Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

J. L. Wilson
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

May 4, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of	)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority	)	50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 and DPR-79 - HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PROTECTION (HPFP) SYSTEM INOPERABILITY

This facsimile transmission confirms information concerning the inoperability of the fire suppression water system in the condenser circulating water intake pumping station initially reported by telephone at 1930 Eastern daylight time on May 2, 1992, in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a).

Details are provided in the enclosure. The condition is applicable to Units 1 and 2. This information is being supplied in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8924.

Sincerely,

J. L. Wilson

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

On May 2, 1992, at approximately 1930 Eastern daylight time, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 entered Limited Conditions for Operation 3.7.11.1 and 3.7.11.4 because of a leak in the high pressure fire protection (HPFP) piping. The leak was disrupting the supply of HPFP water to the fire-hose stations at the condenser circulating-water intake pumping station. The five fire hose stations are listed in Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.11.4 as being required to be operable.

Actions were immediately taken to isolate the leaking portion of the HPFP system. A backup suppression system was established, as required by TS Action Statement 3.7.11.4.

A report outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and restoration of the fire hose stations will be submitted within 14 days, as required by TS Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(c).