Wayne H. Jens Vice President Nuclear Operations



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August 15, 1984 EF2-69283 ImB

Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reference: (1) Fermi 2

NRC Docket No. 50-341

- (2) Letter, D. A. Wells to J. G. Keppler, February 10, 1982, EF2-55874
- (3) Letter, D. A. Wells to J. G. Keppler, November 24, 1982, EF2-61203
- Subject: Final Report of 10CFR50.55(e) Item 50 "5/8 Inch Parker-Hannifin Stainless Steel Tees"

This is Detroit Edison's final report of Item 50, "Linear Indications in Parker-Hannifin Stainless Steel Tees." Item 50 was originally reported as a potential deficiency on January 12, 1982, and was documented in Reference (2). That letter (Reference 2) was considered a final report. Subsequently, Reference (3) was initiated as an interim report when the deficiency recurred.

Description of Deficiency

Detroit Edison received fifty 5/8" O.D. 3000 #SW (heat 215F) stainless steel tees. During installation, three of these had cracks open up during welding. Verification was made that all three were from the same heat, HT0215F. Cracking indications were found on a dye penetrant check test of new tees from this heat which were still in the warehouse.

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Parker-Hannifin was notified, action was taken to identify and remove the affected fittings from the plant and the warehouse. At this point, the problem was thought to be corrected.

Subsequently, as reported in Reference (3), other Parker-Hannifin 5/8 inch tee fittings (heats 019F and 043F) were identified as having linear indications.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Defects in 5/8 inch stainless steel tees could result in the failure of the tee. These fittings are primarily used for instrument and control or vent and drain lines. Failure of these components could cause loss of safety component control functions or system integrity.

Corrective Action

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The following corrective actions have been taken to correct this deficiency:

- o All safety related systems that could have utilized these tees were identified. A review of the documentation for these safety related systems was performed and all tees from the affected heat numbers were liquid penetrant tested and accepted or cut out and replaced.
- o Of the fifty tees received from Parker-Hannifin from heat 0215F, twenty-two were installed in the plant, but have since been replaced; twenty-six were identified and segregated before installation in the plant; and two remain unaccounted. Based on a review of documentation, the two unaccounted tees are not installed in safety related systems.
 - A total of fifty tees from heats 019F and 043F were received from Parker-Hannifin. Of these, thirty were installed in the plant but have since been removed; three were identified and segregated before installation; two were installed but have been accepted by liquid penetrant test and fifteen remain unaccounted. Based on a review of documentation, the fifteen unaccounted tees are not installed in safety related systems.

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 In addition, the Heat Cards and the Receiving Inspection Reports were marked "Reject" to prevent acceptance or turnover of safety related systems with tees from the affected heat numbers.

This is Detroit Edison's final report on this item. If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Lewis P. Bregni, (313) 586-5083.

Sincerely,

Trayne. H Jens

cc: Mr. P. M. Byron Mr. R. C. DeYoung Mr. R. C. Knop