ENCLOSURE 1

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

TVA-SQN-TS-59

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	24
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	23
c. Main Stm. Gen. Water Level-Low-Low					
i. Start Motor Driven Pumps	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. any stm gen.	2/stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	16*
ii. Start Turbine-Driven Pump	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. any 2 stm. gen.	2/stm. gen	1, 2, 3	16*
d. S.I. Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine Driven Pump	See 1 above (all S.I. initiating functions and requirements)				
e. Station Blackout Start Motor-Driven Pump associated with the shutdown board and Turbine Driven Pump	2/shutdown board	1/shutdown board	2/shutdown board	1, 2, 3	20
f. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine Driven Pump	1/pump	1/pump	1/pump	1, 2	20*
g. Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure-Low	3/pump	2/pump	2/pump	1, 2, 3	20*

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
6. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	24
b. Automatic Actuation Logic	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	23
c. Main Stm. Gen. Water Level-Low-Low					
i. Start Motor Driven Pumps	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. any stm gen.	2/stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	16*
ii. Start Turbine-Driven Pump	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. any 2 stm. gen.	2/stm. gen	1, 2, 3	16*
d. S.I. Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine Driven Pump	See 1 above (all S.I. initiating functions and requirements)				
e. Station Blackout Start Motor-Driven Pump associated with the shutdown board and Turbine Driven Pump	2/shutdown board	1/shutdown board	2/shutdown board	1, 2, 3	20
f. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine Driven Pump	1/pump	1/pump	1/pump	1, 2	20*
g. Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure-Low	3/pump	2/pump	2/pump	1, 2, 3	20*

ENCLOSURE 2

JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
TVA-SQN-TS-59

Description

This proposed technical specification change revises the action for item 6.c of table 3.3-3, by adding an asterik which refers to the note that "the provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. This change would allow a change from mode 4 to mode 3 when a level transmitter is inoperable. This change would also make item 6.c of table 3.3-3 consistent with item 5.

Justification

Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2 requires both motor-driven pumps and the turbine-driven pumps to be operable in modes 1, 2, and 3. This requirement will remain unchanged. LCO 3.3.2.1.b requires the channel including the level transmitter (LT) to be operable to start the pumps in modes 1, 2, and 3. When one channel is inoperable, the action statement requires the bistable to be tripped within one hour, but operation may proceed until the next functional test. The same channel and level transmitter is also used for turbine trip and feedwater isolation (item 5). However, item 5 already has the asterik which refers to the note. Consistency in the requirements for this channel would enhance the ability of the operation staff to correctly apply the LCO.

This technical specification change will allow each unit to change modes after the bistable is tripped to the inoperable channel. If one channel is inoperable, the ability to start the pumps automatically is not hindered as two channels are operable to actuate to start the pumps with effectively a 1 out 2 logic on the remaining operable channels. The system functional capability is maintained and the margin of safety is not affected. Therefore, based on the attached significant hazards determination that: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Environmental Statement.

ATTACHMENT

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS

1. **Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report significantly increased?** No.

   With one channel inoperable and placed in the trip position in accordance with action 16, the AFW pumps will start if either of the two remaining channels trip. Thus a single failure to the operable channels will not prevent actuation.

2. **Is the possibility for an accident of a new or different type than evaluated previously in the safety analysis report created?** No.

   If one channel is inoperable, the ability to switch over suction automatically is not hindered as two channels are operable to actuate and open ERCW valves with effectively a 1/2 logic on the remaining operable channels.

3. **Is the margin of safety significantly reduced?** No.

   LCO 3.7.1.2 still requires the pumps to be operable in modes 1, 2, and 3. This will remain unchanged. The logic is maintained within the action statement limits, and the system functional capability is maintained.