NRC Form 366
(9/83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SYSTEM INADVERTENT ACTUATION

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 7	2 3	8 4	8 4	0 4 0	0 0	0 8	2 2	8 4		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
	AREA CODE	
J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER	7 1 4	4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)			

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 23, 1984, at 1335 with Unit 2 in Mode 4, while removing the Plant Protection System (PPS) signal simulators, a Main Steam Isolation System (MSIS) was inadvertently actuated. The technician immediately placed the actuating channel of the PPS in bypass which removed the MSIS actuation signal.

This inadvertent actuation was due to technician error and weakness with procedural precautions. As corrective actions, Procedure S023-II-1.6 has been amended to include precautions ensuring verification that no trips exist after removal of each simulator. The procedure will be further enhanced to include explicit instructions for performing the intended activities. Additionally, the I&C procedure program has been surveyed to assure there are no similar plant evolutions and procedures with related weaknesses. All Operating Procedures initiating the installation of signal simulations and their subsequent removal will be reviewed and modified as required.

Since this procedure is implemented during Mode 3 through 6 only, there is no reasonable or credible alternative condition under which this event would have been more severe.

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NRC Form 366
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NRC Form 366A
(9/83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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FACILITY NAME(1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1	8 4	0 4 0	0 0	0 2 OF 0 2	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On July 23, 1984, at 1335 with Unit 2 in Mode 4, the Plant Protection System (PPS) (EIIS System Code JC) signal simulators (EIIS Component Code XT), were in use to provide stable signals to the PPS to avoid spurious actuation due to varying plant conditions in Mode 3 through 6 operations. A technician removing the simulator from Bay C of the PPS cabinets failed to note that Bistables 11 and 12 (Low Steam Generator Pressure 1 and 2) had tripped due to plant conditions. Upon removal of the simulator from Bay D, Bistable 11 sensing the same plant conditions, tripped. This satisfied the 2 of 4 channels required to initiate a Main Steam Isolation System (MSIS) (EIIS System Code JE) actuation. Immediately the technician placed Bay D, Bistable 11 in bypass which removed the MSIS actuation signal.

This inadvertent actuation was due to technician error and weakness in procedural precautions. The technician erred in that he should have recognized the existing trips or at least verified that there were no trips existing with the control operator, prior to removing the second simulator. The weakness in procedural precautions is in the failure to identify the necessity of ensuring that all trips are cleared prior to initiating removal of any simulator.

As corrective actions, Procedure SO23-II-1.6, "Abnormal System Operation Requiring the Prevention of Trip Signals to the Plant Protection System," has been amended to include precautions ensuring verification that no trips exist after removal of each simulator. The procedure will be further enhanced to include explicit instructions for performing the intended activities. Additionally, the I&C procedure program has been surveyed to assure there are no similar plant evolutions and procedures with related weaknesses. All Operating Procedures initiating the installation of signal simulations and their subsequent removal will be reviewed and modified as required.

Since this procedure is implemented during Modes 3 through 6 only, there is no reasonable or credible alternative condition under which this event would have been more severe.

Southern California Edison Company

J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

August 22, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
    30-Day Report
    Licensee Event Report No. 84-040
    San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required
30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving a Main
Steam Isolation System actuation. Neither the health and safety of plant
personnel nor the public were affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

JGHaynes/sem

Enclosure: LER No. 84-040

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
    J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

    J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)

    Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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