

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **05000275** PAGE (3) **1 OF 02**

TITLE (4) **SAFETY INJECTION**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
07	28	84	84	022	0	08	27	84			05000
<p>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)</p>											

OPERATING MODE (9) 3	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 000	20.406(a)(1)(i)	80.36(e)(1)		80.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	80.36(e)(2)		80.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(i)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)		80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) **DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER** TELEPHONE NUMBER **805 595-7351**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), a Safety Injection and Reactor Trip occurred, due to a coincidence of low-low T_{avg} and high steam flow signals. All required equipment responded automatically. An Unusual Event was declared by the Shift Foreman, and emergency notifications were made. Upon recognition of the spurious nature of this actuation, the systems were reset and realigned to ready status.

The causes of this event are as follows: the high steam flow bistables were tripped to perform a surveillance test using Procedure I-12B1, "Removal of Steam Generator Flow and Pressure Channels from Service". Subsequent water addition to the steam generators caused the average temperature of the Reactor Coolant System to drop below 543° F (Low-Low T_{avg}).

To prevent recurrence, a plant abnormal status board has been installed in the control room to provide a ready reference of evolutions that could affect plant operations.

2035d/0021K

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500027584	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		84	022	010	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 0709 PDT on July 28, 1984, with the Unit in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), a Safety Injection (SI) (BQ) and Reactor Trip (RT) (JC) occurred, due to a coincidence of low-low T_{avg} and high steam flow signals. All required equipment responded automatically. An Unusual Event was declared by the Shift Foreman, and emergency notifications were made. Upon recognition of the spurious nature of this actuation, the systems were reset and realigned to ready status.

The causes of this event are as follows: the high steam flow bistables (FFA) (JC) were tripped to perform a surveillance test using Procedure I-12B1, "Removal of Steam Generator Flow and Pressure Channels from Service." After notification that the high steam flow bistables were tripped, steam generator filling continued, causing the average temperature of the Reactor Coolant System (AB) to drop below 543° F. This resulted in a Low-Low T_{avg} condition which, in coincidence with the high steam flow signal, produced the SI and RT. Operations personnel did not sufficiently consider the effect of a low Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} signal, on the Safety Injection Actuation (JC) coincidence logic.

To prevent recurrence, a plant abnormal status board has been installed in the control room to provide a ready reference of evolutions in progress that could affect plant operations. In addition, the I&C Maintenance Manager has reissued instructions to all I&C technicians requiring that the control room operator be notified immediately before tripping bistables in safety-related systems. This notification is in addition to the regular notification required by procedure.

This event had no safety consequences and in no way affected the health and safety of the public. Had the event occurred at power, this would have been a previously analyzed Condition II event with no effect on the health and safety of the public.

2035d/0021K

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

August 27, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-292

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 84-022-00
Safety Injection Actuation

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning an actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (Safety Injection).

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin
Service List

IE22
/1