AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 77 BEALE STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94106 TELEPHONE (415) 781-4211 PGWE JUL 26 A10:30 July 17, 1984 PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-262 Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attn: Mr. R. J. Pate, Chief Operator Licensing Section Re: Docket No. 50-323 / 00 Diablo Canyon Unit 2 License Examination Waiver Request Dear Mr. Martin: In accordance with 10 CFR 55.24, Operators' Licenses, PGandE requests that examination and test requirements for all presently licensed personnel (OL and SOL) for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 be waived for Unit 2, and combined operator licenses for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 be issued. PGandE believes the waiver to be justified for the following reasons: Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 are essentially identical units, both in 1. design and operation. The major physical differences are in reactor internals and control rod 2. patterns. Many of the shared systems between units (few of which are vital systems), have already been operating to support Unit 1 operations. Most of the shared systems are operated from the Unit 1 control room or Unit 1 side of the plant. Classroom training on the differences is scheduled to be completed on August 10, 1984. The training course is outlined in Enclosure 1. A comprehensive test will be administered to all license holders upon completion of their training. Since the differences are minimal, many Unit 1 NRC license examinations have been held using the Unit 2 side of the control room. The control rooms are essentially identical, and are NOT mirror image (i.e. the location of controls is in the same position from left to right). With the completion of the detailed Control Room Design Review (CRDR), dissimilarities will be reduced further. 8408300482 840717 PDR ADDCK 05000323

Mr. J. B. Martin PGandE Letter No. DCL-84-262 July 17, 1984 Page Two

- 8. Licensed personnel have received operational training and experience during the startup testing of Unit 1, including natural circulation operation and simulated loss of off-site power. This training and experience is directly applicable to the safe operation of Unit 2.
- 9. All licensed personnel have had experience in operation of Unit 1 during pre-operational testing, hot functional testing, fuel loading, startup testing, and low power testing. In addition, licensed management personnel have been involved in procedure writing and testing, have successfully undergone requalification training, and have supported the operation of the plant both on and off shift.
- All licensed personnel have successfully completed requalification for the 1983 annual cycle.
- 11. The success in licensing operators at Diablo Canyon has indicated a high degree of competency and efficiency in the training programs.

I certify that the personnel listed in Enclosure 2 have competently and safely discharged their duties and responsibilities in accordance with their licenses, and they are capable of continuing to do so in the future.

License applications for the 60 licensed individuals will be submitted by July 20, 1984.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Ву

Subscribed to in San Francisco, California this 17th day of July, 1984.

Respectfully submitted,

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

J. O. Schuyler Vice President Nuclear Power Generation

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of July, 1984

Robert Ohlbach
Philip A. Crane, Jr.
Richard F. Locke
Attorneys for Pacific
Gas and Electric Company

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Philip A. Crane, Jr.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

C. T. Neal-Madison, Notary Public in and for the City and County of San Francisco, State of California

My commission expires December 27, 1985.

Enclosures

Ву

cc: G. W. Knighton Service List C. T. NEAL MADISON

NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA

CITY AND COUNTY OF

SAN FRANCISCO

My Commission Expires Dec. 27, 1985

SEAL

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-262

ENCLOSURE 1

UNIT DIFFERENCES TRAINING PROGRAM

Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 are essentially identical units, both in design and operation. The major physical differences are in reactor internals and control rod patterns. Many of the non-vital systems are shared between the units and have been operating for many years to support Unit 1 operations.

The information in this enclosure was prepared to familiarize the licensed operators with the differences between and the shared systems of Units 1 and 2. To enhance the presentation of this material, the contents are divided into four categories:

- PLANT DESIGN This section discusses major design differences between each unit.
- CROSS-CONNECTED or SHARED SYSTEMS This section discusses the systems that are cross-connected or shared and any operational concerns related to this configuration.
- 3. CONTROL ROOM This section identifies annunciator and switch differences.
- TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS This section identifies differences between Units 1 and 2.

For completeness in coverage of the material contained in this enclosure, there is duplication of material from one section to the next.

Item No.

- 1. Generator H₂ Cooling
- 2. Reactor Vessel Internals
- 3. Containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protection
- 4. Rod Control System
- 5. Core Thermocouples

Item 1: Generator H, Cooling

Reference

DCPP FSAR Chapter 10

Description


Unit 2 main generator has a horizontally-mounted H, heat exchanger vice the vertically-mounted heat exchanger as installed on Unit 1. (Drawing attached)

C. Reason

Since Unit 2 has a higher thermal power rating, (1170 MWe vice 1086 MWe for Unit 1), a higher electrical output is allowed and to support this, increased cooling was designed in.

D. Operational Considerations

Generator Capability Curve will be less limiting on Unit 2. Otherwise there will be no operational difference.



- 1. FRAME
- 2. FRAME COVER
- 3. AYDROGEN COOCERS
- 4. STATOR CORE
- 5. STATOR WINDING
- 6. BLOWER SHROUD SUPPORT ASSEMBLY


- 7. BLOWER
- 8. GLAND SEAL, BEARING & BRACKET T.E.
- 10. SHAFT
- 11. ROTOR WINDING
- 14. VIBRO METER PICKUP

DCPP FOR INFORMATION ONLY

FIGURE J - 4 - 38



TURBINE END



ITEM 2: Reactor Vessel Internals

A. Reference

- 1. DCPP Equipment Description
- 2. DCPP FSAR Chapter 4

B. Description (Drawings Attached)

- Unit 2 equipped with "neutron pads" at peak neutron flux areas vice the full "thermal shield" on Unit 1.
- Unit 2 has no diffuser plate installed in lower internals (Unit 1 does).
- Unit 2 upper support plate is flat. Unit l's is of a top-hat configuration.
- 4. Difference in rod pattern and fuel grid.

C. Reason

- 1. Unit 2 allows greater coolant flow, thus higher Rated Thermal Power.
- 2. Unit 2 internals less expensive to fabricate.

D. Operational Considerations

Soak times on natural circulation cooldowns w/o CRDM fans will be more restrictive for unit 2 due to increased mass of water in plenum. It would also require a larger inventory of water in pressurizer to collapse a void in the plenum area.

3

DCPP FOR ONLY

DIABLO CANYON SITE


FIGURE 4.2-6A

UNIT 1/UNIT 2 SIGNI I CANT DIFFERENCES

1. Unit 2 has nuetron shield panels vice wrapped around thermal shield.

2. Unit 2 does not have a diffuser plate.

3. Core support on Unit 2 is flat not hemispherical.




UNIT 2 DIABLO CANYON SITE

FIGURE 4.2-6B

CORE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY

(UNIT 2)

DCPP FOR INFORMATION ONLY CONTROL ACO DRIVE MECHANISM INSTRUMENTATION PORT THERMAL SLEEVE CLOSUPE HEAD LIFTING LUG CONTROL ROC SHROUD TUBE INTERNALS SUPPORT LEDGE DEEP BEAN CATTICE HOLD-COMY SPRING WIFER SUPPORT COLLING COOLANT HOZZILE QUIDE TUBE ASSEMBLY UPPER CORE PLATE BAFFLE RACIAL SUPPORT (FORMER) PUEL ASSEMBLY THERMAL SHIELD REACTOR YESSEL INSTRUMENTATION THINGLE LOWER COME PLATE SIFFICER PLATE BOTTON COME SUPPORT FORGING HUITNETKS SCIUS SUBNINF SECONDARY CORE SUPPORT



Item 3: Containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protection

A. Reference

1. (PGandE Engineering Group)

B. Description

All electrical circuits which penetrate containment are equipped with a redundant circuit breaker (in series). Fuses are used instead of circuit breakers for low voltage control circuit applications. PGandE committed to install this additional protection on Unit 2 by fuel load; on Unit 1 during first refueling outage.

C. Reason

To prevent overcurrent and subsequent melting of an electrical cable penetrating the containment, which would result in a breach of containment.

D. Operational Considerations

Normal practices. Operator must be aware of the added breakers and fuses (additional isolation points).

Item 4: Rod Control System

A. Reference

- 1. DCPP Equipment Description
- 2. DCPP Main Control Board

B. Description

- Unit 1 Control Bank A comprised of 8 CRDM's Unit 2 Control Bank A comprised of 4 CRDM's
- Unit 1 Control Bank B comprised of 4 CRDM's Unit 2 Control Bank B comprised of 8 CRDM's

C. Reason

Unit 2 is designed for the plutonium recycle core and unit 1 is not.

D. Operational Considerations

Difference between units for Control Bank A and Control Bank B rod worths. This will be of minimal concern because these banks are always withdrawn for operation.

Item 5: Core Thermocouples

A. Reference

DCPP P&ID 102035 (Unit 1 & 2)


- B. Description:
 - 1) The cores are indexed the same but the loops are mirror images, thus the thermocouples quadrants do not match the same loops on each unit.
 - 2) Unit 1 has 4 of the 65 incore thermocouples terminated in the upper head area, 2 of which are used as an input to the subcooling margin monitor.


C. Reason

Westinghouse requested that 4 thermocouples be terminated in the plenum on Unit 1 to provide monitoring of plenum temperatures during natural circulation testing. This provision was not performed on Unit 2 since it will not be required to duplicate the natural circulation tests performed on Unit 1.

D. Operational Considerations

- With no temperature monitoring of the plenum on Unit 2, soak times on natural circulation will have to be strictly adhered to.
- The subcooling margin monitor on either unit, always reflects the lowest subcooling based on the hottest temperature, since Unit 1 has an input from the plenum area, natural circulation on unit 1 may indicate a lower than expected subcooling if CRDM fans are not running.





Item No.

Electrical

- 12KV Startup Buses
- 230KV Offsite Power Supply
- 2. Auxiliary Steam
- 3. Main Steam (at Gland Steam Reducer)
- Condenser Vacuum Pump
- Primary Water Storage Tanks 5.
- Condensate Storage Tanks
- 7. Auxiliary Salt Water
- Service Cooling Water 8.
- Component Cooling Water
- 10. Screen Wash System
- 11. Fire Protection
- 12. Boron Recycle
- 13. Liquid Radwaste
- 14. Gaseous Radwaste
- 15. Diesel Generator 1-3
- 16. Compressed Air
- 17. Oily Water Separator and Turbine Building Sump System

Item 1: Electrical Distribution System

I. 12KV Startup Buses

- A. Reference
 - 1. DCPP Equipment Description
- B. Description

12KV Startup Buses can be cross-connected to supply both units from one 12KV Startup Transformer.

C. Reason

System flexibility, e.g. loss of Unit 1 Startup Transformer 1-1

D. Operational Considerations

Overload of on-line Startup Transformer when starting multiple RCP's or Circulating Water Pumps simultaneously while operating with Startup Busca cross-tied on one transformer. Transformer rating: 75 MVA w/pumps and fans; 45 MVA w/o pumps and fans.

If in this lineup the loading of the bus will be monitored closely to alleviate overloading. This lineup is undersirable and will not normally be done.

II. 230KV Offsite Power Supply

- A. Reference
 - FSAR Chap. 8
- B. Description

Unit 1/2 Startup Transformers are fed from the 230 KV switchyard through a common circuit breaker (OCB 212)

C. Reason

A single line is acceptable to provide the power requirements for startup of the units and the added back up reliability for loss of axuliary power during operation.

Operational Considerations D.

Loss of OCB 212 impacts OPERABILITY of offsite power supplies for both units. If available, however, the bypass around OCB 212 may be closed to provide 230 KV power to the plant. Both units would enter an ACTION statement for loss of an off-site power source and follow the appropriate time constraints until such time that the bypass was closed or OCB 212 was declared operable.

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT UNIT NO(S)

NUMBER 0P J-5:I REVISION 3 DATE 09/19/83 PAGE 4 0F 9

TITLE: 12 KV SYSTEM - MAKE AVAILABLE AND ENERGIZE


12. Check fuses installed close the startup bank grounding transformer.

"Grounding Trans Fuse Disc. "Grounding Trans Fuse Disc. Sw. for Startup Trans. 1-1". for Startup Trans. 2-1".

- 13. Check 12 & 4 KV busses being supplied by auxiliary power on both units. If busses need to be transferred to auxiliary, refer to OP J-5:II.
- Start all diesel generators. Check normal speed and voltage. Return each diesel mode switch to AUTO.
- 15. Notify system dispatcher and Morro Bay switching center of intent to open and close PCB-212.
- 16. Station an operator in the 230 KV yard control building and at the 230 KV air switch to be closed; 211-1 for SUT 1-1 or 211-2 for SUT 2-1. Establish conference communication with the control room.
- 17. At the 230 KV switchyard, place the manual-auto transfer switch 243-1 for PCB-212 in MANUAL. Cut in the sync-scope and open PCB-212. Check open in yard.
- 18. The 230 KV yard operator will inform the operator at the air switch that PCB-212 is OPEN and that he may close the air switch for the transformer to be made available. (211-1 for SUT 1-1 or 211-2 for SUT 2-1)
- 19. The operator at the air switch will close and verify that all three phases of the air switch are closed. Inform the operator in the control room and in the 230KV yard that the air switch is closed.
- In the 230 KV yard, check sync and close PCB-212 to energize the startup transformers. Return the manual-auto transfer switch 243-1 for PCB-212 to AUTO.

NOTE: To make available and energize the 12KV Startup Busses, refer to \overline{J} -5:I parts B and C. If both startup busses are energized from one transformer and it is desired to get back normal, proceed with the following steps:

- Rack in the previously cleared startup bus feeder 52-YU-12 or 52-VU-24.
- b. Check sync and close the normal startup bus feeder 52-VU-12 or 52-VU-24, then open the 12 KV startup bus crosstie breaker 52-VU-11. It is not desirable to have the 12 KV startup busses and transformers crosstied for any appreciable length of time.
- 21. Notify Morro Bay switching center that switching is completed, PCB-212 is closed, 52VU-20 and associated circuits are energized.



Item 2: Auxiliary Steam

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 102006, 108006

B. Description

Auxiliary Steam Package Boilers 0-1 and 0-2 located on Unit 1 side. Boilers supply either Unit. Each Unit has its own reducer. Only one reboiler/drain receiver.

Manual pipe break isolation actuation on either Unit provides isolation on both Units.


C. Reason

System flexibility, e.g. during S/U.

The Pipe Break Isolation feature precludes having to qualify certain Class I components for harsh environmental conditions; also prevents "overloading" the ventilation system.

D. Operational Considerations

If there is a pipe break, going to CLOSE on either unit's PCV-69 control switch which will isolate both units' PCV-69's. This will isolate Main Steam to Auxiliary Steam on both units, hence causing a turbine trip on both units due to a loss of sealing steam to both units. Also, both units can be supplied with startup steam from the package boilers.



Item 3: Main Steam (At Gland Steam Reducer)

Reference

DCPP P&ID 102004, 108004

B. Description

Gland Steam Reducer for either Unit can be supplied by Main Steam from either Unit or by the Auxiliary Boiler System.


Reason C.

Provide sealing steam for drawing vacuum on a Main Turbine and Main Feedpumps even with Main Steam isolated on that Unit.

D. Operational Considerations

Main Steam from one unit should not be cut-in to the other unit's seal package unless operators of both units are aware. Due to: 1) reactivity and power effects on the unit supplying the main steam, 2) the possibility of loss of sealing steam on one unit due to Main Steam Isolation Valve closure on the other unit, and 3) loss of steam/water inventory from the supplying unit when cross-tied.

Once a unit is on line, its seals maybe supplied by its own Main Steam System.



Item 4: Condenser Vacuum Pump

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 108002, 108015

B. Description

Can be lined up to pull vacuum on either main condensers. The vacuum pump is located on Unit 1 side and may receive its sealing water from either units Service Cooling Water System.


C. Reason

One vacuum pump is sufficient for both units' needs.

D. Operational Considerations

Can usually pull approximately 24 in. Hg. vacuum using the vacuum pump. Opening the cross-connect on a non-operating unit may result in a reduction in vacuum of the operating unit.

The vacuum pump cannot be operated unless Unit 1 SCW is operating or SCW is cross-connected and the Unit 1 header is being supplied from Unit 2 SCW.



Item 5: Primary Water Storage Tanks

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 102016

B. Description

Tank and transfer pumps on either Unit can be aligned to supply the other Unit.

C. Reason

System flexibility.

D. Operational Considerations


Although there are no Tech. Specs. on Primary Water Storage Tank level, the combined levels should be enough to allow cooldown of both units.

Once Unit 1 is operating, if there is tritium in the Unit 1 tank, the tanks should not be cross-connected until Unit 2 has built up to the same radioactivity level through operation of Unit 2 at power.

Following any cross-connected operations, C&RP should be notified of the likelihood of a change in activity level.

Also, if the tanks are cross-connected then an auto-start on the unit without both pumps will not start the other units' pump that is selected to AUTO. This may runout the other (running) pump.

This system will be connected only if opposite pumps or a tank is inoperable. In this line up special consideration should be given to pump runout. Pumps are 200 gpm/pump.



Item 6: Condensate Storage Tanks

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 107031, 102016

B. Description

Water can be transferred between Units 1 & 2 Condensate Storage Tanks and the Fire Water Storage Tank as desired using the shared Make-Up Water Transfer Pumps 0-1 and 0-2, or gravity flow.


C. Reason


System flexibility.

D. Operational Considerations

Condensate Storage Tank level (178,000 gal.) and Fire Water Tank (270,000 gal.) minimum levels are addressed in Tech. Specs. Use caution when transferring between tanks. Be aware of chemistry conditions when transferring between tanks.

Level should not be allowed to go below approx. 50% in the CST to prevent air in leakage into the hotwell if the makeup valve is opened (LS-463 should prevent this) or to prevent condensate reject water from getting oxygenated and the water cover from getting damaged.





Item 7: Auxiliary Salt Water

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 102017

B. Description

ASW Pump Discharge Headers can be cross-connected between Units using FCV-601.


C. Reason

System flexibility. Assurance of long-term cooling.

D. Operational Considerations

Operability of the ASW system is addressed in Tech. Specs. Operating with only 1 set of pumps to supply both units places both units in an ACTION statement.

The use of the cross-tie is specified in the Abnormal Procedure on loss of ASW to one unit. It is a viable source of ASW (on a temporary basis) that is available from the Control Room.



Items 8: Service Cooling Water

A. Reference

DCPP P&ID 102015, 108015

B. Description


SCW can be cross-connected and supplied by the other units SCW header, however this should not normally be done especially with SCW pumps operating in both units due to a transfer of water which would occur from the higher head pump.

C. Reason

Provide cooling for operation of the shared air conditioning systems, vacuum pump, and/or compressed air systems with the SCW system of one Unit inoperable.

D. Operational Considerations

When supplying the shared loads of SCW, ensure that the SCW supply and return flowpaths are both aligned to the same Unit to prevent overfilling the SCW head tank. Also, unnecessary continuous heat loads, such as air conditioning units for personnel comfort, should be minimized when only one unit is supplying both SCW headers.



Item 9: Component Cooling Water

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 102014

B. Description


The CCW system can be used to supply misc. equipment. Waste gas compressor 0-1 seal water can be supplied with CCW from either Unit. Waste Concentrator package can be supplied with CCW from either Unit. Aux. Steam Drain Receiver can be supplied with CCW from either unit. Through a cross-tie, CCW from one unit can be aligned to supply the opposite unit's B.A. Evaporator, through a cross-tie. This cross-tie can be used for either unit.


C. Reason


System flexibility.

D. Operational Considerations

Ensure that supply and return are both aligned to the same Unit to prevent a change in unit inventory.







Item 10: Screen Wash System

Reference

DCPP P&ID 102017

B. Description


System is shared by both Units. Any of the 3 pumps can supply both units. Two pumps are required for 2 unit operation.

C. Reason

System flexibility

D. Operational Considerations

- Must have ASW bays unisolated to provide suction to SW Pumps (2 on Unit 1, 1 on Unit 2) (Maintenance on Unit 1 requiring de-watering of the ASW bay will isolate suction of 2 pumps).
- Common pressure switch between units' spray header (PS-166) is used to 2. control screen drive motion on both units.
- Can cross-tie ASW to Circ Water via demusseling for suction to ASW and 3. SW pumps.



Item 11: Fire Protection

- A. Reference
 - 1. DCPP P&ID 102018 2. EP M-4
- B. Description


Both the water and CO2 systems are shared by both Units.


C. Reason


One water and ${\rm CO}_2$ system can handle the needs of both units.


D. Operational Considerations

Raw water reservoir provides a redundant water source for fire protection.









Item 12: Boron Recycle

A. Reference

DCPP P&ID 102008

B. Description

Each unit has two 80,000 gallon Liquid Hold Up Tanks (LHUT's), with a shared LHUT 0-1, making a total of 5 LHUT's. Additionally, the following components of the boron recycle system are shared: 1) Concentrates Holding Tank 0-1 shared, including supporting Concentrates Holding Tank Transfer Pumps 0-1 and 0-2 and 2) the Boric Acid Batching Tank is shared between Unit 1 and 2.

C. Reason


System flexibility.


D. Operational Considerations

- LHUT 0-1 can only be valved into one unit's N₂ supply due to a mechanical interlock on the inlet valves.
- Batching Tank and Concentrates Tank are used to supplement both units on an infrequent basis. Manual valving is used throughout.

PERSONE PK. 4A .IP. . A DALWING LIST 050052 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THE PRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA CHEMICAL & YOUUNE CONTROL SYSTEM DIABLO CANYON PIPING SCHEMATIC GAS STREMER C BURICACO EMP PROKACE WESTE COOK RECIRC PP PETD PAPE ENAP RED BASIC DIAGRAM ONLY CHIC 48 METERINES WAS THE BE SELVE BIAS CCW HOUSE + 50 GEAR OIL SYSTEM (315-8) SEAL WATER DEMINERALIZER 100' × 500011 0 DR MCJR MINED BED TABLE OF CHANGES Series Paris ELEC ENGR CONTAINMENT BUSIDE | OUTSIDE REVINED MR F. TUNGLE ENCESS COLUMN CO SPIN LCUPA 3 463787 MILER SMILSAS DEN WIN S RAM INDEXED REY.

DCPP FOR





Item 13: Liquid Radwaste

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 102008, 102019

B. Description


The closed and open drain systems are common to both Units. All radwaste requiring treatment is processed through a single waste concentrator.

C. Reason

Design is adequate for both units.

D. Operational Considerations

Common Aux Bldg for both units. Capacity of shared tanks is designed to accommodate both units. All equipment and controls located outside of Control Room and operated from the Unit 1 side of auxiliary building



S ... Mr. S.

ARTIAL ISSUE .

Item 14: Gaseous Radwaste

A. Reference

(

1. DCPP P&IDs 102014, 102024

B. Description

- 1. Waste Gas Compressor 0-1 shared.
- Can cross-tie between Decay Tank 1-3 and 2-3 inlets to allow gas decay tanks 1-3 and 2-3 to be cross-tied.

C. Reason


Flexibility

.D. Operational Considerations

- 1. WCC 0-1 considerations
 - a. WGC 0-1 may be shutdown by either Unit 1/Unit 2 gas analyzers on High θ_2 .
 - b. WGC 0-1 may be selected to specific unit or remain in AUTO and STBY is On at 3.0/Off at 2.6 psig on whichever unit reaches high pressure setpoint first. WGC 0-1,1 if selected to support one unit, will start at 2.0/Off at 1.6 psig on that unit.
- Gas Decay Tank 1-3/2-3 total curie considerations when cross connected.
- 3. If using TK 2-3 for FILL, must open Key-operated valve FCV 417 (cannot be venting or purging TK 1-3 or 2-3).

OP0059 16

02024 STALL VALLETS SEE EGOPINE INT LOCATION GUIDE DIVING NO. 57724 85-K-50009 S.EV. AREA CONC. Houn BER ANALYZER 2-1 TVAR VENT COND STR 8 08 00 DUDIN COMMIT 19 8 19 60001 PARSTE SAB 198E H (日本日日) Courted Las clos AST - I MISCELL ANEOUS EQUIPMENT DERIN TH. O-1 SHAIM) \$54-876 CAS ANALYZER PLEERVOIR HENDER DEPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM CHEET A D MOLD OF TANKE BAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA PIPING SCHEMATIC 54 DIABLO CANYON UNIT- I I GAS SULAY PROCE SING BASIC DIACRAM 11 +1 14 1.8 SEERT | 2 3 4 5 6 T CAS DECAY TANKS TR. FILLING TANKS TANKS AM INCESSED REV. UNIT 2 NEORMATION DCPP FUR COMPRESSON SCALES SHEET 3 17.41.500977 24 Jano # 2 MD/SR&E S. B. W. T. R. MESTAR SEAWAITE MENSTURE SEMPATOR 1-3 Seater GAS COMPRESSOR SUPPLY HEADER VENT TO 45 N S 3977 WASTE GAS MASTE GAS CHE MANY SEK FUMP SAMPLE RETURN ALL'SHEET, SEE SHEET S FOU DETAILIB 1077 COVER & AS FOR DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES SPINATED -SEE SHEET & FOR DETAILS TABLE OF CHANGES STAN OF CHANGES CHANGE NUMBER UNIT 2. BY ENGR. PIPING APPROVED HOLD-UP BANK SYS NOTOOB) necte. SYSTEMS CHIEF 114



Item 15: Diesel Generator 1-3

A. Reference

- 1. DCPP Equipment Description
- 2. DCPP FSAR, Tech. Specs.
- 3. DCPP EOP-4A
- B. Description

Diesel Generator 1-3 shared by both Units.

C. Reason

Cost-savings.

D. Operational Considerations

Operation of the DG in ESF mode on one Unit makes it unavailable for the other Unit, which places this Unit in a ACTION statement if in Modes 1 through 4. EOP-4A, Appendix B, addresses the problem of re-energizing a dead Bus F on one unit, when the diesel is feeding the other unit. Relays must be defeated to re-energize the dead bus.

Regarding Control Switch positions:

- 1. To operate in Ischronous mode, both Unit 1/Unit 2 sw. must be in AUTO.
- Auto starts of EDG 1-3 are only blocked w/both Unit 1/Unit 2 sw. in MANUAL.
- EDG 1-3 will auto-start if one unit in AUTO, one in MANUAL, even if auto-start signal is on unit in MANUAL.
- Proposed c/o switch for auto-starts on a units 4 KV UV signal.
 Prevents lifting leads. C/O would have alarm annunciation.

On a loss of offsite power each unit has a dedicated diesel to its 4160V Bus G and H. The loads on bus G and H are identical for both units and Unit l's loads are listed below.

VITAL BUS	VITAL BUS	
D/G 1-2	D/G 1-1	
MCC 1-G	MCC 1-H	
CC Pp 1-2	SI Pp 1-2	
Recip. Charg. Pp 1-3 RHR Pp 1-1	RHR Pp 1-2	
CFCU 1-3	CFCU 1-4	
CFCU 1-5	CCW Pp 1-3	
CCW Pp 1-2 ASW Pp 1-2	AFW Pp 1-2	
Cont Spray 1-1	Cont Spray Pp 1-2	

The loads on Vital Bus F are identical on both units. Unit 1 Bus F loads are listed below:

VITAL BUS
D/G 1-3
MCC 1-F
CC Pp 1-1
SI Pp 1-1
CFCU 1-2
CFCU 1-1
CCW Pp 1-1
ASW Pp 1-1
AFW Pp 1-3

During a loss offsite power only I unit's vital bus F can be powered. If there is an Safety Injection (S.I.) signal on a unit the diesel generator breaker feeding the other unit will trip open and the diesel will power the (first) unit with the S.I.

Looking at the above lists it can be easily verified that I train of ECCS equipment is available on the unit without the diesel. This is because Vital Bus F on the unit supplies power only to equipment that the SSPS Train A (for that unit) initiates. (Bus G only supplies power to the equipment that SSPS Train B initiates, and Bus H supplies power to parts of both trains.)

A precaution on operation of the diesel when both units have a loss of offsite power and S.I. signals, is that when the unit that had the first S.I. has its S.I. reset, that unit will have its diesel generator breaker trip and the diesel will load onto the other unit. This feature allows us to choose which unit will get the diesel if both units have an S.I.

In addition to being able to have a single train of ECCS for an S.I., the amount of equipment available or on will also allow either unit to cooldown or maintain Hot Standby status without its Bus F.

Item 16: Compressed Air

A. Reference

1. DCPP P&ID 102025

B. Description


Shared system.

C. Reason

More efficient and there is no need for redundant air sytems for this non-vital system.

D. Operational Consideracions

Reset of a compressor that has auto-started can only be done on Unit 1. Master/Individual loader selection can only be done on Unit 1. Excessive usage of air on either unit will affect both units, although service air isolation will take place as pressure goes below 93 psig.



CATEGORY: Control Room

Item No.

1. Annunciator (PK) windows installed on Unit 1 only (not installed on Unit 2)

2. Control Board; items on Unit 1 only

CATEGORY: Control Room

- 1. "RCS OVERPRESSURE" (PK 05)
 Explanation: Not required on Unit 2. This was an interim fix for PTS considerations. The Low Pressure lift setpoint for PORV's has eliminated the need for it. May be deleted from Unit 1 in the future.
- "YARD LOOP FIRE VALVE CLOSED" (PK 09)
 Explanation: System common to both units.
- "R.O. WATER TREATMENT" (PK 09)
 Explanation: System common to both units.
- 4. "SEA WATER DEMIN SYSTEM" (PK 09)
 Explanation: System common to both units; installed on Unit 1 side.
- 5. "CONDENSER VACUUM PUMP" (PK 10)
 Explanation: System common to both units; installed on Unit 1 side.
- 6. "TRANSFER TANK LEVEL" (PK 10)
 Explanation: System common to both units; installed on Unit 1 side.
- 7. "FIRE WATER SYSTEM" (PK 10)
 Explanation: System common to both units. Tank installed on Unit 1 side.
- "FIRE WATER PUMPS" (FK 10)
 Explanation: Pumps installed on Unit 1 side only.
- 9. "AUXILIARY STEAM SYSTEM" (PK 12)
 Explanation: System common to both units.
- 10. "CAUSTIC STG TANK TEMP HI" (PK 13)
 Explanation: System common to both units. Tank installed on Unit 1 side.

- *11. "BREATHABLE AIR COMPR TROUBLE" (PK 13) Explanation: System common to both units. Compressors are located on Unit 2 side.
- 12. "INSTRUMENT AIR" (PK 13) Explanation: System common to both units.
- 13. "AUXILIARY BOILER" (PK 13) Explanation: Package auxiliary boilers installed on Unit 1 side only.
- 14. "AIR DRYER HI PRESS BYPASS" (PK 13) Explanation: Plant air compressors/dryers installed on Unit 1 side only.
- 15. "BAR RACKS SCREENS" (PK 13) Explanation: System common to both units.
- 16. "SEISMIC INSTR SYSTEM" (PK 15) Explanation: System common to both units.
- *17. "SECURITY POWER SYSTEM" (PK 20) Explanation: System common to both units. Security diesel is located on Unit 2 side.

CATEGORY: Control Room

ITEM 2: Control Board; Items on Unit 1 Only

- FCV-601, ASW CROSS-TIE VALVE HANDSWITCH Explanation: ASW pump discharge cross-connect.
- FIRE WATER TANK LEVEL INDICATION Explanation: Tank located on Unit 1 (shared).
- TRANSFER WATER TANK LEVEL INDICATION 3. Explanation: Tank located on Unit 1 (shared)
- AIR COMPRESSOR MASTER UNLOADER CONTROL SWITCH Emplanation: Shared System. Switch on Unit 1 only.
- AIR COMPRESSOR CONTROL SWITCHES Explanation: Control of compressors 0-1 & 0-2 from Unit 1. Control of compressors 0-3 & 0-4 from Unit 2.
- AIR COMPRESSOR STANDBY START SIGNAL RESET Explanation: Can be reset from Unit 1 only.
- AIR HEADER PRESSURE INDICATION 7. Explanation: Shared system. Indication on Unit 1 only.
- 8. COND VAC PMP, CONTROL SWITCH & PUMP AMP METER (VB 3) Explanation: Vacuum pump installed on Unit 1 only.
- M/U WTR XFER PMP 0-1 & 0-2 CONTROL SWITCHES (VB 3) Explanation: Transfer pumps installed on Unit 1 only.
- 10. 12 KV START-UP BUS TIE BREAKER (52 VU 11) TO UNIT 2 (VB 5) Explanation: 12 KV startup buses may be cross-connected. Provides system flexibility in event of failure of one startup transformer. (Breaker is physically located on Unit 1).
- 11. DSL 1-3 K-VOLT & MVAR RECORDER (VB 4) Explanation: DG 1-3 is shared.
- 12. DSL 1-3 MWATT & FREQUENCY RECORDER (VB 4) Explanation: DG 1-3 is shared.

CATEGORY: Technical Specifications

Item No.

- 1. Rated Thermal Power
- 2. Loop Design Flow
- 3. T' (Reference Tavg of RATED THERMAL POWER)
- T" (Reference Tavg at RATED THERMAL POWER)
- 5. Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch
- 6. Rod Bank Insertion Limits
- 7. RCS Tavg Limit

CATEGORY: Technical Specifications

Item No. 1: Rated Thermal Power

A. Reference

- 1. Tech. Spec. Definition 1.26 (page 1-5)
- B. Description

Unit 2 reads, "3411 MWt" vice "3338 MWt"

C. Reason

Different vessel internals design in Unit 2. Provides greater core flow, thus greater thermal power.

- D. Operational Considerations
 - Unit 2 will operate at a higher power level, but the only place that power level is not referenced to a 100% RTP is on the DEH Turbine Control and the Generator Capability Curves. Nuclear instrumentation should not be affected as far as the operator is concerned because heat balances set the instrumentation trips and they will specify the 100% RTP value for the unit which is applicable.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

1.22 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage, except steam generator tube leakage, through a non-isolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.

PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM

1.23 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the sampling, analysis, and formulation determination by which SOLIDIFICATION of radioactive wastes from liquid systems is assured.

PURGE - PURGING

1.24 PURGE or PURGING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

1.25 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater. With one excore detector inoperable, the remaining three detectors shall be used for computing the average.

RATED THERMAL POWER

1.26 RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 3338 MWt.

[34] MWt]

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

1.27 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

1.28 A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE shall be any of those conditions specified in Specifications 5.9.1.12 and 6.9.1.13.

CATEGORY: Technical Specifications

Item No. 2: Loop Design Flow

- A. Reference
 - 1. Tech. Spec. Table 2.2-1 (page 2-4, footnote)
- B. Description Unit 2 reads, "88,500 gpm" vice "87,700 gpm".
- C Reason

 Different vessel internals
- D. Operational Considerations

 Greater Rated Thermal Power for Unit 2

TABLE 2.2-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUES
1. Manual Reactor Trip	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux	Low Setpoint - ≤ 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER	Low Setpoint - ≤ 26% of RATED THERMAL POWER
	High Setpoint - ≤ 109% of RATED THERMAL POWER	High Setpoint - ≤ 110% of RATED THERMAL POWER
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	≤ 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 second	< 5.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant > 2 second
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	≤ 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a time constant ≥ 2 second	≤ 5.5% of RATED THERMALPOWER with a time constant ≥ 2 second
 Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux 	25% of RATED THERMAL POWER	≤ 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	≤ 10 ⁵ counts per second	\leq 1.3 x 10 ⁵ counts per second
7. Overtemperature ΔT	See Note 1	See Note 2
8. Overpower AT	See Note 3	See Note 4
9. Pressurizer PressureLow	≥ 1950 psig	≥ 1940 psig .
10. Pressurizer PressureHigh	≤ 2385 psig	≤ 2395 psig
11. Pressurizer Water LevelHigh	< 92% of instrument span	< 93% of instrument span .
12. Loss of Flow	> 90% of design flow per loop*	> 89% of design flow 9 per loop*

*Design flow is 87,700 gpm per loop.
[88,500 gpm]

Item No. 3: T' (Reference Tavg at RATED THERMAL POWER)

- A. Reference
 - 1. Tech. Spec. Table 2.2-1 (page 2-7)
- B. Description

For valve of T', Unit 2 reads, " < 577.6°F" vice " < 576.6°F"

C. Reason

Unit 2 has higher rated thermal power

D. Operational Considerations

Since Tavg is automatically controlled most of the time, and Tref is set by the turbine impulse pressure when in Manual, the operational differences are essentially non-existant (Unit 1 vs. Unit 2).

2-

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

NOTATION

NOTE 1: Overtemperature $\Delta T \leq \Delta T_0 \left[K_1 - K_2 \left[\frac{1+\tau_1 S}{1+\tau_2 S} \right] (T-T') + K_3 (P-P') - f_1(\Delta I) \right]$

where: ΔT_0 = Indicated ΔT at RATED THERMAL POWER

T = Average temperature, of

T' = < 576.6°F Reference Tavg at RATED THERMAL POWER

P = Pressurizer pressure, psig

P' = 2235 psig (indicated RCS nominal operating pressure)

 $\frac{1+\tau_1 S}{1+\tau_2 S}$ = The function generated by the lead-lag controller for T_{avg} dynamic compensation

 τ_1 & τ_2 = Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for τ_{avg} τ_1 = 30 secs, τ_2 = 4 secs.

s = Laplace transform operator, sec⁻¹.

 $K_1 = 1.174$

K₂ = 0.01358

K₂ = 0.000685

Item No. 4: T" (Reference Tavg at RATED THERMAL POWER)

- A. Reference
 - 1. Tech. Spec. Table 2.2-1 (page 2-9)
- B. Description For value of T", Unit 2 reads, " \leq 577.6°F" vice " \leq 576.6°F"
- C. Reason Unit 2 has a higher rated thermal power

D. Operational Considerations NONE

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

NOTATION (Continued)

Note 3: Overpower
$$\Delta T \leq \Delta T_0 [K_4 - K_5] \left(\frac{\tau}{3} \frac{s}{1 + \tau_3 s}\right) T - K_6 (T - T'') - f_2(\Delta I)]$$

where: $\Delta T_0 = Indicated \Delta T$ at rated power

 $T = Average temperature, °F$
 $T'' = \leq 576.6°F$ Reference T_{avg} at RATED THERMAL POWER

 $K_4 = 1.079$
 $K_5 = 0.0174/°F$ for increasing average temperature, 0 for decreasing average temperature

 $K_6 = 0.00121$ for $T > T''$; $K_6 = 0$ for $T \leq T''$
 $\frac{\tau_3 s}{1 + \tau_3 s} = The function generated by the rate lag controller for T_{avg} dynamic compensation

 $T_3 = T_{avg} = T_{$$

Note 4: The channel's maximum trip point shall not exceed its computed trip point by more than 3 percent.

Item No. 5: Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch

A. Reference

- 1. Tech. Spec. Bases 2.2-1 (page B 2-7)
- B. Description

Unit 2 SF/FF mismatch setting reads, "1.49 x 10⁶ lbs/hr" vice "1.45 x 10⁶ lbs/hr"

C. Reason

Setpoint is based on approx. 40% total flow from 1 S/G at rated full power. Unit 2 has a higher rated full power (both thermal and electrical) thus higher steam flow.

D. Operational Considerations

None. The alarm and bistables are preset.

Steam Generator Water Level

The steam generator water level low-low trip protects the reactor from loss of heat sink in the event of a sustained steam/feedwater flow mismatch resulting from loss of normal feedwater. The specified setpoint provides allowances for starting delays of the auxiliary feedwater system.

Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch and Low Steam Generator Water Level

The steam/feedwater flow mismatch in coincidence with a steam generator low water level trip is not used in the transient and accident analyses but is included in Table 2.2-1 to ensure the functional capability of the specified trip settings and thereby enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System. This trip is redundant to the Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip. The Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch portion of this trip is activated when the steam flow exceeds the feedwater flow by greater than or equal to 1.45 \times 106 lbs/hour. The Steam Generator Low Water level portion of the trip is activated when the water level drops below 25 percent, as indicated by the narrow range instrument. These trip values include sufficient will initiate a reactor trip before the steam generators are dry. Therefore, the required capacity and starting time requirements of the auxiliary feedwater pumps are reduced and the resulting thermal transient on the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators is minimized.

Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump Busses

The Hoderwolt

The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Bus trips provide reactor core protection against DNB as a result of complete loss of forced coolant flow. The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip set point is reached. Time delays are incorporated in the underfrequency and undervoltage trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients. For undervoltage, the delay is set

Item No. 6: Rod Bank Insertion Limits

A. Reference

1. Tech. Spec. LCO 3.1.3.6, Figure 3.1-1 (page 3/4 1-22)

B. Description

Unit 2 has a different ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS vs. THERMAL POWER curve (i.e. at 100% power, Control Bank D RIL is 189 steps for Unit 2 vice 180 steps for Unit 1).

C. Reason

Unit 2 has greater power and therefore a greater power defect. More rod worth must be inserted to meet Shutdown Margin requirements.

D. Operational Considerations

Normal. The operator must be aware of the different curve that applies to Unit 2. The Rod Lo and Lo Lo Insertion Limit alarm setpoints will reflect Unit 2 differences.




FIGURE 3.1-1 ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VEHSUS THERMAL POWER 100 STEP BANK OVERLAP

Item No. . 7: Reactor Coolant Systems Tavg Limit

A. References

- 1. Tech. Spec. LCO 3.2.5, Table 3.2-1 (page 3/4 2-18)
- B. Description

Unit 2 RCS Tavg Limit is " < 582°F" vice " < 581°F"

C. Reason

Unit 2 has a higher rated thermal power and loop design flow. Thus, the Tavg limit is higher.

D. Operational Considerations

- 1. High Tavg annunciation setpoint on Unit 2 will reflect the higher limit.
- Pressurizer level program difference (61.1% vs. 59.8% at 100% power).
 Color band on level meter will reflect this difference.

TABLE 3.2-1

DNB PARAMETERS

PARAMETER

Reactor Coolant System Tavg

Pressurizer Pressure

LIMITS

< 581°F [582°F] > 2220 psia*

^{*}Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp in excess of 5% RATED THERMAL POWER per minute or a THERMAL POWER step in excess of 10% RATED THERMAL POWER.

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-262

ENCLOSURE 2

NAME	LICENSE /	DOCKET #	POSITION *	DATE OF LICENSE
ADAMS	OP 50004	50012	со	11/08/83
AIKEN	SOP 4274-1	7752	SFM	03/29/84
ARELLANO	OP 5944-1	8295	со	03/29/84
BARD	SOP 50001	9538	STA	11/08/83
BARTLETT	SOP 4483	3139	sco	12/17/82
BEARDEN	SOP 4485	7753	sco	01/03/83
BEASLEY	OP 50005	50010	со	11/09/83
ECKER	SOP 50002	9540	STA	11/08/83
OWLES	SOP 4486	7763	sco	12/17/82
RILEY	OP 50010	7754	AO	11/16/83
OLE	SOP 4052-1	1582	SFM	09/16/83
COLLINS	SOP 3963-1	7764	SFM	06/05/83
RAIG	OP 5945-1	8296	sco	03/29/84
CROCKETT	SOP 3956-1	7765	SR PPE (OPS)	06/05/83

NAME	LICENSE #	DOCKET #	POSITION*	DATE OF LICENSE
EWING	SOP 3960-1	3393	SFM	06/05/83
FISHER	SOP 3961-1	4883	SR PPE (OPS)	06/05/83
PRIDLEY	SOP 3964-1	6673	GEN OP FOREMAN	06/05/83
ISCLON	SOP 3955-1	5525	ASST PLT MGR/ TECH SERVICES	06/05/83
COELZER	SOP 50059	9551	STA	03/28/84
RAHAM	SOP 50060	9553	OP TRNG INST	03/28/84
AUETER	SOP 4273-1	7755	sco	03/29/84
ENDRICKSON	SOP 50061	9539	STA	03/28/84
IFIT	SOP 4269-1	8293	sco	03/12/84
ACOBSON	OP 50006	50019	со	11/08/83
AEFER	SOP 3959-1	5524	ASST PLT MGR/ SUPPORT SERVICES	06/05/83
ENSINGER	SOP 3967-1	7751	SFM	06/15/83
LINE	OP 50007	50013	со	11/08/83
OEHLER	OP 4043-1	7756	со	09/16/83
EADER	OP 50008	50016	ACO	11/08/83
MKE	SOP 50003	50018	ACO	11/08/83
EWIS	SOP 50004	5820	OP TRNG INST	11/08/83

NAME	LICENSE #	DOCKET #	POSITION *	DATE OF LICENSE
LIEW	SOP 4418	8301	PPE (OPS)	10/09/82
LUCKETT	SOP 4487	4261	PPE (NUC)	12/12/82
LUGO	OP 5494-1	7757	со	06/05/83
MAGRUDER	SOP 50062	9552	STA	03/28/84
MARTIN	SOP 3962-1	3796	TRAINING MGR	06/05/83
TIKLUSH	SOP 4271-1	8299	SUP OF MAINT	03/29/84
HOLDEN	SOP 39661	7750	OP TRNG SUP	06/15/83
OORE	SOP 50005	50015	со	11/08/83
AVARRO	SOP 4589	7758	sco	07/14/83
EWMAN	OP 5496-1	7759	со	06/15/83
ILMEIER	SOP 4270-1	8294	sco	03/13/84
ORTHNESS	SOP 50006	7522	OP TRNG INST	11/08/83
ATTERSON	SOP 3958-1	7746	ASST PLT MGR/ PLT SUP	06/05/83

NAME	LICENSE #	DOCKET #	POSITION*	DATE OF LICENSE
PAULSON	OP 5947-1	7760	со	03/12/84
PRICE	SOP 3957-1	7749	sco	06/05/83
RAAB	SOP 4045-1	7748	SFM	09/16/83
RHODES	SOP 4265-1	8289	SFM	03/12/84
ROOS	SOP 4484	7747	sco	12/17/82
SARGENT	SOP 4481	7502	OP SR TNG INST	01/03/83
SEXTON	SOP 3965-1	6672	OPERATION MGR	06/15/83
SMITH	OP 5498-1	7761	ACO	06/05/83
STEINKE	SOP 4275-1	7430	OP SR TRNG INST	04/16/84
TARDIFF	OP 50009	50017	ACO	11/08/83
TINLIN	SOP 4267-1	8291	OP SR TRNG INST	03/29/84
TOSTE	SOP 50008	50011	со	11/08/83

NAME	LICENSE #	DOCKET #	POSITION *	DATE OF LICENSE
VOSBURG	SOP 4266-1	8290	SFM	04/16/84
WATERS	SOP 50009	9541	STA	11/08/83
WILLIAMS	OP 4049-1	7762	со	09/16/83
WOMACK	SOP 4276-1	8489	ENGINEERING MGR	03/12/84