

August 6, 1984  
(NMP2L 0121)


Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
Division of Project and Resident Programs  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning the sizing of Residual Heat Removal System safety valves. This problem was reported via telecon with S. Collins of your staff on July 6, 1984.

Very truly yours,



C. V. Mangar  
Vice President  
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

JM:ja  
Enclosure  
xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION  
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for a Problem  
Concerning the Sizing of Residual Heat  
Removal System Safety Valves  
(55(e)-84-24)

Description of the Problem

The problem concerns the sizing of safety valves 2RHS\*SV34A,B and 2RHS\*SV62A,B which are located on the steam supply piping to the residual heat removal system heat exchangers.

The safety valves provide overpressure protection for the heat exchangers in the event that the upstream pressure control valves, 2RHS\*PV21A,B, fail in a wide open position. The total relieving capacity of the safety valves is approximately 413,000 lb/h/loop. It was determined that each pressure control valve could pass a maximum of approximately 1,100,000 lb/h/loop in a wide open position. This difference in the capacity of the safety valves and pressure control valves could result in a significant overpressure condition within the heat exchanger and connecting piping, valves and instrumentation. This overpressure condition could result in the heat exchanger/Residual Heat Removal System not performing its design function.

Analysis of Safety Implications

This problem could have resulted in the loss of the A and/or B loop of the Residual Heat Removal System. Therefore, if the problem was to have remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

The pressure control valve internals will be modified so that they will not pass flow in excess of the capacity of the safety valves. This modification involves the replacement of the cage within each pressure control valve and will be completed by December 3, 1984.