.6.h

Acceptance Criterion II.6.h of Section 6.2.4 requires that nonessential systems be automatically isolated by the containment isolation signal. HGS complies with this requirement, with the exceptions that are identified and justified in our response to NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2 in Section 1.10.

Insert A

CONTINGENCY PROVISIONS

Item No.	Item Description	Unit	Quantity	Unit Price	Total Price	Material	Installation	Other	Notes	Remarks								
P-3	Water Station Casing Seal	Water	20	55	1100	Yes	Yes	Yes	AC Motor Pressure AC Motor	AS IS M4 AS IS	C C C	0 C 0	None	None	None	30 44 30	A M4 D	b,3 3,2 b,3
P-4	Water Station Casing Seal	Water	12	55	660	Yes	Yes	Yes	AC Motor Pressure AC Motor	M4 C AS IS	C C C	0 C 0	None	None	None	44 30	M4 D	3,2 g
P-4B	Water Station Casing Seal	Water	12	55	660	Yes	Yes	Yes	AC Motor Pressure AC Motor	M4 C AS IS	C C C	0 C 0	None	None	None	44 30	M4 D	3,2 g
P-5A	Cure Spigot To Receiver	Water	12	67	804	Yes	Yes	Yes	AC Motor Pressure AC Motor	M4 C AS IS	C C C	0 C 0	None	None	None	44 30	M4 D	3,2 g
P-5 B	Cure Spigot To Receiver	Water	12	50	600	Yes	Yes	Yes	AC Motor Pressure AC Motor	M4 C AS IS	C C C	0 C 0	None	None	None	44 30	M4 D	3,2 g

TABLE 6.7-10
CONTINUOUS PULVERIZATION

Equipment Number at Site	Line Label	Line Type	Line Size	Line Material	Line Length	Line Type	Line Material	Line Length	Line Type	Line Material	Line Length	Line Type	Line Material	Line Length	Line Type	Line Material	Line Length	Line Type	Line Material	Line Length
P-20	MSX Supply	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-21	MSX Return	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-22	Drinking Water	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-23	Spurs	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-24	Process Exhale	Gas	1/2"	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'
P-25	Process Exhale	Gas	1/2"	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'
P-26	Process Exhale	Gas	1/2"	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'
P-27	Process Exhale	Gas	1/2"	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'
P-28	Process Exhale	Gas	1/2"	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'
P-29	Process Exhale	Gas	1/2"	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'
P-30	Process Exhale	Gas	1/2"	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'	Gas	MSX	10'
P-31	Spurs	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-32	1st Purge System	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-33	2nd Inert	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-34	3rd Inert	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'
P-35	4th Inert	Water	1/2"	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'	Water	MSX	10'

Continued on Page 7

TABLE 8.7-10
CONTINGENCY ESTIMATIONS

Contingency Item	Line Number	Line Description	Unit	Quantity	Unit Price	Total Price	Contingency %	Contingency Amount	Contingency Basis	Notes
P-001	01	Excavation	cu yd	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-002	02	Concrete	cu yd	200	2.00	400.00	10%	40.00	10%	
P-003	03	Reinforcing Steel	lb	5000	0.10	500.00	10%	50.00	10%	
P-004	04	Formwork	sq ft	1000	0.50	500.00	10%	50.00	10%	
P-005	05	Backfill	cu yd	300	1.50	450.00	10%	45.00	10%	
P-006	06	Gravel	cu yd	150	1.00	150.00	10%	15.00	10%	
P-007	07	Asphalt	sq ft	2000	0.20	400.00	10%	40.00	10%	
P-008	08	Paint	gal	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-009	09	Lighting	ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-010	10	Signage	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-011	11	Drainage	ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-012	12	Retaining Wall	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-013	13	Foundation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-014	14	Roofing	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-015	15	Interior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-016	16	Exterior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-017	17	Site Preparation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-018	18	Site Cleanup	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-019	19	Site Restoration	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-020	20	Site Security	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-021	21	Site Access	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-022	22	Site Erosion Control	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-023	23	Site Stabilization	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-024	24	Site Slope Protection	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-025	25	Site Drainage	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-026	26	Site Foundation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-027	27	Site Retaining Wall	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-028	28	Site Roofing	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-029	29	Site Interior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-030	30	Site Exterior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-031	31	Site Site Preparation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-032	32	Site Site Cleanup	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-033	33	Site Site Restoration	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-034	34	Site Site Security	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-035	35	Site Site Access	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-036	36	Site Site Erosion Control	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-037	37	Site Site Stabilization	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-038	38	Site Site Slope Protection	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-039	39	Site Site Drainage	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-040	40	Site Site Foundation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-041	41	Site Site Retaining Wall	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-042	42	Site Site Roofing	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-043	43	Site Site Interior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-044	44	Site Site Exterior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-045	45	Site Site Site Preparation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-046	46	Site Site Site Cleanup	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-047	47	Site Site Site Restoration	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-048	48	Site Site Site Security	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-049	49	Site Site Site Access	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-050	50	Site Site Site Erosion Control	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-051	51	Site Site Site Stabilization	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-052	52	Site Site Site Slope Protection	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-053	53	Site Site Site Drainage	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-054	54	Site Site Site Foundation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-055	55	Site Site Site Retaining Wall	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-056	56	Site Site Site Roofing	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-057	57	Site Site Site Interior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-058	58	Site Site Site Exterior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-059	59	Site Site Site Site Preparation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-060	60	Site Site Site Site Cleanup	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-061	61	Site Site Site Site Restoration	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-062	62	Site Site Site Site Security	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-063	63	Site Site Site Site Access	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-064	64	Site Site Site Site Erosion Control	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-065	65	Site Site Site Site Stabilization	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-066	66	Site Site Site Site Slope Protection	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-067	67	Site Site Site Site Drainage	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-068	68	Site Site Site Site Foundation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-069	69	Site Site Site Site Retaining Wall	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-070	70	Site Site Site Site Roofing	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-071	71	Site Site Site Site Interior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-072	72	Site Site Site Site Exterior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-073	73	Site Site Site Site Site Preparation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-074	74	Site Site Site Site Site Cleanup	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-075	75	Site Site Site Site Site Restoration	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-076	76	Site Site Site Site Site Security	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-077	77	Site Site Site Site Site Access	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-078	78	Site Site Site Site Site Erosion Control	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-079	79	Site Site Site Site Site Stabilization	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-080	80	Site Site Site Site Site Slope Protection	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-081	81	Site Site Site Site Site Drainage	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-082	82	Site Site Site Site Site Foundation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-083	83	Site Site Site Site Site Retaining Wall	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-084	84	Site Site Site Site Site Roofing	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-085	85	Site Site Site Site Site Interior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-086	86	Site Site Site Site Site Exterior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-087	87	Site Site Site Site Site Site Preparation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-088	88	Site Site Site Site Site Site Cleanup	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-089	89	Site Site Site Site Site Site Restoration	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-090	90	Site Site Site Site Site Site Security	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-091	91	Site Site Site Site Site Site Access	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-092	92	Site Site Site Site Site Site Erosion Control	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-093	93	Site Site Site Site Site Site Stabilization	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-094	94	Site Site Site Site Site Site Slope Protection	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-095	95	Site Site Site Site Site Site Drainage	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-096	96	Site Site Site Site Site Site Foundation	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-097	97	Site Site Site Site Site Site Retaining Wall	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-098	98	Site Site Site Site Site Site Roofing	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-099	99	Site Site Site Site Site Site Interior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	
P-100	100	Site Site Site Site Site Site Exterior Finishes	sq ft	100	1.00	100.00	10%	10.00	10%	

Continued on next page

TABLE 6.1.10
CONSTRAINTS PRACTICES

Line Number	Line Description	Unit	Quantity	Unit Price	Total Price	Material	Labour	Overhead	Profit	Remarks
J-001	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-002	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-003	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-004	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-005	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-006	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-007	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-008	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-009	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-010	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-011	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-012	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-013	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-014	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-015	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-016	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-017	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-018	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-019	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100
J-020	Excavation 1.0m x 1.0m x 0.3m	m ³	100	20.00	2000.00	100	0	0	0	100

TOTAL

Amount: \$, 000

TABLE 4-2-14
CORROSION PENETRATIONS

Penetration Reference Number	Line Number	Line Name	Line Material	Line Size	Line Type	Line Length	Line Depth	Line Width	Line Area	Line Volume	Line Weight	Line Loss	Line Loss %	Line Loss Rate	Line Loss Factor	Line Loss Index	Line Loss Class	Line Loss Code	Line Loss Note
A-101	1	Line 101	Carbon Steel	1/2"	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
A-102	1	Line 102	Carbon Steel	1/2"	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102	102
A-103	1	Line 103	Carbon Steel	1/2"	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103
A-104	1	Line 104	Carbon Steel	1/2"	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104
A-105	1	Line 105	Carbon Steel	1/2"	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105	105
A-106	1	Line 106	Carbon Steel	1/2"	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106
A-107	1	Line 107	Carbon Steel	1/2"	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107
A-108	1	Line 108	Carbon Steel	1/2"	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
A-109	1	Line 109	Carbon Steel	1/2"	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109	109
A-110	1	Line 110	Carbon Steel	1/2"	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110
A-111	1	Line 111	Carbon Steel	1/2"	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111	111
A-112	1	Line 112	Carbon Steel	1/2"	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112
A-113	1	Line 113	Carbon Steel	1/2"	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113
A-114	1	Line 114	Carbon Steel	1/2"	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114
A-115	1	Line 115	Carbon Steel	1/2"	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115
A-116	1	Line 116	Carbon Steel	1/2"	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116
A-117	1	Line 117	Carbon Steel	1/2"	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
A-118	1	Line 118	Carbon Steel	1/2"	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
A-119	1	Line 119	Carbon Steel	1/2"	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119
A-120	1	Line 120	Carbon Steel	1/2"	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120

END

TABLE 6-2-14
CONTAINMENT PUBLICATIONS

Publication Number	Volume	Issue	Year	Author	Title	Subject	Classification	Accession Number	Library	Notes
1-1001	1	1	1951
1-1002	1	1	1951
1-1003	1	1	1951
1-1004	1	1	1951
1-1005	1	1	1951
1-1006	1	1	1951
1-1007	1	1	1951
1-1008	1	1	1951
1-1009	1	1	1951
1-1010	1	1	1951
1-1011	1	1	1951
1-1012	1	1	1951
1-1013	1	1	1951
1-1014	1	1	1951
1-1015	1	1	1951
1-1016	1	1	1951
1-1017	1	1	1951
1-1018	1	1	1951
1-1019	1	1	1951
1-1020	1	1	1951
1-1021	1	1	1951
1-1022	1	1	1951
1-1023	1	1	1951
1-1024	1	1	1951
1-1025	1	1	1951
1-1026	1	1	1951
1-1027	1	1	1951
1-1028	1	1	1951
1-1029	1	1	1951
1-1030	1	1	1951

Continued on next page

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TABLE 6.2-16

(1) Valve type:

Ball	BL
Butterfly	BF
Check valve	CK
Gate valve	GT
Globe	GB
Pressure relief	PSV
Stop check	SCK
Safety relief	SRV
Explosive (shear)	XP
Excess flow check	XV
Ball check	DLCK
Hydraulic control unit	HCU
Restriction orifice	FO

(2) See Figure 6.2-28. Numbers in this column refer to details in the figure.

(3) AC-operated valves required for isolation functions are powered from the AC standby power buses. DC-operated isolation valves are powered from the station batteries.

(4) Normal valve position (open or closed) is the position during normal power operation of the reactor.

(5) Table of isolation signal codes:

- A - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - L2
- B - Main Steam Line - High Radiation
- C - Not used
- D - Main Steam Line - High Flow
- E - Main Turbine Inlet - Low Steam Pressure (Run Mode)
- F - Main Condenser - Low Vacuum (Main Stop Valve Greater than 90% Open)
- G - Main Steam Line Tunnel - High Temperature
- H - Drywell High Pressure
- I - Reactor Building High Radiation
- J - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - L3
- K - Reactor Vessel Low Water Level - L1
- L - Reactor Water Cleanup System - Area High Temperature in the system's equipment compartment
- M - Reactor Water Cleanup System - Area High Differential Temperature across the system's equipment compartment ventilation ducts
- N - Reactor Water Cleanup System - High Differential Flow between the system influent and effluent piping outside the drywell
- O - Standby Liquid Control System Operating
- P - Reactor Water Cleanup - High Temperature at Outlet of Nonregenerative Heat Exchanger

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TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd)

(6) Power source: *channels*
 Electrical Separation Source:

- A - Class 1E electrical channel
- B - Class 1E electrical channel
- C - Class 1E electrical channel
- D - Class 1E electrical channel
- W - Reactor protection system (RPS)
 electrical separation channel
- X - RPS electrical separation channel
- Y - RPS electrical separation channel
- Z - RPS electrical separation channel
- N - Non-Class 1E

For explanation of electrical separation channels, refer to Section 8.1.

(7) Remarks:

- a. ^{The} Main steam isolation valves requires that both solenoid pilots be deenergized to close valves. Accumulator air pressure plus spring act together to close valves when both pilots are deenergized. Voltage failures at only one pilot does not cause valve closure. The valves are designed to fully close in less than 10 seconds, but in no less than 3 seconds.
- b. A separate pressure interlock closes the valves ^{or} upon a high reactor pressure.
- c. Separate HPCI system isolation provisions ^{close this} isolate these valves ^{or} on exhaust pressure high, area temperature high, steam pressure low, and steam flow high.
- d. Separate RCIC system isolation provisions ^{close this} isolate these valves ^{or} on exhaust pressure high, area temperature high, steam pressure low, and steam flow high.
- e. Valves ~~FD V007 and FD V010~~ ^{close} isolate on HPCI system steam line pressure high, and drywell pressure high. ~~low and drywell pressure high.~~
- f. Valve ~~closes on HPCI system exhaust pressure high, area temperature high, steam pressure low, and steam flow high.~~ ^{or} Valve closes on RCIC system steam line pressure low and drywell pressure high.

cc. Where no Appendix J, Type C test is indicated, see Table 6.2-24 for further discussion.

TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd)

- g. Valve ~~close~~^{close} on HPCI system high discharge flow.
- h. Valve closes on RCIC system high discharge flow.
- i. Valves ~~BC V031, V034, V120, and V131~~ close on RHR system high discharge flow.
- j. Valves ~~BE V035, V036~~ ^{closes} close on core spray system high discharge flow.
- k. This penetration is a boundary between the drywell and the suppression chamber. It is not a path from the primary containment to the environment.
- l. ~~This penetration is classified as an ESF penetration since it is used by the containment hydrogen recombiner system.~~
^{Deleted}
- m. Sealed penetration
- n. Relief valve set pressure - 410 psig
- o. Relief valve set pressure - 68 psig
- p. Relief valve set pressure - 495 psig
- q. Relief valve set pressure - 500 psig
- r. Locked closed valve
- s. System defined as essential per the definition in HCGS' response to NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2
- t. System defined as nonessential per the definition in HCGS' response to NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2
- u. ~~Instrument lines are not classified as either essential or nonessential in Section 1.8.1.11.~~
^{Designed and installed per Regulatory Guide 1.11 as discussed}
- v. Penetration P-22 and P-220 share primary containment isolation provisions.
- w. Penetration P-70 and J-202 share primary containment isolation provisions.
- x. Manual override of the isolation signal is provided to enable the operator to change the post-accident position of the valve.
- y. This valve will be tested as part of the MSIV sealing system per Chapter 16 requirements.
- z. Relief valve set pressure - 1480 psig
- aa. Relief valve set pressure - 150 psig Amendment 6, 6/84
^{P. 207, P. 207}
- bb. Penetrations P-201A and P-213B share primary

Containment isolation provisions.

T1002775

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TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd)

(8) P&ID's published as FSAR figures depicting the penetration configuration.

<u>Note</u>	<u>Figures</u>
A	5.1-3, Sh 1 5.1-3, Sh 2 6.7-1
B	5.1-3, Sh 1 5.4-8 5.4-17 6.3-1
C	5.4-13, Sh 1
D	5.4-13, Sh 1 5.4-13, Sh 2
E	6.3-7 6.3-1
F	6.3-1
G	9.2-14, Sh 2
H	5.4-17
I	5.4-8
J	5.1-3, Sh 1
K	5.4-2, Sh 1
L	9.3-8
M	6.2-29 6.2-30
N	9.3-7, Sh 1 9.3-7, Sh 3
O	9.3-3
P	9.3-11, Sh 1
Q	9.2-17
R	9.5-32
S	4.6-6
T	6.3-1 5.4-13, Sh 1 5.4-8
U	6.3-7
V	6.2-41
W	9.1-5, Sh 2
X	9.3-5, Sh 1
Y	5.1-4, Sh 1
Z	Deleted
AA	6.2-29
BB	11.5-3, Sh 1
CC	9.3-5, Sh 2
DD	5.4-13, Sh 2
EE	5.4-2, Sh 1 9.3-5
FF	6.3-1 6.2-41
G6	5.1-3, Sh 1 5.1-3, Sh 2

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TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd)

- (9) Post-Accident valve position (open or closed) is the position during the initial 10 minutes after an accident.
- (10) Shutdown valve position (open or closed) is the position beyond the initial 10 minutes after an accident.
- (11) The ESF System designation is applied to primary containment penetrations that are a part of an ESF System and where that part of the system provides or aids a function that is characteristic of an ESF System. Although reactivity control systems are not usually characterized as being ESF Systems, in this table reactivity control system penetrations are given the ESF system designation.
- (12) Manual indicates remote manual initiation of valve closure from the main control room, unless indicated otherwise.
- (13) The valve is closed by remote manual initiation from the main control room.
- (14) Operation is by ^{local} manual handwheel.
- (15) The valve closure times are indicative of the valves rated capabilities. Maximum valve closure times are given in Chapter 16.
- (16) The valve actuator is only ^{used} to exercise the Valve disk during testing.
- (17) Remote manual initiation capability is provided in the main control room for air-assisted ^{closure.} Amendment 6, 6/84

TABLE 6.2-25

PENETRATIONS USING A CLOSED SYSTEM OUTSIDE
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AS A SECOND ISOLATION BARRIER

Containment Penetration Number	Line Isolated	Justification(1)
P-4A, 4B	RHR Shutdown Cooling Return	a, e
P-5A, 5B	Core Spray to Reactor	a, e
P-6A thru 6D	RHR Low Pressure Coolant Injection	a, e
P-201	Vacuum Breaker Network Branch	a, c, d
P-202	HPCI Pump Suction	a, c
P-203	HPCI Minimum Return	a, c
P-204	HPCI & RCIC Vacuum Breaker Network	a, d
P-207	Vacuum Breaker Network Branch	a, c, d
P-208	RCIC Pump Suction	a, c
P-209	RCIC Minimum Return	a, c
P-211A thru 211D	RHR Pump Suction	a, c
P-212A, 212B	RHR Suppression Pool Cooling & System Test	a, c
P-213A, 213B	Vacuum Breaker Network Branch RHR Relief to Suppression Pool	a, c, d
P-214A, 214B	RHR to Suppression Pool Spray Header	a
P-216A thru 216D	Core Spray Pump Suction	a, c
P-217A, 217B	Core Spray Test to Suppression Pool	a, c
P-228, J-209, J-217, J-219	Suppression Pool Water Level	b


Notes:

(1) Justifications:

- a. A single isolation valve is used because the system provides or aids the emergency passage of fluids into and out of primary containment. The addition of a second containment isolation valve decreases the reliability of the system by providing an additional source of active failure.
- b. A single isolation valve is used because a second isolation valve would not add to the dependability of the containment boundary. These instrument lines are a reliable containment boundary. To add a second containment isolation valve would lengthen the containment boundary without a subsequent increase in the dependability of the containment boundary.
- c. The line to the suppression pool is always submerged so that the primary containment atmosphere cannot impinge upon the valve.
- d. the isolation provisions that are shared in common between containment penetrations P-201, P-204, P-207, P-213A, and P-213B, can be shown to provide isolation by redundant primary containment isolation valves, as an alternative to considering the vacuum breaker network as a closed system.

RPV
(RECIRC. LOOP)

PRIMARY
CONTAINMENT



DETAIL 3


HOPE CREEK
GENERATING STATION
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION LINE

FIGURE 6.2-38
SHEET 3 OF 48

AMENDMENT 6, 06/84

(SEE LEGEND)



ISOLATION VALVES	
P-4A	P-4B
BC-V013	BC-V110

TEST/DRAIN VALVES	
P-4A	P-4B
BC-172	V169
BC-170	V171
BC-V348	V334
BC-V355	V335
BC-V074	V183
BC-V118	V117

OTHER VALVES	
P-4A	P-4B
BC-V014	V111

ISOLATION VALVES	
P-4A	P-4B
BC-V014	V111
BC-V013	V110
BC-V118	V117


HOPE CREEK
GENERATING STATION
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

RHR SHUTDOWN
COOLING RETURN LINES

FIGURE 6.3-28
SHEET 4 OF 48

AMENDMENT 8, 06/84

(SEE LEGEND)



OTHER VALVES

P-5A	BE-V002
P-6A	BC-V006
P-6B	BC-V017
P-6C	BC-V114
P-6D	BC-V102


TEST/DRAIN VALVES

P-5A	BE-V070	V069	V078	V077	V072	V001
P-6A	BC-V173	V177	V320	V321	V119	V076
P-6B	BC-V174	V178	V324	V325	V120	V075
P-6C	BC-V175	V179	V353	V354	V121	V182
P-6D	BC-V176	V180	V332	V333	V122	V181

ISOLATION VALVES


P-5A	BE-V003	V002	V072
P-6A	BC-V004	V065	V119
P-6B	BC-V018	V017	V120
P-6C	BC-V113	V114	V121
P-6D	BC-V101	V102	V122

OR



NOTE:
FOUND ON CORE SPRAY
SYSTEM ONLY.

* (SEE LEGEND)




DETAIL 9

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT	
MAIN STEAM DRAIN LINE	
FIGURE 6.2-28 SHEET 9 OF 48	AMENDMENT 6, 06/84

(SEE LEGEND)

PRIMARY
CONTAINMENT

RPV



CLOSED SYSTEM

DETAIL 27


HOPE CREEK
GENERATING STATION
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

RHR RELIEF TO
SUPPRESSION CHAMBER LINES

(SEE LEGEND)

FIGURE 6.2-28
SHEET 27 OF 48

AMENDMENT 6, 06/84



ISOLATION VALVES

DETAIL 34

P-8A	GB-V082	GB-V048	GB-PSV-9523A
P-388	GB-V084	GB-V071	GB-PSV-9523B

TEST VALVES

P-8A	GB-V231	GB-V230	GB-V275
P-388	GB-V237	GB-V236	GB-V241

TEST VALVES

P-8B	GB-V233	GB-V232	GB-V274
P-38A	GB-V235	GB-V234	GB-V240

NOTE: THIS IS A TEST TAP ON P-38A AND P-38B

(SEE LEGEND)

ISOLATION VALVES

P-8B	GB-V081	GB-V048	GB-PSV-9522A
P-38A	GB-V083	GB-V070	GB-PSV-9522B


HOPE CREEK
GENERATING STATION
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

CHILLER WATER SYSTEM LINES

FIGURE 8.3-28
SHEET 24 OF 48

AMENDMENT 8, 06/84

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE
 2. INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT
 3. THE INFORMATION IS THE PROPERTY OF THE
 4. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND IS
 5. LOANED TO YOU BY THE NATIONAL BUREAU
 6. OF STANDARDS. IT AND ITS CONTENTS
 7. ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE
 8. YOUR AGENCY.



- ISOLATION VALVE FOR PENETRATION WITH ONLY ONE ISOLATION VALVE
- △ ISOLATION VALVE FOR PENETRATION WITH REDUNDANT ISOLATION VALVES
- SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- ++++ INDICATES THE EXTENDED CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY AFTER A SINGLE FAILURE

N-40-1 REV 2
 HOPE CREEK
 GENERATING STATION
 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
 PS-10
 REACTOR CORE
 ISOLATION COOLING
 FIGURE 5.4-1
 APPENDIX 5, FIGURE 5.4-1

6.2-45 - take to
 ok for
 FIG 5.4

1. The purpose of this drawing is to show the location of the various structures and equipment at the Hope Creek Generating Station. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

2. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

3. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

4. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

5. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.


6. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

7. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

8. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

9. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.

10. The drawing is a plan view of the station and shows the layout of the buildings, piping, and other structures. The drawing is a technical drawing and is intended for use by the operating personnel of the station.



H-41-REV 3

HOPE CREEK
 GENERATING STATION
 PHYSICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

NRC AS AN EXTENDED
 CONTAINMENT
 BOUNDARY

FIGURE 5.4-B
 SHEET 1 OF 2

AMENDMENT 5, MARK

5.4-B

*Title to cover
 for Fig. 2-41-
 21*

QUESTION 480.14 (SECTION 6.2.3)

Provide the following additional information related to potential bypass leakage paths given in Table 6.2-15.

- a. For each air or water seal demonstrate that a sufficient inventory of the fluid is available to maintain the seal 30 days following onset of a LOCA. Note that the suppression pool cannot be considered a water seal. Describe the testing and proposed entries for the Technical Specifications that will verify the assumptions used in the analyses.
- b. For each path where water seals eliminate the potential for bypass leakage, provide a sketch to show the location of the water seal relative to the system isolation valves.

RESPONSE

BCGS does consider the suppression pool to be an effective water seal. The suppression pool is a reliable source of water that can provide the required separation between the primary containment atmosphere and the environs. The suppression chamber's structural design is discussed in Section 3.8.2. Thus, we have considered it to be a water seal as indicated in Section 6.2.3.

Below is an item by item discussion of the ability of the air and water seal barriers identified in Table 6.2-15 to maintain sufficient inventory for 30 days following a LOCA. For those valves maintaining a water seal, calculations have been done to verify that there is sufficient inventory for 30 days assuming leakage rates of 10 ml/h per inch of nominal valve diameter, unless otherwise indicated below (Reference 1). Except for HPCI valves FD-V017 and FD-V003, RCIC valves FC-V021 and FC-V015, and RACS valves ED-V003 and ED-V004, all valves required to maintain a water seal are 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Type C tested. Those valves that are not Type C tested will be identified in the technical specifications as requiring periodic leakage testing in order to ensure the existence of the water seal.

Main Steam - A positive air seal is maintained through the operation of the MSIV sealing system as discussed in Section 6.7.

Feedwater Line - There is sufficient water inventory for a 30-day seal, assuming a leakage rate of 40 ml/h per inch of nominal valve diameter for valves AE-V003 and AE-V007. Figure 480.14-1 is provided to show the location of the water seal relative to the system isolation valves. The ECCS and RCIC jockey pumps can be used to provide makeup should it be necessary.