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August 9, 1984

BECO Ltr. #84-131

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Docket Number 50-293
License DPR-35

Dear Sir:

The attached update Licensee Event Report 77-030/03X-1, "CRD 34-11," is hereby submitted in accordance with the previous requirements of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 6.9.B.2.b.

If there are any questions on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully submitted,



W. D. Harrington

PH:caw

Enclosure: LER 77-030/03X-1

cc: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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UPDATE REPORT

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE - 9/01/77

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-293

Attachment to LER 77-030/03X-1

On August 6, 1977, while conducting a normal shutdown in preparation for Refuel Outage #3, Control Rod Drive 34-11 remained at Position 48 (full-out) when the reactor was scrammed. The scram signal was generated by placing the mode switch to shutdown at approximately 8 percent reactor power. The remainder of the CRD's achieved full scram insertion and reactor shutdown was accomplished.

An individual rod scram signal was generated from the Reactor Scram Test Panel (C-916) for CRD 34-11 and the control rod inserted to Position 26. Attempts to insert the drive with normal means were unsuccessful and a second individual rod scram was required to obtain full insertion.

The operation of the scram valves (with associated solenoids) and the directional control valves was checked by the Instrument and Control Group. There were no apparent problems observed. A check was made of all documented scrams for CRD 34-11 performed this cycle and there were no indications of abnormal restrictions.

A search of all documents was made and no exact cause of the event was determined. However, the most probable cause must be attributed to the presence of a foreign substance which restricted the normal operation of the CRD.

Control Rod Drive 34-11 (Serial #1318) was replaced during Refueling Outage Number 3, was scrapped, and is no longer on-site. Functional scram and friction testing of the new drive (#7066) was accomplished in accordance with Station procedures.