

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 OF 0 4 PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) Both Containment Spray Systems Inoperable in Mode 4

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)															
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	7	2	6	8	4	8	4	0	1	9	0	0	0	0	8	2	4	8	4	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.406(e)	90.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)								
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	90.36(e)(1)	90.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)								
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	90.36(e)(2)	90.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)								
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(i)	90.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)									
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	90.73(a)(2)(ii)	90.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)									
20.406(a)(1)(v)	90.73(a)(2)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(x)										

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)  
NAME J. L. Rupp TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 0 9 3 3 9 - 4 3 0 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 26, 1984, a controlled cooldown to Mode 5 was being performed. Integrated Operating Procedure No. 6 requires various Emergency Core Cooling System equipment to be administratively cleared and tagged, at specific Reactor Coolant System temperatures. In anticipation of the Mode changes, the procedure was reviewed and the appropriate tagging requests were made ready. Although the tagging requests were correct, both Containment Spray Pumps were inadvertently cleared and tagged while the Unit was in Mode 4. However, Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.2.1 requires two independent Containment Spray Systems to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. When the error was discovered, the Shift Supervisor immediately authorized the release of the tags and ordered an operability test on the pumps. Both pumps were satisfactorily tested and returned to an operable status. The Containment Spray Systems were inoperable for approximately three hours. The incident was attributed to personnel error; a combination of lack of communication, and insufficient instructions when issuing the tagging request. Since the Containment Spray System serves as an accident mitigating system, its inoperability is reportable in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

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**PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:**

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

**IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:**

Depressurization and Cooling Systems - Both Containment Spray Systems Inoperable

Event Date: 07/26/84

Report Date: 08/24/84

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 84-116

**CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:**

Mode 4 - Rx Power 000 % - Unit Load 0000 MWe

**DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:**

Following a reactor trip/safety injection on July 25, 1984, it was necessary to place the Unit in Mode 5 in order to facilitate a thorough investigation and effect the required repairs. For the circumstances surrounding the reactor trip and safety injection, see LER 84-018-00.

At 0339 hours, July 26, 1984, while performing the controlled cooldown to Mode 5 in accordance with Integrated Operating Procedure 6 (IOP-6), "Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown", both Containment Spray Pumps [BE] were inadvertently cleared and tagged for the Shift Supervisor, while the Unit was still in Mode 4. This action is prohibited by Technical Specifications; i.e., Technical Specification Limiting Condition For Operation 3.6.2.1 requires two (2) independent Containment Spray Systems to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.

At approximately 0530 hours, July 26, 1984, while monitoring the progress of the cooldown, the Shift Supervisor observed that both Containment Spray Pumps were tagged. Realizing that the Unit was in Mode 4, he immediately authorized the release of the tags, and instructed the NCO's to perform an operability test on the pumps. Technical Specification Limiting Condition For Operation 3.0.3 was entered retroactive to the time of occurrence. At 0551 hours, the tags were removed and the 4KV breakers for No. 21 and No. 22 Containment Spray Pumps were made operable. At 0634 hours, both pumps were satisfactorily tested and returned to service, and Technical Specification Limiting Condition For Operation 3.0.3 was terminated.

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**APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:**

IOP-6 requires various Emergency Core Cooling System equipment to be administratively cleared and tagged, at specific Reactor Coolant System [AB] temperatures. When the cooldown commenced, at 2000 hours, July 25, 1984, the Shift Supervisor reviewed the procedure and made the tagging requests ready, in anticipation of the pending mode changes. The tagging requests were turned over to the relieving shift at 2300 hours.

The relieving Shift Supervisor reviewed the tagging requests and the cooldown procedure, and upon entering Mode 4, instructed the Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) at the desk to have the equipment cleared and tagged. At this point, the Shift Supervisor became involved with other requirements of the cooldown procedure. Not differentiating the Technical Specification Mode requirements for the operability of the Containment Spray Pumps, the desk NCO initiated the tagging of the Emergency Core Cooling System pumps. The NCO at the Control Console, who was signing off the steps as he proceeded with the cooldown, apparently had no knowledge of the tagging of the Containment Spray Pumps.

The following personnel errors contributed to the occurrence:

- (1) The Shift Supervisor failed to provide adequate instructions when issuing the tagging requests.
- (2) The desk NCO did not consult the procedure when initiating the tags.
- (3) There was a lack of communication between the two NCO's, in regard to the tagging of the pumps.

**ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:**

The Containment Spray System is designed to provide the following functions:

- (1) Containment cooling and depressurization, following a high energy line break (primary or secondary).
- (2) Addition of Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) for removal of elemental iodine from the containment atmosphere, following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

The Containment Fan Coil Units [BK] provide one-hundred percent (100%) backup for the containment cooling function; however, there is no backup for the NaOH addition function. Because the Unit was in Mode 4 at the time of this occurrence, the possibility of an accident requiring activation of the Containment Spray System was significantly reduced.

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
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ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Since the Containment Spray System serves only as an accident mitigating system, this event involved no immediate threat to the health or safety of the public. However, due to a condition, which alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the event is reportable in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

All personnel involved in the occurrence were counseled concerning their actions. The occurrence was discussed in the Operations Department Newsletter, with the purpose of re-emphasizing the responsibilities of licensed operators when in the process of heatups and cooldowns.

  
General Manager-  
Salem Operations

JLR:tns

SORC Mtg 84-113



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 24, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION  
LICENSE NO. DPR-75  
DOCKET NO. 50-311  
UNIT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-019-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. M. Zupko, Jr.", written in a cursive style.

J. M. Zupko, Jr.  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

JR:k11

CC: Distribution