92-14061 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWED STATION R. D. 1, Box 208 DELTA, PA 17314 (717) 456-7014 KEN POWERS PLANT MANAGER May 7, 1992 Docket No. 50-277 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

> SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit ?

This LER concerns a manual scram and Primary Containment Isolation System Group II/III isolations following a condensate vent line failure.

Reference: Docket No. 50-277

Report Number: 2-92-006 Revision Number: 00

Event Date: 04/07/92 Report Date: 05/07/92

Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

> Van Bur. Sincerely,

J. J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

T. T. Martin, USNRC, Region I

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On 4/7/92 at 0935 hours, the Floor Foreman reported a weld leak on a one inch vent line and that it could not be isolated during current plant conditions. At 0955 hours, the one inch vent line weld broke and a rapid shutdown was commenced in accordance with General Procedure GP-9-2 "FAST REACTOR POWER REDUCTION". At 1014 hours, a reactor scram was initiated during a fast power reduction . 43% power when the mode switch as placed in the "SHUTDOWN" position. A Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group II/III isolation occurred as expected due to the level decrease following the scram. The cause of the event has been determined to be the failure of a one inch vent line weld on a six inch condensate line. Metallurgical analysis showed that the weld failure was the result of metal fatigue due to high frequency vibration. Following the event, the scram and PCIS Group II/III isolation logics were reset. Affected systems were restored to appropriate conditions as necessary. The failed one inch weld was repaired. An evaluation is being performed on similar drain and vent line configurations in this high vibration area on both units. No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event. One previous similar event has been identified.

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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 species i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

NRC FORM 366.

NRC FORM 366A

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OME NO. \$150 0104 EXPIRES 4/30 72

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST BOO HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTRATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P.S.OL U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20655. AND TO THE PARENWORL REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BURDET WASHINGTON DC 20669.

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Requirements for the Report

This report is submitted to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because of unplanned Engineered Safety Feature Actuations.

Unit Conditions at Time of Event

Unit 2 was in the RUN mode at 100% of rated thermal reactor (EIIS:RPV) power. Reactor power was reduced to 43% power at the time of the scram. There were no other systems, structures, or components that were inoperable that contributed to the event.

Description of Event

On 4/7/92 at 0925 hours, a System Engineer reported to the Control Room that a leak was observed in the Turbine Building on 116' elevation. The Control Room immediately dispatched a Floor Foreman (FF) (non-Licensed, Utility) to investigate the problem. At 0935 hours, the FF reported a weld leak on a one inch vent line and that it could not be isolated during current plant conditions. The vent line was connected to a six inch condensate line which provides cooling supply water to the Off Gas Recombiner (EIIS:WF) Condenser (EIIS:COND). At 0955 hours, the one inch vent line weld broke and a rapid shutdown was commenced in accordance with General Procedure (GP)-9-2 "FAST REACTOR POWER REDUCTION".

At 1014 hours, a reactor scram was initiated during a fast power reduction at 43% power when the mode switch was placed in the "SHUTDOWN" position. A Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS)(EIIS:JM) Group II/III isolation occurred as expected due to the level decrease following the scram. The weld failure allowed condensate water to enter the Normal Waste Drain system which communicates with site storm drains. Immediately after condensate water was identified to be entering the Normal Waste Drains, surveys were performed of the site storm drains. The scram was reset at 1028 hours and the PCIS Group II/III isolations wer eset at 1055 hours. The NRC was notified of the event via ENS at 1303 hours. Following the repair of the one inch condensate line weld, a plant startup was immediately commenced and power operation was achieved on 4/10/92.

Surveys indicate that no activity was present in the storm drains. It was estimated that approximately 20 gallons of condensate water was released to the Normal Waste Drains. A liquid sample was obtained from the condensate line which is assumed to be representative of the effluent released. This sample indicated that the actual activity release through the Normal Waste Drain was well below the limits specified in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).

Cause of Event

The cause of the event has been determined to be the failure of a one inch vent line weld (See Attached Drawing) on a six inch condensate line. The leak could not be isolated at power without removal of the Off Gas Recombiner system from service. Therefore, power reduction was commenced and a manual scram was initiated.

NRC FORM 386A

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

MEPROVED ONE NO. 3150-0104

TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDON REH RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INSCRIMATION COLLECTION REGULEST BOD HRS FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDON, ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PABUL US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 2055S AND THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANUFEMENT AND SUPPOST WASHINGTON DC 20073

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Metallurgical analysis showed that the weld failure was the result of metal fatigue due to high frequency vibration. During normal system operation prior to 1990, the pressure controller sensing lines experienced pressure pulsations as the condensate cooling water system inlet pressure was reduced from as high as 700 psig down to 120 psig by a pressure control valve and by throttling the Manual Globe Valve. These pulsations caused several failures of pressure controllers. Prior to the 1990 operating procedure revision which reduced the system vibrations, pressure controller valve linkage failures were identified on the both Unit 2 and 3 pressure controllers (only one train was used during normal operation). The system operating procedures were revised in 1990 such that both pressure control valves are throttled to approximately 75% open. Both trains are now placed inservice at the same time to reduce system vibration. The 6" manual globe valves directly downstream of the pressure control valves are now manually throttled to co trol the inlet pressure of condensate cooling water to the Off Gas Recombiner Condenser. In addition, condensate from the failed connection entered the Normal Waste Drains since the drains were not plugged.

Analysis of Event

No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event.

Even though the vent line break resulted in a manual reactor scram, Operations personnel were already performing a fast power reduction to minimize the effect. In addition, all automatic isolations and initiations functioned as designed.

It was estimated that approximately 20 gallons of condensate water was released to the Normal Waste Drains. A liquid sample was obtained from the condensate ine and this sample is assumed to be a representative of the effluent released. This sample indicated that the actual activity release through the Normal Waste Drain were well below the limits specified in the Tech Specs.

Corrective Action

Following the event, the scram and PCIS Group II/III isolation logics were reset. Affected systems were restored to appropriate conditions as necessary. In addition, the actual activity released through the Normal Waste Drains was verified to be well below the limits specified in the Tech Specs. Subsequently, the failed one inch weld and other unrelated components were repaired.

Both trains are now placed inservice at the same time to reduce system vibration. The 6" manual globe valves directly downstream of the pressure control valves are now manually throttled to control the inlet pressure of condensate cooling water to the Off Gas Recombiner Condenser.

An evaluation is being performed on similar drain and vent line configurations in this high vibration area on both units.

APPROVED DME NO. 3180-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THE INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 1800 HRS. FORWAR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORD AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT SPANICH PLSSO, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATION'S COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20656, AND T

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT Iff more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3664 (cl. 11)

The concern of unplugged Normal Waste Orains was a previously identified issue. An evaluation is being performed which will include the effect on normal operations and the consequences of area flooding. Corrective actions will be implemented as necessary pending the results of the evaluation.

Previous Similar Events

One previous similar LER (3-90-008) has been identified which involved equipment failure due to vibrations and resulted in a manual scram to shutdown.

The corrective actions taken as a result of the previous LER involved the repair of a broken control valve linkage, a change to the system operating procedure which reduced component vibrations, and to review the system design.

Since these corrective actions did not inspect or evaluate the effects of long term vibration on the system, it is not expected that these corrections could have prevented this event. Implementation of the corrective actions addressed above should prevent future recurrences.

18" TRAIN

4" PRESSURE

CONTROL VALVE

CV-83868

5" MANUAL

GLOBE VALVE

5-263808

5" MANUAL

DATE VALVE

5-263758

5-26368

30" CONDENSATE LINE