

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



The Connecticut Light And Power Company
Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Holyoke Water Power Company
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices · Selden Street, Berlin Connecticut

P. O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270
(203)665-5000

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)
April 30, 1992
MP-92-454

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Licensee Event Report 92-008-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 92-008-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

FOR: Stephen E. Scace
Director, Millstone Station

BY: Raymond J. Palmieri
Millstone Unit 1 Operations Manager

SES/PHB:ljs

Attachment: LER 92-008-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region 1 Administrator
W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 6 1	PAGE (3) OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Nonseismic Mounting of Control Room A/C Compressors

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES											
0	4	0	3	9	2	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	4	0	3	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																		
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.402(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)															
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)															
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366-A)															
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)																	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Philipp H. Baumann, Engineer, Ext. 5211	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 2 0 3 4 4 7 - 1 7 9 1
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	
B	V	I	C	M	P	T	-	6	5	N

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	Y	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 3, 1992, at 1900 hours, with the unit operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, the mounting, bushings for the Control Room Air Conditioning Compressors (F-22 A&B) were determined to be nonseismic, contrary to design requirements.

An Operability and Reportability determination was performed which concluded that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was operable and still capable of performing its intended design safety function for all credible accidents. The operability determination concluded that, following a seismic event, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System would remain capable of providing cooling to the control room by drawing in outside fresh air. Supplemental cooling can also be provided, if necessary in accordance with existing procedures, by utilizing readily available portable air handling units powered from vital electrical outlets located in the control room.

An immediate report was issued on April 3, 1992, at 1910 hours and action was initiated to seismically mount the compressors by installing restraining brackets around the compressor mounting feet. This design ensured that the compressor would remain operable following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), without affecting the normal operation of the unit. The restraining brackets were designed to minimize the stresses on the compressor feet during a SSE.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 30 0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-533), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500033692	LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3) 02 OF 02
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	
		92	008	

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Description of Event

On April 3, 1992, at 1900 hours, with the unit operating in mode 1 at 100% power, the mounting bushings for the Control Room Air Conditioning Compressors (F-22 A&B) were determined to be non-seismic, contrary to design requirements. A deficiency was identified in the original seismic qualification specification. This deficiency affected both trains of safety related Control Room Ventilation. A detailed analysis of the mounting bushings after a field walkdown inspection identified that the existing mounts were in compliance for a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). Immediate action was initiated to restrain the compressors so that they would remain operable following a seismic event. There were no automatic or manually initiated safety responses.

An Operability and Reportability determination was performed which concluded that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was operable and capable of performing its intended design safety function for all credible accidents. The operability determination concluded that, following a seismic event, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System would remain capable of providing cooling to the control room by drawing in outside fresh air. Supplemental cooling can also be provided, if necessary in accordance with existing procedures, by utilizing readily available portable air handling units powered from vital electrical outlets located in the control room.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of this event was an error in the original seismic analysis for the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning Compressors. The analysis, performed by Dynatec for the Trane Company, analyzed the mounts and made an incorrect assumption with regard to the shock mounts. A statement was made that the "shock" mounts were adequate for an SSE. A field walkdown and analysis identified that the mounts in question would not be adequate in the event of an SSE.

III. Analysis of Event

This report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(a), "Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition." There were no safety consequences resulting from this event since the control room air conditioning system would still have been capable of providing cooling to the control room by drawing in outside air and because it is beyond the design basis to combine a seismic event with an event that creates the need to isolate the control room from outside air.

IV. Corrective Action

Seismic mounting restraints were installed on both compressors to ensure that the compressors would remain unaffected by a seismic event.

V. Additional Information

Failed Component: Vibration Isolation Products (originally manufactured by Firestone) Rubber Mount CA-244 for TRANE compressor number HF-240.

Similar LERs: None.

EHS: VI-CMP-T265